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CENTRALISED FUNDING AND THE DIVISION OF
COGNITIVE LABOUR
Abstract. Project selection by funding bodies directly influences
the division of cognitive labour in scientific communities. I present
a novel adaptation of an existing agent-based model of scientific
research, in which a central funding body selects from proposed
projects located on an epistemic landscape. I simulate four differ-
ent selection strategies: selection based on a god’s-eye perspective
of project significance, selection based on past success, selection
based on past funding, and random selection. Results show the size
of the landscape matters: on small landscapes historical informa-
tion leads to slightly better results than random selection, but on
large landscapes random selection greatly outperforms historically-
informed selection.
Word count: 4359
Introduction
National funding bodies support much of contemporary science. The
selection criteria for funding have gained increasing attention within
philosophy of science (Gillies, 2008; O’Malley et al., 2009; Haufe, 2013;
Lee, 2015). Meanwhile, there has been growing interest in model-based
approaches to understanding the social epistemic activities of scientists
(Kitcher, 1990; Strevens, 2003; Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009; Grim,
2009; Zollman, 2010). The current paper builds on previous modelling
tools to explore the effects of centralised selection mechanisms on the
division of cognitive labour and the ability of scientific communities to
efficiently discover significant truths.
Science aims at discovering significant truths, i.e. not just any truths,
but truths that will eventually contribute in a meaningful way to well-
being (Kitcher, 2001). This is the justification for the public support
of science, including basic science (Bush, 1945). Some funding termi-
nology: scientific projects have high impact (ex post) if they result
in significant truths; projects have high merit (ex ante) if they are
predicted to have high impact.
Polanyi (1962) analysed merit as being composed of three compo-
nents: scientific value, plausibility and originality. Polanyi notes an
essential tension between plausibility and originality: the more original
a project, the more difficult it is to evaluate its plausibility. Polanyi ad-
vocates selection by peer review as a conformist position, that sacrifices
the occasional meritorious original project while ensuring all supported
research projects are plausible, to “prevent the adulteration of science
1
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -2-
2 CENTRALISED FUNDING AND THE DIVISION OF COGNITIVE LABOUR
by cranks and dabblers” (p. 8). Gillies (2008, 2014) takes an oppos-
ing position, arguing that the cost of losing (infrequent) highly original
and meritorious research is much greater than the cost of occasion-
ally supporting implausible research that ends up being of low impact.
As an alternative to peer review, Gillies advocates random selection.
The tension between plausibility and originality is clearly relevant to
questions of effective division of cognitive labour, and has direct links
to science policy. This tension, and its complexity, is explored in this
paper.
I will argue that the results of the simulations presented are both sig-
nificant and surprising. The simulations show that, under reasonable
parameter values for at least some fields of science, choosing projects
at random performs significantly better, in terms of accumulated sig-
nificant truths, compared to other funding strategies, including project
selection by peer review. The results support, to an extent, Gillies’
proposal of funding by lottery.
1. Model description
The model explores the influence of different funding mechanisms on
the accumulation of significant truths. It builds on the epistemic land-
scape model developed by Weisberg and Muldoon (2009), extending it
by adding representations of centralised funding selection and dynamic
changes in project merit. The latter is added to reflect a more realistic
picture of scientific merit. For example, Strevens (2003) discusses the
effect of a successful discovery on all further pursuits of the same ques-
tion: they no longer have any merit, as they lose all originality. Several
dynamic processes affecting merit are detailed later in the paper.
The model represents a population of scientists exploring a topic of
scientific interest. They are all funded by the same central funding
body to pursue projects of varying duration, measured in years. Each
project’s significance is allocated in advance by the modeller, from a
“god’s-eye” perspective. When grants end scientists successfully com-
plete their project. Their projects’ results contribute to the collection
of significant truths in the field’s corpus of knowledge. Funding mech-
anisms are compared by their ability to generate this accumulation of
significant truths.
For simplicity, scientists in the model (unrealistically) do not share
their findings nor explore similar projects during research. They only
work on the project for which they were funded and they only share
their results at the end of a grant. The social processes set aside here
have been explored in previous works (Grim, 2009; Zollman, 2010).
Future work may combine the different models towards a unified picture
of the division of cognitive labour.
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Funding is represented as a process of selection. In every time step,
the scientists whose grants have run out are placed in a pool of candi-
dates along with new entrants to the field, and the modelled funding
mechanism selects from this pool of candidates those who will receive
funding and carry out research projects. Modelled funding mechanisms
differ in the way they select individuals, as outlined below.
Actual potential: Actual potential, which can only be known from
a god’s-eye perspective, is the significance of a project’s re-
sults were it successfully completed today. In the absence of
time-dependant merit, actual potential is simply the signifi-
cance of the project’s results. However, in the presence of time-
dependence the significance could change between the initiation
of the project (at the point of funding) and its completion (at
the point of contributing the results to the relevant corpus).
This means that in the presence of time-dependence, actual
potential might diverge from the eventual contribution of the
project.
Estimated potential: Estimated potential is the scientific commu-
nity’s ex ante evaluation (assumed, for simplicity, to be single-
valued) of the merit of a proposed project. This prediction is
taken to rely on the known contributions of past projects which
bear some similarity to the proposed project, and so depends
on the history of research projects in the field. In representing
decisions based on the research community’s prediction, this
selection method is akin to peer-review.
Past funding: Under this mechanism, funding is allocated to those
scientists who already received funding in the past, and only
to them. The model (unrealistically) represents all scientists as
being of equal skill, and so this mechanism cannot be taken to
mean the selection of the most “intrinsically able” scientists.
Rather, this mechanism is included as a “most conservative”
option, not admitting any new researchers to the field beyond
the field’s original investigators.
Lottery: Under a lottery, all candidates have equal chances of being
funded. The lottery option serves both as a natural bench-
mark for other funding methods, and as a representation of the
mechanism proposed by Gillies (2014).
The essence of the model is the comparison of the performance of these
selection mechanisms in generating results of high significance over time
under various conditions.
To represent in the model the time-dependence of merit, the signif-
icance contributions of different project results are allowed to change
over time as a response to scientists’ actions. Three dynamic processes
are included in the model (details in §2.5). Two processes involve a re-
duction of significance following a successful project or breakthrough,
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which reflects the one-off nature of discovery. The third process involves
an increase in significance when a new avenue of research is opened by
a significant discovery. Simulations based on the model show that these
dynamic processes have a significant effect on the relative performance
of different funding strategies.
2. Simulation details
2.1. Simulating the epistemic landscape. To investigate the com-
plex nature of the domain being modelled, the model was turned into a
computer simulation.1 The basic structure of the landscape simulation
follows Weisberg and Muldoon’s, of a two-dimensional configuration
space, charted with two coordinates x and y, with an associated scalar
field represented in a third dimension as height along the z axis. Each
(x, y) coordinate pair specifies a different potential research project;
the closer two projects are on the landscape, the more similar they are.
The scalar value associated to the coordinate represents the significance
of the result obtained on a successful completion of the project, were
it completed today (allowing for time dependence). The limit to two
spatial dimensions of variation between projects is likely to be unreal-
istic (Wilkins, 2008), but a higher-dimensional alternative would make
the model much less tractable.
In each run of the simulation, the landscape is generated anew in the
following process:
(1) Initialise a flat surface of the required dimensions.
(2) Choose a random location on the surface.
(3) Pick random values for relative height, width along x, and width
along y.
(4) Add to the landscape a hill at the location chosen in step 2
by using a bivariate Gaussian distribution with the parameters
picked in step 3.
(5) Repeat steps 2-4 until the specified number of hills is reached.
(6) Scale up linearly the height of the landscape according to the
specified maximum height.
This process generates the “god’s-eye” perspective of the research po-
tential of the domain. Here and later, random variables are used to
fill-in parameters whose existence is essential for the simulation, but
where (1) the specific values they take can vary across a range of valid
model targets, and/or (2) there is no compelling empirical evidence to
choose a particular value. This requires, however, several runs of the
simulation for each configuration, to average out the effects of random
variation.
1Source code for the simulation is available from the author on request.
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2.2. Simulating agents. The agents in the model represent scientists
investigating the epistemic landscape. Each agent represents an inde-
pendent researcher or group, and is characterised by its location on the
landscape, representing the project they are currently pursuing, and
a countdown counter, representing the time remaining until their cur-
rent project is finished. Like Weisberg and Muldoon’s “hill climbers”,
agents are simulated as local maximisers. Agents follow the following
strategy every simulation step:
(1) Reduce countdown by 1.
(2) If countdown is not zero: remain in same location.
(3) If countdown is zero: contribute to the accumulated significance
the significance of the current location, and attempt to move to
the highest local neighbour.
In the simulation, the agents are identical, in the sense that any
agent, when successfully completing a project of a given significance,
will contribute exactly that amount to the accumulated significance
of the field. This simplification ignores natural ability and gained ex-
perience, and stems from a focus on a particular approach to science
funding, which funds projects, rather than funding people. The focus
is informed by the explicit policies of certain funding bodies, like the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), reflected, for example, in the in-
stitution of blind peer review. Thus, the results of the current work
would not extend to the minority of science funding bodies, such as
the Wellcome Trust, that make explicit their preference to fund people
rather than projects.
The local neighbourhood of an agent is defined as the 3 × 3 square
centred on their current position. The attempt to move to the highest
neighbour depends on the selection (funding) mechanism, as discussed
below. The accumulated significance, which is the sum of all individ-
ual contributions to significance, is stored as a global variable of the
simulation and used to compare strategies.
In the beginning of the simulation, a specified number of agents are
seeded in random locations on the landscape, with randomly generated
countdowns selected from a specified range of values. An example of
an initial seeding of agents can be seen in Fig. 1.
In the absence of selection and time-dependence, the course of the
simulation is easy to describe: agents begin in random locations on a
random landscape, and as the simulation progresses the agents finish
projects and climb local hills, until, after an amount of time which de-
pends on the size of the landscape, the number and size of peaks, and
the duration of grants, all agents trace a path to their local maxima
and stay there. Since agents increase their local significance during the
climb, the rate of significance accumulation increases initially, until
all agents reach their local maxima, at which point significance con-
tinues accumulating at a fixed rate indefinitely. This is the dynamic
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Figure 1. Landscape simulation with initial seeding of
agents. Each number on the landscape represents an
agent at its location, with the value of the number rep-
resenting the agent’s countdown. The colours indicate
the height (significance) of each position (project) in the
landscape.
seen in Weisberg and Muldoon’s simulation for a pure community of
“hill climbers”, and its unrealistic nature highlights the importance of
simulating the time-dependence of significance.
2.3. Simulating communal knowledge. In addition to their con-
tribution to significance, agents also contribute to the visibility of the
landscape (Muldoon and Weisberg, 2011). The visibility of a project
represents whether the scientific community, and especially funding
bodies, can estimate the significance contribution of that project. Ini-
tially, the entire landscape is invisible, representing full uncertainty.
Upon initial seeding of agents, each agent contributes vision of their lo-
cal neighbourhood, as defined above, to the total vision. As the agents
move, they add vision of their new local neighbourhood. Visibility is
used in the best visible funding mechanism described below.
The simulation represents visibility in a simplistic manner by assign-
ing binary values: either the community knows what the significance
of a project will be, or it does not. A more realistic representation will
allow partial visibility, with some distance decay effect, such that the
community would still be able to make predictions of significance for
less familiar projects, but these predictions will have a probability of
being wrong, with the probability of error increasing the more unfamil-
iar these projects are. This addition, however, will be computationally
heavy, as it requires maintaining multiple versions of the landscape,
both for the real values and for the estimated values.
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -7-
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2.4. Simulating funding strategies. The aim of the model is to
explore the effects of funding mechanisms on the population and dis-
tribution of investigators. Since the aim is to simulate current fund-
ing practices (albeit in a highly idealised manner), and since current
funding practices operate in passive mode (choosing from proposals
originating from scientists rather than dictating which projects aught
be pursued), the guiding principle of the simulation is that a funding
mechanism is akin to a selection process: at each step of the simula-
tion, the actual population of agents is a subset of the candidate or
potential population, where inclusion in the actual population follows
a certain selection mechanism.
Funding mechanisms are simulated in the following manner:
Every step:
(1) Place all agents with zero countdown in a pool of “old candi-
dates”.
(2) Generate a set of new candidate agents, in a process identical
to the seeding of agents in the beginning of the simulation.
(3) Select from the joint pool of (old candidates + new candidates)
a subset according to the selection mechanism specified by the
funding method.
(4) Only selected agents are placed on the landscape and take part
in the remainder of the simulation, the rest are ignored.
The simulation can represent four different funding mechanisms:
best: selects the candidates which are located at the highest points,
regardless of the visibility of their locations. This simulates a
mechanism which selects the most promising projects from a
god’s eye perspective. This overly optimistic mechanism does
not represent a real funding strategy. Rather, it serves as an
ideal benchmark against which realistic funding mechanisms are
measured.
best visible: filters out candidates which are located at invisible loca-
tions, i.e. candidates who propose to work on projects which are
too different from present or past projects. It then selects the
candidates in the highest locations from the remainder. This
strategy is closer to a realistic representation of selection by peer
review. Note that even this version is epistemically optimistic,
as it assumes the selection panel has successfully gathered all
available information from all the different agents, both past
and present.
lotto: selects candidates at random from the candidate pool, disre-
garding the visibility and height of their locations.
oldboys: represents no selection: old candidates continue, no new can-
didates are generated.
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The key parameters for all funding mechanisms are the size of the
candidate pool and the size of the selection pool. The size of the can-
didate pool, which in turn depends on the size of the new candidate
pool (as the size of the old candidate pool emerges from the simula-
tion), has been chosen in the simulations such that the total candidate
pool is equal in size to the initial number of agents (except oldboys
where there are no new candidates). This means the success probabil-
ity changes between funding rounds, around a mean which is equal to
1/(average countdown). With an average grant duration of five years,
this yields a success rate of 20%, close to the real value in many contem-
porary funding schemes (NIH, 2014). The number of grants awarded
each year is set to equal the number of grants completed each year,
maintaining a fixed size for the population of investigators.
For simplicity, the simulated funding mechanisms do not take into
account the positions of existing agents on the landscape, except indi-
rectly when considering their vision. Future simulations may consider
a selection mechanism which explicitly favours either diversity or ag-
glomeration, though one expects difficulties in operationalisation and
measurement of epistemic diversity.
2.5. Simulating merit dynamics. To make the simulation more re-
alistic, the significance of projects is allowed to change over time in re-
sponse to research activities of the community of investigators. Three
such dynamic processes are included in the simulation:
Winner takes it all: As was made explicit by Strevens (2003), the
utility gain of discovery is a one-off event: the first (recognised)
discovery of X may greatly contribute to the collective utility,
but there is little or no contribution from further discoveries of
X. In the simulation, this is represented by setting the signifi-
cance of a location to zero whenever an agent at that location
has finished their project and made their contribution to ac-
cumulated significance. This effect is triggered whenever any
countdown reaches zero, which makes it quite common, but it
has a very localised effect, only affecting the significance of a
single project.
Reduced novelty: When a researcher makes a significant discovery,
simulated by finishing a project with associated significance
above a certain threshold, the novelty of nearby projects is
reduced, which in the model is simulated by a reduction of
significance in a local area around the discovery.
New avenues: When a researcher makes a significant discovery, it
opens up the possibility of new avenues of research, simulated
in the model by the appearance of a new randomly-shaped hill
at a random location on the landscape.
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -9-
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3. Results and discussion
Here I present the results of simulations of different setups of interest,
exploring the relative success of different funding mechanisms under
different conditions.
All simulation results show a comparison between the four fund-
ing mechanisms, as a plot of total accumulated significance (arbitrary
units) at the end of the simulation run, averaged over five runs with dif-
ferent random seeds. In all simulations the range of countdowns was 2
to 7. The number of individuals was set to equal (size of landscape)3/4.
Simulations were ran for 50 steps. The trigger for significance-dependant
processes was 0.7 of the global maximum. Results are shown for a small
landscape (50× 50) in Fig. 2 and for a large landscape (500× 500) in
Fig. 3.
Figure 2. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, small landscape (50×
50).
To get a feeling for how the community is affected by the funding
mechanism, I present visualisations of the state of the landscape at the
end of the simulation run for the two funding mechanisms mentioned
in the introduction (best visible and lotto) in Fig. 4. Note that due to
the winner takes it all dynamic process it is possible to “see” the past
trajectory of exploration, as completed projects leave behind highly
localised points of zero (remaining) significance. This allows for a visual
representation of the division of cognitive labour that emerges under
different funding schemes.
As is clear from the simulations, the best funding mechanism is in-
deed best at accumulating significance over time, though with various
lead margins over the second best strategy. In the presence of dynamic
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -10-
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Figure 3. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, large landscape (500×
500).
(a) best visible (b) lotto
Figure 4. Landscape visualisation at the end of the
simulation run under different funding mechanisms.
processes, best is in the best position to locate new avenues for re-
search, wherever they show up. However, as mentioned above, the best
funding strategy is not realisable, as it requires a god’s eye view of the
epistemic landscape.
On the small landscape the three strategies, best visible, oldboys,
and lotto perform roughly similarly, with lotto at a small disadvantage
as it cannot make use of valuable information from past successes. It
seems counter-intuitive that best visible performs worse than oldboys. A
possible explanation is the effect of reduced novelty: best visible tends
to cluster scientists around the most promising projects, and so when
one makes a breakthrough it reduces the significance of contributions
for all groups working on similar projects (the phenomenon known in
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -11-
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contemporary science as “scooping”). This excessive clustering around
fashions is not present in oldboys or lotto.
On the large landscape lotto greatly outperforms best visible and
oldboys. This is because new avenues on a large landscape are likely to
spawn outside the visibility of the agents, where lotto can access them
but the other two strategies cannot. In the smaller landscape this
effect is not apparent, as the relative visibility is larger, and therefore
the chance of a new avenue appearing within the visible area is larger.
Conclusion
This paper presented a way to extend existing epistemic landscape
models so that they can represent selection by a central funding body
and time dependence of significance. This model was used in computer
simulations to compare the effectiveness of different idealised versions
of selection criteria, most notably selection based on past successes
(akin to peer review), random selection and no selection. The most
significant result from the simulation was that on a large landscape,
when a topic can be explored in many ways that could be very different
from each other, random selection performs much better than selection
based on past performance.
This result fits in with a general result from the body of works on
agent-based models of scientific communities, that shows diversity in
the community trumps individual pursuit of excellence as a way of
making communal epistemic progress. The tension of science funding,
between originality and plausibility, is thus a part of the broader tension
between diversity and excellence, between exploration and exploitation.
Previous social epistemology models have focused on the role of inter-
nal factors in shifting the balance between exploration and exploita-
tion. Kitcher (1990); Strevens (2003) look at reward structures (of
internal credit, not external monetary rewards) and individual motiva-
tion towards credit or truth. Grim (2009); Zollman (2010) look at in-
formation availability and information transfer between scientists, and
at individual beliefs. Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) look at individual
researchers’ social strategy: follower or maverick.
The current work is the first within this modelling lineage to look at
the effects of an external, institutional factor: selection by a centralised
funding body. The current paper brings this line of research closer to
having a direct relevance to science policy. Hopefully future work in
this vain will continue this trend, to deliver on the challenge set out by
Kitcher (1990, p. 22):
How do we best design social institutions for the ad-
vancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored
the social structure of science. The point, however, is to
change it.
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We could start by advocating for funding mechanisms that allow for
more exploration.
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How	To	Make	Selective	Realism	More	Selective	(and	More	Realist	Too)	
Massimiliano	Badino	
Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	—	Universitat	Autonoma	de	Barcelona	
Abstract	
Selective	realism	is	the	thesis	that	some	wisely	chosen	theoretical	posits	are	essential	
to	science	and	can	therefore	be	considered	as	true	or	approximately	true.	How	to	
choose	them	wisely,	however,	is	a	matter	of	=ierce	contention.	Generally	speaking,	we	
should	favor	posits	that	are	effectively	deployed	in	successful	prediction.	In	this	paper	
I	propose	a	re=inement	of	the	notion	of	deployment	and	I	argue	that	selective	realism	
can	be	extended	to	include	the	analysis	of	how	theoretical	posits	are	actually	deployed	
in	symbolic	practices.	
1. Introduction	
Among	the	several	forms	of	realism,	the	so-called	selective	realism	(SelRealism)	is	
arguably	the	one	that	engages	history	of	science	more	seriously.	The	driving	idea	of	
SelRealism	is	that,	although	theories	as	wholes	are	false	and	doomed	to	be	
abandoned,	it	is	possible	to	select	a	certain	number	of	theoretical	posits	(TPs)	that	are	
likely	to	be	maintained	in	future	theories	and	are	therefore	true	or	approximately	
true.	How	to	determine	these	TPs	is	partly	an	empirical	question—and	this	explains	
the	historical	character	of	the	SelRealism	program—but	it	cannot	be	merely	an	
empirical	question	lest	one	end	up	in	post-hoc	rationalizations.	A	central	issue	of	
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SelRealism,	hence,	is	how	to	specify	criteria	to	properly	conceptualize	the	TPs	on	
which	one	should	place	one’s	realist	commitment.	
In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	contemporary	approaches	to	SelRealism	have	neglected	an	
important	element	related	to	the	way	in	which	theoretical	claims	are	deployed	in	
scienti=ic	theories	(Section	2).	In	Section	3,	I	propose	a	re=inement	of	SelRealism	
based	on	the	distinction	between	deploying	a	TP	fundamentally	and	deploying	it	in	a	
non-accidental	fashion.	I	use	the	concept	of	symbolic	practices	to	articulate	this	
distinction.	Finally,	in	Section	4,	I	clarify	my	points	by	discussing	the	early	
development	of	perturbation	theory.	
2. Selective	Realism:	Theory	and	Practice	
The	upholders	of	SelRealism	cherish	two	fundamental	ambitions.	First	and	foremost,	
they	aim	at	making	a	good	use	of	the	so-called	no-miracles	argument	(NMA)	
according	to	which	one	can	justi=iably	infer	the	truth	(or	the	approximate	truth)	of	a	
successful	theory,	because,	otherwise,	the	success	would	remained	inexplicable.	The	
NMA	is	considered	to	be	the	strongest	support	to	realisms	of	any	sort	(Musgrave	
1988;	Psillos	1999,	68-94).	A	challenging	objection	to	the	NMA	is	the	pessimistic	
meta-induction	(PMI)	originally	formulated	by	Larry	Laudan.	According	to	this	
argument,	the	success	of	a	theory	is	never	a	suf=icient	reason	to	infer	even	its	
approximate	truth	because	history	of	science	is	replete	with	examples	of	very	
successful	theories	that	wound	up	overthrown	at	some	later	stage.	As	it	is	likely	the	
case	that	our	most	successful	theories	will	suffer	the	same	fate	in	the	future,	one	has	
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to	conclude	that	the	realist	commitment	is	not	justi=ied	(Laudan	1981).	Among	the	
several	responses	to	the	PMI,	one	consists	in	noticing	that	the	failures	of	past	theories,	
in	fact,	did	not	depend	on	those	TPs	that	lead	them	to	success.	In	other	words,	granted	
Laudan’s	point	that	successful	past	theories	are	false	as	wholes,	it	can	still	be	argued	
that	the	constituents	of	those	theories	that	were	responsible	for	their	empirical	
success	have	been	retained	in	our	current	science.	Thus,	the	realist	needs	only	to	shift	
her	commitment	from	theories	as	wholes	to	those	enduring	TPs	that,	being	essential	
for	success,	can	be	justi=iably	believed	to	be	true	or	approximately	true.	
The	next	question	is,	of	course,	how	to	determine	those	TPs.	Thus,	the	second	
ambition	of	the	upholders	of	SelRealism	is	to	solve	the	problem	of	selectivity	in	some	
principled	way	and	so	beat	the	PMI.	In	one	of	the	=irst	instantiations	of	SelRealism,	
Philip	Kitcher	argued	that	one	must	“distinguish	between	those	parts	of	theory	that	
are	genuinely	used	in	the	success	and	those	that	are	idle	wheels”	(Kitcher	1993,	143).	
The	point	of	this	distinction	is	that	credit	for	the	success	of	a	theory	should	be	due	
only	to	those	TPs	that	effectively	contribute	to	it.	Elaborating	on	Kitcher’s	intuition,	
one	can	argue	that	the	program	of	SelRealism	is	based	on	two	major	conditions:	
(S)	Success	condition:	the	selection	of	the	important	TPs	must	hinge	on	their	
relation	with	some	signi=icant	success	of	the	theory.	
(D)	Deployment	condition:	one	must	select	those	TPs	that	were	effectively	used	in	
scoring	that	success.	
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Let	me	brie=ly	comment	on	these	two	conditions.	While	(S)	is	now	a	realist	trademark,	
the	deployment	condition	(D)	is	what	sets	apart	SelRealism	from	other	forms	of	
realism,	such	as	structural	realism,	also	engaged	in	picking	out	enduring	elements	of	
scienti=ic	theories	(Worrall	1989;	Chakravartty	2011).	It	is	also	important	to	notice	
that	(S)	and	(D)	are	independent	conditions.	Firstly,	(S)	refers	to	a	relation	between	
the	selected	TP	and	empirical	success,	while	(D)	refers	to	a	relation	between	the	TP	
and	the	rest	of	the	theory.	Secondly,	either	condition	can	be	satis=ied	separately.	(D)	
has	been	added	precisely	to	avoid	those	cases	in	which	idle	TPs	are	involved	in	
empirical	success	and,	obviously,	there	are	scores	of	examples	of	TPs	used	by	theories	
which	however	never	led	to	any	success.	It	follows	that,	while	(S)	is	supposed	to	meet	
the	=irst	ambition	of	SelRealism,	the	second	ambition,	to	block	the	PMI,	is	on	(D).	
So	much	for	SelRealism	in	theory.	Let	us	now	examine	how	this	program	has	been	
carried	out	in	practice.	One	of	the	=irst	philosophers	to	seriously	elaborate	on	
Kitcher’s	suggestion	was	Stathis	Psillos.	His	criterion	for	selecting	TPs	works	in	the	
following	way	(Psillos	1999,	110).	Let	us	assume	that	a	certain	successful	prediction	P	
can	be	obtained	by	combining	the	TPs	H,	H’	and	the	auxiliaries	A. 	According	to	1
	For	virtually	all	writers,	empirical	success	means	“successful	prediction”.	David	1
Harker	has	leveled	important	criticisms	against	this	tendency	to	interpret	success	in	
terms	of	individual	predictions	and	has	suggested	that	success	should	be	understood	
as	progress,	i.e.	in	terms	of	the	improvements	a	theory	makes	with	respect	to	its	
predecessors	(Harker	2008,	2013).
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Psillos,	the	TP	H	is	essential	to	success	P	and	should	be	considered	true	or	
approximately	true	if	and	only	if:	
(1) H’	and	A	alone	do	not	lead	to	P.	
(2) There	is	no	alternative	H*	to	H	such	that:	
(a) H*	is	consistent	with	H’	and	A;	
(b) H*,	H’,	and	A	lead	to	P;	
(c) H*	is	not	ad	hoc	or	otherwise	purposefully	concocted	to	lead	to	P.		
This	criterion	is	the	bedrock	of	Psillos’s	divide	et	impera	strategy.	The	driving	intuition	
behind	it	is	to	capture	the	indispensability	of	H:	we	should	place	our	realist	
commitment	upon	those	TPs	without	which	empirical	success	cannot	be	obtained.	
However,	Tim	Lyons	has	cogently	argued	that	Psillos's	criterion	fails	to	characterize	
indispensability	(Lyons	2006).	The	indispensability	of	H	should	be	ensured	by	
condition	(2),	which	states,	in	brief,	that	H	cannot	be	replaced	by	any	other	TP.	But,	
Lyons	notices,	“there	will	always	be	other	hypotheses,	albeit	some	that	we	=ind	very	
unappealing,	from	which	any	given	prediction	can	be	derived”	(Lyons	2006,	540).	
More	importantly,	Lyons	argues,	Psillos’s	criterion	is	not	even	an	effective	means	for	
credit	attribution,	because	it	does	not	tell	us	much	about	how	H	contributes	to	the	
empirical	success	P.	In	particular,	condition	(2)	has	no	relevance	whatsoever	for	H’s	
speci=ic	contribution,	because	it	only	concerns	conceivable	alternatives	to	H,	
alternatives	that,	if	H	is	at	hand,	nobody	would	even	bother	to	explore.	Lyons	
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perceptively	stresses	that	the	problem	with	Psillos’s	criterion	boils	down	to	the	fact	
that	it	obliterates	condition	(D):	“by	introducing	his	criterion,	[Psillos]	has	discarded	
the	central	idea	of	deployment	realism—introduced	by	Kitcher	and	seemingly	
advocated	by	Psillos	himself”	(Lyons	2006,	541).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	by	
dropping	condition	(D),	Psillos’s	position	becomes	vulnerable	to	another	form	of	PMI.	
One	could	think	of	getting	around	of	Lyons’s	=irst	objection	by	arguing	that,	even	
though	an	alternative	to	H	is	always	conceivable,	at	the	present	state	of	our	knowledge	
it	is	not,	therefore	the	objection	is	empty.	In	other	words,	one	could	inject	the	time	
factor	in	Psillos’s	criterion	and	make	it	a	statement	of	our	actual	best	knowledge.	But	
then	the	PMI	crops	up	again,	because	history	shows	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	
what	is	indispensable	today	will	be	so	tomorrow.	The	whole	point	of	the	PMI	is	that	
there	is	nothing	special	in	our	knowledge	as	far	as	it	is	considered	present,	because	
there	have	been	a	lot	of	present	knowledges	that	have	been	blissfully	abandoned.	This	
is	why	one	needs	condition	(D):	what	makes	our	present	knowledge	so	special	is	not	
its	happening	at	a	certain	time,	but	its	having	gone	through	a	certain	process,	i.e.,	a	
form	of	deployment.	The	fact	that	our	present	knowledge	has	been	deployed	at	
lengths	and	it	is	still	with	us	constitutes	a	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	true	or	
approximately	true.	
3. Deconstructing	Deployment	
Having	grasped	that	the	=law	in	Psillos’s	criterion	is	the	dropping	of	the	deployment	
condition,	Lyons	suggests	to	run	to	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	and	to	in=late	
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dramatically	the	notion	of	deployment.	His	“responsibility	model”	consists	in	
discarding	selectivity	altogether	and	in	considering	responsible	for	the	empirical	
success	of	a	theory	each	and	every	element	that	was	originally	deployed:	“credit	will	
have	to	be	attributed	to	all	responsible	constituents,	including	mere	heuristics	(such	
as	mystical	beliefs),	weak	analogies,	mistaken	calculations,	logically	invalid	reasoning	
etc.”	(Lyons	2006,	543).	Clearly,	Lyons’s	proposal	amounts	to	a	crack-up	of	the	entire	
SelRealism	program.	But,	more	importantly,	I	do	not	think	that	the	responsibility	
model	captures	the	correct	signi=icance	of	(D).	As	my	previous	considerations	about	
the	PMI	show,	the	deployment	condition	is	not	merely	supposed	to	tell	us	that	a	TP	
has	been	effectively	used	in	obtaining	empirical	success	(as	opposed	to	be	
dispensable),	but	also	that	it	has	been	robustly	so	(as	opposed	to	be	merely	
accidental).	What	makes	it	plausible	that	a	TP	will	still	play	a	role	in	future	theories	is	
the	fact	that	its	importance	for	empirical	success	has	been	tested	by	extensive	and	
repeated	deployment.	It	is	therefore	clear	that	there	are	two	ideas	nested	in	the	
deployment	condition.	One	is	the	idea,	captured	by	Psillos’s	criterion,	that	signi=icant	
TPs	must	play	a	fundamental	role	in	success	in	order	to	distinguish	them	from	idle	
hypotheses;	the	other	is	the	idea	that	the	deployment	of	a	TP	must	ensure	that	its	
success	is	not	accidental.	These	are	two	distinct	ideas.	It	might	happen,	for	example,	
that	a	TP	plays	an	essential	role	in	deriving	a	prediction	in	virtue	of	fortuitous	factors	
cancellation	or	other	favorable	circumstances.	So,	while	an	intensive	deployment	
ensure	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP,	an	extensive	deployment	founds	its	robustness.	Both	
fundamentality	and	robustness	are	ways	to	articulate	the	complex	relation	between	a	
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TP	and	the	rest	of	the	theory,	or	at	least	some	parts	of	the	theory	(more	on	this	in	a	
bit).	Further,	while	fundamentality	is	an	atemporal	articulation	of	this	relation, 	2
robustness	concerns	precisely	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	deployment	condition	
that	escaped	Lyons’s	analysis:	robustness,	as	we	shall	see	below,	is	achieved	over	time.	
In	order	to	clarify	the	distinction	between	fundamentality	and	robustness,	I	introduce	
the	notion	of	symbolic	practices.	By	symbolic	practices	I	mean	all	the	methods	
customarily	used	in	science	to	manipulate	symbols. 	These	include,	but	are	not	3
limited	to,	mathematical	methods,	formal	tools,	approximations	procedures,	models,	
heuristics,	solution	tricks,	and	any	sort	of	way	by	which	one	can	transform	a	symbolic	
expression	into	another	symbolic	expression.	Symbolic	practices	are	the	set	of	
methods	adopted	by	a	theory	to	“put	to	work”	a	certain	TP	or,	in	other	words,	to	
deploy	it	in	order	to	set	problems	and	to	interpret	solutions.	By	using	the	concept	of	
symbolic	practices,	one	can	reformulate	the	two	ideas	of	the	deployment	condition	in	
the	following	way:	
	Of	course	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP	can	change	over	time	because	it	can	become	2
more	or	less	fundamentally	used.	However,	the	relation	in	itself	does	not	concern	this	
change.
	My	discussion	is	especially	tailored	on	the	case	of	mathematical	physics.	I	do	not	3
exclude,	however,	that	it	can	be	suitably	extended	to	other	branches	of	science	by	
taking	an	appropriately	enlarged	notion	of	symbolic	practices.
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(F)	Fundamentality:	A	TP	must	be	embedded	in	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	that	lead	
to	empirical	success.	
(R)	Robustness:	The	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	deploy	the	TP	must	be	reliable.	
Let	us	begin	with	(F).	This	idea	hinges	on	the	“embeddedness”	of	a	TP	into	a	set	of	
symbolic	practices.	An	empirical	success,	a	successful	prediction	or	an	explanation,	is	
obtained	by	starting	with	one	TP—or,	better,	its	symbolic	codi=ication—and	by	
deriving	from	it	the	phenomena	to	be	treated	by	means	of	suitable	manipulations.	In	
their	analysis	of	the	path	from	TP	to	success,	philosophers	usually	disregard	the	
epistemic	role	played	by	symbolic	manipulations	of	TPs.	But	if	we	neglect	this	
important	factor	of	the	process	of	predicting/explaining,	we	are	left	with	no	other	
option	than	characterizing	fundamentality	as	a	relation	between	TPs,	i.e.,	a	‘Psillosian’	
criterion	and	then	a	‘Lyonsnesque’	argument	can	easily	prove	that	this	falls	short	of	
providing	a	satisfactory	notion	of	fundamentality.	In	my	proposal,	fundamentality	is	
rather	a	relation	between	TP	and	the	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	transform	and	
manipulate	it.	Although	intuitively	clear	enough,	the	concept	of	embededdness	
admittedly	needs	further	philosophical	analysis.	In	Section	4,	I	provide	a	historical	
example	to	clarify	what	it	means	for	a	TP	to	be	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	
practices.	
Before	discussing	the	example,	however,	I	need	to	analyze	brie=ly	the	idea	of	
robustness.	Condition	(R)	states	that	reliability,	and	hence	robustness,	is	a	property	of	
the	symbolic	practices	themselves.	In	other	words,	and	this	is	the	central	point,	a	TP	
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can	be	made	more	robust	by	means	of	historically	and	rationally	describable	strategies	
conceived	to	enhance	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	put	it	to	work.	
One	way	to	appreciate	this	point	is	to	notice	that	the	concept	of	reliability	has	three	
main	components.	First,	there	is	an	empirical	component,	that	is	its	connection	with	
success.	It	is	expected	that	reliable	symbolic	practices	have	led	and	will	lead	to	
empirical	success.	This	is	unsurprising,	because	it	is	still	part	of	the	relation	between	
(D)	and	the	NMA.	Second,	there	is	a	conceptual	component:	reliable	symbolic	practices	
allow	us	to	distinguish	between	real	facts	of	nature	and	artifacts.	This	is	the	
component	that	accounts	for	the	non-accidentality	of	success	and	it	depends	on	the	
adoption	of	strategies	to	enhance	reliability.	Applying	symbolic	practices	to	multiple	
cases,	relating	them	with	other,	better	understood,	sets	of	practices	(e.g.,	by	showing	
structure	similarities),	generalizing	solution	methods,	simplifying	computation	
procedures,	introducing	redundant	check	routines,	improving	the	symbolic	notation,	
multiplying	proof	procedures	are	just	a	few	examples	of	strategies	used	to	ensure	that	
the	result	of	symbolic	manipulation	is	a	real	information	and	not	an	artifact	generated	
by	the	practice	itself. 	Finally,	there	is	a	historical	component.	As	I	said	above,	4
deployment	is	a	process	extended	over	time.	When	are	we	justi=ied	to	consider	a	
result	as	reliable?	This	is	an	agent-	and	a	context-dependent	component	of	reliability.	
	This	component	of	the	concept	of	reliability	is	closely	connected	with	the	usual	4
notion	of	robustness	(see,	e.g.,	(Soler	et	al.	2012)	for	an	overview).	Indeed,	robustness	
has	to	do	with	the	multiplications	of	methods	of	check	and	control	as	a	way	to	
distinguish	what	is	real	and	what	is	fabricated	by	practices.
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I	submit	that	this	component	can	be	clari=ied	in	terms	of	control.	We	develop	theories	
because	we	need	to	manipulate	symbols	in	order	to	make	predictions	and	
explanations.	It	is	reasonable	to	state	that	an	agent	considers	reliable	a	theory	when	
she	has	control	on	it,	when	she	knows	how	to	do	things,	where	the	theory	can	be	
applied,	to	what	extent,	what	kind	of	information	she	can	obtain,	what	kind	of	
epistemic	risks	are	involved	in	it,	how	to	improve	progressively	the	performance	and	
a	lot	of	other	things	related	to	the	general	idea	of	knowing	what	is	going	on.	Thus,	
reliability	can	change	over	time	in	virtue	of	new	information	and	further	inquiry.	This	
component	accounts	for	the	fact	that	science	is	an	ongoing	human	endeavor.	
To	sum	up,	I	propose	to	extend	SelRealism	in	the	following	way:	
(SelRealism+)	We	are	entitled	to	consider	the	TP	H	as	true	or	approximately	true	at	
time	t	if	and	only	if:	
1. H	is	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	S	
2. S	is	reliable	
3. H	and	S	lead	to	signi=icant	success	
This	is	a	more	selective	version	of	SelRealism,	because	the	philosophical	and	
historiographical	program	stemming	from	it	extends	the	inquiry	to	the	strategies	
adopted	to	improve	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	and	the	contingent	conditions	
for	control.	As	stated	in	condition	3,	the	units	of	analysis	of	SelRealism+	are	TPs-cum-
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practices	rather	than	TPs	only.	In	the	following	section,	I	provide	an	example	of	what	I	
mean	by	intensive	and	extensive	deployment.	
4. The	Coming	of	Age	of	Perturbation	Theory	
The	Principia	Mathematica	are	a	supreme	example	of	how	to	embed	a	TP,	in	this	case	
the	gravitational	law,	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices. 	However,	Newton’s	mainly	5
geometrical	methods	were	fantastically	complicated	and	notoriously	dif=icult	to	
master.	A	signi=icant	breakthrough	in	what	came	to	be	called	celestial	mechanics	
happened	in	the	mid-1740s,	when	Leonhard	Euler	laid	down	the	foundations	of	
analytical	perturbation	theory.	Euler	made	a	number	of	decisive	steps	forward.	First,	
he	used	the	gravitational	law	to	formulate	general	equations	of	motion	for	celestial	
problems.	Second,	he	introduced	the	use	of	trigonometric	series	to	construct	
approximate	solutions.	The	use	of	these	series	also	depended	crucially	on	the	
gravitational	law,	because	it	satis=ied	the	assumption	that	planetary	orbits,	even	
under	perturbations,	can	be	represented	by	a	combination	of	periodic	functions.	
Finally	he	introduced	manipulation	practices	such	as	the	method	of	the	variation	of	
	In	what	follows,	I	consider	perturbation	theory	as	the	set	of	practices	conceived	to	5
put	to	work	the	gravitational	law.	It	must	be	noted	that	other	TPs	were	involved	(e.g.,	
Newton’s	laws	of	dynamics)	and	that	the	gravitational	law	can	be	decomposed	in	
further	assumptions	such	as	the	action-at-a-distance,	the	instantaneous	propagation	
and	so	forth.	These	considerations	affect	the	level	of	detail	of	my	example,	but	not	the	
structure	of	my	argument.
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constants	and	the	method	of	successive	approximations	to	solve	the	equations	of	
motion.	Perturbation	theory	is	therefore	a	clear	example	of	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	
conceived	to	cast	a	TP	into	a	manipulable	form	and	to	applied	it	to	speci=ic	problems.	
For	the	purpose	of	this	paper,	I	distinguish	two	phases	in	the	early	history	of	
perturbation	theory.	The	=irst	phase	goes	roughly	from	the	mid-1740s	to	the	
mid-1760s	and	it	concerns	the	cause	of	numerous	astronomical	anomalies.	Newton	
had	left	behind	a	few	conundrums	that	even	his	genius	was	unable	to	unravel.	The	
most	conspicuous	of	these	problems	was	the	precession	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	
Newton's	Lunar	theory,	elaborated	in	Book	I	and	III	of	the	Principia	only	managed	to	
obtain	half	of	the	observed	value.	In	the	1740s,	there	were	two	approaches	to	the	
issue	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	The	analytical	approach	adopted	the	gravitational	law,	or	a	
slightly	modi=ied	form	of	it,	and	tried	to	calculate	the	observed	precession	by	
analytical	methods	only.	The	physical	approach	supposed	that	the	observed	
anomalies	could	be	due	to	material	causes	such	as	a	resisting	medium	or	
interplanetary	vortices.	It	is	important	to	realize	that	these	approaches	were	
compatible.	Euler	himself	supported	both	the	resisting	medium	hypothesis	and	the	
analytical	approach	and	occasionally	also	proposed	the	use	of	vortices	(letter	to	
Clairaut,	30	September	1747).	For	several	years,	the	best	mathematicians	of	Europe	
struggled	with	the	riddle	of	the	Lunar	apogee		(Bodenmann	2010)	until,	on	21	
January	1749,	Alexis	Clairaut	showed	that	if	one	pushes	the	approximation	to	the	
second	order	of	the	perturbation,	some	terms	that	are	negligible	at	the	=irst	order	
become	sizable	and	generate	the	missing	half	of	the	precession	(Clairaut	1752).	
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -26-
Clairaut’s	success	was	surely	an	impressive	breakthrough,	but	what	made	it	so	
impactful	was	not	the	brute	fact	that	gravitational	law	had	eventually	led	to	a	
successful	explanation.	Physical	hypotheses	such	as	vortices	and	resisting	medium	
also	provided	an	explanation	of	the	observed	precession.	The	crucial	difference	lies	in	
the	fact	that	the	gravitational	law	could	be	fully	integrated	with	the	analytical	
practices	and	then	manipulated	to	provide	suitable	symbolic	expressions	of	the	
precession	of	the	apogee.	That	did	not	happen	with	the	physical	hypotheses,	although	
not	for	lack	of	trying.	Euler,	for	instance,	tried	hard	to	integrate	the	hypothesis	of	the	
resisting	medium	in	perturbation	theory,	but	the	ensuing	equations	of	motion	were	
simply	unmanageable	(Euler	1747).	Clairaut’s	success	is	eminently	a	story	of	
intensive	use	of	the	gravitational	law:	he	managed	to	integrate	it	with	a	set	of	
symbolic	practices	and	to	accommodate	effectively	the	observations.	
Clairaut’s	feat	did	not	close	the	debate	on	the	gravitational	law,	tough.	His	calculations	
used	many	case-based	assumptions,	simpli=ications,	and	shortcuts	and	its	
straightforward	extension	to	more	complex	cases,	such	as	the	behavior	of	Jupiter	and	
Saturn,	was	doubtful	to	say	the	least.	But	there	was	also	a	deeper	problem.	At	some	
point	in	his	analysis,	Clairaut	obtained	an	“arc	of	circle”,	i.e.,	a	trigonometric	function	
multiplied	by	time.	Such	terms	are	obviously	unbounded	and	hence	make	the	whole	
trigonometric	series	diverge.	Clairaut	got	rid	of	it	by	ad-hoc	assumptions,	but	the	
status	of	these	unbounded	terms	remained	unclear:	they	could	represent	an	artifact	
of	the	theory,	a	limitation	of	its	predictive	power	or	even	a	dynamical	instability	of	the	
system.		
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Soon,	the	problem	of	the	arcs	of	circle	become	more	troublesome.	Euler	found	the	
same	terms	in	his	analysis	of	the	motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	and	in	1766	Lagrange	
proved	that	they	are	actually	a	necessary	consequence	of	the	method	of	successive	
approximations	applied	to	astronomical	problems	(Lagrange	1766).	Thus,	in	the	
mid-1760s,	perturbation	theory	appeared	to	be	a	fragile	set	of	practices	which	had	
scored	some	important	success,	but	was	still	marred	with	problems	of	unreliability	
under	certain	conditions.	From	the	late	1760s	onwards,	the	issue	of	improving	the	
robustness	of	perturbation	theory	became	a	central	preoccupation	of	the	leading	
mathematicians	interested	in	physical	astronomy.	
There	were	two	programs	inspired	by	this	issue.	On	the	one	hand,	Lagrange	tried	to	
improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	methods	as	a	mathematical	theory.	He	carried	
out	this	project	by	means	of	multiple	strategies:	(1)	enhancing	the	relation	between	
perturbation	theory	and	other	branches	of	mathematics	(e.g.,	potential	theory);	(2)	
elaborating	arguments	to	extract	information	from	the	equations	of	motion	without	
solving	them	(e.g.,	by	using	integrals	of	motion);	(3)	improving	methods	to	simplify	
the	solution	procedure	(e.g.,	Lagrange’s	coordinates);	(4)	introducing	new	symbolic	
codi=ications	to	manipulate	the	equations	of	motion	(e.g.,	the	perturbing	function);	(5)	
making	the	notation	less	cumbersome	(Lagrange’s	coef=icients).	Around	the	same	
years,	Laplace	was	also	working	to	improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	theory,	but	
his	program	adopted	a	different	approach.	He	concentrated	on	methods	to	make	
perturbation	theory	a	more	reliable	problem-solving	tool.		He	developed	his	own	
method	to	eliminate	the	arcs	of	circle—which	was	based	on	the	recalculation	of	the	
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integration	constants—he	imported	probability	theory	and	the	equations	of	condition	
to	deal	with	astronomical	observations	and	devised	several	strategies	to	identify	in	
concrete	cases	those	elements	of	the	equations	of	motion	that	were	likely	to	produce	
sizable	perturbation	terms	at	higher	order.	Both	Lagrange’s	and	Laplace’s	programs	
scored	their	own	successes.	In	the	early	1780s,	Lagrange	proved	a	very	general	result	
of	stability	according	to	which	the	three	more	important	orbital	elements	(mean	
motion,	eccentricity,	and	inclination)	are	invariable	or	bounded	(Lagrange	1781).	
Laplace,	on	his	part,	explained	the	decades-long	problems	of	the	anomaly	in	the	
motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	as	well	as	the	secular	acceleration	of	the	Moon	(Laplace	
1785,	1787;	Wilson	1985).		
5. Conclusions	
In	several	places,	Kyle	Stanford	has	argued	that	any	selection	of	enduring	TPs	is	
ultimately	ungrounded	and,	consequently,	the	entire	SelRealism	program	is	unviable	
(Stanford	2003,	2006).	In	his	view,	there	are	two	possible	ways	to	select	essential	TPs.	
The	=irst	way	is	to	trust	scientists	when	they	say	that	a	certain	posit	is	fundamental.	
However,	neither	commonsense,	nor,	more	importantly,	historical	records	support	the	
hypothesis	that	scientists’	take	on	this	matter	is	or	should	be	particularly	reliable.	The	
other	option	is	to	wait	and	see:	when	a	theory	is	superseded,	one	can	check	which	TPs	
have	survived.	The	reason	why	a	selective	realist	cannot	go	with	this	option,	however,	
has	been	summarized	effectively	by	Peter	Vickers:	
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If	we	cannot	identify	the	working	posits	of	a	theory	until	it	has	been	superseded	
by	some	other	theory,	then	realism	is	no	longer	about	identifying	what	we	ought	
to	believe	to	be	true:	one	is	always	waiting	for	the	next	theory	to	come	along	to	
tell	us	which	parts	of	our	current	theory	are	working	posits.	(Vickers	2013,	207)	
From	this,	Stanford	concludes	that	SelRealism	without	prospectively	applicable	
selectivity	criteria	is	empty	and	should	be	replaced	by	a	more	modest	form	of	realism.	
But	Stanford’s	wait-and-see	stance	is	neither	necessary	nor	suf=icient	to	do	the	job	it	
is	supposed	to	do,	i.e.,	to	pick	out	essential	TPs.	It	is	not	suf=icient	because	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	the	TPs	survived	one	theory	change	will	survive	the	next	ones.	It	is	not	
necessary	because	we	do	not	need	the	next	theory	to	form	reasonable	judgements	
about	essential	TPs.	As	I	have	shown	above,	science	provides	a	variety	of	strategies	to	
improve	the	reliability	of	the	TP-cum-practices	and	hence	good	reasons	to	believe,	
within	the	actual	theory,	that	a	certain	TP	intensively	and	extensively	deployed	is	in	
fact	essential.		
From	this	perspective,	Stanford’s	argument	simply	sets	the	epistemic	bar	too	high.	By	
stating	that	the	essentiality	of	a	TP	can	be	adjudicated	only	from	the	vantage	point	of	
the	superseding	theory,	he	implicitly	challenges	the	realist	to	provide	a	
“superselection	rule”	able	to	capture	the	whole	history	of	science,	a	task	that	the	
realist	is	neither	willing,	nor	actually	requested	to	accomplish.	By	contrast,	the	
historical	and	philosophical	program	of	SelRealism+	moves	from	the	conviction	that	
TPs	and	symbolic	practices	follow	a	dynamics	able	to	=ilter	out	inessential	
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components.	Consequently,	SelRealism+	is	committed	to	historically	identify	and	
philosophically	analyze	this	dynamics	and	to	trace	the	genealogy	of	our	theories	in	
terms	of	the	processes	of	codi=ication,	manipulation,	and	stabilization	of	TPs.	
Ultimately,	this	program	aims	at	producing	new	and	interesting	historical	narratives	
of	theory	change.	It	remains	true	that	the	strategies	making	up	the	theoretical	
dynamics	only	provide	good	reasons	to	allocate	the	realist	commitment.	It	might	
happen	that	the	judgement	on	the	reliability	of	the	TPs-cum-practices	change	over	
time	in	virtue	of	further	inquiry	or	new	information.	This	fact,	as	stated	above,	follows	
from	the	fallibility	of	science	as	a	human	endeavor	and,	as	such,	should	not	trouble	
the	realist.	
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Duhemian good sense and agent reliabilism 
 
Famously, according to Duhem a hypothesis can never be experimentally tested in 
isolation, but only along with the entire theoretical scaffolding it comes with. So in the face of 
disagreement between theory and experiment, it is impossible to point out which hypotheses in 
the theory are flawed. A big question for Duhem was, how does the physicist act in such a 
situation of underdetermination? Which hypotheses does s/he discard, and which one(s) does 
s/he retain? Duhem’s response was that the physicist possesses an intuitive “good sense” that 
directs this choice. Although good sense does not provide a rigorous, rule-based template for 
theory choice
1
, it allows scientists to weigh evidence and be “fair and impartial” (Duhem, 218) in 
theory choice. 
 
Recently, there has been much interest in drawing parallels between Duhem’s good sense 
and ideas in virtue epistemology (VE). VE emerged in the 1980s as an approach to epistemology 
based on virtue ethics. In the words of Greco (2004): “Just as virtue theories in ethics try to 
understand the normative properties of actions in terms of the normative properties of moral 
agents, virtue epistemology tries to understand the normative properties of beliefs in terms of the 
normative properties of cognitive agents.” A virtue epistemological reading of good sense as first 
advanced by David Stump (2007) is based on the idea that Duhem too emphasized the normative 
properties of the scientist qua cognitive agent and took them as a basis for legitimate scientific 
                                                
1
 While “theory choice” today is generally understood in the context of contrastive underdetermination, Duhem was 
primarily concerned with the holist variety of underdetermination and advanced good sense in the context of the 
latter. But for the purposes of this paper the distinction will not matter, and I shall use “theory choice” to refer to 
underdetermination in general, as do all the authors I reference. 
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knowledge in the face of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Stump finds striking 
similarities particularly between Duhemian good sense and Linda Zagzebski’s (1996) views of 
VE. Here, I discuss the views of Stump, Milena Ivanova (2010), and Abrol Fairweather (2012) in 
this regard and ultimately propose my own view in response which is an agent-reliabilist reading 
of Duhem’s good sense. 
 
Stump argues that Duhem conceived of good sense in a way that can today be understood 
as virtue theoretic. In particular, Stump finds similarities between good sense and ideas of VE 
put forward by Zagzebski (1996). As Stump tells us, Zagzebski argued that justified belief comes 
from a “cluster of intellectual virtues in the same way that the rightness of an act can be defined 
in terms of moral virtue in ethical theory”(Stump, 151). Stump argues that Duhem’s good sense 
nicely fits in with these ideas. Good sense depends on the scientist, the cognitive agent, being 
“virtuous”: s/he has to be, in the words of Duhem quoting Claude Bernard, a “faithful and 
impartial judge”. Stump further provides another illuminating quote from Duhem from his 
lectures on German science: 
 
“In the realm of every science, but more particularly in the realm of history, the pursuit of the truth not 
only requires intellectual abilities, but also calls for moral qualities: rectitude, probity, detachment 
from all interest and all passions. (Duhem, 1991b, p. 43)” (Stump, p. 152). 
 
Stump notes that some of the epistemic virtues put forward by Zagzebski include 
intellectual sobriety, impartiality and intellectual courage and the list fits very well with 
Duhem’s. Yet another striking similarity between Zagzebski and Duhem according to Stump is 
that they both appeal to non-rule-governed epistemology. Zagzebski, in making a case for an 
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epistemology based on ethics, says, “The idea is that there can be no complete set of rules 
sufficient for giving a determinate answer to the question of what an agent should do in every 
situation of moral choice.” (Stump, 152) Similarly, Duhem arrives at the idea of good sense 
when the rule-based epistemology of the physical method (i.e. strict agreement between theory 
and experiment) fails. As Stump says, 
 
“Holism threatens to make testing impossible, yet Duhem believes that scientific consensus will 
emerge. While the pure logic of the testing situation leaves theory choice open, good sense does not. 
Duhem claims that the history of science shows that while there is controversy in science, there is also 
closure of scientific debates.” (Stump, 155) 
 
Milena Ivanova (2010) has argued in response to Stump, that the latter is mistaken in 
drawing such close parallels between VE and Duhem’s good sense. She raises two main 
objections: first, while VE is concerned with getting to the truth via epistemic virtues, for 
Duhem, physical theory only asymptotically approaches truth – truth here being the truth of a 
natural order, of the “real affinities” among things. Ivanova makes this point keeping in mind 
Duhem’s view of a ‘perfect theory’ and the convergent nature of his realism: for Duhem, the aim 
of physical theory was to classify experimental laws, and a physical theory – one picked out by 
good sense in the face of underdetermination – constantly approached but never reached, a 
perfect theory which classified laws and their phenomena in exactly the way underlying 
metaphysical realities are really classified in nature. So her point is that while VE is concerned 
with getting to the truth, good sense doesn’t help us with that. But as Ivanova herself points out,  
 
“Still, in response to this objection one can adopt the weaker thesis that even though natural 
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classification may not reveal the truth about the unobservable, it will be true for the observable 
phenomena. Also, one may argue that it is legitimate to aim at a particular epistemic goal 
independently of whether this goal is achievable or not.” (62) 
  
I take her point here to be that both VE and good sense are after all in the business of truth-
seeking even though attaining the truth may be impossible for with the latter. 
 
Ivanova’s more forceful objection has to do with epistemic justification. According to her 
whereas VE takes epistemic virtues to be justifications for beliefs, Duhem did not invoke the 
concept of good sense to justify belief in one theory over another. (To reiterate, Duhem did not 
have a full-blown metaphysical notion of truth of a theory – but worked with the surrogate idea 
of truth, that a right theory approaches a transcendental, natural classification.) Rather, she 
argues, good sense for Duhem was more a post hoc explanation of the physicist’s choice: it 
explains the repeated success of theories at making novel predictions. According to Ivanova, 
what really justified belief in a theory for Duhem – i.e. the belief that it was approaching a 
natural classification – was the success of the theory in making correct novel predictions: She 
says that for Duhem, “[a scientist] is justified in believing that a theory is a natural classification 
only when some empirical evidence supports it or when the theory has become a ‘prophet for us’ 
(Duhem, 27), that is, when it has managed to make novel predictions.” (Ivanova, 62). Here’s 
Ivanova’s argument broken down: 
- Physical theory is a classification of laws.  
- In a situation where we have a theory that contradicts experimental data and are left 
without any means within physics to decide what to do - whether to tweak parts of the 
theory to accommodate the available experimental data – and if so, which parts to tweak 
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– or to abandon it for another theory. Somehow in the end, the scientist decides which 
way to go.  
- The “highest test” for physical theory is to ask it to make new and novel experimental 
predictions.  
- When the theory succeeds it is justified – in that it is taken to approach a natural 
classification. 
- Repeatedly, the scientist sees her/his choices made in the difficult situation of 
underdetermination emerging successful in such predictions.  
- How does this happen? There must be some innate ability or virtue in the scientist that 
enables him to do this: good sense. 
 
Thus according to Ivanova, good sense is an explanation of theory choice rather than a 
justification for it. Moreover, according to her, Duhem doesn’t say anything about good sense as 
a method of science: he doesn’t tell us how exactly it directs our choice. His account of how 
good sense comes about and works to direct theory choice is quite thin. For Ivanova, this further 
shows that Duhem did not introduce it as a justification but only as a post hoc explanation. 
 
 Abrol Fairweather (2012) has argued against Ivanova’s above objection and has 
attempted a position on Duhemian good sense that is a hybrid of Ivanova’s and Stump’s views. 
Fairweather claims to draw upon an agent reliabilist VE to do this. Reliabilism in Alvin 
Goldman’s words,  “… as a distinctive approach to knowledge is restricted to theories that 
involve truth-promoting factors above and beyond the truth of the target proposition.” (Goldman, 
2011) Fairweather’s argument is that good sense results in a reliable process. Since Duhem’s 
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claim is that good sense has a great “track record” and always picks out a successful theory – i.e. 
a theory which inevitably correctly makes a novel prediction – good sense produces knowledge 
(which here in the Duhemian context, consists in taking a predictively successful theory to be 
approaching a natural classification) by a reliable process. Good sense is a ‘truth-promoting 
factor’ regardless of whether the theory it picks out ultimately succeeds in novel prediction or 
not. It is “tracking evidentially important features of theories” (Fairweather, 10) Fairweather 
claims that “If a belief P is the product of a reliable capacity or process this fact constitutes 
evidence in favor of P.”  This implies, “If the products of good sense reliably turn out to be 
supported by compelling new evidence, then being the product of good sense will be evidence 
for any theory with such a distinguished etiology.” (Fairweather, 10) So, Fairweather says, it 
seems that “future evidence is not required to evidentially distinguish the theory chosen by good 
sense, because the reliability of good sense is itself evidence supporting that theory.” 
(Fairweather, 10) While I agree that agent reliabilism is the best way to understand good sense, 
Fairweather does not seem to give an accurate interpretation of this reading. Although he claims 
to provide an agent reliabilist reading of good sense, he grounds the reliability of good sense in 
its track record and not in its own nature or the mind where it is born. This is antithetical to agent 
reliabilist VE which situates reliability in the cognitive character of the agent. So it seems that 
Fairweather’s characterization is more along the lines of process reliabilism or simple reliabilism 
– according to which a belief is justified just in case it is formed via reliable processes – rather 
than agent reliabilism, and hence contrary to what he set out to do. His argument does not help 
situate good sense back into VE. Let us now turn to agent reliabilism in detail. 
 
Greco and Agent Reliabilism: A Short Detour 
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 As above, simple reliabilism is the view that a belief is justified just in case it is formed 
via reliable processes. Here the proportion of true beliefs the process results in, over time, 
measures reliability. Greco (1999) argues that simple reliabilism is insufficient for two reasons:  
1. An agent might form a belief via fleeting or strange processes: Greco starts by noting that 
“Reliabilism must somehow restrict the kind of reliable process that is able to ground 
knowledge, so as to rule out processes that are strange or fleeting.” (Greco, 286) As an 
example of such processes, Greco discusses Platinga’s “The case of the epistemically 
serendipitous lesion” where an agent has a rare kind of a brain lesion, one that makes her 
believe that she has a brain lesion. There is no evidence for the lesion: there no 
symptoms, no testimony etc.; in fact there might even be a lot of evidence against it. But 
the agent is unable to take account of this (lack of) evidence due to the lesion. The 
relevant cognitive process here must no doubt be deemed very reliable, but we would not 
want to take the resulting belief as justified.  
2. Process reliabilism doesn’t guarantee that the agent has a subjective justification of her 
belief. Greco says,  
“[there] is a powerful intuition that knowledge does require that the knower have some kind of 
sensitivity to the reliability of her evidence. Sometimes this intuition is expressed by insisting 
that knowledge requires subjective justification. It is not enough that one's belief is formed in a 
way that is objectively reliable; one's belief must be formed in a way that is subjectively 
appropriate as well.” (285)  
 
 Greco’s solution to the above problems is agent reliabilism. According to agent 
reliabilism, reliability is shifted from the belief-forming process to the qualities of the agent’s 
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“Relevant to present purposes is Sosa's suggestion for a restriction on reliable cognitive processes; it is 
those processes that have their bases in the stable and successful dispositions of the believer that are 
relevant for knowledge and justification. Just as the moral rightness of an action can be understood in 
terms of the stable dispositions or character of the moral agent, the epistemic rightness of a belief can 
be understood in terms of the intellectual character of the cognizer.” (Greco, 287) 
Following Sosa’s views, Greco proposes that “knowledge and justified belief are grounded in 
stable and reliable cognitive character.”(Greco, 287) Accordingly, “We may now explicitly revise 
simple reliabilism as follows: A belief p has positive epistemic status for a person S just in case 
S's believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make up S's cognitive character.” 
(Greco, 287) Hence we see that reliability now has little to do with the truth of the resultant 
belief(s) but rather with the cognitive character of the agent. 
 Greco proceeds to show how agent reliabilism also solves the problem of subjective 
justification: 
VJ: “A belief p is subjectively justified for a person S (in the sense relevant for having knowledge) if 
and only if S's believing p is grounded in the cognitive dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking 
conscientiously.” (289)  
By “thinking conscientiously”, Greco clarifies that he does not mean thinking with the purpose 
of finding truth, but rather the “usual state that people are in as a kind of a default mode – the 
state of trying to form beliefs accurately.” Greco contrasts this with epistemic “vices” such as 
trying to comfort oneself or trying to seek attention. Lastly, Greco points out that agent 
reliabilism reverses the “usual direction of analysis between virtuous character and justified 
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belief”. While non virtue theoretic epistemologies understand virtues in terms of justified belief, 
here justified belief is being cached out in terms of virtues of the cognizer. “Virtuous belief is 
associated with the dispositions a person manifests when she is sincerely trying to believe what 
is true”, and “The dispositions that a person manifests when she is thinking conscientiously are 
stable properties of her character, and are therefore in an important sense hers.” (Greco, 290) 
Therefore, a belief formed this way will be subjectively appropriate.  
Back to Duhem 
 Duhem’s views seem to exhibit all the features of agent reliabilism discussed above. In 
addition to the features of good sense and the physicist qua cognitive agent discussed so far I 
want to draw the reader’s attention to Duhem’s characterization of the different kinds of minds. 
For Duhem, the “strong and the narrow” mind is one capable of ordering and organizing laws 
and hypotheses into theories, and the “supple” mind or the “mind with finesse” – one capable of 
grasping a wide range of objects and at the same time able to group them logically – is the mind 
that produces good sense. This certainly seems to talk of  “stable dispositions” in Greco’s sense 
of the term, that reflect the “cognitive character” of the scientist. Duhem takes pains to carefully 
describe the mind of the physicist and discuss beliefs and attitudes in terms of cognitive character 
traits and not the other way round. i.e. Duhem talks of legitimacy of beliefs in terms of cognitive 
character traits; he does not talk of the traits or “epistemic virtues” so to speak, in terms of the 
validity of beliefs. For instance, he says about those not interested in seeing a unified system of 
classification erected, “Only those who affect a hatred of intellectual strength were mistaken to 
the extent of taking the scaffolding for a completed building.” (Duhem, 103) There are several 
such instances where Duhem turns traditional non virtue-theoretic epistemology on its head and 
makes cognitive character traits basic. Now it remains to be seen if we can defend a view of 
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justification from good sense that goes with Greco’s account. If we are successful in this, 
Ivanova’s position will be untenable. Before going there though, let us return to Fairweather for 
a moment. 
In addition to the argument from reliabilism, Fairweather advances another argument 
against Ivanova’s “deflation of good sense”: the position that good sense does not lend any 
epistemic strength or any justification to the chosen theory. The argument is that if good sense 
were indeed merely explanatory and post hoc as Ivanova claims, and not justificatory, then we 
are free to imagine a case where good sense doesn’t intervene at all. After all, if good sense 
explains theory choice and there is no choice being made – i.e. no explanandum -  we don’t need 
an explanation. So let us suppose that we don’t make any choice and just wait for a future novel 
prediction to make a choice and justify it. This might not be the most efficient way to choose a 
theory, but let us assume we do this nevertheless – for according to Fairweather, Ivanova’s 
objection should imply the possibility of this solution. Fairweather rightly points out that in this 
situation we might again end up with an underdetermination: what if all competing theories pass 
the novel prediction test? Therefore, Fairweather argues, good sense must play an important 
epistemic role above mere explanation, in the face of such a “second level” underdetermiantion. 
But he goes further than that and says that without it, we would never end up with a determinate 
choice, even with new confirming evidence. What Fairweather is ignoring here is that future 
evidence could pick out a theory, however small the probability. It is possible that when all the 
options resulting from underdetermination are asked to make a novel prediction, only one 
succeeds, hence obviating the need for any further theory revision. But the important point is that 
good sense enters the scene even before such an attempt to single out a theory based on novel 
prediction. So the merit of good sense in my view does not lie in the inability of novel 
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predictions to single out a theory. It is more fundamental than that. But reasons for meriting good 
sense apart, let us again look at Fairweather’s take on what the merit of good sense is. 
 
According to Fairweather, good sense confers uniqueness to a theory (which, according 
to him, no future evidence can confer). But after good sense has uniquely picked out a theory, it 
is a successful novel prediction that counts as evidence in favor of the chosen theory. Fairweather 
makes the following interesting observation that follows from such a reading of good sense:  
 
“This shows an interesting fact that new evidence in favor of a theory gives it a different epistemic 
standing depending on whether we are considering it alongside or independent of meaningful rivals. In 
the former case, new confirming evidence does not make a theory the determinate choice with 
fundamental epistemic standing. In the latter case, that same evidence determines theory choice and 
confers fundamental epistemic standing.” (Fairweather, 13) 
 
So there are two “epistemic values and epistemic standings”: uniqueness, which comes from 
good sense, and clinching evidential support from a successful novel prediction. This way, good 
sense alone does not confer “fundamental epistemic standing”, and evidence alone cannot confer 
uniqueness. This account which recognizes an important epistemic role for both good sense and 
new evidence, Fairweather calls the “hybrid reading”. 
 
My own view is that while Fairweather is right in that good sense plays a key epistemic 
role unlike what Ivanova says, we can go back full circle to Stump and have a proper virtue 
epistemological – specifically agent reliabilist – reading of good sense. I contend that good sense 
confers not just uniqueness, but actually does determine theory choice, also providing (an agent-
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reliabilist) justification. Good sense doesn’t simply pick one and put the rest “out of the 
running”. It is not just something that prevents the proliferation of acceptable theories obtained 
by tweaking different parts of theories that don’t agree with future experiment. Good sense 
provides a basis for the uniqueness. Just as with the problem of coming up with a realist 
interpretation of Duhem, this problem of the epistemic role of good sense is not easy either given 
the sometimes confusing nature of Duhem’s claims. Nonetheless, I still think an agent-reliabilist 
VE reading of Duhem is possible and that Ivanova and Fairweather are mistaken. 
 
Ivanova claims that good sense is only offered as a post hoc explanation of theory choice 
during underdetermination and not as a justification. I argue to the contrary. Ivanova’s claim 
seems to be based on a purely externalist notion of justification. It seems to assume that there is 
one single concept of justification – specifically, externalist, evidential – and that good sense 
doesn’t fit with it. But justification can be of many kinds. Duhem says we can “very properly 
decide” (Duhem, 217) between multiple theory choices using good sense. Further, he says good 
sense strongly “comes out in favor of” one of the choices – again implying that we are compelled 
to accept its judgment even before future experiment can ratify the choice. He goes on to say, 
“Pure logic is not the only rule for our judgments; certain opinions which do not fall under the 
hammer of contradiction are in any case perfectly unreasonable." (Duhem, 217) How do we 
understand such language? If an epistemic choice is proper, forceful, and reasonable, I don’t see 
any reason we cannot properly construe it as being justified, in an internalist sense.  
 
Further, Duhem does not introduce good sense as a merely post hoc explanation. He says, 
we can “properly decide” between the various options of theories using good sense. “Properly 
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decide” very much implies an active role for good sense during underdetermination. Duhem 
presents elaborate and careful characterizations of different kinds of minds and puts forward 
quite clearly, normative merits of cultivating/ possessing one kind of mind over the other as far 
as physics goes (the supple or the strong and narrow over the ample, broad and weak).  Good 
sense is but a feature of the supple mind. It is not introduced all of a sudden as a new idea to just 
“save the (meta)phenomenon” of theory choice during underdetermination. It is a smooth and 
natural continuation of Duhem’s views on the mind of the theorist, which he articulates way 
before he comes to this problem of underdetermination, in one of the early chapters in Aim and 
Structure.  In fact, Duhem’s view that physicists don’t actually actively choose hypotheses at all, 
and that they “come to his mind” when his mind is ready to receive them, clearly reveals the 
agent reliabilist in Duhem. 
 
Finally, Greco’s account of agent reliabilist justification seems to lend itself to Duhem 
very well. Reliable cognitive character justifies beliefs it produces and further, it is subjectively 
justified: Duhem’s virtuous scientist certainly “thinks conscientiously”, following Duhem’s 
instructions of shunning passions and interests, and so a belief, here the belief in the theory 
chosen, grounded in the cognitive dispositions, here good sense, he manifests when thinking like 
this – is subjectively justified. So we seem to have comfortably accommodated Duhem in a full-
blown agent reliabilist reading. 
 
But what about the textual evidence cited by Ivanova, which seems to say Duhem did not 
think good sense justified theory choice? Why does Duhem insist that despite good sense, it is a 
successful novel prediction that has the final word? Why does he, in the context of resolving 
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underdetermination say in as many words that the method of the physicist “is justified only by 
experiment”? I contend that throughout Aim and Structure, Duhem seems to have two distinct, 
non-intersecting epistemologies: one of physics, and one outside of physics – which we may call 
philosophy. Duhem was a physicist-philosopher. He frequently claims that although there are 
absolutely no epistemic resources within physics for us to believe that physical theory latches on 
to a natural underlying order, we are forced to believe so by various factors outside of physics, 
logic and reason. It is worth noting that Duhem cites Pascal as saying that we sometimes believe 
for ‘reasons that reason does not know’, both in the context of theories converging on to a natural 
classification as well as in that of good sense during underdetermination. About the former, he 
says: “The opinion is a legitimate one because it results from an innate feeling of ours which we 
cannot justify by purely logical considerations, but which we cannot stifle completely either.” 
(Duhem, 102) Further:  
 
“No language is precise enough and flexible enough to define and formulate them; and yet, the truths 
which this common sense reveals are so clear and so certain that we cannot either mistake them or cast 
doubt on them; furthermore, all scientific clarity and certainty are a reflection of the clarity and an 
extension of the certainty of these common-sense truths.” (Duhem, 104) 
 
 Since Duhem attributes good sense to similar patterns of thinking, we can associate his 
above assertions about the legitimacy of beliefs not borne out of logic, with good sense as well. 
Given Duhem’s commitment to the moral goodness and the intellectual acuity of the supple, 
strong and narrow minds, it is very unlikely that he would think that epistemic ends justify the 
means (here, successful novel prediction justifying that which chose the theory, i.e. good sense). 
Reliabilism in fact expressly turns this around and say it is the means (by virtue of their 
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reliability) that justify the ends. So beliefs that arise from good sense are justified from an 
(internalist, deontological) agent reliabilist perspective. The justification Duhem talks about 
when he says that the methods of the physicist are justified by experiment should be when we are 
strictly within the context of physics: there it is Duhem qua physicist speaking. But from a 
broader, philosophical perspective, Duhem rather means, I think, that experiment validates the 
choice and confers certainty on it. But we can have justification without certainty, like in agent 
reliabilism. In simpler terms, the reasons for which the physicist chooses a theory are grounded 
in her good sense. However, the successful novel prediction will no doubt make the choice 
certain. 
 
Thus, Ivanova is mistaken in arguing that good sense does not provide justification. 
Fairweather’s hybrid reading is inadequate as well for it ignores the justification offered by a 
proper agent reliabilist reading of good sense. I argue that a proper agent reliabilism 
accommodates Duhem as a virtue epistemologist very well and shows us that good sense does 
offer justification for theory choice. Importantly, I have shown that it is certainly not a post hoc 
explanation but a part and parcel of Duhem’s overall views on the mind of the physicist. 
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There Is a Special Problem of Scientific Representation 
(Word count: 4998) 
 
Abstract: Callender and Cohen (2006) argue that there is no need for a special account of the 
constitution of scientific representation. I argue that scientific representation is communal 
and therefore deeply tied to the practice in which it is embedded. The communal nature is 
accounted for by licensing, the activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish a 
representation. A case study of the Lotka-Volterra model reveals how the licensure is a 
constitutive element of the representational relationship. Thus, any account of the 
constitution of scientific representation must account for licensing, meaning that there is a 
special problem of scientific representation.  
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1. Introduction 
According to many philosophers of science, representation in scientific practice is different 
from representation in other disciplines, like art and language. This claim is denied by Craig 
Callender and Jonathan Cohen (2006), who argue that representation is the same across 
disciplines. In this paper, I will argue that their view leaves the communal nature of scientific 
representation unexplained. To explain why scientific representation is dependent upon 
practice, I will introduce the concept of licensing, in which the targets of representational 
vehicles are determined through various activities performed by scientists in accord with 
broader scientific practice. I will argue that licensure is a constitutive feature of 
representation in science, indicating that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
2. Callender and Cohen’s View 
On Callender and Cohen’s evaluation, much of the literature on scientific representation has 
been “concerned with non-issues” (2006, 67). Specifically, they think there is no reason for 
philosophers of science to give a special account of the “constitution question:” “What 
constitutes the representational relation between a model and the world?” (2006, 68). In 
response to this question, they make a few observations. One is that it is “economical and 
natural to explain some types of representation in terms of other, more basic types of 
representation” (2006, 70). They also identify a general desire to have a consistent account of 
how “entities other than models—language, pictures, mental states, and so on—…represent 
the very same targets that models represent” (2006, 71). For these reasons, they suggest that  
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“scientific representation is just one more special case of derivative representation” (2006, 
75). That is to say that the representational nature of scientific vehicles is explained in the 
same way that the representational nature of linguistic entities, artwork, etc. is explained. In 
each case, and in every practice, the representational nature in question will be reduced to a 
more fundamental representational entity. So, e.g., the representational nature of a word, a 
painting, and a scientific model will each be explained in terms of the representational nature 
of mental states.  
On Callender and Cohen’s view, representation is purely stipulative: “virtually 
anything can be stipulated to be a representational vehicle for the representation of virtually 
anything…” (2006, 74). Of course, it is not the case that any stipulated representation will 
actually be useful for scientific aims. Thus, they identify pragmatic constraints which delimit 
scientific representation. However, they make it quite clear that these constraints are 
delimiting already-existing representations. As such, the pragmatic constraints are not a part 
of an account of the constitution of representation itself: “the questions about the utility of 
these representational vehicles are questions about the pragmatics of things that are 
representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status per se” (2006, 75). 
 If Callender and Cohen are correct, then we are left rethinking a rather extensive 
literature on scientific representation which typically begins with the assumption that there is 
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something special about representation in science.1 As one example among many, Mauricio 
Suárez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. His account 
takes careful notice of the aims of scientific practice, noting that mere stipulation (what he 
calls “representational force”) is insufficient for representation in science. To be a scientific 
representation, a vehicle must also permit surrogate reasoning which “allows competent and 
informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding [a target]” (2004, 773). If we accept 
Callender and Cohen’s view, then Suárez’s account and the many others like it do nothing 
more than identify some of the typical pragmatic strategies employed in delimiting 
representations for scientific uses (Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).  
3. Private Reminiscence and Communal Representation 
In order to show that the extensive literature on scientific representation has not been 
addressing a non-issue, I will need to show that there is a special problem of scientific 
representation, a feature unexplained by Callender and Cohen’s account. I submit that the 
relevant feature in need of special explanation is the communal nature of scientific 
representation, that it inherently involves reference to the practice. To see why Callender and 
                                               
1
 For more accounts which answer the constitution question in a distinct way, see the work of 
Ronald Giere (1988, 2004), Bas van Fraassen (1980, 2008), RIG Hughes (1997), Steven 
French, James Ladyman, and Otávio Bueno (French and Ladyman 1999; Bueno and French 
2011), and Gabriele Contessa (2007). For an overview of these accounts of scientific 
representation among others, see Brandon Boesch (2015) and Mauricio Suárez (2015).  
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Cohen’s view is unable to account for the communal nature of scientific representation, 
consider what I call ‘reminiscence’, a representational relationship which lacks the same 
communal feature. It is defined schematically as the following:2 
Some X is reminiscent of some Y for some agent A provided that when A 
thinks about or experiences X, she thinks about or experiences Y and 
attributes some connection between X and Y.  
So, for example, a drawing can be reminiscent of my nephew, the smell of honeysuckle can 
be reminiscent of golfing, etc.  
 There are three noteworthy features of reminiscence. First, the representational nature 
of reminiscence can be reduced to the representational nature of more fundamental entities. 
For example, I can explain the drawing’s reminiscence of my nephew in virtue of the mental 
state produced by the drawing (which is about my nephew, who created it). Second, 
stipulation is sufficient to create an instance of reminiscence. For example, I could draw a 
symbol on my hand which I create for the sake of reminding me to buy bread from the store. 
The reminiscent relationship exists because of my stipulative act.  Finally, any limitations of 
reminiscent relationships will be made for pragmatic reasons. For example, it would be for 
pragmatic reasons that I make the symbol on my hand look like a loaf of bread.  
                                               
2
 I should note that the account of reminiscence here is not meant as a detailed explanation of 
this concept, but only as an analogy to draw a point about representation.  
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 These three features of reminiscence are noteworthy because they are shared by 
Callender and Cohen’s view of scientific representation. In fact, from Callender and Cohen’s 
perspective, the only major difference between the two concepts would be the particular aims 
for which each relationship is utilized. While important, these different aims alone are 
insufficient to explain a key dissimilarity between scientific representation and reminiscence: 
while reminiscence can be private, scientific representation is necessarily communal. That 
reminiscence can be private can be seen from the fact that discussions of reminiscence can 
terminate in disagreement. For example, no one is ultimately ‘correct’ about whether or not 
someone is reminiscent of someone else. This is because reminiscence is agent-relative and 
so depends only upon some particular agent and her mental states.  
 Scientific representation relies on much more. As Suárez has argued, “representation 
is not at all ‘in the mind’ of any particular agent. It is rather ‘in the world’, and more 
particularly in the social world – as a prominent activity or set of activities carried out by 
those communities of inquirers involved in the practice of scientific modelling” (2010, 99). 
Scientific representation is not isolated from the practice in which it is embedded. It is 
necessarily communal.3  The communal nature is demonstrated from the fact that 
representational vehicles demonstrate autonomy from individual scientists and their mental 
                                               
3
 The view of representation argued for in this paper echoes many of the points made by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s in his ‘Private Language Argument’ where he argues that meaning is 
necessarily communal (1953/2009, 95e-111e).  
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states.4 For example, a scientist’s rogue stipulation that the Lotka-Volterra model (which 
represents predator-prey relations) represents population change due to genetic drift does not 
count as an instance of scientific representation. This is not only because it does not 
(pragmatically) allow for meaningful insights, but also because it ignores and discounts the 
autonomous elements of the model as understood by the broader scientific community.5 The 
autonomous elements are seen in the materiality or historicity of the representational vehicle; 
in its development, reception, and contemporary use. Understanding how and why the 
scientific object represents its target requires paying attention to these communal features. 
That is to say that the communal nature is partially constitutive of the representational 
relationship. Callender and Cohen’s account of scientific representation does not sufficiently 
account for these constitutive communal elements, as will be shown more explicitly below. 
4. Licensing 
Explaining the communal nature of scientific representation requires that attention be given 
to the material, autonomous dimensions of the representational vehicle in terms of its 
                                               
4
 This point has already been made specifically with regard to models by Morrison and 
Morgan (1999). Here, I am extending a similar point to other representational vehicles,  
including things like diagrams and figures.  
5
 Of course, there may be disagreements and developments internal to the practice about how 
to use some representation, but these disagreements and developments are part of the 
practice.  
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development, reception, and use. All of these features partially establish a scientific 
representation, through an activity I call licensing. Licensing is the set of activities of 
scientific practice by which scientists establish the representational relationship between a 
vehicle and its target. It is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship: it 
is a critical part in explaining how and why some vehicle represents its target. Seeing the 
sorts of activities involved in licensing and how they partially constitute the representational 
relationship will require that we pay close attention to the historical development, reception, 
and use of actual instances of scientific representation.  
4.1 Licensing in Artistic Representation 
A similar sort of licensing is present in representation in art, and so an initial pass on 
the concept as it applies to artistic practice will be helpful to draw an analogy to licensing in 
science.6 To see the role of licensing in artistic representation, consider an example. The 
mere stipulation that Pablo Picasso’s Guernica should represent the pain of cyberbullying is 
clearly insufficient to make it represent this target. Understanding how Guernica is 
representational involves an awareness of communal features: Picasso’s intentions within the 
environment in which he created the painting, how the painting was received by viewers in 
the years following its creation, and how it is understood today. With these features in mind, 
                                               
6
 It is somewhat contentious to draw conclusions about the nature of representation in science 
by appeal to art; see e.g. Bueno and French (2011). Nonetheless, it is a common technique in 
discussions of scientific representation; see e.g. Suárez (2004).  
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it is clear that Guernica represents the pain and suffering of the people of Guernica who had 
been bombed by axis forces at the request of Francisco Franco and the Spanish Nationalists. 
The licensing here is a constitutive element of Guernica’s representational nature: without 
these features, it is not clear whether or how the painting would manage to represent anything 
at all. 
 Licensing also occurs outside of the scope of authorial intent, when the artistic 
community comes to accept that a piece of art is representational in a way that was not 
intended by the author. A good example can be taken from an anecdote related by the author 
Flannery O’Connor: 
[A] student asked me…: “Miss O’Connor, what is the significance of the 
Misfit’s hat?” Of course, I had no idea the Misfit’s hat was significant, but 
finally I managed to say, “Its significance is to cover his head.” (1988, 853) 
The Misfit is a key character in O’Connor’s famous short story, “A Good Man is Hard to 
Find,” and, as such, it would not be surprising for his wardrobe to be importantly 
representational. Her answer indicates that while she did not intend any representational 
target for the hat, there may yet be one. If the hat is representational, it will not be due to her 
authorial intent, but rather due to the views of the broader artistic community. 
 Let me make it very clear that the licensure so far described is not already accounted 
for by elements of Callender and Cohen’s account. First, notice that none of these means of 
licensing is a mere pragmatic limitation of already existing representations. It is not as if 
Guernica represents anything and everything, but is then limited by the contexts of Picasso, 
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audiences, and art historians. These contexts are a crucial part of understanding why it 
represents at all. Nor is the licensing mere stipulation. O’Connor leaves it open that there 
may be a representational target for the Misfit’s hat, even though she did not stipulate one. A 
single reader’s stipulation alone is insufficient to make it a representation, since the target 
must also fit well with the Misfit’s characteristics, with O’Connor’s general themes as 
understood by literary critics and audiences alike, and so on. Once again, these contexts are a 
critical part of establishing the representational nature of the hat. 
4.2 Licensing in Scientific Representation: A Case Study 
The unique aims of science indicate that the licensing of scientific representation is of a 
different kind than the licensing in art. All the same, licensing similarly plays a critical role in 
establishing scientific representation. According to Tarja Knuuttila, case studies of scientific 
representation have revealed that it is “a complicated phenomenon” and “a laborious art” 
(2014, 304).  Understanding the nature of licensing and its role in the complexities of 
scientific representation will be best accomplished by examining the complicated features 
seen in the context of a case study. Examples could be made of any type of representational 
vehicle, like the masterful case study of a scientific figure made by Bruno Latour (1999).  I 
will take as my example the Lotka-Volterra model, since its development exhibits interesting 
features, many of which have already been widely discussed by other philosophers (e.g. 
Knuuttila and Loettgers 2011, forthcoming).  
 As mentioned above, the Lotka-Volterra model is used by ecologists to represent 
predator-prey relations. It had its beginnings in the independent work of two different 
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scientists, Vito Volterra and Alfred Lotka. In understanding the representational nature of 
this model, it is important to pay attention to the licensing through its historical development. 
This attention includes noticing things like the way that the construction of the model by 
Lotka, Volterra, and others has been responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims. 
These historical and practice-centered features of the model’s development reveal the partial 
autonomy of its representational nature. These features constitute the licensing which is itself 
partially constitutive of the representational nature of the model since understanding how and 
why the model represents its targets requires attending to these features. Let us now turn to 
examine these features in more detail. 
 Consider first the development of the model by Volterra, who was “motivated by the 
goal of reproducing the kind of oscillating behavior that was observed empirically in fishery 
statistics” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 19). His aim to address a theoretical 
question with an empirically useful model is central not only to understanding how the model 
historically came about, but in understanding how it represents its targets. Consider how 
Volterra described his project and the aims which permeate his description:  
Let us seek to express in words the way the phenomenon proceeds roughly: 
afterwards let us translate these words into mathematical language. This leads 
to the formulation of differential equations. If then we allow ourselves to be 
guided by the methods of analysis we are led much farther than the language 
and ordinary reasoning would be able to carry us and can formulate precise 
mathematical laws. These do not contradict the results of observation. Rather 
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the most important of these seems in perfect accord with the statistical results. 
(1928, 5)  
Volterra’s actual process of moving from words, to equation, to application of results (for 
both theoretical and empirical purposes) first involved creating an equation to account for the 
population change of a single species. He then added additional species and modelled 
interactions under different conditions, including, notably, contending for the same food and 
the predation of one species upon the other. Using these models, he demonstrated “three 
fundamental laws of the fluctuations of the two species living together” (1928, 20). He then 
applied these theoretical laws of predator-prey relations to the empirical case which had 
prompted his analysis, the peculiar rise in predator populations during the decrease of fishing 
of prey populations in the Adriatic Sea during World War I (1928, 21).  
Why does Volterra’s model represent these theoretical features of predator-prey 
relations? Why does it represent the populations of fish in the Adriatic during World War I? 
It represents these targets because, through a series of steps of analysis, revision, and 
development, each of which was responsive to certain theoretical and empirical aims 
understood and described in his account, Volterra established this representational nature. 
Indeed, as explained by Knuuttila and Loettgers (forthcoming), the historical development of 
this model has a much more extended history than the one Volterra described in the two 
papers where he first introduced it (1926, 1928). The model is a representation of its target 
not by mere stipulation and pragmatic constraint, but through careful and attentive 
construction of equations which ensure that the model functions in the wider theoretical 
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contexts and can explain the relevant empirical aims. In short, the model represents its targets 
because Volterra so licensed it by building into the model these external, autonomous 
representational features. Without these features, how or what would it represent? 
Consider another instance of licensing in the development of the Lotka-Volterra 
model, this time by Lotka. His development proceeded with a different aim than Volterra: 
“instead of starting from the different simple cases and generalizing from them, he developed 
a highly abstract and general model template that could be applied in modelling various kinds 
of systems” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 13). He began by creating a very general 
equation which described “evolution as a process of redistribution of matter among the 
several components…of the system” (Knuuttila and Loettgers forthcoming, 15). In two 
papers (1920a, 1920b), Lotka applied this general equation to particular cases in biology and 
chemistry, in each case coming to theoretical conclusions about the systems in question. For 
example, in applying the equation to a predator-prey system, he concluded that there would 
be “undamped oscillation continuing indefinitely” among the two populations (1920a, 414). 
Lotka did not specifically apply the results to any empirical data, but instead used his results 
to come to theoretical conclusions about these relationships which he then connected to 
theoretical ecological principles drawn from Herbert Spencer’s First Principles (1920a, 414).  
 Why does Lotka’s model represent its theoretical target? What constitutes this 
representational relationship? Any attempt to explain the representational relationship must 
reference the way in which Lotka derived his general equation and the way in which he 
applies it to the specific cases. That is to say, the representational nature of the model is 
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constructed through the scientific activities performed by Lotka during the development of 
the model. Lotka does not merely stipulate that his model targets predator-prey relationships. 
Instead, he builds this ability into the model during the development of the general equation 
and further constructs this ability in his application of the question to specific targets. In so 
doing, he partially constructs the representational nature of the model—he licenses it as a 
representation through activities in accord with the broader practice. 
 The Lotka-Volterra model’s history since its initial development is long and complex. 
As described by Alan Berryman (1992), one development was a shift in the 1940s to the use 
of a logistic formulation which allowed for attention to be placed on predator-prey ratios 
rather than products. Another development, which occurred around the same time, was the 
use of a predator functional response which introduced a nonlinear rate of death for the prey. 
These developments license new representational targets by expanding and altering the 
model to make it responsive to different theoretical or empirical aims, by removing 
idealizations, or otherwise by allowing for different theoretical conclusions. Many other 
variations of the Lotka-Volterra model exist, licensed by similar developments. Additionally, 
the original formulation of the model is still used in introductory textbooks on ecology (see, 
e.g. Cain, Bowman, and Hacker 2008). The representational nature of the model in each of 
these cases is partially established by these features of the model which stand independent of 
any mental states of scientists and students alike. In short, the constitution of the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model relies deeply upon these historical 
features of licensing as understood by the broader scientific community.  
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Let me briefly underscore the importance of these activities of licensing to the 
representational nature of the Lotka-Volterra model by imagining a scenario in which these 
features are absent. Suppose that Volterra and Lotka had proceeded differently. Suppose that 
they began, for no particular reason, by drawing a five-pointed star and stipulated that it 
represented predator-prey relations. What is the status of this star, qua representation? It is 
not as if the star really is a scientific representation of predator-prey relations albeit a bad 
representation (because it does a poor job of meeting certain pragmatic constraints). Rather, 
the star plainly fails to be a scientific representation at all. Scientific representations are 
constructed to assist in answering certain questions, explaining certain phenomena, 
understanding certain target systems. It is through licensing that scientists build into the 
vehicle the features capable of achieving these aims. A vehicle without licensing does not 
have this ability and so it is not just a bad representation. It is not a representation at all. 
Indeed, a discussion of the representational nature of vehicles which lack these features is 
either infelicitous or involves an equivocation of the word ‘representation.’ A view of 
scientific representation which equally counts both the star and the Lotka-Volterra model as 
full scientific representations, even if it specifies one as good and one as bad, underestimates 
the role of these historical features of the model. They are not external to the representational 
nature of the vehicle, but are themselves an essential constitutive feature of this 
representational nature: without these features, the vehicle is not a scientific representation at 
all.  
5. The Special Problem of Scientific Representation  
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If I am right that licensing is a necessary constitutive feature of scientific representation 
which explains its communal nature, then contrary to Callender and Cohen’s suggestion, we 
cannot pull the question of the constitution of representation away from questions of practice. 
A scientific object represents its target not (only) because there is some stipulation and 
pragmatic constraint, but also in virtue of licensing: the context in which it was created, the 
application of theoretical and empirical constraints, the awareness of and management of 
idealizations, and the history of its reception and use. Accounting for whether and how a 
scientific object represents its target will always require reference to these features which 
partially establish the representational nature.  Thus, there is a special problem of scientific 
representation.  
I should note that I am not here arguing for a stronger counter claim to Callender and 
Cohen which says that accounts of the representational nature of mental states are without 
any value to the constitution question of scientific representation. But my argument does 
indicate that an account of the representational nature of mental states alone is insufficient to 
account for scientific representation. Even if tomorrow we had a solid, universally accepted 
account of the representational nature of mental states, we would not yet have a complete 
account of scientific representation. We would still need an account of the deep reliance that 
it has upon the practice in which it is embedded. Thus, while our discussion of the 
constitution of scientific representation might include reference to the representational nature 
of mental states, it must also include reference to what I have described here as the licensing 
by the practice.  
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A different concern is that the use of the word ‘special’ is a bit deceptive. What I have 
identified here as the ‘special’ problem of scientific representation turns out to be a common 
feature of representation across disciplines, since, for example, I have suggested that it holds 
of artistic representation as well. While it is true that, according to my argument, an account 
of artistic representation will likely take account of licensing as well, it does not indicate that 
it is the same type of licensing in both practices. Indeed, given the unique aims that mark off 
scientific practice, its licensing can reasonably be expected to be correspondingly unique. 
That is to say that understanding, knowing, or explaining the empirical world are special 
aims, and therefore subject to special sorts of licensing. Scientific representation remains 
special because these features merit special attention.  
We might also wonder whether it is right to continue to discuss scientific representation 
as a whole. If understanding representation in science requires in part that we understand the 
way in which scientists of a practice develop, utilize, and adapt these representational 
devices, then it is at least possible that these activities will be different within different 
domains. For example, the licensure of representations in physics might be rather different 
from that of economics. My suspicion is that, given the common broad scale aims of the 
various domains, we can still say some general things about representation in science as a 
whole.  Nonetheless, we would do well to pay attention to representation as it occurs in these 
more localized contexts. Moving forward from this conclusion to develop further insights 
about the nature of scientific representation will involve analyzing specific representational 
objects or strategies as they occur in scientific practice, perhaps taking hints and clues from 
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in-the-field investigations like those conducted by sociologists of science, e.g. those in Lynch 
and Woolgar (1990), Latour (1999), and Coopmans et al. (2014).  
6. Conclusion 
Though Callender and Cohen’s view remains a formidable approach to the constitution 
question of scientific representation, I have endeavored in this paper to show why their 
account is insufficient, and thus why this question merits continued attention by philosophers 
of science. Representation in science is deeply tied up with the practice in which it is 
embedded. The communal nature of scientific representation can be seen in the way that 
science, as a practice, partially constructs its representations through the activities of 
licensing. The licensing is not the pragmatic limitation of some already existing 
representations, but is itself a constitutive element of the representational relationship. Any 
account of what it is for a scientific object to represent its target will necessarily involve 
reference to licensing. Thus, there is a special problem of scientific representation.  
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Dissolving the missing heritability problem 
Abstract: Heritability estimates obtained in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are much 
lower than those of traditional quantitative methods. This has been called the “missing 
heritability problem”. By analyzing and comparing these two kinds of methods, we first show 
that the estimates obtained by traditional methods involve some terms that GWAS do not. 
Second, the estimates obtained by GWAS do not take into account epigenetic factors 
transmitted across generations, whilst they are included in the estimates of traditional 
quantitative methods. Once these two factors are taken into account, we show that the missing 
heritability problem can be largely dissolved. Finally, we briefly contextualize our analysis within 
a current discussion on how non-additive factors relate to the heritability estimates in GWAS.  
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1. Introduction.  
One pervasive problem encountered when estimating the heritability of quantitative traits is that 
the estimates obtained from Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are much smaller than 
that calculated by traditional quantitative methods. This problem has been called the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011). Take human height for example. Traditional 
quantitative methods deliver a heritability estimate of about 0.8, while the first estimates using 
GWAS were 0.05 (Maher 2008). More recent GWAS methods have revised this number and 
estimate the heritability of height to be at most 0.45 (Yang et al. 2010; Turkheimer 2011). Yet, 
half of the heritability is still missing. 
In quantitative genetics, heritability is defined as the portion of phenotypic variation in a 
population that is caused by genetic difference (Downes 2015). Traditionally, this portion is 
estimated by measuring the phenotypic resemblance of genetically related individuals without 
identifying at the molecular level (more particularly the DNA level) the genetic causes of 
phenotypic variation. GWAS have been developed in order to locate the DNA sequences that 
influence the target trait and estimate their effects, especially for common complex diseases 
such as obesity, diabetes and heart disease (Visscher et al. 2012; Frazer et al. 2009). As for height, 
almost 300 000 common DNA variants in human populations that associate with it have been 
identified by GWAS (Yang et al. 2010). Granted by many that the heritability estimates obtained 
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by traditional quantitative methods are quite reliable, the method(s) used in GWAS have been 
questioned (Eichler et al. 2010).  
A number of partial solutions to the missing heritability problem have been proposed, with 
most of them focusing on improving the methodological aspects of GWAS in order to provide 
a more accurate estimate (e.g., Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Some authors have also 
suggested that heritable epigenetic factors might account for part of the missing heritability. For 
instance, in Eichler et al. (2000, 488), Kong notes that “[e]pigenetic effects beyond imprinting 
that are sequence-independent and that might be environmentally induced but can be 
transmitted for one or more generations could contribute to missing heritability.” Furrow et al. 
(2011) also claim that “[e]pigenetic variation, inherited both directly and through shared 
environmental effects, may make a key contribution to the missing heritability.” Others have 
made the same point (e.g., McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008; Johannes et al. 2008). Yet, in the 
face of this idea one might notice what appears to be a contradiction: how can epigenetic factors 
account for the missing heritability, if the heritability is about genes?  
To answer this question as well as to analyze the missing heritability problem, we compare 
the assumptions underlying both heritability estimates in traditional quantitative methods and 
those in GWAS. We argue that a) the heritability estimates of traditional methods include some 
terms associated with broad-sense heritability (�²), as opposed to narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$); 
b) although GWAS are supposed to get ℎ$, ℎ$ relies on an evolutionary concept of the gene 
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that can include epigenetic factors while heritability estimates obtained from GWAS do not. 
With these two points being illustrated, we expect the missing heritability problem to be largely 
dissolved as well as setting the stage for further discussions. 
The reminder of the paper will be divided into three parts. First, we briefly introduce how 
heritability is estimated in two traditional methods, namely twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression. We show that the estimates obtained by each methods include some non-additive 
elements and consequently correspond neither to �² nor to ℎ$, but to a notion in between 
which we term “broader-sense heritability”. Second, we outline the basic rationale underlying 
GWAS and illustrate that they estimate heritability by considering solely DNA variants. By 
arguing that the notion of additive genetic variance does not necessarily refer to DNA sequences 
but can also refer to epigenetic factors in traditional quantitative methods, we show that the 
notion of heritability estimated in GWAS is more restrictive than that of traditional quantitative 
methods, and term this notion “DNA-based narrow-sense heritability”. Finally, in Section 4, 
based on the conclusions from Section 2 and Section 3, we claim that the gap between the 
heritability estimates of traditional quantitative methods and those of GWAS can be explained 
away in two major ways. One consists in recognizing that if non-additive variance was removed 
from the estimates obtained via traditional methods, they would be lower. The other consists in 
recognizing that if epigenetic factors were taken into account by GWAS, the heritability 
estimates obtained would be higher. We conclude Section 4 by showing how our analysis sheds 
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some light on a discussion about the role played by non-additive factors in the missing 
heritability problem. Because human height has been “the poster child” of the missing 
heritability problem (Turkheimer 2011, 232), we will use this example to illustrate each of our 
points. 
 
2. Heritability in Traditional Quantitative Methods.  
According to quantitative genetics, the phenotypic variance (�& ) of a population can be 
explained by two components, its genotypic variance (�') and its environmental variance (�(). 
In the absence of gene-environment interaction and correlation, we thus have: 
�& = �' + �(  (1) 
From there broad-sense heritability (�$) is defined as: 
�$ =
+,
+-
   (2) 
�'  can further be portioned into the additive genetic variance (�.), the dominance genetic 
variance (�/) and the epistasis genetic variance (�0). We have: 
�& = �. + �/ + �0 + �(     (3) 
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where �. is the variance due to hypothetical genes making an equal and additive contribution 
to the trait studied (e.g., height). �/ is the variance due to interactions between alleles at one 
locus for diploid organisms, and �0 is the variance due to interactions between alleles from 
different loci. �/ and �0 together represent the variance due to particular combinations of 
genes of an organism. 
Since genotypes of sexual organisms recombine at each generation via reproduction, 
dominance and epistasis effects are not transmitted stably across generations, only additive 
genetic effects are. Therefore, �.  is the variance due to stably transmitted genetic effects. 
Narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) measures to what extent variation in phenotypes is determined 
by the variation in genes transmitted from parent(s) to offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 
123). It is defined as:  
ℎ$ =
+1
+-
                                                            (4) 
ℎ$ is important in breeding studies and is used by evolutionary theorists who are interested in 
making evolutionary projections of a trait within a population across generations. 
To know ℎ$, both �. and �& must be known. �&, for most quantitative traits (including 
height), can be directly estimated by measuring individuals. However, there is no direct way to 
estimate �. in traditional quantitative methods. The traditional way to estimate it requires two 
elements. First, one needs a population-level measure of a phenotypic resemblance of family 
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relative pairs1. This measure is obtained by calculating the covariance of the phenotypic values for 
those pairs. The choice of what sort of relatives to use depends on what data is available. The 
second element is the genetic relation between family pairs. It indicates the percentage of genetic 
materials the pairs are expected to share. With these two elements, one can estimate how much 
the genes shared contribute to the phenotypic resemblance. In a large population with different 
phenotypes, one can then estimate how much the additive genetic difference contributes to 
phenotypic difference in this population, which estimates ℎ$. 
For simplicity, traditional quantitative methods usually assume that there is neither gene-
environment interaction nor correlation (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 131). Thus the covariance 
between the phenotypic values (e.g., height) of pairs equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant and epistasis genetic covariance, plus the environmental covariance. A general 
equation for traditional quantitative methods can be written as follows: 
��� �6, �$ = ��� �6 + �6 + �6 + �6, �$ + �$ + �$ + �$ =
																														��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$ + ��� �6, �$  (5)          
where indexes “1” and “2” represent the two family members for each pair studied. 
��� �6, �$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one individual with the other. 
                                                
1
	 Or the mean values of  their class (e.g., offspring) depending on the particular method used.	
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� , � , �  and �  represent additive effects, dominant effects, epistasis effects and 
environmental effects respectively. 
The most commonly used traditional methods for estimating heritability are twin studies. 
In these studies one already knows that monozygotic twins share almost 100% of their genetic 
material while dizygotic twins about 50%. The environment is typically divided into the part of 
the environment that affects both twins in the same way (the shared environment, �) and the 
part of the environment that affects one twin but not the other (the unique environment, �) 
(Silventoinen et al. 2003). Hence, in the absence of interaction and correlation between � and 
�, we have:  
� = 	� + �     (6) 
Assuming epistasis effects to be negligible (a common assumption in twin studies), by inserting 
Equation (6) into Equation (5), we have: 
��� �>6, �>$ = ��� �>6 + �>6 + �>6 + �>6, �>$ + �>$ + �>$ + �>$ 	=
																						��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$ + ��� �>6, �>$   (7) 
where indexes “T1” and “T2” represent the two twins for each twin pair studied. 
��� �>6, �>$ 	is the covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other. 
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Because each twin’s unique environment by definition is independent of that of the other 
twin, ��� �>6, �>$  is zero for both monozygotic and dizygotic twins. Given that variance is 
a special case of covariance when the two variables are identical, and that for monozygotic twins 
�>6, �>6, and �>6equal to �>$, �>$, and �>$ respectively, we can formulate the equation 
from Equation (7) as follows: 
���?> �>6, �>$ = �. + �/ + �@      (8) 
where ���?> �>6, �>$  is the covariance between the phenotypic values of monozygotic twin 
pairs studied. 
By contrast, dizygotic twins are expected to share half of their genes, which means that the 
covariance between the phenotypic values of one twin with the other of dizygotic twin pairs 
studied (���/> �>6, �>$ ) is expected to be equal to half of the additive genetic variance, a 
quarter of dominant variance 2 , and all of the shared environmental variance (with 
��� �>6, �>$  also to be zero). We have: 
���/> �>6, �>$ =
6
$
�. +
6
B
�/ + �@      (9) 
It is classically assumed that �@  in Equation (8) and (9) is the same. That is to say, for both 
monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs, it is assumed that the shared environment would act in 
                                                
2  For each given gene with two alleles, the possibility that dizygotic twins have the same 
genotype is one quarter. 
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the same way if the pair has been reared together.3 �@  can be cancelled by subtracting Equation 
(9) from Equation (8). The heritability can then be estimated as follows:  
ℎCDE
$ =
$ @FGHD &DI,&DJ K@FGLD &DI,&DJ
+-
=
+1
+-
+
M
J
+L
+-
      (10) 
We call ℎCDE
$  broader-sense heritability (the index “b” is for “broader-sense”) from twin studies, 
because the resulting estimate (which is about 0.8 for height) provides an accurate estimate of 
neither �$ nor ℎ$, although it is closer to �$ than to ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 172). 
That is to say, it corresponds to a definition of heritability that includes some elements of broad-
sense heritability but not all of it. 
Another often used traditional quantitative method to estimate heritability involves a 
parent-offspring regression. This method also assumes neither gene-environment interaction 
nor correlation, the covariance between the height of parents (one or the mean of both) and the 
mean of their offspring (Falconer and Mackay 1996, 164), equals to additive genetic covariance, 
dominant covariance (the epistasis covariance is assumed to be small and is not included), plus 
environmental covariance. Hence, Equation (5) can be formulated as follows:  
                                                
3 This assumption might be problematic because monozygotic twins are often treated more 
similarly by their parents than are dizygotic twins, and monozygotic twins are more likely to 
share a placenta than dizygotic twins. The difficulty can be mitigated by using adoption twin 
studies in which the environments for twins are random on average. But large adoption twins’ 
data are exceedingly difficult to get (Griffiths 2005). 
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��� �& , �N = ��� �& + �& + �& + �& , �N + �N + �N + �N =
																														��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N                  (11)                   
where indexes “P” and “O” represent the “parents” and the “offspring”.  
Two assumptions are then made. The first one is that there is no dominant effects 
transmitted from the parents to the offspring assuming the parents are unrelated (Doolittle 
2012, 178), which means ��� �& , �N  is nil. Another assumption is that there is no 
correlation between the parents’ environment and the offspring’s environment so that 
��� �& , �N  in Equation (11) is also nil. Given that on average, parents share in expectation 
50% of genes with their offspring (parents and offspring share half of their genes), it leaves 
Equation (11) with a result of half of additive genetic variance (
6
$
�.). Given �&, ℎ
$ can be 
estimated straightforwardly.  
But the above two assumptions are problematic. First, the assumption of unrelated parents 
might be violated because of assortative mating in humans resulting in parents to be more 
genetically similar than two randomly chosen individuals (Guo et al. 2014). Hence, 
��� �& , �N  is likely to be non-nil. Second, because the environments experienced by 
individuals are likely to be more similar within a family line, ��� �& , �N  might not be nil, 
either. If we take these two factors into consideration, the covariance of the parents and their 
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offspring is equal to half of additive genetic variance, plus a variance term representing effects 
due to dominance and similarities between environments. This can be written formally as:   
��� �& , �N = ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N + ��� �& , �N =	
6
$
�. + �/&(@      (12) 
where �/&(@  represents the variance due to some dominance and environmental correlation 
effects between the parents and the offspring studied.                                        
The heritability can then be estimated by doubling the parent–offspring covariance in 
Equation (12) and dividing the total phenotypic variance of the population as follows: 
ℎC-PQ
$ =
$@FG &-,&P
+-
=
+1
+-
+
$+L&RS
+-
                                       (13) 
For similar reasons as with the heritability estimates from twin studies, we call ℎC-PQ
$  broader-
sense heritability (with the index “b” also being for “broader-sense”) from parent-offspring 
regression. Indeed, although it is often assumed that ℎC-PQ
$  represent ℎ$ (Falconer and Mackay 
1996, 147), the resulting estimate (also about 0.8 for height) is broader than ℎ$ as it can include 
a component led by dominance variance and environmental correlation between parent and 
offspring. 
To conclude this section, heritability estimates in both twin studies and parent-offspring 
regression include an extra term when compared to ℎ$, but they do not correspond to �². For 
this reason we regroup them under the term ℎC
$ for “broader-sense heritability”, such that: 
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ℎC
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$                                                     (14) 
where ℎFTUVW
$  is the part of heritability contributed by the extra component(s) representing 
non-additive variance. 
 
3. Heritability in GWAS.  
Although any two unrelated individuals share about 99.5% of their DNA sequences, their 
genomes differ at specific nucleotide locations (Aguiar and Istrail 2013). Given two DNA 
fragments at the same locus of two individuals, if these fragments differ at a single nucleotide, 
they represent two variants of a Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP). GWAS focus on SNPs 
across the whole genome that occur in the population with a probability larger than 1% which 
are called common SNPs. If one variant of a common SNP, compared to another one, is 
associated with a significant change on the trait studied, then this SNP is a marker for a DNA 
region (or a gene) that leads to phenotypic variation. For a polygenic trait like height, if we can 
detect all the SNPs that associate with it, then all the DNA difference makers that determine 
height difference can be located.  
The development of commercial SNP chips makes it possible to rapidly detect common 
SNPs of DNA samples from all the participants involved in a study. By using a series of 
statistical tests, it can be investigated at the population level whether each SNP associates with 
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that target trait. The choice of the statistical tests depends on the data available as well as the 
trait studied. For quantitative traits like height, the most common approach is to make an 
analysis of variance table and assess whether the mean height of a group with one variant at one 
nucleotide is significantly different from the group with another variant of the same SNP4 
(Bush and Moore 2012). With all the SNPs associated with height being detected, data from the 
HapMap project, which provides a list of SNPs that are markers for most of the common DNA 
variants in human populations (Consortium, International HapMap 3 2010), is used to map the 
associated SNPs with common DNA variants. These mapped DNA variants, to be 
distinguished from DNA variants that do not affect the target trait, have been called “causal 
variants” (Visscher et al. 2012).  
Based on the readings of SNP chips as well as further independent tests for SNPs, the 
effects of the associated SNPs (markers for causal DNA variants) on the trait can be calculated. 
By estimating the phenotypic variance contributed by these SNPs and the total phenotypic 
variance of the population, the heritability of causal DNA variants can be estimated as the ratio 
of the phenotypic variance caused by all the associated SNPs compared to the total phenotypic 
variance of the population (Weedon et al. 2008). Since it is common for biologists to assume 
                                                
4  For categorical (often binary disease/control) traits, the association test used involves 
measuring an odds ratio, namely the ratio of  the odds of  disease for individuals having a specific 
variant of  a SNP, and the odds of  disease for individuals who have another variant at the same 
locus. If  the odds ratio of  a common SNP is significantly different from 1, then that SNP is 
considered to be associated with the disease (Bush and Moore 2012). 
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that genes are only made up of pieces of DNA, it is thought that the variance obtained from all 
the causal DNA variants represent exactly the additive genetic variance, and the heritability 
estimated by GWAS should match narrow-sense heritability (ℎ$) (Yang et al. 2010; Visscher et 
al. 2006). However, the assumption that additive genetic effects are solely based on DNA 
sequences is problematic when faced with the evidence of epigenetic inheritance. 
As was mentioned in Section 2, traditional quantitative methods for estimating heritability 
are based on measuring phenotypic values and genetic relations without reaching the molecular 
level. The genes are not defined physically, but functionally as heritable difference makers 
(Falconer and Mackay 1996, 123). In other words, they are theoretical units defined by their 
effects on the phenotype. With the discovery of DNA structure in 1953, it was thought that the 
originally theoretical genes were found in the physical DNA molecules. Since then, biologists 
commonly refer to genes as DNA molecules and this assumption is also made by researchers 
of GWAS. As [author] claim, this step was taken too hastily. If there is physical material, other 
than DNA pieces, that can affect the phenotype and be transmitted stably across generations, 
then it should also be thought to play the role that contributes to additive genetic effects. 
Many studies have provided evidence for epigenetic inheritance 5 , namely the stable 
transmission of epigenetic modifications across multiple generations and affect organism’s traits 
                                                
5 We use the notion of  “epigenetic inheritance” in the broad sense that refers to the inheritance 
of  phenotypic features via causal pathways other than the inheritance of  nuclear DNA 
(Griffiths and Stotz 2013, 112). 
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(e.g., Youngson and Whitelaw 2008; Dias and Ressler 2014). A classical example of this is the 
methylation pattern on the promoter of the agouti gene in mice (Morgan et al. 1999). It shows 
that mice with the same genotype but different methylation levels display a range of colors of 
their fur, and the patterns of DNA methylation can be inherited through generations causing 
heritable phenotypic variations. Epigenetic factors such as self-sustaining loops, chromatin 
modifications and three-dimensional structures in the cell can also be transmitted over multiple 
generations (Jablonka et al. 2014). Studies on various species suggest that epigenetic inheritance 
is likely to be ‘ubiquitous’ (Jablonka and Raz 2009).  
The increasing evidence of epigenetic inheritance seriously challenges the restriction of the 
concept of the gene in the evolutionary sense to be materialized only in DNA. Relying on 
traditional quantitative methods, it is impossible to distinguish whether additive genetic variance 
is DNA based or based on other material(s). Some transmissible epigenetic factors, which are 
not DNA based, might de facto be included into the additive genetic variance used to estimate 
ℎ². This extension of heritable units also echoes to the recent suggestion that genetic (assuming 
genes to be DNA based) and non-genetic heredity should be unified in an inclusive inheritance 
theory (Danchin 2013; Day and Bonduriansky 2010).  
To apply the idea that some epigenetic factors can lead to additive genetic effects, the 
additive variance of them (�.XYZ) should be added to the additive variance of DNA sequences 
(�.L[1) to obtain �.. Assuming there is no interaction between �.XYZ and �.L[1 , we have: 
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�. = �.L[1 + �.XYZ     (15) 
Inserting Equation (15) to Equation (4) leads to: 
ℎ$ =
+1L[1
+-
+
+1XYZ
+-
     (16) 
Here we term the first term on the right side of Equation (16) “DNA-based narrow-sense 
heritability” (ℎ/\.
$ ), and the second term “epigenetic-based narrow-sense heritability” (ℎV]^
$ ), 
we thus have: 
ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$        (17) 
 
4. Dissolving the Missing Heritability.  
As we mentioned it in Introduction, since the first successful GWAS was published in 2005 
(Klein et al. 2005), there have been a lot of proposals for methodological improvements in 
GWAS (Manolio et al. 2009; Eichler et al. 2010). Studies have been conducted according to 
those proposals that permit to obtain higher heritability estimates. Examples include increasing 
the sample sizes which has resulted in more accurate estimates (e.g., Wood et al. 2014), 
considering all common SNPs simultaneously instead of one by one which has increased the 
heritability estimates of height from 0.05 to 0.45 (see Yang et al. 2010), and conducting meta-
analyses which can lead to more accurate results when compared to single analysis (see Bush 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -88-
	
	
and Moore 2012). Biologists have also suggested to search for SNPs with lower frequencies 
than 1% in order to account for a wider range of possible causal variants (Schork et al. 2009). 
Aside from these partial improvements, our analysis reveals two reasons explaining away 
the missing heritability problem: a) In traditional quantitative methods, the heritability estimates 
include extra terms which are not presented in GWAS; b) In GWAS, heritability is estimated 
solely from causal DNA variants, while in traditional quantitative methods the additive effects 
contributed by epigenetic difference (ℎV]^
$ ) are de facto included in the estimates. 
These two reasons can be shown formally. Using our terminology, missing heritability 
(��) equals to the estimates obtained by traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$ ) minus the 
estimates obtained by GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ), which are 0.8 and 0.45 respectively in the case of height. 
Thus we have: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$
      (18) 
Replacing ℎC
$ and ℎ/\.
$  by the right hand side of Equation (14) and (17), we obtain: 
�� = ℎC
$ − ℎ/\.
$ = ℎ$ + ℎFTUVW
$ − ℎ$ − ℎV]^
$ = ℎFTUVW
$ + ℎV]^
$      (19) 
Which means that the missing heritability results from the part of heritability originating from 
epigenetic factors stably transmitted across generations, plus the part of heritability originating 
from non-additives factors. 
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Our point that part of the missing heritability can be dissolved by considering non-additive 
effects echoes to the claim that almost all GWAS to date have focused on additive effects might 
be a reason for the missing heritability (McCarthy and Hirschhorn 2008). Although there is not 
enough data to confirm that non-additive effects do explain away some part of missing 
heritability, this claim appears again and again in discussions on the missing heritability problem 
(see for instance Maher 2008; Frazer et al. 2009; Gibson 2010; Kong 2010; Moore 2010). Yang 
et al. (2010, 565) disagree with this claim and respond that “[n]on-additive genetic effects do 
not contribute to the narrow-sense heritability, so explanations based on non-additive effects 
are not relevant to the problem of missing heritability.”  
We agree with Yang et al. (2010) that non-additive effects do not contribute to ℎ². That 
said, because the heritability estimates obtained from traditional quantitative methods do not 
strictly correspond to ℎ² but include some non-additive elements, non-additive effects cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant for the missing heritability problem, though probably they are relevant 
in a way that both Yang et al. (2010) as well as their opponents did not consider.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
We have provided two ways in which the missing heritability problem can be explained away. 
First, heritability estimates from traditional quantitative methods (ℎC
$) are overestimated when 
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compared to ℎ$. The resulting estimates would be smaller if the non-additive elements were 
eliminated. Second, heritability estimates from GWAS (ℎ/\.
$ ) are underestimated when 
compared to ℎ$ because they do not take into account the additive effects of epigenetic factors 
behaving like evolutionary genes. The resulting estimates would be larger if epigenetic factors 
were taken into account. We have voluntarily stayed away from the question of whether 
heritability should be defined strictly relative to DNA sequences or if it should encompass any 
factors behaving effectively like an evolutionary gene. Our inclination is that there is no 
principled reason to exclude non-DNA transmissible factors from heritability measures, but our 
analysis does not bear on this choice. 
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1 Introduction
Scientists are often asked by political institutions to give expert advice on press-
ing questions. For instance, agencies that regulate medicines regularly resort to
expert panels, and national scientific academies give advice to the government or to
the assemblies. Even after discussing, scientific experts do not always agree on the
answer, and when they do, they may disagree on the justification for this answer.
How should decisions that involve risk assessments be taken and justified within sci-
entific expert panels? This is the central question studied in this paper. As a matter
of fact, many expert panels take decisions using the majority voting rule. This is
for instance the case in advisory committees in the European and in the American
agencies that grant medicines authorization, respectively the EMA and the FDA.1
But is it the best decision rule? Is majority voting on the final decision the best
way to aggregate different experts’ opinions, and to track their reasons? This paper
is restricted to cases in which the expert panel is asked to take a decision on only
one binary question, for instance to answer the question “Is the risk-benefit ratio
of some medicine worth it to be authorized for commercial use?”. This simple case
is already interesting as it corresponds to many real-life cases: some expert panels
are constituted on the sole purpose of answering one specific question, or are asked
to answer several but logically unrelated questions — e.g. decisions about different
medicines.
To study this problem, I introduce a novel decision-theoretic model. The true/false
decision is supposed to be taken by comparing a risk assessment a (typically, a prob-
ability) to a risk acceptability threshold t, e.g. “true” if and only if a < t. For sim-
plicity, a and t are supposed to be in [0, 1], but any quantity might go.2 It is assumed
that the n experts agree on the threshold value, but differ in their individual risk as-
sessments ak (k = 1, . . . , n) — or conversely, that they agree on the assessment, but
disagree on the threshold value. Typically, the question asked to the expert panel is
in the form “Is X’s risk below t?”. The problem studied in this paper is to determine
how the individual ak’s should be aggregated in comparison with t, so as to give the
group’s answer to this question (I shall speak equivalently of the group’s decision,
or of the group’s belief on whether the risk is below t). Compared to probability ag-
gregation theory which studies the aggregation of probabilistic opinions, the novelty
of this model lies (i) in the introduction of a threshold comparison which projects
probabilities into a binary space, and (ii) in the fact that the group has to take a
1Cf. Hauray and Urfalino (2007), Urfalino and Costa (2015).
2Real quantities can be mapped to the interval [0, 1], for instance with the function
x→ 1− 1/(1 + x)).
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stand on one binary question only, and not on a more complex agenda. Compared
to judgment aggregation theory which studies the aggregation of an interconnected
set of beliefs, the novelty is that individuals do not just have true/false beliefs but
probabilistic ones, even if the group is asked to express a true/false belief in the end.
The present problem can be considered as a first bridge between these two existing
frameworks. The best decision rule for our binary question is likely to depend on the
details of characteristics of the question, of the experts, of the available knowledge,
and on other details. My methodological approach is not to conduct a detailed study
of particular cases, but to look at features which most (interesting) cases share, so
as to find general properties of the best decision rule — what is meant by “best”
shall be discussed too.
The main claims of this paper are the following. I argue that the framework
of probability aggregation cannot help us solve the present problem (Section 2),
because the aggregation problems it considers are too general. For the aggregation
of scientific risk assessment on a specific question, a theory of its own is needed,
and I try to sketch one here. I then argue that robustness considerations clearly
legitimate majority voting on the final decision (Section 3). But when justifications
for the decisions are sought, majority voting can lead to inconsistencies and the
expert panel should aggregate on the reasons separately, before deriving logically its
decision (Section 4). Overall, the case for the majority rule is thus a mixed one.
2 Probability Aggregation and Beyond
A standard requirement for a scientific expert panel is that it provides justi-
fications for its decision. In the present model, the decision has to be consistent
with the comparison between the risk assessment and the threshold, so a minimal
justification is that the panel has a belief on the risk assessment (as all experts have
a belief on the risk assessment, it would be weird that the panel claims to refuse the
authorization while not being able to say that it believes that the risk assessment
is above the threshold). So, our problem includes as a first step the aggregation of
the individual risk assessments {ak}1≤k≤n into a single group assessment a — deeper
justifications for the group’s decision are contemplated in Section 4. The group’s
decision is supposed to be consistent with this assessment, so pragmatically the eas-
iest way to do so may be for the group to first aggregate the individual assessments,
and then compare the result to the threshold.
Majority voting on the decision itself is a standard way for expert groups to
take decisions, but it does not proceed in that way. Can it be objected that, within
our model, it lacks the requirement that the group should be attributed a belief
3
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on the risk assessment? No, for the following reason. The result of the majority
vote is “true” if and only if a majority of agents vote “true”, i.e. if and only if a
majority of agents have a numerical assessment below the threshold, i.e. if and only
if the median of the agents’ assessments is below the threshold. In other words, the
majority voting rule on the decision is equivalent to considering that the group’s
assessment is the median of the individual assessments. Hence, majority voting is in
the race. What are the other challengers? A standard way to aggregate probabilities
is to make averages. The linear average is defined as
∑
k ak, and it can be generalized
with weights ωk ≥ 0 and
∑
k ωk = 1, as
∑
k ωkak, to take into account unequal
degrees of expertise on the question.3 Other averages are the geometric average or
the harmonic average. Our problem is to determine which probability aggregation
rule, followed by the threshold, is the best one in our problem. It is easy to see that
these various probability aggregation rules can give different binary decisions for the
group.4
Pooling probability functions has been studied for several years in the theory
of probability aggregation (for surveys, cf. Dietrich and List forth., Martini and
Sprenger forth., section 3). Can its results be used to select the best aggregation
rule in our problem? I shall argue that unfortunately no. The framework of proba-
bility aggregation adopts an axiomatic method: it starts by stating several axioms
which appear as desirable properties for the pooling function and then studies which
function or aggregation rule, if any, satisfies them. The axioms considered in Dietrich
and List’s survey can be expressed in our case as:
• Independence: the group’s probability a only depends on the individual
probabilities ak.
• Unanimity preservation: if all agents’ probabilities ak are the same, then
the group’s probability a is this one too.
• Three Bayesian axioms: if some information is learned by all individuals,
then the group’s decision changes by conditionalization on that event.
3It is akin to the iterated Lehrer-Wagner model which, starting from respect weights agent have
to one another, provides a single probability for the group. However, the iterated Lehrer-Wagner
model, and even more its normative interpretation, have been subjected to many criticisms (for a
survey, cf. e.g. Martini and Sprenger forth. section 4). As a descriptive model, it is not useful for
the present discussion.
4Consider for instance the median and the linear average, with three experts with
a1 = a2 = 0.04, a3 = 0.10, and t = 0.05. A majority voting on the decision gives a “true” as
two experts on three assess the risk to be below the threshold. The linear average (with equal
weights) is 0.06, which is higher than t, so this gives a “false”.
4
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The Independence axiom is automatically satisfied here, because our problem con-
tains only one true/false answer, and there is no other probability on which a could
depend. The three Bayesian axioms make sense in cases where the expert panel
learns new information. In our problem, however, an extensive discussion has al-
ready taken place so no agent learns new information anymore, and the expert panel
is not making any new inquiry. So the Bayesian axioms are not relevant in our case,
and only the Unanimity preservation axiom expresses a desirable property for the
aggregation rule.
An essential point to note is that a very large number of aggregation rules sat-
isfy this axiom: the median, linear averaging, geometric averaging, and so on —
actually, any convex function of the ak. This illustrates the fact that a classical
uniqueness result from the probability aggregation literature does not hold any-
more: the well-known theorem by McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982, which states
that linear averaging functions are the only independent and unanimity-preserving
functions. The reason is that the theorem requires a set of at least three events,
whereas our problem only considers two — e.g. the product is risky, with probabil-
ity ak, and the product is not risk, with probability 1 − ak. Considering a simpler
agenda has widened the set of suitable aggregation rules, and no theoretical result
from the literature can be used to pick the best one. More generally, the uniqueness
and impossibility results from the theory of probability aggregation are useless for
our problem. So, how scientific expert panels should aggregate risk assessments is
not a simple problem that can be solved straightforwardly with the existing liter-
ature, which has focused on general problems with complex agendas, and has thus
neglected more specific yet important questions. In the next section, I discuss other
desiderata or axioms that we would like to impose on the aggregation rule.
3 Robustness Matters
Scientific risk assessment is supposed to meet some standards of reliability and
objectivity, and the aggregation of these assessments should follow alike standards.
In this spirit, I now introduce several new requirements for our aggregation rule.
The aggregation rule should be sensitive to the right features of our problem, and
not to the parasitic ones. It should favor objective features at the detriment of
idiosyncrasies or unwanted values (for an analysis of the concept of objectivity, cf.
Douglas 2004 — I refer to some of her distinctions below). In other words, the
aggregation rule should be robust to some changes that we regard as irrelevant.
In this section, I defend three dimensions of robustness that should be taken into
account: the risk metrics, the level of detail, and the presence of strategical agents.
5
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Several probability aggregation rules can be considered: linear averaging, geo-
metric averaging, harmonic averaging, among others. As the forthcoming robustness
discussion is similar for all the various averagings, I shall simplify it and consider
only linear averaging, which shall be contrasted with the median. Ra denotes the
aggregation rule that compares the threshold with the linear average (which thus
stands for other averages), and Rm the aggregation rule that compares the thresh-
old with the median of the individual assessments (which is equivalent to a majority
vote on the decision itself).
3.1 Metrics
The formal model I have introduced relies on a quantitative scale — a and t
are given numerical values in [0, 1]. How is this scale defined in real cases? My
talking about probabilities has been only a matter of simplicity given the reduction
of the problem to the [0, 1] interval, and typical cases do not bear on well-defined
probabilities or explicit scales. For instance, a standard question posed at an FDA
advisory committee is “Does the overall risk versus benefit profile for X support
marketing in the US ?”5. This question supposes that experts identify the risk versus
benefit profile, and determine the value of the threshold under which a marketing is
warranted. This can be done in a number of ways, and these are essentially value-
laden questions6 — what is acceptable or not has to do with extra-scientific values,
and may also reflect the fact that an expert is risk-averse or risk-seeking. Overall, it
makes sense to suppose that both the metrics scale and the threshold depend on the
experts. Conversely, as the aggregation procedure is supposed to take place when
the experts have extensively discussed, one can make the simplifying assumption
that the same facts are known to all, and thus that the risk assessment is the same
for all. In that way, our model actually applies in the setting in which a is common
to all experts, but each has her own threshold tk. The fact that the quantitative
risk scale is not uniquely defined can be approached from a mathematical viewpoint:
any scale can be reparametrized by applying any continuous bijection from [0, 1] to
[0, 1], such as x 7→ x2.
These points make a hard time for the rule Ra (and other non linear averagings).
First, from a practical viewpoint, the dependence of the risk scale metrics on the
expert prevents the use of rules which take as inputs the numerical values of the risk
assessments or of the threshold. For instance, is it even possible for a chairman to ask
her colleagues “Please tell me your overall risk versus benefit acceptability threshold”
5Cf. Urfalino and Costa (2015, p.183).
6On the role of values in science more generally, and a critic of the value-free ideal, cf. Douglas
2009.
6
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -100-
(or assessment), given that each expert may have her own scale? The rule Rm, as it
is equivalent to majority voting, needs not rely on input individual numerical values,
and is thus safe from this criticism. Second, even if these practical difficulties could
be overcome, some theoretical difficulties remain. Suppose a common scale has been
adopted so that all experts can express their tk. An aggregation rule that depends
on the metrics of that common scale can give different outcomes according to the
scale employed, as shown in Table 1. This dependence is a problem: which common
scale should be chosen? (This is another aggregation problem!) Note that a variant
of this problem exists even with a well-defined probability scale. For instance, let A
be the event that a certain risk (e.g. carcinogenic substances in food) is responsible
for more than 10 cases of cancer in 100,000 people during 1 year. The experts
estimate the probability of A, p(A). Consider now A′ the event that the risk is
responsible for more than 10 cases of cancer in 100,000 people during 10 years.
Call p(A′) its probability. If the cancer cases are independent along the years, then
p(A′) = 1− (1− p(A))10. Because the relation between p(A) and p(A′) is not linear,
taking the linear average of the experts assessments on A, and transforming it into
an assessment on A′, or taking the linear average of the experts assessments on A′,
does not give the same result. Which event A or A′ is the more “natural” is not
clear, and so much more for the right risk group assessment.
This gives good reasons to consider the following requirement: the aggregation
rule should be insensitive to the metrics used to describe the problem, i.e. the
assessment and the threshold. What should matter is just the relative position of
the a and tk, not their distance which can be due to some idiosyncratic value-laden
judgments. This is requiring that the aggregation rule is more objective, under the
sense of value-neutral objectivity as characterized by Douglas (2004, p. 460), which
does not mean “free from all value influence” (as judging whether a risk benefit
ratio is lower enough is bound to involve a value judgment), but takes a position
“that is balanced or neutral with respect to a spectrum of values” (here, the balance
is reached by taking into account only relative positions). The metrics robustness
excludes the rule Ra which employs a linear average — Table 1 has shown a counter-
t1 t2 t3 a Average t Ra Rm
x scale .01 .01 .1 .05 .04 False False
x2 scale 0.0001 0.0001 .01 0.0025 0.0034 True False
Table 1: Example in which the ruleRa gives different answers depending on the scale.
The three experts have different thresholds tk and a common risk assessment a.
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example — but not Rm which relies on the median.
7
3.2 Level of detail
Another argument for an aggregation rule that does not rely on a specific metrics
comes from considerations of the level of detail in which the problem is described. So
far, a continuous scale has been assumed, with numerical assessments in [0, 1]. Nu-
merical discrete scales could also be used or even qualitative assessments only — it
corresponds to decisions under uncertainty and not under risk. Consider for instance
the case of the well-known IPCC Assessment Reports, that formulate a synthesis of
existing scientific knowledge on climate change issues. The reports use a standard-
ized vocabulary to express uncertainties, with several scales: some are qualitative
(e.g. low/medium/high), others are quantitative (and use probabilities).8 The his-
torical trend has been to use more quantitative scales and less qualitative scales,
but the latter have the advantage of being easily understandable by non-technical
audiences, and thus should continue to be used in the future. Some qualitative
and quantitative scales are in an explicit correspondence, as illustrated on Table 2.
Writing an IPCC report involves synthesizing large amounts of scientific literature,
so co-authors of a chapter may have different beliefs on the uncertainties associated
with a finding. Whether they express their beliefs on a qualitative or on a quan-
titative scale, the way their beliefs are aggregated should be smooth and not vary
abruptly (some very precise yet qualitative scales are conceivable), all the more than
some explicit correspondence exist (Table 2). This is also a question of historically
7The comparability of scales is also discussed in Risse’s (2004) political philosophy work, who
also takes it as an argument for majority voting.
8Cf. e.g. the last report of the Working Group I, Stocker et al (2013, p. 138-142).
Term Likelihood of the Outcome
Virtually certain 99–100 % probability
Very likely 90–100% probability
Likely 66–100% probability
About as likely as not 33–66% probability
Unlikely 0–33% probability
Very unlikely 0–10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1% probability
Table 2: Likelihood terms associated with outcomes used in the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC (Stocker et al 2013, p. 142).
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consistency when switching from qualitative to quantitative scales.9 Thus, a sound
requirement is that the aggregation rule extends to formulations with discrete and
qualitative scales. As the average of non-numerical and qualitative values is not
defined, Ra does not satisfy this requirement. The median is defined on any kind of
scale, and Rm satisfies the requirement. So only Rm is robust for the level of detail.
3.3 Bias and strategical votes
Not all experts are moved by epistemic goals only, and conflicts of interests
can arise. For instance, numerous controversies have surrounded the FDA advisory
committees along the years (Urfalino and Costa 2015, p. 168-169.) If a better
selection of experts may be the solution, the decision rule used in the expert panel
can also reduce the impact of bias agents.10 With Ra, an expert can strategically
express a much lower risk of a medicine to influence the group’s average — with
a threshold at 10 %, she might express 0.1% instead of just 9%. The aggregation
rule should be insensitive to such a strategical vote manipulation, and this is all
the more important as the biased agent may have already influenced other agents
during the preceding discussion. Rm is clearly robust in this sense, as an agent has
the same influence whether her probability is just below the threshold or close to 0.
This is not so for Ra. This robustness requirement also makes the aggregation rule
more objective, in the sense of detached objectivity (Douglas 2004, p. 459): one’s
personal values (allegiance to a firm) should not prevail on evidence (e.g. that the
probability is 9%, as above).
Overall, the three robustness requirements considered here clearly favor Rm over
Ra. This provides a substantial justification for the traditional democratic rule in
expert panels confronted with a binary decision. This result is a real departure from
probability aggregation theory, in which linear averaging is justified on solid grounds.
Narrowing the agenda and introducing a threshold has changed the solution to the
aggregation problem.
9One may object that in the IPCC case the co-authors aggregate beliefs without a threshold
comparison for a binary decision. Actually, thresholds are implicit: a finding which confidence is
too low may not be mentioned. Anyway, the IPCC example can be seen as a mere illustration of
the level of detail problem.
10Biased and extremist agents have been much studied in the literature of opinion dynamics (cf.
for instance in Lorenz’s 2007 survey), but not so in the literature of opinion aggregation.
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4 Reasons
So far, a simplified model of scientific expert panels has been considered, one
in which the group is asked to give a binary decision. As argued, the first step in
justifying that decision consists for the panel to have a belief on the risk assessment,
which is given by the median of the individual assessments in the case of Rm. How-
ever, expert panels are often asked to provide a deeper justification. The question
then arises of how the panel should aggregate its members views on this justifica-
tion. In this section, I propose a novel but simple model for individual numerical
assessment justification, in line with my previous threshold model.
Perhaps the most typical interpretation of the risk assessment a is that of a
(subjective) probability. Suppose this probability is determined by m independent
factors (m ≥ 2). For instance, the risk associated with a medicine comes from m
unrelated secondary effects. Then a is the probability that at least one risk factor
triggers:
a = 1−
m∏
j=1
(1− aj). (1)
Each expert k is supposed to have her own assessment of each factor ak,j (j = 1, . . . ,m).
Our problem is then to aggregate the n×m matrix of probabilities ak,j, and to com-
pare that result with the threshold.
As the m factors are independent, a sound requirement is to aggregate the
individual assessments on them separately. How should that be done? Adapting the
arguments from the previous section, one is lead to the conclusion that the panel
should take the median of the individual assessments for each factor. However,
there is a fundamental limitation to this, due to the previously mentioned theorem
by McConway and Wagner’s (cf. Section 2). Here is why. Requiring as above
that the aggregation proceeds on each factor independently is just requiring the
classical independence axiom. Another legitimate requirement is the classical axiom
of unanimity preservation: if all experts agree on the risk assessment for one factor,
then the panel should take this value as its own. As m ≥ 2, all the conditions of
the theorem by McConway and Wagner are fulfilled11, so its conclusion apply: the
only probability aggregation rule on the set of factors and on the overall decision is
linear averaging. This reveals that, if groups use the median to determine both the
independence factors’ values and the overall risk (according to the above results),
then it does not give a probability function and inconsistencies can arise. Table 3
11Each of the m ≥ 2 factors can be triggered or not, so there are at least 4 events, which is
higher than the 3 required in the theorem.
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gives such an example. In other words, asking the expert panel to take stands on
the reasons for its majority decision can lead it to change its decision.
Does it mean that our robustness defense of the median should be discarded?
Not necessarily. The theorem by McConway and Wagner assumes that the experts
aggregate their views both on the independent factors and on the overall risk as-
sessment. But one can have the experts aggregate their views on the independent
factors only. The overall risk assessment is then computed according to Equation 1,
and the final decision is logically obtained from a comparison between this value
and the threshold. In that way, experts do not vote on the final decision directly.
This decision rule is a so-called premise-based rule.12 Then, the linearity result of
McConway and Wagner does not apply any more. The robustness considerations
from the previous section do apply at the level of independent factors, and they
recommend that the group takes the median of the individual assessments.
The present model of factors has assumed that there exists some common nu-
merical scale, so that taking the median of individual assessments makes sense.
However, the previous section has in part argued that such a scale may not always
exist. In these cases, the present model of independent factors cannot apply. The
theory of judgment aggregation offers a general framework for the aggregation of
non-numerical reasons or justifications, with true/false beliefs (for reviews, cf. List
2012, Martini and Sprenger forth.). Applying in detail this framework to our prob-
lem of scientific justification would require another paper. A general result from this
literature, however, is the discursive dilemma: majority voting on a set of true/false
beliefs related in a logical way (here: reasons for the decision) may generate incon-
sistent collective judgments. This echoes our own finding about the median, which
corresponds to majority voting in case of a threshold comparison. So whatever
12On this strategy more generally, see Cooke (1991), Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), Hartmann
and Sprenger (2012). Another solution to our problem could be the conclusion-based rule, i.e.
aggregate only the views on the conclusion, but this is just like the previous section that we are
trying to surpass.
Risk aspect a1 a2 a = 1− (1− a1) · (1− a2)
Agent #1 0.01 0.01 0.0199
Agent #2 0.02 0.01 0.0298
Agent #3 0.01 0.02 0.0298
Median 0.01 0.01 0.0199 or 0.0298 ?
Table 3: A case in which the rule of the median can lead to inconsistencies. With a
threshold at e.g. 0.025, the group’s decision could be either true or false.
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the scale, majority voting on all parts of the question is in great difficulty, and a
premise-based solution should be adopted.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the rationale for the majority rule that is often used
in scientific expert panels, when dissent persists after discussion, and has looked for
the best decision rule in this context. To this end, I have introduced a threshold
probability model for individual decisions. Three main points have been shown
in the paper: (1) the standard framework of probability aggregation is unable to
solve our problem of risk aggregation. (2) robustness considerations clearly favor
majority voting on the decision, i.e. comparing the threshold to the median of the
individual risk assessments. (The robustness axioms I have advocated, which have
been designed from considerations on scientific expert panel, could in return inspire
social choice theory). (3) when a justification of the panel’s decision is looked for,
the median rule (corresponding to majority voting) can lead to inconsistencies. The
promising route is to have the group aggregate on the reasons level, not on the final
decision one. This should encourage scientific expert panels to divide questions from
a logical viewpoints, and to take decisions on sub-problems instead of voting on the
final decision directly. Current practices in advisory committees of the FDA and of
the EMA could evolve in this respect. However, these claims have only been shown
in quite simple and idealized models of decision-making. Future work is needed
to investigate other models. These preliminary results have nonetheless cast some
serious doubts on the majority voting rule only applied on the final decision.
Note finally the generality of the proposed model, which goes well beyond sci-
entific expertise: the a and t variables can be interpreted as degrees of beliefs or as
utility measures, within an epistemology or an economy framework.
12
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Abstract
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game
and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often
built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries
that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing
receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the
likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often
has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also
help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence
of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of
interest signalling games.
1 Signalling games and evolution
Common interest signalling games were introduced by David Lewis (Lewis,
1969) as part of a game theoretic framework which identified communicative
conventions as the expected solutions to coordination problems. In recent years,
this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of communication,
incorporating signalling games into an evolutionary game theoretic approach to
modelling the evolution of communication and cooperation in humans (Skyrms,
2010; Skyrms, 1996).
As the basis for game theoretic modelling of such phenomena, David Lewis
signalling games are attractive in their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes.
They are coordination games of common interest between world-observing senders
and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where
interests may differ and where costly signals are typically invoked. In the stan-
dard two-player, two-state, two-option David Lewis signalling game (hereafter
the ‘2x2x2 game’), the first agent (signaller) observes that the world is in one of
two possible states (state1 or state2) and broadcasts one of two possible signals
(signal1 or signal2) which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions (act1 or act2). If the acts match the state of
the world (i.e. act1 if state1 or act2 if state2) then the players receive a greater
payoff than otherwise.
Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signalling systems where
senders condition otherwise arbitrary signalling behaviour on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals to secure the mutual payoff. The two
1
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systems only differ on which signal gets to be associated with each state of the
world1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under certain
conditions a signalling systems is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator
dynamics, a standard model of evolution to be discussed further in section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’ approach makes sense is the degree
to which we have confidence in the interpretation and application of such a
highly idealised model to the more complex target systems. The obvious worry
is that by introducing more realistic features into the model one might break or
significantly dilute previous findings on the evolution of signalling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signalling games has investi-
gated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur. Some devia-
tions from the standard Lewis signalling game include: more and varied states
of the world, the possibility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals,
partial deviation in interest between senders and receivers, the reception of more
than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt with favourably in
Skyrms (2010), and in work by others. For example Bruner et al. (2014) gen-
eralizes beyond the 2x2x2 case and Godfrey-Smith and Martinez (2013) and
Godfrey-Smith (2015) mix signalling games of common interest and conflict of
interest. One complication of the Lewis signalling game (particularly important
for our purposes) is that signalling systems are not guaranteed in the simple
2x2x2 case when the world is biased. In other words, when the probabilities
of the world being in state1 or state2 are not equal, a pooling equilibrium in
which no communication occurs between sender and receiver is evolutionarily
possible.
2 Symmetry breaking
The focus here will be with the idealisation that sender and receiver are equally
responsive in strategic settings. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treat-
ment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained
agency roles: all that signallers do on observing the state of the world is send a
signal, and the receivers must act as though the world is in one or other of the
sender-observable states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on receivers
which is the more problematic.
Imagine for example a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inaccessi-
ble to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who cannot
observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip into
the signalling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counterpart. To
play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually re-orient their
attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate behaviour for
the world-state the first has observed (e.g. prey is to the east or to the west,
etc.).
The Lewis signalling model by design is constrained such that the receiver’s
actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s observed
world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple of a model
as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli. However, our
point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for signallers than
1The other two possible outcomes of the game are ‘pooling equilibrium’, where the receiver
plays act1 or act2 unconditionally.
2
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for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to send, yet the actions
available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as intrinsically cheap and
free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world state
will likely inform their motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to dictate a
fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behaviour’). But
all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture or other signal which (by stipulation)
has no pre-established meaning. The experience of observing a strategically rel-
evant state of the world will typically be richer and more detailed than that of
observing a strategically relevant artificial signal. All this leads to two concerns.
Firstly, asymmetries in the strategic situations are likely to exist between senders
and receivers. Receivers are likely to have locally reasonable options available
to them other than those relevant to signaller-observed states of the world, and
their responsiveness to the strategic situation is therefore less satisfactorily mod-
elled by the strictly symmetric payoff structures of standard signalling games.
Call this the structural responsiveness concern.
Secondly, given the likely differences in informational states, goal-directness,
workload and opportunity cost implications of sender and receiver roles, we
can expect the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) which instantiate them to
differ as well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should not
expect their update-responsiveness in any given game to be equal either. Yet
the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and receivers update their
strategies in an identical manner, modelled using either learning dynamics or
replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary responsiveness concern.
3 Hedgehog strategies and update asymmetry
The first of these concerns might sound like an argument for abandoning co-
ordination games and moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of
interest’ models. However the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to one of
Kim Sterelny’s (Sterelny, 2012) concerns about Skyrms (2010) use of the Lewis
model. Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part of
the receiver might undermine the evolution of signalling even when these third
options are less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination. As part of
a discussion of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedgehog’ strategy –
taking an action which pays off modestly, regardless of the state of the world.
To make this concrete, hedgehogs often roll into a ball in response to predators.
This is a stark contrast to the more sophisticated behaviour of vervets, who
have specific responses to specific threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet
takes to one threat – climb a tree when confronted by a leopard – may lead
to total disaster when used in response to another threat, such as an eagle.
Hedgehogs avoid such outcomes by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a
modest payoff. Translated to signalling games, such a gambit may, in many
cases, be more attractive than attempting to respond optimally to a signal2.
2It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signalling game is in
many ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing
hare instead of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster, but only guarantees the individual a
3
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This compliments the structural responsiveness concern: receivers (espe-
cially) might have other options of value which will stand in competition to
those assumed in the standard signalling game. Something like these hedgehog
strategies are plausible departures from the idealisation and should be expected
on the part of the receiver given a realistic demandingness of the role. The
question is whether (as Sterelny suspects) including hedgehog strategies might
undermine the robustness of evolution toward signalling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (Van Valen, 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signalling situations – such as predator-
prey signalling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signallers and
receivers come to not just update their strategies, but to do so at faster or slower
rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are entwined in3.
It might seem that in David Lewis signalling games (as with games of com-
mon interest in general) the Red Queen effect should have no role to play. How-
ever any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signalling game makes it plausible
to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely, if not the norm.
First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and procedures employed by
senders and receivers are likely to be different. Different systems will admit to
different degrees of plasticity and evolvability – and will have a different set of
cross-cutting tasks and utilities that will place their own demands upon them.
Quick and easy signalling responses will have different pathways of update and
adaptation than the (typically) more complex set of systems which appropriate
receiver responses require.
The consideration of multiple use or adaptive reuse also makes the Red
Queen hypothesis salient: it is wildly implausible that entirely separate cog-
nitive systems would evolve to deal with competitive signalling situations and
coordination-style situations. Cognitive structures which underpin sender or
receiver behaviour will likely be subject to evolutionary pressures from compet-
itive as well as cooperative situations, and the responsive nimbleness of sender
and receiver strategies is therefore not guaranteed to be the same. We should
not assume that the evolution of sender and receiver strategies always proceeds
at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between sender
and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For example,
Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flexibility on the
receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while Seyfarth and Cheney
(2003) discuss about how greater inferential sophistication on the receiver side
is a feature of many primate communication systems. While these findings do
mediocre payoff. Thus the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy are
general concerns not confined to just the Lewis signalling games. Thanks to [name redacted
for review] for helping us better see this connection.
3An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in Richard
Dawkin’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). While
we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims the prey species
will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species due to the different selection
pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough for the predator means
going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey means death.
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not directly support the structural and evolutionary responsiveness concerns,
they show that real-life sender and receiver strategies (in our near biological
cousins at least) exhibit important differences, suggesting cognitive asymmetries
compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signalling game as especially salient to the issue of responsiveness:
the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers, and differing rates of change
in sender and receiver strategies.
4 The model
The evolutionary model we use as a basis for our analysis is the pure-strategy
2x2x2 David Lewis signalling game, with the two-population discrete-time repli-
cator dynamics.
Exact components of the model include two states of the world (L and R),
a world-observing signaller with two possible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-
observing receiver with two possible actions (AL and AR). If the receiver’s action
matches the state of the world, then both signaller and receiver get a fixed
positive success payoff, otherwise their payoff is zero. Signallers and receivers
both have four pure strategies available to them (see table 1).
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
Table 1: Signaller and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest
signalling game.
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies within
sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated. The fitness
of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the composition of the
opposing population and the payoff associated with each strategy pairing. The
proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period t+ 1 is determined
by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For the sender population
this is:
Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t)
Fi
FS
where Xi is the ith sender strategy, Fi is the fitness of that strategy and FS
is the average sender strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers:
Yj(t+ 1) = Yj(t)
Fj
FR
where Yj is the jth sender strategy, Fj is the fitness of that strategy and FR is
the average receiver strategy fitness. This is repeated until the populations settle
5
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into an evolutionarily stable arrangement. The update process is deterministic
and no randomising or mutations are allowed.
5 Modifications and results
We introduce two novel modifications to this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’
action AH for the receiver. Second, we allow the rate of generational change
of senders and receivers to vary relative to one other. In addition, the bias of
nature is also varied, and we investigate the effects these three departures from
the Skyrms/Lewis idealisation have on the evolutionary stability of signalling
equilibria.
Turning to our first modification, the receiver now has three possible actions
upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH . As before a success payoff of 1 is
received by both players in the case that the receiver plays AL while the world
is in state L, or the receiver plays AR while the world is in state R. A payoff
of zero is received if AL or AR is played otherwise. A payoff of H is received
unconditionally if the receiver plays AH , where the value of H is between 0 and
1. The sender has four familiar pure strategies, whereas the receiver now has
five (for simplicity we omit conditional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation where the sender
remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right) and calls
out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the prey but
can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if they go in the matching
direction), or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain a less valu-
able resource they do not need help from the sender to acquire (the hedgehog
strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equivalent to it being in
a situation where it is systematically more likely that the prey is to the left or
the right.
In the simple unbiased 2x2x2 signalling game, one of the two signalling
equilibria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics. In our
notation, these equilibria are S1-R1 and S2-R2. Increasing the bias of the world
(i.e. making L more probable than R or vice versa) will undermine this, with
an increasing proportion of populations instead collapsing to pooling equilib-
ria. This will occur when there are initially few conditional signalling strategies
in the sender population. In such situations, receivers do best to simply per-
form the act that is most appropriate for the more likely state of the world.
The incentive for senders to adopt a signalling system then disappears and the
community is locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we found a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as
values of H, the payoff for AH , becomes significant. The hedgehog strategy R5
is an additional unilateral response, and is able to draw some initial populations
away from the signalling equilibria when H is in excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average
payoff for ‘guessing’). This result, for an unbiased world, is illustrated in Figure
14.
4Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect becomes
significant and the y-intercept, are artefacts of the number of world-states and strategies in
the model and therefore not general.
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Figure 1: Effect of hedgehog payoff on proportion of signalling equilibria.
We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in com-
bination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values of H. The
H = 0 curve has the expected n-shape, with perfect signalling being degraded
as world-bias increases away from the mid-point of even bias between L and R.
The inclusion of significant (i.e. H ¿ 0.5) hedgehog payoffs decreases signalling
at even bias. As nature becomes increasingly biased, however, the proportion
of simulations that head to a signalling system does not go down. In fact we
observe a ‘plateau’ followed by a gradual increase in the proportion signalling
as nature becomes increasingly biased. However, once the bias becomes too
extreme, the traditional pooling equilibrium becomes increasingly likely as the
payoff associated with simply performing the appropriate act for the more likely
state of the world approaches 1. This results in a steep decline in the proportion
of simulations that result in signalling systems.
6 Generational asymmetry
We now turn to our second modification of the David Lewis signalling framework
in which we introduce a generational asymmetry. We introduced a ‘slow-down
factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics in order control the rate at which sender and
receiver populations change over time. Composition of the sender and receiver
populations are now governed by the following equations:
Xi(t+ 1) = (1− ZS)Xi(t)
Fi
FS
+Xi(t)ZS
Yj(t+ 1) = (1− ZR)Yj(t)
Fj
FR
+ Yj(t)ZR
7
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Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on proportion of sig-
nalling equilibria.
Note that when both ZR and ZS are zero there is no deviation from the stan-
dard replicator dynamics. Rates of changes are slowed as their values increase;
for example setting ZS = .5 halves the rate of change for sender strategies. ZR
(alone) being set to 1 means taht the composition of the receiver population
would not change over time, and only the sender population would evolve.
The result of introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and
receivers is that signalling is more likely when sender strategies evolve faster
than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where senders (ZS) and
receivers (ZR) are slowed down to half and one-tenth speeds (with the other
population unaltered) as the bias of nature is varied.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling because,
as before, receivers facing a sender population whose conditional signalling is
low will begin to gravitate to the act that matches the more likely state of the
world (and the threshold for ‘low’ is higher at higher bias). This evolution-
ary trajectory only reverses if conditional signalling increases rapidly enough
to tip the fitness balance toward its matching conditional response, before that
response is overpowered. Thus signalling becomes quite a remote possibility
when bias is high and senders are slow, occurring in less than 10% of simula-
tions for some parameter values. Slowing the evolutionary responsiveness of the
receiver population evolves has the opposite effect – as senders will have time to
adopt the best separating strategy given the mix of receiver strategies, and the
receiver population slowly adjusts and a robust signalling system establishes.
By a similar logic, it is easy to see that a quickly evolving sender population
also mitigates against the effect of hedgehog strategies.
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Figure 3: Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on proportion of
signalling equilibria.
7 Discussion
We have explored a few well-motivated departures from the highly idealized
and simple Lewis signalling game typically considered in the literature. As
shown in section 4, breaking the symmetry between senders and receivers often
significantly reduces the likelihood that a separating equilibrium emerges. For
one, providing receivers with a safe third option which allows them to secure a
decent payoff regardless of the state of the world significantly reduces the size
of the basin of attraction of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, separating is
a remote possibility when receivers outpace senders in the race to adapt.
However the interaction between hedgehog payoffs and bias shows that signalling-
undermining effects are not strictly additive. Likewise, the situation is much
less bleak when senders evolve at a faster pace than receivers. Interestingly,
many scholars in the animal communications literature have noted a similar re-
sponse asymmetry between sender and receiver in conflict of interest and partial
conflict of interest signalling games. For instance, Owren, Rendall, and Ryan
(2010) note that senders can easily adapt their signalling behaviour while re-
ceivers for the most part have responses to the stimuli produced by senders that
are more difficult to change. Thus some have taken to think of signalling as
primarily involving the manipulation of receivers by senders.
But this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a conflict of interest
between sender and receiver, then what prevents receivers from increasing the
speed at which they adapt to the behaviour of the senders? In other words,
what explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and
receiver? These are the exact circumstances we would expect the red queen
hypothesis to apply. We believe the results of this paper may form the basis of
9
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a novel explanation for this puzzling phenomena. When the interests of sender
and receiver are perfectly aligned it is actually in the interest of both parties for
the sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve at the faster rate, as doing so
ensures the community is more likely to hit upon a mutually beneficial signalling
system. When the interests of sender and receiver significantly diverge, however,
we would expect this not to be the case since both parties now have reason to
adapt at a faster pace than the other.
Yet individuals who routinely interact rarely find themselves playing either
common interest or conflict of interest signalling games exclusively. As is well
known by any parent, not all signalling interactions between relatives are free
of conflict. Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be par-
tially opposed, such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common
interest signalling games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point is that a
variety of strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver, and there
is no principled reason to think all interactions will involve perfect alignment
or sizable conflict. If so, then a proportion of signalling interactions between
sender and receiver may involve no conflict, a partial conflict, or a full conflict
of interest. When the proportion of no or low conflict signalling games is sig-
nificant, the generational asymmetry result from the previous section may hold
to some degree. Both sender and receiver will then profit from the sender pop-
ulation evolving at a faster rate than the receiver population, and receivers do
best to limit how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the emergence
of informative signalling systems when their interests do overlap. Thus, while
it may appear puzzling as to why a receiver is not more responsive when her
interests diverge from that of the sender, this confusion might be resolved when
the interaction is put into context.
The robustness analysis considered in this paper has in some sense shown
how fragile the evolution of signalling can be. Slightly altering the framework in
a sensible fashion leads to significantly different results. While many variants of
the baseline Lewis signalling game have been explored by philosophers in recent
years, more work is required in order to better assess the prospect of signalling
in realistic environments.
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Abstract: Magnus and Callender (2004) argue that we ought to focus on retail arguments, 
which are arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical entities, as 
opposed to theoretical entities in general. However, scientists are the ones who put 
forward retail arguments, and it’s unclear how philosophers can engage with such 
arguments. We argue that philosophers can engage with retail arguments by providing 
criteria that they must satisfy in order to demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities. 
We put forward experimental individuation as such a criterion—when scientists 
experimentally individuate an entity, a realist conclusion about that entity is warranted. 
 
Word Count: 4983 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -119-
1. Introduction 
 
Magnus and Callender argue that we ought to abandon “wholesale arguments,” which are 
“arguments about all or most of the entities posited in our best scientific theories” (2004, 
321). Instead, we ought to embrace “retail arguments,” which are “arguments about 
specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance” (2004, 321). This shift in focus 
rules out standard scientific realism as well as various antirealist positions, and in Section 
2, we’ll argue that Magnus and Callender’s position is preferable to these other positions. 
However, we recognize that philosophers who choose to abandon wholesale 
arguments in favor of retail arguments face a potential problem. Dicken (2013) has 
argued that such philosophers will merely end up repeating the retail arguments that 
scientists offer. In that case, the turn to retail arguments may entail that no distinctively 
philosophical work remains to be done. In Section 3, we’ll argue that this is not the case. 
Not all retail arguments successfully demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities, and 
it can take some philosophical work to distinguish the ones that do from the ones that 
don’t. 
In Section 4, we’ll put forward a criterion for doing so, which we take from 
Chen’s (2016) work on experimental individuation. Chen suggests that “[i]f a scientist 
can realize the individuality of an object in a particular experiment, then she has provided 
the strongest evidence ... to warrant the reality of the object” (2016, 365). We’ll argue 
that retail arguments that demonstrate the experimental individuation of a theoretical 
entity succeed in showing that realism about that entity is warranted. 
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We’ll draw on three examples throughout the paper: Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of 
acidity, J. J. Thomson’s work on cathode rays, and Davy’s discovery of potassium. We’ll 
conclude, in Section 5, by applying our criterion to these three cases, with the result that 
the upshot of a retail argument can be either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding 
the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. 
 
2. The Turn to Retail Arguments 
 
We’ll now introduce Magnus and Callender’s position in a bit more detail, and indicate 
why we take it to be preferable to standard scientific realism (SSR) and antirealism. SSR 
is a position regarding theories in general—the success of our best theories warrants the 
claim that they are at least approximately true, as well as the claim that the theoretical 
entities that they posit exist. Antirealist positions come in a number of different forms, 
but they all typically endorse claims about theories in general, and deny that success 
warrants the two claims endorsed by proponents of SSR. 
According to Magnus and Callender, there is something that all of these positions 
have in common, namely, their proponents attempt to support these positions by engaging 
in wholesale arguments. They focus on two examples of such arguments. First of all, 
there is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of our best theories 
would be a miracle if those theories weren’t at least approximately true. Secondly, there 
is the pessimistic meta-induction, which uses past successful-but-false theories as an 
inductive basis for concluding that our current successful theories are false as well. The 
no-miracles argument is taken to support “[w]holesale realism,” which “seeks to explain 
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the success of science in general”; and the pessimistic meta-induction is taken to support 
“wholesale anti-realism,” which “seeks to explain the history of science in general” 
(2004, 321). However, Magnus and Callender argue that these arguments, and wholesale 
arguments in general, ought to be abandoned. This is because they embody the base rate 
fallacy, since they don’t take into account the base rate probability of any successful 
theory being true or false. For this reason, they maintain that wholesale realism and 
wholesale antirealism ought to be abandoned as well. 
Magnus and Callender propose that we ought to replace wholesale arguments 
with retail arguments. Unlike wholesale arguments, the scope of a retail argument is 
restricted to a particular theory and/or a particular kind of theoretical entity. By shifting 
the focus from theories in general to theories in particular, philosophers can dissolve the 
traditional realism debate, with the result that “realism and anti-realism are options to be 
exercised sometimes here and sometimes there” (2004, 337). This, in turn, opens up the 
possibility that “[t]here may be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist 
about top quarks, and so on” (2004, 333). 
In order to show why this possibility represents an improvement over SSR and 
antirealism, we’ll now consider a case from the history of chemistry. This case concerns 
the composition of hydrochloric acid. Scheele was the first to decompose this acid, which 
he called “acid of salt,” and he identified its constituent substances as phlogiston and 
“dephlogisticated acid of salt” (1774/1931). However, it was a matter of some 
controversy whether he had succeeded in decomposing hydrochloric acid. According to 
Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity, all acids are composed of oxygen (the principle of 
acidity) and a radical, which can be either a simple substance or a compound (1789/1965, 
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65, 115). Neither Scheele nor any other chemist had been able to extract the oxygen from 
hydrochloric acid, which Lavoisier called “muriatic acid.”  And so Lavoisier held that it 
remained undecomposed, and, in accordance with his theory, he hypothesized that it must 
contain oxygen combined with what he called “the muriatic radical” (1789/1965, 71-72). 
As for Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt, Lavoisier held that it is a compound of 
muriatic acid and oxygen, which he called “oxygenated muriatic acid” (1789/1965, 73). 
Some years later, Davy argued that Scheele was correct, while Lavoisier was in error 
(1810, 236-37). On Davy’s view, muriatic acid is composed of hydrogen and what he 
calls “oxymuriatic acid,” which is what Lavoisier called “oxygenated muriatic acid,” and 
what Scheele called “dephlogisticated acid of salt.”  Davy later went on to argue for the 
elementary nature of this latter substance, and proposed a new name for it: “Chlorine” 
(1811, 32). His approval of Scheele stems from the fact that Davy, like a number of 
latter-day phlogiston theorists, identified hydrogen with phlogiston.
1
  And the claim that 
hydrochloric acid is made up of hydrogen and dephlogisticated acid of salt, even if 
terminologically problematic, is essentially correct. Lavoisier, however, was in error 
since this acid contains no oxygen, thus falsifying his oxygen theory of acidity. 
Proponents of SSR, impressed by narratives of the Chemical Revolution 
according to which Lavoisier’s oxygen theory defeated the phlogiston theory, are often 
explicit that their realism applies to the oxygen theory but not to the phlogiston theory.
2
  
But in that case, SSR entails the implausible conclusion that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical 
exists, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt does not. It seems much better to 
																																																								
1
 See, e.g., Kirwan (1789, 4-5). 
2
 See, e.g., Hardin and Rosenberg (1982, 610) and Psillos (1999, 291). 
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conclude that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical doesn’t exist, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated 
acid of salt does. 
Antirealism, at least of the Kuhnian variety, fares no better. Those influenced by 
Kuhn’s (1962/1996) views regarding incommensurability would claim that theoretical 
entities conceptualized by rival theories should be treated as different entities. However, 
chemists working in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shared a set of 
operations for producing the substance that was variously known as dephlogisticated acid 
of salt, oxymuriatic acid, and chlorine. It’s therefore implausible to maintain that, in light 
of the fact that these chemists held different theories, they were working with distinct 
theoretical entities. A trans-theoretical view of the substance that came to be known as 
chlorine is therefore preferable. 
By abandoning wholesale arguments in favor of retail arguments, we can sidestep 
these difficulties, and simply adopt realism about chlorine (whatever it was called and 
however it was conceptualized) and antirealism about Lavoisier’s muriatic radical. That 
said, by trading wholesale arguments for retail arguments, we face another difficulty, to 
which we’ll now turn. 
 
3. Can Philosophers Engage with Retail Arguments? 
 
Dicken (2013) has objected that those who abandon wholesale arguments in favor of 
retail arguments face a serious difficulty. In short, once one does so, it’s not clear that any 
“distinctively philosophical” issues remain to be addressed (2013, 564). Scientists are 
generally the ones who put forward retail arguments. And if the turn to retail arguments 
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amounts to merely repeating arguments scientists have offered first, then perhaps nothing 
distinctively philosophical remains to be done. Our goal in the remainder of the paper is 
to provide a way of engaging with retail arguments that is distinctively philosophical, and 
to thereby answer Dicken’s objection. 
We’ll start by considering how scientists demonstrate the existence of theoretical 
entities, and so we’ll now introduce another case from the history of science. This case 
concerns Thomson’s work on cathode rays and his determination of the mass-to-charge 
ratio (m/e) of the electron. According to the official website of the Nobel Prize, it was 
because of this work that Thomson “received the Nobel Prize in 1906 for the discovery of 
the electron, the first elementary particle.”
3
 Thomson (1897, 1906/1967) hypothesized 
that cathode rays are currents of “carriers of negative electricity” or “corpuscles”—what 
we now know as electrons.
4
 His hypothesis was not only about the nature of cathode rays, 
but also about the interaction among cathode rays and other theoretical entities such as 
electrostatic fields and electrons. In order to determine the mass-to-charge ratio, he 
measured the deflection of cathode rays passing through an electrostatic field, the 
strength of the electrostatic field, and other related magnitudes. He interpreted the value 
that he obtained for m/e in light of his hypothesis, and his experimental results confirmed 
that hypothesis. 
																																																								
3
 Retrieved January 27, 2016 from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/vacuum/experiment-1.html. See also 
Harré (2002) and Whittaker (1989). 
4
 For the identification of Thomson’s carriers with electrons, see the reprint of Thomson 
(1897) in Magie (1969), in which Magie makes the identification. 
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However, one might ask how it’s possible to infer from Thomson’s experimental 
confirmation of his hypothesis to the claim that he had thereby demonstrated the 
existence of the electron. Philosophers can engage with such a question. And regardless 
of the answers they provide, they must at least defend those answers by invoking some 
kind of criterion for concluding that the evidence that scientists have offered does or does 
not constitute a demonstration of the existence of a given entity. To take one example of 
such a criterion, Hacking (1983, 23) suggests manipulation: “if you can spray them then 
they are real.”  While Thomson manipulated cathode rays, he did not manipulate 
electrons, and so, according to Hacking’s criterion, Thomson did not offer evidence 
strong enough to demonstrate the existence of electrons. 
The important point, for our purposes, is that providing a criterion for granting the 
reality of a theoretical entity, and determining whether the evidence that scientists have 
offered satisfies that criterion, constitutes a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments. Scientists may be the ones who initially put forward retail arguments. But it is 
a distinctively philosophical task to determine a criterion that can distinguish those retail 
arguments that demonstrate the existence of a theoretical entity from those that do not. 
We thus have a way of answering Dicken’s objection, provided that, by invoking such a 
criterion, we are not thereby turning back to wholesale arguments. In the next section, 
we’ll introduce our criterion and argue that applying it does not amount to a wholesale 
argument. 
 
4. Ontological Commitment and Experimental Individuation 
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Our proposed criterion for granting the reality of theoretical entities is experimental 
individuation. A retail argument that demonstrates the experimental individuation of an 
entity is a good argument for realism about that entity. 
Individuation and ontological commitment are connected. When scientists are 
ontologically committed to the theoretical entities that they posit, this commitment 
involves not just a belief that the entities exist, but also a responsibility to demonstrate 
their existence. Demonstrating the existence of a posited entity requires scientists to find 
an individual instance or sample of that entity, and if a scientist posits a theoretical entity 
without individuating it, then her ontological commitment is empty. 
How do scientists individuate theoretical entities? Answering this question 
requires us to distinguish theoretical individuation from experimental individuation. 
Scientists theoretically individuate an entity if, in the course of theorizing, they describe a 
set of properties and behaviors of a posited entity by which they can identify it and 
distinguish it from other entities. However, these descriptions by which scientists 
theoretically individuate entities require evidence. Scientists can offer evidence for the 
existence of a theoretical entity if they produce an instance or sample of such an entity by 
performing an experiment. In doing so, they individuate an entity experimentally.
5
 
The relationship between theoretical individuation and experimental individuation 
is much the same as the relationship between theory and experiment more generally. 
																																																								
5
 Scientists may also individuate an entity observationally, by observing an instance or 
sample of such an entity. Since observation is itself a complex issue, and since 
participants in the realism debate rarely question the existence of entities that scientists 
have observed, we will not discuss observational individuation here. 
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Various worries about the theory-ladenness of experimentation are relevant here. If a 
theoretical hypothesis yields a prediction regarding some experimental result, the result 
may be interpreted in light of the hypothesis. Moreover, since a theoretical hypothesis 
may involve two or more theoretical entities and their interactions, it can be difficult to 
show that an experiment produces an instance or sample of the target entity, i.e., that it 
experimentally individuates that entity. And it can be difficult to judge whether an 
experiment produces a real individual, as opposed to a mere phenomenon that results 
from experimental apparatuses and their interactions with experimented objects. For 
these reasons, a criterion of experimental individuation that is sufficiently independent of 
theoretical interpretation is needed.  
Is there such a criterion for experimental individuation? One candidate is 
Hacking’s manipulation criterion, which we mentioned in Section 3. However, since 
experimenters can manipulate not just real individuals, but also mere phenomena, 
manipulation cannot singly serve as the criterion of experimental individuation. Chen 
(2016) takes Hacking’s criterion of manipulation, along with two other criteria, namely, 
separation and maintenance of structural unity, as jointly constituting a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the experimental individuation of a theoretical entity. In short, 
experiments that produce individuals are experiments that separate individuals from their 
surrounding environment, manipulate them, and maintain their structural unity 
throughout the process. Importantly, Chen’s further conditions ensure that the 
manipulated object is a real individual as opposed to a mere phenomenon. We take 
Chen’s criteria to offer a satisfactory account of experimental individuation. In Section 5, 
we’ll illustrate his criteria in terms of three retail arguments from the history of science, 
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and thereby provide some support for our claim that his criteria are satisfactory. 
For now, we wish to emphasize two points. First of all, experimental 
individuation is our proposed criterion for determining whether a retail argument 
successfully demonstrates the existence of some theoretical entity—it succeeds if it 
demonstrates the experimental individuation of that entity. Secondly, Chen’s three 
criteria provide an adequate account of what experimental individuation requires. 
Before moving on, we’ll discuss two potential problems with this proposal. First 
of all, some theoretical entities, like the chemical substances named by mass terms like 
‘water,’ ‘phlogiston,’ and ‘oxygen,’ are paradigm cases of non-individuals. It’s therefore 
not immediately obvious how we can appeal to the notion of experimental individuation 
when it comes to such entities. We propose to do so by considering the experimental 
individuation of samples of such substances, as we’ll illustrate in Section 5.1, in terms of 
Davy’s discovery of potassium. Since samples count as individuals, our criterion is 
applicable to cases involving non-individuals like chemical substances. 
Secondly, there’s the issue as to whether the application of our criterion amounts 
to a kind of wholesale argument. Whether a given retail argument demonstrates the 
experimental individuation of some theoretical entity is a local matter, grounded in the 
details of that argument. In contrast, wholesale arguments are not grounded in such local 
matters. Instead, they rely on claims regarding populations of theories in general, and it is 
for this reason that they embody the base rate fallacy. We’ve consciously avoided 
reasoning that may lead to the base rate fallacy. For example, we haven’t argued that the 
success of our best theories would be a miracle unless the entities they posit can be 
experimentally individuated. For these reasons, the application of our criterion to retail 
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arguments does not amount to a kind of wholesale argument. And in that case, we’ve 
provided a way of answering Dicken’s objection, since our criterion provides a way for 
philosophers to engage with retail arguments. 
 
5. Application of the Criterion to Three Retail Arguments 
 
Our goal at this point is to show how one can use the criterion we’ve proposed in order to 
engage with retail arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical 
entities. We’ll discuss three cases: Davy’s potassium, Lavoisier’s muriatic radical, and 
Thomson’s electron. 
 
5.1 A Realist Conclusion Regarding Davy’s Potassium 
 
To begin with, we’ll argue that Davy demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
potassium, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument for realism about 
that substance. 
 Davy first isolated potassium by decomposing potash, which he did by means of 
electrolysis (1808, 4-5). He was the first to decompose potash, though for some time, 
chemists suspected it to be a compound.
6
  Davy acted on a small piece of moistened 
potash with a Voltaic battery. As a result, at the negative surface of the battery Davy 
observed the appearance of “small globules having a high metallic lustre, and being 
precisely similar in visible characters to quicksilver” (1808, 5). In the lecture in which he 
																																																								
6
 See, e.g., Lavoisier (1965/1789, 156). 
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reports these results, Davy goes on to write: “These globules, numerous experiments soon 
shewed to be the substance I was in search of, and a peculiar inflammable principle the 
basis of potash” (1808, 5). And later in the lecture, he proposes the name “Potasium 
[sic]” for the basis of potash (1808, 32). 
 While this experiment, on its own, does not demonstrate the experimental 
individuation of a sample of potassium, subsequent experiments that Davy conducted do, 
and he shows that potassium satisfies all three of Chen’s criteria. First of all, there is 
Chen’s separation condition: scientists must separate the entities that they produce “from 
their environments” (2016, 348), and “from the experimental instruments that may have 
helped produce [them]” (2016, 365). In order to determine whether his results depended 
on the platinum instruments that he used, Davy performed a number of experiments using 
a variety of other materials, including copper, silver, and gold (1808, 5). And in order to 
determine whether his results depended on the fact that he conducted his experiments in 
the open atmosphere, he performed similar experiments in a vacuum (1808, 5). In all of 
these cases, he obtained the same results. These experiments collectively show that Davy 
had separated potassium from its surrounding environment (including the atmosphere and 
the other components of potash), and from the instruments that he used, thereby 
satisfying Chen’s separation condition. 
 Secondly, there is Chen’s condition regarding the maintenance of structural unity. 
Chen understands structural unity as the idea that “the components of an individual are 
structured into a whole in some specific manner” (2016, 358). Davy encountered a 
number of difficulties when it came to maintaining the structural unity of the globules of 
potassium that he had produced because “they acted more or less upon almost every body 
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to which they were exposed” (1808, 10). One of the first things Davy notes about the 
globules is that they did not last long—the ones that did not explode immediately after 
forming soon lost their metallic luster and became “covered by a white film” (1808, 5). 
Davy identifies this film as pure potash, and explains how it attracts moisture from the 
atmosphere, converting the globule into a saturated solution of potash (1808, 7). 
Eventually, Davy discovered one substance on which potassium did not have much of an 
effect, namely, recently distilled naphtha (1808, 10). He used that fluid to preserve 
globules of potassium, and he was able to examine the properties of potassium in the 
atmosphere by covering the globules with a thin film of naphtha. This method allowed 
Davy to maintain the structural unity of potassium, thus satisfying Chen’s condition. 
 Thirdly, there is Chen’s manipulation condition. Chen understands this condition in 
terms of the “instrumental use” of an object “to investigate other phenomena of nature” 
(2016, 358). Towards the end of the lecture in which he reports the electrolytic 
decomposition of potash, Davy conjectures that the globules of potassium he isolated 
“will undoubtedly prove powerful agents for analysis; and having an affinity for oxygene 
[sic] stronger than any other known substances, they may possibly supersede the 
application of electricity to some of the undecompounded bodies” (1808, 44). Making 
good on this conjecture would amount to showing that chemists can use potassium to 
decompose previously undecomposed substances, thereby satisfying Chen’s manipulation 
condition. And in the following year, Davy made good on this conjecture by using 
potassium to extract the oxygen from a previously undecomposed substance, namely, 
boracic acid, thereby decomposing it (1809, 76-77). 
 In sum, Davy shows that samples of potassium satisfy all three of Chen’s criteria. 
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And by demonstrating the experimental individuation of these samples, Davy presents us 
with a successful retail argument for realism about potassium. 
 
5.2 An Antirealist Conclusion Regarding Lavoisier’s Muriatic Radical 
 
We’ll now argue that Davy shows why the experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s 
muriatic radical is not possible, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument 
for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
As we discussed in Section 2, Lavoisier hypothesized that hydrochloric acid, 
which he called muriatic acid, is composed of oxygen and a hypothetical substance that 
he called the muriatic radical. He thereby theoretically individuated the muriatic radical 
as that substance which combines with oxygen to form muriatic acid, which, in turn, is 
converted into oxymuriatic acid (i.e., chlorine) by means of combining with even more 
oxygen. But as we emphasized in Section 4, theoretical individuation is a mere belief, 
and beliefs require evidence. 
Davy (1810, 235-36) provides a retail argument that demonstrates that the 
experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s radical is not possible. He emphasizes the 
results of various experiments that he and other chemists performed, which show that 
oxymuriatic acid combines with hydrogen to form muriatic acid. And he goes on to 
discuss those experiments that seem to show the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid into 
oxygen and muriatic acid. Davy observes that in these experiments, water is always 
present. And he concludes that the oxygen that such experiments produce results from the 
decomposition of the water, not from the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid, which has 
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not been demonstrated. If oxymuriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen, and muriatic acid 
contains oxymuriatic acid and hydrogen, then muriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen 
either. To adopt Davy’s later terminology, the only components of muriatic acid are 
hydrogen and chlorine. Experimentally individuating the muriatic radical would involve 
separating it from the oxygen with which it combines to form muriatic acid and 
oxymuriatic acid. And since Davy showed that this is not possible, he gives us a 
successful retail argument for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
 
5.3 A Skeptical Conclusion Regarding Thomson’s Electron 
 
Finally, we’ll argue that Thomson neither demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
the electron, nor shows that it is impossible. Hence, we have an example of an 
inconclusive retail argument. The proper response to such an argument is skepticism 
regarding the entity in question, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument 
regarding the existence of that entity. 
Thomson (1897) designed a new type of cathode ray tube (figure 1) to perform a 
deflection experiment.  
 
 
Figure 1. Thomson’s cathode ray tube in 1897. Reproduced from Thomson 1969, 586. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -134-
This tube contains a cathode C, a cylindrical anode A with a slit, a cylindrical metal ring 
B with a slit, and a pair of plates D and E that produce an electrostatic field. A cathode 
ray is produced when the cathode discharges, and the ray passes through the slits in A and 
B before passing through the electrostatic field produced by D and E. Thomson’s goal 
was to determine whether the ray would be deflected in the field, and to thereby 
determine the composition of cathode rays. The basic idea was that, if cathode rays were 
made of ethereal waves, the rays would not be deflected by an electrostatic field; if, 
however, the rays were made up of negatively electrified bodies, then the rays would be 
deflected by an electrostatic field. 
Thomson’s thought was that a cathode would produce both electric currents and 
cathode rays when discharging, and that, in order to determine the composition of 
cathode rays, it would be necessary to eliminate the electric currents and experiment with 
purified cathode rays. Purification is the function of the cylindrical metal ring B, which 
absorbs the electric currents leaked from A and thus ensures that the ray passing through 
B is pure. Thomson found that the purified cathode ray was deflected when it passed 
between the plates D and E, thus confirming that cathode rays are made up of negatively 
electrified bodies. 
While Thomson satisfies Chen’s criteria when it comes to cathode rays, he didn’t 
thereby experimentally individuate the electrons that make them up. Thomson succeeded 
in separating cathode rays from currents; purifying them with the metal ring B, and thus 
maintaining their structural unity; and manipulating them by deflecting them with an 
electrostatic field. According to Chen’s criteria, one can say that Thomson 
experimentally individuated cathode rays and demonstrated that they are currents of 
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negative electricity. But Thomson presupposed rather than demonstrated that the currents 
consist of electrons. He did not demonstrate the existence of electrons, because he did not 
experimentally individuate them. Hence, the proper response to the retail argument that 
Thomson gives us is neither realism nor antirealism, but rather skepticism regarding the 
existence of electrons, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our goal in this paper has been to provide a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments, and thereby show that, even if we dissolve the traditional realism debate, 
there is still philosophical work to be done. We’ve put forward the criterion of 
experimental individuation in order to determine whether a given retail argument 
demonstrates the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. And we’ve applied 
that criterion to three cases, with the result that the upshot of a retail argument can be 
either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding the existence of a particular kind of 
theoretical entity. 
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Crash Testing an Engineering Framework in 
Neuroscience: 
Does the Idea of Robustness Break Down?1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I discuss the concept of robustness in neuroscience. Various 
mechanisms for making systems robust have been discussed across biology 
and neuroscience (e.g. redundancy and fail-safes). Many of these notions 
originate from engineering. I argue that concepts borrowed from engineering 
aid neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness; (2) formulating 
hypotheses about mechanisms for robustness; and (3) quantifying robustness. 
Furthermore, I argue that the significant disanalogies between brains and 
engineered artefacts raise important questions about the applicability of the 
engineering framework. I argue that the use of such concepts should be 
understood as a kind of simplifying idealization.  
 
 
“The brain is a physical device that performs specific functions; therefore, its 
design must obey general principles of engineering.” 
Sterling and Laughlin (2015:xv) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I discuss a cluster of issues around the understanding of 
robustness in neuroscience. Systems biologist, Hiroaki Kitano defines 
                                                        
1 M. Chirimuuta. History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. 
mac289@pitt.edu. Accepted for presentation at the 2016 Philosophy of 
Science Association meeting and publication of the proceedings in Philosophy 
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robustness as, “a property that allows a system to maintain its functions 
against internal and external perturbations” (Kitano 2004, p.826). According 
to this definition, in order to determine whether or not a system is robust, one 
must specify its function, and also specify the kinds of perturbation it faces. 
Empirically determinable questions then follow about how exactly the system 
achieves its robustness. Various means for making systems robust have been 
discussed across biology and neuroscience: copy redundancy, fail-safes, 
degeneracy, modularity, passive reserve, active compensation, plasticity, 
decoupling, and feedback (see Figure 1). It is obvious, but still worth 
emphasising, that most of these notions originate from engineering.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. The Engineering Framework for Robustness. A set of terms 
originating from engineering and control theory, which are applied to 
biological systems to explain how they achieve robust performance. 
 
In Section 2 of this paper I argue that the framework of concepts borrowed 
from engineering aids neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness by 
specifying functions of the system and determining possible sources of 
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perturbation; (2) formulating hypotheses about means for the system to 
achieve robustness; and (3) showing how robustness may be precisely 
quantified. This will be shown with examples of neuroscientific research 
which aims to measure robustness in a retinal circuit (Sterling and Freed 
2007), in the motor cortex (Svoboda 2015), and to develop models of 
homeostatic control (Davis 2006, O’Leary 2014).  
 
In Section 3 I argue that the use of the engineering framework in 
neuroscience gets stretched, perhaps to breaking point, when applied to 
systems where (1) there is no principled distinction between processes for 
robustness and processes which continually maintain the life of the cell; (2) 
where perturbations are a regular occurrence rather than anomalous events; 
and (3) where one should not conceive of the system as seeking to maintain a 
steady state. This point will be illustrated through examination of some 
recent work from Eve Marder’s laboratory, one of the key centres for research 
on robustness in neuroscience. 
 
I will argue that the limitations of the engineering notions are put into stark 
relief when one examines neural systems through the lens of the process 
approach to biology (Dupré 2012). The engineering perspective, to the extent 
that it treats biological systems as pre-specified objects with fixed functions, 
misses many of the features that make robust biological systems fascinating 
and which are highlighted by the process view. 
 
In Section 4 I will consider if it is necessary to re-engineer the concepts of 
robustness to be more in line with the dynamicism of biological systems; or 
alternatively, if we should accept the engineering perspective as it is, as one 
amongst many idealizing and simplifying heuristics for understanding 
complex systems like the brain. 
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2. PUTTING THE ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK TO USE 
 
The robustness of the brain is one of its many extraordinary attributes. By 
this I mean the fact that brains can undergo moderately severe external 
perturbations while still maintaining approximately normal function. 
Obviously, robustness has its limits and the brain’s characteristic patterns of 
resilience and fragility are an important target of research (Sporns 2010, 
chap. 10). In order to investigate robustness it is necessary first to specify 
what sorts of perturbations the system is robust to, and then to quantify how 
robust it actually is. Explanations of robustness can be developed by testing 
hypotheses concerning the exact mechanisms by which robust performance is 
achieved. The engineering framework can be put to effective use in each of 
these processes. 
 
For example, Sterling and Freed (2007) pose the question of how robust the 
retinal circuit is. They define robustness as the factor by which intrinsic 
capacity exceeds normal demand, which is the engineer’s notion of margin of 
safety (p.563). The idea can be illustrated through their comparison with 
bridge design. An engineer designing a road bridge will consider both the 
anticipated normal demand (e.g. commuter traffic) as well as the unusual 
demands that might occasionally be placed on the bridge (e.g. the passage of 
a 30 ton military vehicle). The unusual demand can be thought of as a 
“perturbation” in Kitano’s terms. A robust design will ensure that the system 
does not break when pushed beyond normal conditions. For a bridge this can 
be achieved with passive reserve (using thicker steel than is needed under 
normal conditions) and redundancy (including additional beams so that there 
are back-up structures if any parts are compromised). 
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Sterling and Freed take the bridge case to be analogous to the retinal circuit. 
Normal demand, for the retina, is the intensity of illumination that the eye 
will encounter under naturalistic stimulation conditions. The safety factor is 
calculated by experimental determination of the maximum illumination level 
under which neurons in the retina can maintain their ability to signal to 
downstream neurons. Sterling and Freed (2007, p.570) report that,  
“across successive stages in this neural circuit, safety factors are on the 
order of 2–10. Thus, they resemble those in other tissues and systems. 
Their similarity across stages also accords with the principle of 
symmorphosis—that efficient design matches capacities across stages that 
are functionally coupled….”  
 
Sterling and Freed’s explanation of robustness depends on the notion of 
passive reserve. For photoreceptor neurons, this is calculated as the number 
of vesicles of neurotransmitter available in their synapse for continuous 
signalling at high-rates without restocking of the vesicles (p.565-6). In 
arriving at their conclusion about retinal safety margins, they argue that 
there are at least twice as many vesicles as needed under normal stimulation 
conditions. In this case we have seen that a design approach borrowed from 
civil engineering plays a clear and striking role in these neuroscientist’s 
definition, operationalization and explanation of robustness in the retina.   
 
Another example comes from Davis’s (2006) review of work on homeostatic 
regulation2 in the nervous system. As he writes:  
                                                        
2 Note that Davis makes a conceptual distinction between robust properties 
and properties under homeostatic control: “In general, robustness describes a 
system with a reproducible output, whereas homeostasis refers to a system 
with a constant output” (2006, p.308). I will ignore this difference for the 
purposes of the paper since homeostatic systems conform to Kitano’s general 
definition robust systems.  
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“Homeostatic control systems are best understood in engineering theory, 
where they are routinely implemented in systems such as aircraft flight 
control. Recently, biological signaling systems have been analyzed with 
the tools of engineering theory….” (p.314)  
Accordingly, homeostatic control systems have a number of “required 
features”: 1) a set point which defines the target output of the system; 2) 
feedback; 3) precision in resetting the output back to the set point, following a 
perturbation; and (normally) 4) sensors which measure the difference 
between the actual output and the set point (p.309). 
 
Thus control theory offers neuroscientists clear and experimentally testable 
criteria for determining whether a system undergoes homeostatic regulation, 
by looking for these required features (e.g. the existence of a set point) in a 
system. The operating conditions of homeostatic regulation, and the 
biophysical mechanisms of feedback, sensors, etc., are also open to 
experimental investigation. Reported examples of properties under 
homeostatic control are muscle excitation at the neuromuscular junction 
(p.309) and bursting properties of invertebrate neurons (p.311). More 
recently, O’Leary et al. (2014, p.818) argue that ion channel expression in 
their simplified model of invertebrate neurons can be understood as an 
implementation of integral control, a standard control-theoretic architecture.  
 
Figure 2 (if space) schematic for integral control 
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3. CRASH TESTING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
Before considering the question of whether the engineering framework 
becomes structurally unsound when applied to some kinds of neural systems, 
I would like to draw our attention to some of its features. The basic ideas are 
clearly illustrated in Sterling and Freed’s (2007) example of the bridge. When 
one considers the robustness of an engineered artefact like the bridge, it is 
presupposed that the system is built up from component parts in such a way 
as to achieve a specific function. The robustness of the bridge is conceptually 
distinct from its other designed features or functions, and it can trade off 
against some of them. For example, the more robust the bridge is to the 
passage of the occasional heavy vehicle, the more expensive it will be to build 
(because requiring more steel) (p.563). Moreover, the perturbations against 
which the system is robust are thought of as atypical events, also 
conceptually distinct from the normal operations of the system.  
 
There is also the tendency to think of robustness as allowing the system, 
following a perturbation, to return to its initial stable state. Some 
experiments specifically involve the operationalization of the robustness of a 
system as the reversion to a prior state. For example, reporting on an 
experiment in which mouse premotor cortex in one hemisphere was inhibited 
using optogenetics during the preparation period for the animal’s movement, 
Svoboda (2015)3 writes, that “[t]his preparatory activity is remarkably robust 
to large-scale unilateral optogenetic perturbations: detailed dynamics that 
drive specific future movements are quickly and selectively restored by the 
network.” This notion of robustness as the ability of the system to revert to a 
                                                        
3 To my knowledge, these results have not yet been published in a journal. I 
have contacted the author to find out if the study is under review or in press.  
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prior functional states is similar to the idea of homeostasis as the ability of a 
system to stabilize some quantity in spite of external changes.  
 
Figure 3 (if space) After Kitano (2004, Figure 1) 
 
Eve Marder’s laboratory has carried out a long term investigation into the 
ability of neurons to maintain stable electrophysiological properties despite 
continual turnover of the ion channels embedded in the cell membrane which 
are responsible for its electrical excitability. This research project is one of 
the central examples of the study of robustness in neural systems. Marder 
and her collaborators make ample use of the engineering framework when 
reviewing other results and reporting their findings. For example, O’Leary et 
al. (2013, p.E2645) write: 
“Both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that maintaining 
stable intrinsic excitability is accomplished via homeostatic, negative 
feedback processes that use intracellular Ca2+ concentrations as a sensor 
of activity and then alter[s] the synthesis, insertion, and degradation of 
membrane conductances to achieve a target activity level.”  
 
What is striking about the characterization of electrophysiological stability in 
the face of ion channel turnover as a kind of robustness in the face of a 
perturbation (e.g. p.E2651), is the fact that the turnover is just part of the 
normal physiology of the cell. There is no functional and stable state of the 
cell in which this turnover does not occur—a fact which these authors also 
highlight.4 This brings our attention to some strains in the application of the 
engineering framework to this biological system.  
                                                        
4 “neurons in the brains of long-lived animals must maintain reliable function 
over the animal’s lifetime while all of their ion channels and receptors are 
replaced in the membrane over hours, days, or weeks. Consequently, ongoing 
turnover of ion channels of various types must occur without compromising 
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In the basic engineering characterisation of robustness, sketched above, 
perturbations are different from the normal circumstances in which the 
system is expected to operate. “Perturbation” carries the everyday 
connotation of an event which throws the system off balance and is 
deleterious to its normal functioning. We cannot think of the events of ion 
channel turnover as perturbations in this sense; they are business as usual 
for the cell. 
 
Furthermore, it is not in the nature of the system to seek to return to a prior, 
stable arrangement of its parts. A crucial property of the nervous system is 
its plasticity: the tendency for its component parts and the connections 
linking them to be continually sculpted by experience. The homeostatic 
mechanisms which Marder and colleagues investigate need to be understood 
as maintaining specific properties (such as a cell’s Ca2+ concentration) at a 
certain point, but not (nor do these researchers claim it) some generalised 
operation for achieving system-wide internal stability (see §4.4). 
 
In the basic engineering conception of robustness, there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between the features of a system which allow it to carry out its 
intended function, and those which make the system robust (even if in reality 
one individual feature can serve both purposes). In the case of the neuron 
which has continual ion channel turnover and no definite stable state to 
return to following these “perturbations”, it is not clear that we can we make 
this distinction. A more natural way to think about this and other biological 
systems is as ones, unlike engineered artefacts, “designed” to keep changing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the essential excitability properties of the neuron” (O’Leary et al. 2013, 
p.E2645). 
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and “designed” to maintain functional stability in the midst of this constant 
change.5  
 
The tensions and strains associated with the application of the basic 
engineering framework to biological systems can be felt more sharply if we 
appeal to a process metaphysics of biological “things” (Dupré 2012). According 
to this view, organisms are not substances but processes—items whose 
existence depends on the taking place of certain changes. This highlights the 
fact that the life of organisms depends on a continual turnover of its 
component parts, and that the system as a whole, while living, persists longer 
than its parts. Yet features and functions of the organism remain relatively 
stable. For example, memories can endure for decades even though the 
neurons that form them have undergone material change. This stability must 
be achieved—somehow. And so processes for robustness are not cleanly 
distinct from the general maintenance processes which keep the organism 
alive. 
 
The processual nature of neurons is nicely described by Marder and Goaillard 
(2012, p.563): 
“each neuron is constantly rebuilding itself from its constituent proteins, 
using all of the molecular and biochemical machinery of the cell.”  
(and see F n 4) 
                                                        
5  This blurring of the lines between mechanisms for robustness and 
mechanisms for life is highlighted by Edelman & Gally (2001: 13763) in their 
discussion of the difference between redundancy and degeneracy in biological 
systems: “the term redundancy somewhat misleadingly suggests a property 
selected exclusively during evolution, either for excess capacity or for fail-safe 
security. We take the contrary position that degeneracy is not a property 
simply selected by evolution, but rather is a prerequisite for and an 
inescapable product of the process of natural selection itself.” They also 
discuss another disanalogy between engineered and biological systems—the 
applicability of “design” talk.  
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We can contrast this with the substance metaphysics that we usually assume 
when thinking about engineered artefacts. A bridge or an aeroplane is what 
it is because of the parts which comprise it. Its existence does not depend on 
the occurrence of any process. This is not to deny that an expert in the theory 
of matter might well argue that the steel of the bridge maintains its integrity 
because of some fundamental processes. The point is that when 
characterising the robustness of the bridge or the aeroplane we would not 
resort to such sophistication. Rather, we think of the bridge as a substance 
and not a process—a steel structure which, in order to maintain its function 
in the face of perturbation, must resist rather than effect the swapping 
around of its component parts.  
 
 
4. EXAMINING REASONS TO RE-ENGINEER 
 
Now that we have noted these disanalogies between biological organisms and 
engineered things, we ought to worry that the framework borrowed from 
engineering is misleading when thinking about robustness in the brain and 
other biological systems. Is it time to re-engineer our conceptual tools for 
thinking about robustness to make them more suitable for characterising 
living things? In this section I consider four possible answers to this question.  
 
4.1 No. The terms in the engineering framework are just words that are used 
to facilitate communication of the neuroscientific results.6   
 
One potential response to the concerns raised in the previous section is that 
they stem from a superficial fixation on the vocabulary neuroscientists use 
when writing about their research. Just because the authors discussed above 
                                                        
6 A response along these lines was suggested to me by Timothy O’Leary, in 
conversation.  
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have employed certain words first introduced by engineers, it does not follow 
that their understanding of neurophysiology is distorted by comparisons with 
engineering. For example, I mentioned that the word “perturbation” has a 
negative connotation which makes it seem inappropriate when describing 
non-pathological and frequent events like ion channel turnover. It could well 
be that in the context of this research the term takes on a different 
meaning—for example, as any event that the system cannot directly control,7 
such as changes in protein configuration due to thermal noise.  
 
I believe that this response is warranted by what we know of the 
methodology of some of the investigations discussed above, but not all of 
them. In the case of Sterling and Freed (2007) I was careful to show that the 
engineering conceptions directly shaped how these neuroscientists 
operationalized and quantified robustness, and how they identified 
mechanisms by which robustness is achieved. There is no indication that they 
used terms such as “safety factor” to mean something radically different in 
the context of neuroscience.   
 
A very explicit statement of the aim to apply engineering principles directly 
to the understanding of the premotor cortex comes from Svoboda (2015): 
“preparatory activity is distributed in a redundant manner across weakly 
coupled modules. These are the same principles used to build robustness 
into engineered control systems. Our studies therefore provide an example 
of consilience between neuroscience and engineering.”  
Thus the convergence between a neurophysiological and the engineering 
perspective on the mouse motor planning system is taken to be an important 
result of this study. This echoes Sterling and Laughlin’s (2015, pp. xiii-xv) 
proposal that enquiring to see how engineering principles are implemented in 
                                                        
7 I thank Timothy O’Leary for this suggestion.  
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neural systems, and the attempt thereby to reverse-engineer the brain, leads 
to insights not otherwise available through routine data collection.  
 
4.2 No. The inadequacies you point out with the engineering framework are 
based on a caricature of mechanical engineering, not the actual complex 
discipline.8 
 
My characterisation of the engineering framework assumes that mechanical 
engineering (the design of bridges, aeroplanes and such like) is paradigmatic 
of the engineering approach in general. But of course there are many 
different kinds of engineering, from mechanical to electronic to 
communications and chemical. It could well be that the mismatch between 
understanding the robustness of a highly dynamic entity like the brain, and 
the rather static conception of robust objects that falls out of the basic 
engineering framework is just an artefact of only focussing narrowly on the 
kind of engineering that is actually furthest away from neuroscience.   
 
It would take me beyond the scope of this short article (and well beyond my 
own knowledge of the subject) to sketch out the various possible frameworks 
associated with each field of engineering specifically, and to see which 
conception of robustness is most suitable for biology. However, what I will say 
is that there is evidence in the studies discussed above that neuroscientists 
themselves do sometimes draw from the mechanically based caricature. This 
is particularly true of Sterling and Freed (2007). In contrast, when Davis 
(2006) and O’Leary (2014) make direct appeal to engineering they refer 
specifically to models in control theory.9 This invites questions, still, about 
whether the paradigm examples of controlled systems (e.g. a car driven on 
                                                        
8 This concern was raised by Arnon Levy and Timothy O’Leary. 
9 See also Zhang and Chase (2015) on the physical control system perspective 
on brain computer interfaces for motor rehabilitation. 
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cruise control, a Watt governor, or an aeroplane flown on autopilot) are 
dynamical enough capture the processual nature of the nervous system.  
 
4.3 Yes. The brain is so different from an engineered artefact that the 
framework is misleading and inappropriate. 
 
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 I discussed two reasons for thinking that we should 
not be concerned about any radical disanalogy between robustness in 
biological and engineered systems. While I agree that these are important 
points to keep in mind, I do not think that they diffuse the fundamental 
concern that when neuroscientists borrow engineers’ terms in order to study 
robustness, they risk mischaracterising the brain as more like an engineered 
artefact than it actually is. Is the appropriate conclusion, then, that a neural 
circuit is so different from a bridge or an aeroplane that the engineering 
framework is simply misleading and should be discarded? 
 
The best way to make this strong negative case is to consider some historical 
examples in which reasoning by analogy with engineered systems seems to 
have lead neuroscientists and theorists astray. One example comes from von 
Békésy, a physicist and communications engineer who turned his attention to 
inhibition in the nervous system.  In his book Sensory Inhibition he notes 
that there are feedback loops everywhere in nervous system and he asks how 
it is that system manages to avoid ending up in a dysfunctional oscillatory 
state (1967, p.25). It seems that von Békésy is importing his understanding of 
systems containing feedback from engineering, and in that context 
oscillations are normally problematic and efforts must be made to dampen 
them. These days neuroscientists seek to understand how oscillations in the 
healthy brain  (i.e. its characteristic patterns of endogenous activity) are 
actually responsible for cognitive functions, and how these oscillations differ 
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from the ones associated with pathologies such as epilepsy and Parkinson’s 
disease.10  
 
Another example is the comparison of the effects of “noise” in brains and 
artificial signalling systems…… GET EXAMPLE 
 This is very different from how neuroscientists understand noise today, 
which begins with the idea that brains evolved under constraints imposed by 
noisy “components”, which has therefore shaped all aspects of neural 
computation (Faisal et al. 2008). It would be a mistake to think of the brain 
processing information in the same way as an electronic computer, but with 
added redundancy to offset the noisiness of individual processing streams. 
 
 
The cautionary tales just told give some concrete indications of how 
imposition of the engineering framework on to neural systems can lead to 
conclusions which in retrospect appear false and misguided. But it would be 
too hasty infer from these two examples that current work on robustness in 
neuroscience is of dubious standing whenever it appeals to the concepts of 
engineering. A more general argument is the following: the brain is not like a 
bridge (or a computer, or an aeroplane on autopilot….); therefore whenever 
neuroscientists appeal to terms borrowed from the analysis of such systems, 
they risk saying things that are simply false because they fail to notice 
relevant disanalogies. This lays all the sceptical cards on the table. In the last 
part of the paper I attempt to mitigate these worries.  
 
                                                        
10 For a scientific overview see Buzsáki (2006).  For discussion of 
philosophical implications, see Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2013). See also 
Knuuttila and Loettgers (2013, p.160) on a parallel difference across 
engineering and cell biology, where oscillations are found to have a functional 
role. 
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4.4 No. Use of the engineering framework should be thought of as a 
simplifying strategy. 
 
Neuroscientist Steven Rose (2012:61) writes that:  
“one of the most common but misleading terms in the biology student’s 
lexicon is homeostasis….[the] concept of the stability of the body’s internal 
environment. But such stability is achieved by dynamic responses; stasis 
is death, and homeodynamics needs to replace homeostasis as the relevant 
concept”11 
This seems to capture the problem that was first noted in Section 3, that we 
should not be mislead by the engineering framework into thinking of neural 
systems as seeking to maintain an initial stable state. But we also noted that 
the neuroscientists employing control-theoretic models of homeostatic 
mechanisms are not thinking of their systems as seeking stability in this very 
general way. Instead, they are modelling the stability of a specific variable—
in the case of O’Leary et al. (2014), the concentration of Ca2+—and 
investigating the mechanisms by which it is controlled. To this end, it is 
reasonable to interpret the system as an integral controller (p.818).12 Thus it 
is still useful to talk about homeostasis with respect to Ca2+ concentration, 
even while thinking of the system as a whole, and in reality, as a 
“homeodynamic” one. 
 
                                                        
11 Compare Sterling (2012) on the concept of allostasis – stability through 
change with an emphasis on predictive regulation. Day (2005) and O’Leary 
and Wyllie (2011), in contrast, argue that the concept of homeostasis easily 
accommodates these dynamic and predictive aspects, and that the term 
allostasis is therefore superfluous. It is an interesting question (but beyond 
the scope of this paper) whether the narrow or wide definition of homeostasis 
is currently more prevalent amongst biologists and neuroscientists.  
12 Note that O’Leary et al. (2014) study of homeostasis is via a model of a 
neuron. But the model is realistic enough that it is expected to shed light on 
actual biophysical mechanisms. 
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I think of neuroscientists whose investigation of robustness in the brain is 
scaffolded by the engineering framework as providing idealized mechanistic 
explanations. Their explanatory target is, for example, the process by which 
overall neuronal activity level is controlled via regulation of ion channel gene 
transcription through a Ca2+ sensitive feedback loop. This is standard fodder 
for mechanistic explanation. At the same time, the framework of 
engineering—in this case the schematic of the integral controller—serves to 
direct attention to specific parts and processes in the extremely complex 
cellular machinery and to interpret them in control theoretic terms (sensors, 
feedback loops, etc.), while bracketing other aspects not immediately relevant 
to the explanation of robustness.  
 
Bechtel (2015, p.92) has presented the case that: 
“mechanisms are [to be] viewed not as entities in the world, but as posits 
in mechanistic explanations that provide idealized accounts of what is in 
the world.” 
His example is the idealization (understood as “falsehood”) that scientists 
introduce by putting boundaries around putative mechanisms which in 
nature do not exist. In the cases explored in this paper, the idealization 
comes in through the analogical reasoning of treating a neuronal system as if 
it is an engineered artefact. This, like the positing of boundaries, is a useful 
way to simplify the explanandum. It enables neuroscientists to bracket some 
of the known facts about the brain’s messy, Heraclitean nature. But it means, 
perhaps, that there is a stark difference between the brain viewed sub specie 
aeternatis (what some neuroscientists call the “ground truth” of the brain) 
and viewed sub specie mechinae (in the guise of a machine).  
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Eight Myths about Scientific Realism 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Selective realist projects have made significant improvements over the last two decades. 
Judging by the literature, however, antirealist quarters seem little impressed with the results. Section I 
considers the selectivist case and its perceived shortcomings. One shortcoming  is that selectivist offerings 
are nuanced in ways that deprive them of features that—according to many—cannot be absent from any 
realism “worth  having”. Section II (the main part of the paper) considers eight features widely required of 
realist positions, none of them honored by selectivist projects. Modulo those requirements, even if 
selectivists managed to clear other shortcomings of their project selectivism would still not be a position 
worth considering. Next the historical background and present credentials of the requirements in question 
are examined. All are found to rest on myths and confusions about science and knowledge. If this is correct, 
realists and antirealists should reject the requirements. 
 
I. Background 
The antirealist waves of the 1980s stifled naïve realist projects, but they also gave rise to critical 
realist reactions, particularly a shift in the way theories are accepted at face value from whole 
constructs to selected “theory-parts” (existence claims, narratives and structures regarding 
features beyond the reach of unaided perception). Moves in this “selectivist” direction were 
variously developed in the 1980s and 1990s, most influentially by Leplin (1984), Worrall 
(1989b), Kitcher (1993), Leplin (1997), and Psillos (1999). Selectivists see in the history of 
science a past littered not just with failures but also clear successes, especially after the 
consolidation of methodologies focused on impressive novel prediction in the early 19th century. 
The successes selectivists point to involve law-like structures all over physics, functional (as 
opposed to formally “fundamental”) entities like the particles invoked by the kinetic theory of 
matter, numerous extinct species hypothesized by Darwin and his circle, structures and processes 
from microbiology, much in Mendelian genetics, myriads of  molecular structures, and most of 
the subatomic entities deemed well-established since the 1950s, along countless causal networks, 
histories and functional entities in virtually all theories with warrant in terms of impressive novel 
predictive success. Selectivists thus respond to skeptical readings of the history of science with 
optimistic readings, which they argue are better justified than Laudan (1981)’s skeptical appeals. 
History, Leplin (1984) noted early in the debate on selectivism, is not opposed to realism any 
more than our experience of ordinary objects is unambiguously veridical.  
In selectivist terms, successful scientific theories may provide imperfect representations 
of unobservable aspects of some of their intended domains, but they do get those aspects right to 
some significant extent—and that is what matters to a realist stance. Realism has to do with 
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having warranted augmentative inference at levels that reach into unobservables, i.e. beyond the 
level allowed by its contrast position—constructive empiricism. 
Developing selectivism into a mature project has not proved easy. The initial criteria 
proposed for identifying theory-parts worthy of realist commitment were either too vague or 
picked up through “retrospective” projection of current. As Kyle Stanford (2006) cautioned, 
mere retrospective projection of current science reflects limitations of human imagination as 
easily as it does truth-content and can be variously misleading; also, it can be self-serving, and 
worse still it severely weakens selectivism by giving up the traditional realist goal of identifying 
the truthful parts of a theory while the theory is still alive. Realists need to develop compelling 
criteria for prospective projection, applicable to theories in full flight, and over the last decade 
selectivists have moved imaginatively to respond to this challenge. One promising contribution 
is a stronger emphasis on impressive novel predictions as a marker of success and truth content. 
This trend is multiply developed in works that revisit in detail the cases most used by antirealists 
as springboard exemplars of gross epistemic failure, as well as studies of other seemingly 
germane cases from the last 200 years (e.g. Saatsi 2005, Saatsi & Vickers 2011, Votsis 2011, 
Vickers 2013, @@@). While the debate is far from over, upgraded proposals are on view in the 
selectivist analyses just cited. At the very least, the initial antirealist arguments from radical 
underdetermination and so-called “skeptical inductions” have been weakened by selectivist 
challenges to the antirealist arguments at work. Still, many critics join Stanford in thinking that 
selectivism lacks a convincing realist criterion for prospective identification of theory-parts. As 
said, promising selectivist developments seem on view in this regard, but there is something else.  
Something seems to be making the selectivist project intellectually unattractive in some 
quarters, independently of the issue about the criterion for theory-parts. There is, in particular, a 
perception (not least among many sympathizers of realism) that selectivism advances its case at 
the cost of diluting its realist import, resulting in a stance “not worth having.” By the lights of 
selective realism, an empirically successful theory T contributes significant truths about 
unobservables but  
(1) typically, what makes T approximately true is that abstract versions of some of its 
parts are truthful, making the realist stance applicable to selected fragments of T rather 
than the integral whole initially intended;  
(2) such truth as T contains need not have universal applicability;   
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(3) T need not offer literal truth at its most fundamental level;  
(4) the significance of T’s central terms is high in unificationist rather than epistemic 
terms;  
(5) T adds significantly to our knowledge of unobservables in the intended domain, but 
there is no reason to expect T to be “right for the most part” at any level (what matters is 
that it yields epistemic gain at theoretical levels). 
(6) T may not instantiate uniformly convergent progress towards any “final description;”  
(7) the intelligibility T confers to its intended domain is generally incomplete. 
 
Each of the above tenets clashes head on with widespread assumptions and expectations 
regarding a realist stance about theories. The latter, many believe, should (1) constitute integral 
wholes, (2) apply universally, (3) give correct theoretical description, (4) have central terms that 
refer, (5) be, at least, right for the most part. (6) display epistemic progress, and (7) offer 
substantial intelligibility of the intended domains, Behind these expectations about scientific 
theories and what theoretical claims amount to is a view on what a realist position worth having 
comprises: to be worth having, a realist position must encompass strong versions of most of the 
listed assumptions. Antirealists (and not a few realists) routinely take these assumptions for 
granted. This aspect of the debate needs discussion because, as noted, the assumptions in 
question are clearly at odds with the selectivist strategy, which—generalizing Worrall (2016) a 
bit—might be the only viable realist game in town.  
 
II. Taxing Assumptions  
There is a view, shared by numerous scientists, according to which scientific realism cannot be a 
position worth having unless it encompasses most of the traits listed at the end of the last section. 
One problem with those traits is that they provide antirealists with fodder for criticizing positions 
that embrace them and realists for dismissing positions that lack them. Let us consider the listed 
items in detail. 
 
(1) Theories as Integral Wholes. Selectivism rejects the view that theories and conceptual 
networks are intellectual constructs made of non-separable parts. The integral wholes vision 
commits realism to nothing less than complete theories. Motivations for it come from at least two 
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fronts. One includes linguistic holism and/or the statement view of theories, endorsed in the 
1960s and 1970s by thinkers as superficially different as Ernest Nagel and Thomas Kuhn. 
Another motivation, good for a weaker version of the vision, has been the presumption that some 
concepts are grounded in “metaphysical necessities,” a position widely held in natural science 
until the early 1900s. In the 19th century it was thought that breaking of a theory into 
independently assertible parts had drastic limits. A case in point was the need felt for positing an 
ether of light, as at the time waves were conceived of within a traditional metaphysics that 
regarded them as propagating disturbances and thus as ontologically dependent entities that 
required the existence of something being disturbed (@@@). Institutional deference towards 
similarly presumed conceptual necessities is massively lower now. One major inflection point 
was the acceptance of Einstein’s Special Relativity, which opened the road to changes in both the 
conception of light and the requirements of intelligibility in physics.  
Nobody thinks now that light is completely as Fresnel or Maxwell imagined, yet— 
having no conceptual links closed to the possibility of scientific revision— there is little question 
that Fresnel’s theory got many things right, e.g. what might be termed “Fresnel’s Core”: light is 
made of microscopic transversal undulations, and these undulations follow the Fresnel laws of 
reflection and refraction. Abstracted from reference to the wave substratum, this schematic part 
of the theory spells out a descriptive core that all subsequent theories of light have retained. Once 
conceptual networks are recognized as relations sustained by revisable inductive conjunctions, 
scientific “good sense” allows shifts in science towards theory-parts cut out from the rest. There 
is a historical supplement to this.  There has never been much serious allegiance to theory 
“unbreakability” in scientific practice. As scientists developed their ideas, virtually all took a 
realist stance towards just selected parts of a theory at hand while taking a non-realist stance 
towards other parts (e.g. Newton’s approach towards Kepler’s cosmology and Galileo’s 
mechanics; 19th century wave theorists towards particle theories of light, Einstein towards 
Fresnel’s Core, Einstein towards Newtonian mechanics, molecular geneticists towards 
Mendelian genetics, and so forth). Being selective about what to take at face value in a theory is 
exactly what selective realists do, also what we all do in ordinary life. The idea that proper 
theories are unbreakable integral wholes just rests on myth. 
 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -164-
(2) Universality. Another widespread assumption is that, for realism, proper scientific theories 
must hold universally. We find this view expressed in e.g. van Fraassen (1980: 86): from a realist 
perspective, he claims, ‘‘a theory cannot be true unless it can be extended consistently, without 
correction, to all of nature’’  
This request rests on myth. There is no reason to think that interesting theories can be so 
extended even at the lowest phenomenal level. Generalizations limited to the observable level 
typically turn out to be true only over restricted ranges, just as with theoretical generalizations. 
The standards of acceptability should not be arbitrarily raised against scientific theories. So, past 
successful theories could not be extended consistently, without correction, to all of nature. 
However, as selectivists show, those theories made significant cognitive gains at significant 
levels, where various assortments of the theoretical descriptions they licensed remain both 
accurate and illuminating. The universality objection, it seems, burdens realism with a suicidal 
demand. 
 
(3) Truthful description. Realists are allegedly claim that what a theory T says about entities, 
properties, relations and processes should be construed literally; and to take a realist stance 
towards T is to believe that what it says is literally true. This view comprises three major lines: 
(3a) literalism, (3b) accuracy realism, and (3c) a methodological supplement.  
 
(3a) Like their biblical counterparts, theory-literalists think one mistake in a narrative is one 
mistake too many.  Phlogiston theory got some of its central claims wrong, as did also Fresnel’s 
theory, Mendel theory, Bohr’s 1913 theory of the hydrogen atom, and countless other theories, 
so those theories were all completely wrong.  
The antirealist uses of literalism are straightforward. If departures from literal accuracy, 
however small, make theories count as different, then the chances of a scientist  ever picking the 
right theory will be wretchedly small (argument of the bad lots). And the probability of 
conjecturing the one (and only one) truthful theory will be hopelessly small (problem of the base 
rate). And, so, at any given time, the chances that the one truthful theory is among the as yet 
“conceived alternatives” will be overwhelmingly low.  
Happily for realists, the expectations in (3a) belong in fairy-tales. Scientific theorizing is 
rarely strictly literalist. Scientists effectively abandoned literalism early in modern times, as they 
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began to articulate explanatory idealizations that carried an expectation that nothing in nature 
exactly realized them. For example, the aim of the kinetic theory of matter developed around 
1860 was to causally account for approximate empirical laws that had been gathered in the two 
previous centuries about the macroscopic behavior of gasses (e.g. PV = nRT ) and materials (e.g. 
thermal expansion).  Crucially, in the case of gases, the accounts invoked structureless point-
particles—the so-called “ideal gas”—that the theorists involved did not believe existed in nature. 
The ideal gas was explicitly an idealization, with a two-fold expectation at work: (i) actual gasses 
are made of non-ideal corpuscles moving at random  and  located at relatively large distances 
from one another “on average”; and (ii) the behavior of those actual corpuscles instantiated that 
of the ideal gas to a significant degree within a certain restricted domain. There was no question 
that ideal gasses literally construed had to be “real” in order to take the theory realistically. 
Scientific theories are likewise generally false in strictly literal fashion. As with maps, the point 
of realist interest is the extent to which a theory’s depictions match the intended domain. 
Theoretical representations of empirical domains resemble maps far more than they do assertions 
(e.g. Giere 2006). Selectivists proceed accordingly: taking a realist stance towards a theory T 
amounts to claiming only that some of the explanations and descriptions distinct to T are correct 
by acceptable standards.  
 
 (3b) In mathematized disciplines literalism easily ups its ante. According to a long lived 
assumption of quantitative exactitude, there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems 
have definite values, and in a correct theory the claims it makes correspond to the world with 
total accuracy. This ideal is found in early modern scientists, notably theorists with strong 
Platonist leanings such as Kepler.  
Dear though these expectations of divine accuracy and depth are, they rest on myth. Such 
correspondence as mathematized theories have to the world is not conditioned to radical 
accuracy. As Bertrand Russell noted on behalf of sound epistemology,  
 
“Although this may seem a paradox, all exact science is dominated by the idea of 
approximation. When a man tells you that he knows the exact truth about anything, you 
are safe in inferring that he is an inexact man. Every careful measurement in science is 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -166-
always given with the probable error [...] every observer admits that he is likely wrong, 
and knows about how much wrong he is likely to be.” (1931: 42) 
 
More recently, in a more comprehensive vein, Paul Teller (2015) complains that “accuracy 
realism” assumes that the quantities invoked by a theory actually refer. But—he notes—this 
misunderstands the fabric of theoretical representation, because theories generally formulate 
idealizations that burden quantitative attributions with failure of specificity in picking concrete 
cases. In the narrowest literal sense, the claim “the meter-standard kept in Paris is 1 meter long” 
may be true only by definition—any attempt to check it with absolute precision against any 
external objective length would be frustrated by, to begin with,  ineliminable thermal and 
quantum mechanical fluctuations. The point is that one-to-one matching makes no sense as a 
goal in scientific language, given that so many descriptive words in science are intrinsically 
vague and/or refer to idealizations. Actual reference to lengths presumes just perspectivally 
acceptable (never absolute) accuracy. At the lowest empirical levels also, completely exact 
assertions are generally neither relevant nor true. This connects with a related point, namely, the 
irrelevancy of these literalist and accuracy assumptions to the actual realism/antirealism debate. 
Shaped by the discussions started in the 1980s, the dispute is now primarily about whether or not 
warranted augmentative scientific inferences reach into unobservable domains. Ordinary realism 
about chairs, cats and mountains fails the ideals of radical literalism and accuracy no less than 
scientific realism.  
 
(3c) The methodological supplement claims that science would be merely an instrumentalist 
affair unless theorists aim to produce a complete description of the way things are, with scientists 
as pursuers of God-like reportage (perfect “mirror reflection”): scientific theories advance 
towards the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth (see e.g. Sankey 2008’s discussion of 
this). Although this position lost much of its ancient appeal in the 18th century, to this day some 
top theoreticians continue to wax lyrical expressing it, especially in “editorials”. 
 
“The ‘theory of everything’ is one of the most cherished dreams of science. If it is ever 
discovered, it will describe the workings of the universe at the most fundamental level 
and thus encompass our entire understanding of nature. It would also answer such 
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enduring puzzles as what dark matter is, the reason time flows in only one direction and 
how gravity works. Small wonder that Stephen Hawking famously said that such a theory 
would be ‘the ultimate triumph of human reason – for then we should know the mind of 
God’ ”.  (New Scientists, 4 March 20101)   
 
This colorful supplement lacks warrant if, as selectivists claim, the realist stance can be 
consistently and fruitfully applied to selected theory-parts.  
 
The realist badge of honor is not awarded for telling the truth, all the truth, and nothing 
like the truth about anything—let alone reading the mind of God. It is a distinction for finite 
cognitive achievements forged with crooked tools. See also (6) below.  
 
(4). Realist Significance of the “Central Tenets” of a Theory. A related common assumption 
is this: Even if truthful description may have limits, taking a theory T realistically requires 
commitment to T’s central tenets (i.e. those about the entities, principles and laws that 
individuate T). In Laudan’s version, realism about T commits to the view that the T’s central 
terms successfully refer.  
There is little question that in numerous scientific theories the central terms fail to refer—
on this point we all have a debt of gratitude to Laudan. However, once theories are no longer 
approached as unbreakable wholes the emphasis on central terms wanes. If anything, the 
reference that matters is that of theory-parts. Then, on the explanatory side, the scientific focus is 
on the structures of possibilities of its intended domain D. As such, a theory is not exclusively 
about the entities and relations invoked at the level of its central terms. Primarily the theory is 
about D, whose relevant entities and structures include those that may be found at intermediate 
levels of description—like Fresnel’s Core. A theory may thus be individuated by its central 
tenets, but the latter do not exhaust the theory’s realist import. The appropriate realist focus is 
those theoretical claims derivable from the theory and for which there is strong evidence (and so 
a strong expectation of truthfulness), not whether the terms involved are “central”, 
“intermediate”, or “peripheral”.  
                                                 
1
  “Knowing the mind of God: Seven theories of everything”, New Scientists, 4 March 2010: 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18612-knowing-the-mind-of-god-seven-theories-of-everything/   
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(5). Being “right for the most part”. Another related assumption links the realist stance 
towards a theory with the claim that the theory is right “for the most part”. Michael Devitt, for 
example, voices this assumption when he defines scientific realism as the doctrine according to 
which “Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist 
mind-independently and mostly have the properties attributed to them by science” (2005:  769). In 
his view, theories that are well-established theories by today’s methodological standards are right 
for the most part.   
This supposition sounds reasonable at first hearing but it too seems suicidal for realism. 
Virtually all the past theories realists want to be realist about seem to have turned out to be wrong 
“for the most part”—unless “being right” is granted with postmodern largesse.  Newtonian 
mechanics is “right” for a comparatively tiny regime of speeds and fields. Bohr’s theory of the atom 
gets impressive aspects right but otherwise is wrong for the most part of the entire quantum domain. 
Mendel’s theory invites a similar reaction. For all we know, our excellent present physics may be 
wrong for most of the total universe. So, scientifically successful theories seem “wrong for the most 
part”. But they have great realist import, nonetheless.  That import comes from the fact that they get 
right novel significant unobservable aspects of their intended domains. As David Bohm urged long 
ago, piecemeal caution needs to be exercised in one’s realist commitment to the entities, regularities 
and processes invoked by well-established current scientific theories (1957, Chapter V).  Two lines 
of reasoning in particular support this prudence (@@@): (1) Qualities, properties of matter, and 
categories of laws expressed in terms of some finite set of qualities and laws are generally applicable 
only within limited contexts (in terms of ranges of conditions and degrees of approximation). (2) 
There is no reason to suppose that new qualities and laws will always lead to mere correction 
refinements that converge in some simple and uniform way. This may occur in some contexts and 
within some definite range of conditions, but in different contexts and under changed conditions the 
qualities, properties and laws may be quite novel and lead to dramatic effects relative to what 
previous theorizing would have led to expect. For example, for bodies moving with speeds negligible 
compared to the speed of light, the laws of relativity lead to small corrections of the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics. But they also lead to such qualitatively new results as the “rest energy” of 
matter. Further laws yet to discover may be vastly more bizarre.  
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(6) Progress: The realist expectation that successful science achieves cumulative truth content 
about unobservables is frequently nailed to the idea that “modern science is converging on a 
single picture of the world”.  Claims along these lines come in several flavors, in particular (a) 
linear epistemic progressivism and (b) “metaphysical” realism. 
 
(6a) Convergent progress. Léo Errera expressed the idea in his Botanique Générale of 1908: 
“Truth is on a curve whose asymptote our spirit follows eternally2.” This expectation has 
recurrent mystical roots in science. John Herschel, for example, is cited by Marcel de Serres as 
saying “All human discoveries seem to be made only for the purpose of confirming more 
strongly the truths come from on high, and contained in the sacred writings3.” 
Convergent progressivism runs against a recurrent realization in modern science. As 
selectivists recognize, successful theories give knowledge but they usually err at numerous levels of 
description. Successful theories don’t give us everything there is to know about any intended domain, 
let alone ‘The World.’ Finite sets of simple laws can provide correct descriptions and predictions 
when we constrain their context enough, notes Bohm (1957), but we should expect unrestricted 
theories to be false. Many defenders of scientific objectivity have followed suit, stressing the shift 
from traditional searches for a comprehensive world-view to explicitly perspectival searches for 
piece-meal knowledge about domains of current scientific interest, leading to assertions of 
corresponding partiality. 
 
(6b) In no better shape is the claim that realism is committed to the existence of one true and 
complete description of the world, whose truth bears one-to-one correspondence to ‘mind-
independent reality, so that the purpose of science is to discover that description. Critics 
persuasively dismiss this brand or realism. But no knowledgeable realist has held such a position 
in generations. It is a thesis recalled from the grave in the late 1970s and 1980s by Hilary Putnam 
under the label “metaphysical realism,” a view he presented as an example of a hopelessly 
jumbled project (e.g. Putnam, 1978: 49, and 1990: Preface). 
                                                 
2
  Recueil d'Œuvres de Léo Errera: Botanique Générale (1908), 193. As translated in John Arthur Thomson, 
Introduction to Science (1911): 57 
 
3
  Marcel de Serres, 1845. “On the Physical Facts in the Bible Compared with the Discoveries of the Modern 
Sciences”. The Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal (Vol. 38): 260.  [239-271] 
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(7) Intelligibility: Another claim often associated with realism is that science aims to provide 
truthful explanations that make the phenomena at hand intelligible. This condition comes in (a) 
radical and (b) moderate strengths. The radical version calls for explanations that leave the 
intellect content and with no further whys. The weak condition calls for explanations that make 
the target phenomena more but not necessarily fully intelligible. 
 
(7a) Leibniz’s rationalist objection to Newton’s Theory of Gravitation exemplifies the radical 
version. He complained that if gravity were thought as a real force, then its effect would be a 
mysterious action at a distance. Leibniz blamed Newton for introducing “occult” forces into 
science, and until the end of his life Newton hoped to produce a properly “intelligible” account 
of gravity involving only action by contact interactions—he did not succeed. Modern scientific 
theories do not provide radical intelligibility. Once Galileo gave up his initial hope of presenting 
inertial motion as uniform circular motion, the theory of free fall he accepted left open at least as 
many whys as it closed. Why or how Galileo’s mysterious mathematical structures arise in 
nature? The same goes for subsequent theorizing. Why or how the regularity given as Newton’s 
law of gravitation arises? Why or how Fresnel’s Core arise? Why or how the speed of light is a 
universal invariant?  Contemporary fundamental theories fail radical intelligibility just as clearly.   
Realists need not worry about this. Calls for radical intelligibility rest on views of 
cognition now widely recognized as mythical. Barring mystical insight and such, all actual 
understanding comes with opaque spots. At every scientific stage scientific warrant (and 
intelligibility) stops somewhere, albeit usually not at the traditional empiricist boundaries. 
Realism is compatible with suspending judgment about whether a certain theoretical claim 
correctly describes a fundamental or derivative aspect of nature. This is exemplified in the stance 
realists take towards e.g. Fresnel’s Core, the invariance of light’s speed, and fundamental 
principles in general.  
A theory that saves all the known phenomena but whose reliable parts comprise only 
structures and explanations at phenomenal levels, provides the lowest level of understanding. 
This makes for a constructive empiricist take, which escapes skepticism by accepting realism 
about just the theory’s empirical substructures. The point here is that radical theoretical 
intelligibility is not necessary for taking a realist stance towards a theory. From a selectivist 
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perspective, the key factor for taking a theory-part realistically is not the “intelligibility” it 
confers but its indispensability for maintaining the theory’s predictive power in the context of 
current background knowledge. Ptolemaic orbits were denied realist interpretation not primarily 
because they failed the intelligibility requirement—Ptolemaic constructions went out of their 
way to honor, of all requirements, intelligibility (then guided by the Principle of Uniform 
Circular Motion for heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian arguments for the fixity of the Earth). 
Rather, Ptolemaic orbits were refused realist interpretation because the epicycles, deferents and 
equants they invoked were grossly underdetermined by extant knowledge (i.e. available data and 
cosmological principles). Positive evidence for the orbits specifically proposed was lacking.  
None of this is not to question the realist relevance of theories that seek to achieve deep 
understanding. What is denied is that scientific realism must embrace radical intelligibility. 
Radical intelligibility is a trait realism about observables and every day affairs neither honors nor 
is expected to honor.  
 
(7b) This brings us to cogent versions of the moderate intelligibility condition. Selectivists take a 
realist stance only towards theory-parts deemed to be both indispensable for the theory’s success 
and free of compelling specific doubts against them (@@@). That is, the realist stance goes only 
to tenets for which there is strong positive evidence by modern scientific standards.  In all the 
cases highlighted by realists, the selections supported by the strongest level of evidence available 
make the target domain intelligible well beyond the observable levels. When, by contrast, the 
positive evidence for a theory does not reach the unobservable explanatory posits that make the 
relevant phenomena intelligible, then the best stance to take about the theory is not realism but 
constructive empiricism. This clarifies what introductory characterizations of scientific realism 
get right about the intelligibility condition: A good theory must not have just significant 
predictive power but must also make the relevant phenomena intelligible (Richard DeWitt 2010: 
72). If the theory parts that do this lack evidential warrant, then the reasonable stance towards 
them is constructive empiricism. 
 
(8) Realism Worth having. Topping the above assumptions, there is a popular notion to the 
effect that a realist stance failing to adhere to most of the above requirements is “not a realism 
worth having”. Against this idea, I have argued that none of the listed assumptions is worth 
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having. Every one of them lacks convincing warrant. Moreover, even if the assumptions did get 
proper warrant they face a deeper problem: the assumptions are irrelevant to the current 
realism/antirealism debate—they do not expose relevant contrasts between inferences limited to 
the phenomenal level and inferences that reach into theoretical levels.  
In modern science, virtually all interesting augmentative inferences violate the listed 
assumptions. So, the latter simply and arbitrarily raise the epistemological standards of 
acceptability against theoretical assertions. If the above considerations are correct, then, realists 
and antirealists should reject the assumptions examined in this paper—they all rest on 
counterproductive myths and confusions.   
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1. Introduction 
 
One philosophical interest in the philosophy of modelling focuses on the problem of the 
model-world relationship, also known as the representation problem. Among many 
approaches to this problem, the similarity account has attracted much attention recently. 
Ronald Giere (1988, 1999a, 1999b, 2004, 2010), Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Michael 
Weisberg (2012, 2013) have made the most substantial contributions. 
  The core of this account, first developed by Giere, is a view of the model-world 
relationship: 
The appropriate relationship, I suggest, is similarity. Hypotheses, then, claim a 
similarity between models and real systems. But since anything is similar to anything 
else in some respects and to some degree, claims of similarity are vacuous without at 
least an implicit specification of relevant respects and degrees. The general form of a 
theoretical hypothesis is thus: Such-and-such identifiable real system is similar to a 
designated model in indicated respects and degrees. (Giere 1988, 81; author’s 
emphasis) 
  However, critics point out that this account is only schematic since it falls short of 
specifying the relevant respects and degrees (Suárez 2003). Moreover, Giere argues that a 
philosophical account of scientific representation should also take into consideration 
factors such as the roles played by scientists, and the intentions those scientists have 
when modelling (Giere 2004, 2010). Given these considerations, Weisberg develops a 
more sophisticated similarity account, called the weighted feature-matching account 
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(2012, 2013). The basic idea of his account comes from psychologist Amos Tversky’s 
contrast account of similarity, which states that the similarity of objects a and b depends 
on the features they share and the features they do not. In light of this, Weisberg proposes 
his own account: 
S (m, t) = 
θf(Ma∩Ta)+ρf(Mm∩Tm) 
θf(Ma∩Ta)+ρf(Mm∩Tm)+ αf(MaTa)+ ȕf(MmTm)+ Ȗf(TaMa)+ δf(TmMm)            (1) 
f(x) refers to the weighting function, α, ȕ, Ȗ, δ, θ, and ρ denote weighting terms 
(parameters), subscripts a and m stand for attributes and mechanisms,1 and M denotes the 
model and T the target. (Ma∩Ta) stands for attributes shared by the model and the target, 
(MaTa) attributes that the model has while the target does not, and (TaMa) attributes that 
the target has while the model does not. The same story goes for mechanisms m. 
Attributes and mechanisms as a whole are called features of the model and the target. 
      An interpretation for this equation is needed. First, there must be a feature set Δ, and 
the set of features of the model and the set of features of the target are defined as sets of 
features in Δ. The elements of Δ are determined by a combination of context, 
conceptualization of the target, and the theoretical goals of the scientist. Besides, the 
                                                          
1
 Properties and patterns of systems are termed attributes, and the underlying mechanisms 
generating these properties and patterns are termed mechanisms (Weisberg 2013, 145). 
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contents of Δ may change through time as science develops, which in turn might result in 
a reevaluation of the established model-world relationship (Ibid., 149). 
      Second, consider the values of weighting parameters α, ȕ, Ȗ, δ, θ, and ρ. On Weisberg’s 
account, different kinds of modelling require different weighting parameters. For example, 
if what interests us is the minimal modelling which concerns merely the mechanism 
responsible for bringing about the phenomenon of interest, the goal of this modelling is 
written as:2 
Mm∩Tm 
       ——————————————      1 
                                          Mm∩Tm+MaTa+MmTm                                          (2) 
Finally, consider the weighting function f(x), telling us the relative importance of each 
feature in the set Δ. Weisberg says scientists in most cases have in their mind some subset 
of the features in Δ, which they regard as especially important. Hence some features are 
weighted more heavily, while others are equally weighted. Besides, the background theory 
determines which features in Δ should be weighted more heavily. If the background theory 
is not rich enough, deciding which should be weighted more heavily is partly an empirical 
problem. 
 Having presented an outline of Weisberg’s account, I will now argue that this account 
fails to capture the relationship between concrete models and their targets. To illustrate this 
                                                          
2
 Weisberg also describes three other kinds of modelling requiring different weighting 
parameters: hyperaccurate, how-possibly and mechanistic modelling (2013, 150-52). 
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shortcoming (Sec. 3), I will first describe the San Francisco Bay model (Sec. 2). Sec. 4 will 
propose a holistic alternative to Weisberg’s account, suggesting that the model-world 
relationship be viewed as an overall structural fit where one organized whole fits another 
organized whole. Sec. 5 will examine a case where the organization of the whole can be 
treated as simply another feature. 
 
2. The San Francisco Bay Model 
 
John Reber worried about the fragility of the water supply in the San Francisco Bay area in 
the 1950s. To solve this problem, he proposed an ambitious proposal, namely, to dam up 
the Bay. Carrying out this plan would not only supply San Francisco with unlimited 
drinking water but also entirely change the area’s transportation, industrial, military and 
recreation landscape (Weisberg 2013, 1). However, his critics worried that Reber’s plan 
would only achieve its aims at the cost of destroying commercial fisheries, rendering the 
South Bay a brackish cesspool, creating problems for the ports of Oakland, Stockton, and 
Sacramento, and so on (Jackson and Peterson 1977; Cf. Weisberg 2013, 1).  
      To settle this dispute, the Army Corps of Engineers was charged with investigating the 
overall influence of the Reber plan by building a massive hydraulic scale model of the Bay 
(Weisberg 2013, 1-2). Once the model was built, it was adjusted to accurately reproduce 
several measurements of the parameters such as tide, salinity, and velocities actually 
recorded in the Bay (for details see Army Corps of Engineers 1963). After the adjustment, 
it was time to verify the model: 
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Agreement between model and prototype for the verification survey of 21-22 
September 1956, and for other field surveys, was excellent. Tidal elevations, ranges 
and phases observed in the prototype were accurately reproduced in the model. Good 
reproduction of current velocities in the vertical, as well as in the cross section, was 
obtained at each of the 11 control stations in deep water and at 85 supplementary 
stations. The salinity verification tests for the verification survey demonstrated that 
for a fresh-water inflow into the Bay system […], fluctuation of salinity with tidal 
action at the control points in the model was in agreement with the prototype 
(Huggins and Schultz 1967, 11). 
After the verification, modellers were in a good position to assess the Reber plan through 
the model built. The investigation showed that it would considerably reduce water-surface 
areas, reduce the velocities of currents in most of South San Francisco Bay, reduce the 
tidal discharge through the Golden Gate during the tidal cycle, and so forth (Huggins and 
Schultz 1973, 19). Given these disastrous consequences, the Army Corps then denounced 
Reber’s plan (Weisberg β01γ, 9). 
 
3. How Could Weisberg’s Account Shed Light on the Bay Model? 
 
I have argued elsewhere that Weisberg’s account cannot shed light on mathematical 
models due to its atomistic conception of features and its assumption of the set-theoretic 
approach to model structures (citation anonymized). I find that the same charges can be 
raised in the case of concrete models. 
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        Consider the first charge: Weisberg’s account is committed to an atomic conception 
of features. The key of Weisberg’s account is the claim that the similarity of objects a and 
b depends on the features they share and the features they do not share. Let us take a closer 
look at the equation (1). The numerator invites us to weight features shared, and the 
denominator asks us to weight all features involved (including three feature subsets: 
features shared, features possessed by the model but not the target, and features possessed 
by the target but not the model). Each feature is weighted independently and only once, 
with it falling into one of the three feature subsets. The numerator is the weighted sum of 
features shared, the denominator is the weighted sum of features shared and unshared, and 
the similarity measure is the ratio of the numerator to the denominator. 
  However, features in the Bay model are not atomistic and independent of each other. 
As Huggins and Schultz put it explicitly, “Among the problems to be considered were the 
conservation of water […]; […] the tides, currents and salinity of the Bay as they affect 
other problems […]. None of these problems can be studied separately, for each affects the 
others” (1973, 12). The reason why none of these problems can be studied separately is 
because factors involved in these problems cannot be studied separately. 
  Consider, for instance, the relationship between two key features in the model: tide and 
salinity. Salinity levels vary along an estuary depending on the mixing of freshwater and 
saltwater at a site. An estuary “is the transition between a river and a sea. There are two 
main drivers: the river that discharges fresh water into the estuary and the sea that fills the 
estuary with salty water, on the rhythm of the tide” (Savenije 2005, Preface ix). 
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  To illustrate this “rhythm of the tide”, consider the effect of the spring-neap tidal cycle 
on the vertical salinity structure of the James, York and Rappahannock Rivers, Virginia, 
U.S.A.: 
 Analysis of salinity data from the lower York and Rappahannock Rivers (Virginia, 
U.S.A.) for 1974 revealed that both of these estuaries oscillated between conditions of 
considerable vertical salinity stratification and homogeneity on a cycle that was 
closely correlated with the spring-neap tidal cycle, i.e. homogeneity was most highly 
developed about 4 days after sufficiently high spring tides while stratification was 
most highly developed during the intervening period. (Haas 1977, 485) 
This short report shows not only that characteristics of salinity (such as stratification and 
homogeneity) are influenced by characteristics of the tide, but also that there is a phase 
connection (or synchronization) between tidal cycle and salinity oscillations. The former is 
a causal relationship while the latter is a temporal relationship. The phase connection 
among features was also emphasized by the Army Corps when verifying the Bay model, 
saying “These gages were installed in the prototype and placed in operation several months 
in advance of the date selected to collect the primary tidal current and salinity data required 
for model verification, since it was essential to obtain all data simultaneously for a given 
tide over at least one complete tidal cycle of 24.8 hours” (196γ, 50; my emphasis). 
Moreover, the same story goes for tide and tidal currents (for details see Army Corps 1963, 
20). 
  In short, features in a model bear not only causal relationships, but also temporal 
relationships to one another. This implies that, when verifying the model, features of the 
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model causally interact with each other in producing certain outputs (e.g. predictions, 
effects, phenomena, etc.), rather than that they individually or separately produce outputs. 
So although outputs of key features in the Bay model can be identified and measured 
separately, they are not produced separately. 
  It is important to note that the causal interaction among features may lead to a different 
kind of interaction, i.e. a “similarity interaction”,3 wherein features interact with one 
another in producing the similarity value. That is, one feature’s contribution to the 
similarity value depends on other feature(s)’ contribution to that value.4 The difference 
between causal and similarity interaction is that the latter is a statistical relationship among 
measured features, and can be viewed as a reflection of the former when coupled with an 
assumption that there might be such an underlying causal structure.5 For example, a 
similarity interaction is shown by the verification of salinity in the Bay model, where the 
measurement of salinity (as a measurement of one feature’s contribution to the similarity 
                                                          
3
 I thank X for suggesting this term for me. 
4
 This point can be best illustrated with the curve fitting example: when computing the fit 
of a straight line y=ax+b to a cloud of points, a and b will depend on each other to produce 
the best fit (I thank X for giving me this example). 
5
 This assumption is important because there are cases where the fact that there is 
similarity interaction cannot guarantee that there is also causal interaction, because some 
randomly generated data set may also show interaction among features. In other words, 
causal interaction can lead to similarity interaction and the reverse is not true (I thank Y for 
letting me know this). I will discuss this assumption, called “precondition” later, in Sec. 4. 
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value from Weisberg’s perspective) depended on other features in the way in which other 
features were kept constant: “salinity phenomena in the model were in agreement with 
those of the prototype for similar conditions of tide, ocean salinity, and fresh-water inflow” 
(Ibid., 54; my emphasis). 
  The way that similarity interaction reflects causal interaction, when coupled with the 
assumption mentioned above, can be expressed as follows: if what is under verification is a 
causal structure to which modellers do not have direct access (so the structure cannot be a 
feature in Weisberg’s formula), then the coherent behavior of features (i.e. their similarity 
interactions such as phase connections) is a way of verifying, or at least indicating, the 
causal interactions in the underlying causal structure.6 That is the reason why it was so 
essential to obtain all data simultaneously within a complete tidal cycle for the Bay model, 
and why all other features must be kept constant when verifying salinity (or other features). 
  Given features’ causal interactions in the model and their similarity interactions when 
measuring them, it seems that assessing the relationship between a model and its target 
cannot be simply achieved in the way suggested by Weisberg’s equation, for features’ 
contribution to the similarity relationship is not additive but interactive. That is, to assess 
the relationship between a model and its target, one cannot measure each feature’s 
contribution independently and then add them together. 
 
4. Set-Theoretic or Non-Set-Theoretic? A Holistic Alternative 
 
                                                          
6
 I thank X for bringing this point to my attention. 
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Now we arrive at the problem of why Weisberg’s account is deeply committed to an 
atomistic conception of features. As I have argued elsewhere, this problem ultimately 
comes down to Weisberg’s understanding of the structure of models (citation anonymized). 
Weisberg says models are interpreted structures (2013, 15), so concrete models are 
interpreted concrete structures. At first glance, I have no quarrel with this understanding. 
On closer inspection, however, it can be shown that Weisberg’s account on the model-
world relationship assumes a set-theoretic approach to the structure of models.7 This is 
because Weisberg’s similarity measure can be derived from the Jaccard similarity 
coefficient between two sets, a coefficient assuming a set-theoretic conception of objects 
(citation anonymized). 
  The key to the set-theoretic approach to structures is its assumption that elements of 
objects (i.e. models and targets) are independent of each other, just as elements of a set are 
independent of each other. In other words, it construes both the model and the target as a 
set of independent elements, the similarity between which consists in the ratio of the 
number of elements shared to the number of all elements (citation anonymized). However, 
as discussed in Sec. 3, features are not independent. More importantly, their causal 
interactions may result in a similarity interaction among features. 
  This similarity interaction undermines Weisberg’s account, for it cannot properly 
capture the dependence relationship of features’ contribution to the overall similarity 
                                                          
7
 Note that Weisberg explicitly objects to the set-theoretic approach to models (2013, 137-
42). However, I think it is compatible to claim that someone implicitly assumes what 
someone explicitly rejects. 
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measure between a model and a target. Nonetheless, there is still a way to save the very 
intuitive notion of similarity, by abandoning the set-theoretic conception of structures. That 
is, if the structure of a model is viewed as an organized whole in which each component of 
the whole is interconnected to other component(s) (directly or indirectly) in such a way 
that they interact with one another in producing certain phenomena of interest (i.e. outputs). 
Under such an understanding, therefore, assessing the relationship between a model and its 
target cannot be simply achieved by assessing each individual feature’s relationship and 
then adding them together. Nor can this be done by assessing each connection among two 
or more features and then adding them together, even if connections (causal or non-causal) 
are also interpreted as features. On the other hand, however, the notion of similarity can be 
minimally preserved by claiming that assessing the similarity or fit (I will use fit hereafter) 
between a model and a target amounts to assessing the overall structural fit between the 
model and its target. 
  Generally speaking, structural fit means the structure of the model fits the structure of 
the target as an organized whole. That said, nevertheless, it should be stressed that there is 
no univocal meaning for the term “structural fit” that could encompass all circumstances, 
nor can a single equation or formula capture all situations. This is largely due to the 
heterogeneity of modelling practice and its multifarious goals. On the other hand, however, 
instructive points can still be asserted. In what follows I will elaborate some basics 
regarding the conception of “structural fit”. 
      Structural fit in mathematical modelling means different things than in concrete 
modelling. For example, in a very simple case of curve fitting where a straight line y=ax+b 
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is fitted to a cloud of points, features a and b will interact with each other to produce the 
best fit. That is, what fits the cloud of points is the overall structure, not the additive sum of 
each individual feature. As I have argued elsewhere, in more complicated mathematical 
modelling such as the maximum likelihood estimation, the fit is usually achieved through 
comparing the predicted data set derived from the model as a whole to the observed data 
set derived from the target system (citation anonymized). Individual features of the model 
simply disappear, and causally related features, as constituting a whole, that co-occur in the 
data set are what really matters. 
    In the case of concrete modelling, admittedly, the claim that assessing the fit between 
a model and a target amounts to assessing the overall structural fit seems to be less 
apparent. On closer examination, however, the same claim still holds. Let us go back to the 
verification of the Bay model. At first glance, it seems the verification of the model was 
achieved by independently verifying the output (i.e. data sets) of each individual feature, as 
the report showed (see Sec. 2 for the verification report). That is, it seems that by verifying 
that each feature in the model fits its counterpart in the target, scientists made the judgment 
that the model fits the target system. 
  Underlying this seemingly plausible reasoning, however, there remains the problem of 
why we are allowed to confirm the verification of the model by means of only verifying 
several outputs of individual features. Or, to put it slightly differently, in terms of what 
does the fit of features guarantee the judgment about the fit of the model to the target? I 
take it that it is more than the fit of individual features themselves that makes sense of the 
reasoning that the model fits the target. There must be a precondition for this reasoning 
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(remember the “assumption” made in the last section). After all, there are many cases in 
which the fit of features does not guarantee the fit of the model itself to the target. For 
instance, a drawing of Tom’s face may accurately capture all features of his face, e.g., nose, 
eyes, mouth, etc., but still falls short of fitting his face, because of the wrong organization 
of these features, e.g., putting the mouth in between the eyes and nose (Weisberg would 
argue that the organization could be a feature. I will discuss this point in Sec. 5.). 
  So if the fit of features is insufficient to vindicate the fit of a model to its target, what 
could provide this vindication? My claim is, contrary to Weisberg, that it is the overall 
structural fit of the model to the target system that warrants the fit judgment about the 
model and its target. In other words, the fit of individual features can only succeed in 
supporting the fit of the model to the target by the precondition that these features can be 
organized into the whole (i.e. the assumption that there is such an underlying causal 
structure), not the other way around. 
  To understand this “holistic reasoning”, let me articulate the specifics involved step by 
step. We first build a concrete model, i.e. a concrete structure, wherein features are 
interconnected with one other in such a way that they have the potential to interactively 
produce certain phenomena of interest (i.e. outputs). Before verifying the model, we need 
to adjust key features to make sure the model works very well. Note that any adjustment 
will not simply be the adjustment of individual features but also of their interconnections, 
resulting in the adjustment of the overall structure of the model. Finally, we verify the 
model by comparing the outputs of the model to the outputs of the target. As with 
mathematical models, this verification is also usually made via comparing data sets, as 
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shown in the Bay model. Note that though these outputs can be identified, derived and 
measured independently, it is causally connected features that interact in producing them. 
In other words, although you verify each feature separately, the support provided by a 
single feature is not confined to that feature of the model, but confirms all aspects of the 
model that are involved in generating that output. 
  Thus understood, therefore, the gist of verifying a concrete model such as the Bay 
model can be captured as follows. The verification of each feature, as a component of a 
whole, is simply the verification of one aspect of the structure. So the verification of 
different features is the verification of the same structure from different perspectives. Thus, 
if the model is an organized whole, then the more features that are independently verified 
the more likely it is that the model resembles the reality. On the other hand, if what is 
under verification is not an organized whole but an aggregation of independent items, then 
the verification of each lends no credence to other parts of the aggregated whole—because 
these items are not causally linked, the verification of each item is only the verification of 
that item itself. 
  In sum, the relationship between a concrete model and its target is a holistic matter 
wherein an organized whole fits (to a certain degree) or fails to fit another organized whole. 
Though it seems at first blush that the verification of the whole results from the sum of the 
verification of each component, the real picture is just the reverse: the whole is always in 
place and the component can gather force in supporting the verification of the whole only 
when it can be organized into the whole. 
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5. Organization and Features 
 
As mentioned above, Weisberg would argue that the organization could be a feature, so a 
drawing of Tom’s face capturing accurately not only his nose, mouth, eyes but also their 
organization can be a good model of Tom’s face. A holistic account agrees that 
organization could be a feature, but disagrees with the way that organization is treated in 
Weisberg’s similarity measure. Intuitively, we may say that a drawing of one person’s face 
is a good model if it has the right features: such as a nose, a mouth, eyes, and the 
organization of all of these. So it seems that if you get each individual feature right, then 
you get the whole model right. That is, features additively contribute to the goodness of the 
model. 
      This intuitive way of understanding scientific modelling, however, obscures the fact 
that features may interact in producing the fit of a model, as shown in Sec. 4. To reiterate 
this point and to draw a connection to our current discussion, consider another ordinary 
example.8 Suppose Anne’s face is an ideal one which scientists want to model. Anne has 
an ideal nose, which is straight, in contrast to a non-ideal nose, which might be bumped or 
concave. She also has an ideal nostril, which is round, in contrast to a non-ideal one, which 
might be triangular or square. Scientist A draws a face for Anne that has a round nostril 
and a concave nose, while scientist B draws a face that has a triangular nostril and a 
bumped nose. Drawing A has an ideal feature (the round nostril), but neither feature of 
drawing B is ideal. Now we ask which drawing better fits Anne’s face. It is likely that we 
                                                          
8
 I thank X for giving me this nice example. 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -190-
   
will say that B is better because our contemporaries’ taste tells us that there is no face so 
ugly as one with a round nostril and a concave nose, though a round nostril itself is ideal. 
Hence we see a case wherein the nostril and nose interact to produce the fit of a model to a 
target. 
      This discussion leads to a more general question: what are features? In Weisberg’s 
account, a model can more or less fit a target, but features are either shared or not. Yet as 
Wendy Parker points out, “relevant similarities often seem to occur at the level of 
individual features, not just at the level of the model” (β015, β7γ). This is because features 
themselves can be objects such that they more or less fit each other.9 Weisberg may argue 
that this problem can be fixed by the assumption that a feature can be redescribed as a set 
of sub-features, so the similarity between two features can be measured as the result of the 
similarity between their sub-features. However, I see this treatment as a non-starter, for the 
similarity between sub-features may also be a matter of degree such that it should be 
measured as the result of the similarity between their sub-sub-features, and between their 
sub-sub-sub-features, and so on. 
      On the other hand, a holistic account does not encounter this problem: if a feature is an 
object, then it can be viewed as an organized whole. So the relationship between a feature 
in a model and a feature in a target also consists in their structural fit. Take a minimal 
model for instance. Most minimal models primarily attempt to represent repeatable 
patterns of behavior largely insensitive to underlying microscopic details (Batterman 2002, 
27). Suppose we are interested in the buckling behavior of struts, and write a 
                                                          
9
 I thank X for bringing this to my attention. 
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phenomenological formula, called Euler’s formula, to characterize it (see Batterman β00β 
for details). It seems the pattern of behavior is the only feature involved in this case, i.e., a 
dependence relationship among several parameters. So assessing the fit between the model 
and the target comes down to assessing the fit between the feature in the model and the 
feature in the target. For this, a holistic account can easily come through: the relationship is 
an overall structural fit, wherein a dependence relationship as a feature fits another 
dependence relationship. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the assumption of a set-theoretic approach to structures makes 
Weisberg’s account fail to shed light on the San Francisco Bay model. Alternatively, a 
holistic approach to models, viewing the model-world relationship as an overall structural 
fit, fares better not only in capturing the Bay model, but more generally in making sense of 
modelling practice. 
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ABSTRACT. Actual (token) causes – e.g. Suzy’s being exposed to asbestos –
often bring about their effects – e.g. Suzy’s suffering mesothelioma – prob-
abilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to tackle one of the thornier
difficulties for traditional accounts of probabilistic actual causation: namely
probabilistic preemption.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Actual (token) causation is the relation that obtains when, for example, Suzy’s being exposed
to asbestos causes her to suffer mesothelioma. A number of theorists (e.g. Halpern and Pearl
2001, 2005; Hitchcock 2001, 2007; Weslake 2016) have deployed structural equations mod-
els (SEMs) in developing novel solutions to difficulties confronting traditional accounts of
this relation. These theorists have focused on deterministic actual causation (DAC).1 I draw
on probabilistic causal models (PCMs) – analogues of deterministic SEMs – to provide an
account of probabilistic actual causation (PAC). I don’t attempt to show that my account can
handle the full battery of test cases discussed in the literature. I simply demonstrate that it
yields an elegant treatment of one very central case – probabilistic preemption – with a view
to motivating further investigation of formal approaches to PAC.
2. PROBABILITY-RAISING
Probability-raising is central to the account developed here – as on traditional accounts of
PAC.2 To explain how I will understand that notion a bit of stage-setting is required.
I take the relata of the actual causal relation to be variable values. Adopting Goldszmidt
and Pearl’s (1992, 669–70) notation, P(W = w|do(V = v)) represents the probability forW =
w that would obtain if V were set to V = v by an ‘intervention’ (Woodward 2005, 98). This
is liable to diverge from the conditional probability P(W = w|V = v): witness the difference
between the probability of a storm conditional upon the barometer needle pointing toward the
1Cf. Halpern and Pearl (2005, 852); Hitchcock (2007, 498).
2Reichenbach (1971, 204); Suppes (1970); Lewis (1986, 175–84); Menzies (1989). The
deficiencies of these accounts have been demonstrated by e.g. Salmon (1984, 192–202);
Menzies (1996, 85–96); Hitchcock (2004).
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word ‘storm’ and the probability of a storm if I had intervened upon the barometer needle to
point it toward ‘storm’.
Variable X taking value X = x (rather than X = x ′) raises the probability of Y = y in the
relevant sense iff:3
(1) P(Y = y|do(X = x))> P(Y = y|do(X = x ′))
Appealing to interventionist probabilities means avoiding probability-raising relations be-
tween independent effects of a common cause, such as the barometer reading and the storm
(cf. Lewis 1986, 178).
Probabilistic preemption cases illustrate that straightforward probability-raising is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for causation (Menzies 1989, 1996).
3. PROBABILISTIC PREEMPTION
The following example is inspired by Anscombe (1971).4
3Here and throughout, the probabilities (chances) should be taken to be those obtaining
immediately after the interventions bringing about the variable values specified in the scope
of the do(·) function have occurred (cf. Lewis 1986, 177).
4The probabilities involved (except the decision probabilities) are quantum and therefore
objective and able underwrite causal relations. (If you’re worried that the decision probabil-
ities are not objective, the example could be complicated so that the decisions are made on
the basis of outcomes of quantum measurements.) I find it plausible that the probabilities of
many high level sciences are also objective (cf. e.g. Loewer 2001; Ismael 2009).
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(ProbPre) Someone (neither you nor I) has connected a Geiger counter to a bomb so that the
bomb will explode if the Geiger registers above a threshold reading. I place a place a chunk
of U-232 (half-life = 68.9 years; decays by α-emission) near the Geiger. By chance, enough
U-232 atoms decay within a short enough interval for the Geiger to reach the threshold read-
ing so that the bomb explodes. Unbeknownst to me, you’ve been standing nearby observing.
You have a chunk of Th-228 (half-life = 1.9 years; decays by α-emission), which contains
many more atoms than my chunk of U-232. You’ve decided that you’ll place your Th-228
near the Geiger iff I fail to place my U-232 near the Geiger. There’s a negligible chance that
you won’t follow the course of action you’ve decided on. Seeing that I place my U-232 near
the Geiger, you don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger.5
Let M, D, Y , T , and E be binary variables which, respectively, take value 1 if the following
things occur (and 0 otherwise): I place my U-232 near the Geiger; you decide to place your
Th-228 near the Geiger iff I don’t place my U-232 near the Geiger; you place your Th-228
near the Geiger; the threshold reading is reached; the bomb explodes.
My act (M= 1) was an actual cause of the explosion (E = 1). Yet plausibly the following
inequality holds:
(2) P(E = 1|do(M = 1))< P(E = 1|do(M = 0))
5The range of α-particles is 3-5 cm. Suppose that, for each of us, a decision to place our
chunk ‘near’ the Geiger counter is a decision to place it < 5cm away and a decision not to
place it nearby is a decision to place it nowhere near (≫ 5cm away).
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That is, my placing my U-232 near the Geiger lowers the probability of the bomb exploding
because it strongly lowers the probability of your placing your more potent Th-228 near the
Geiger. Probability-raising is therefore unnecessary for actual causation.
Your decision (D = 1) was not an actual cause of the explosion, since you don’t place
your Th-228 near the Geiger. Yet provided there’s some chance thatM = 0, the following
inequality holds:
(3) P(E = 1|do(D= 1))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0))
Inequality (3) holds because your decision raises the probability that the bomb will still ex-
plode in the scenario in whichM = 0.6 Probability-raising is therefore insufficient for actual
causation.
Actual causation therefore can’t be identified with probability-raising. In developing a
more nuanced analysis, it is helpful to appeal to PCMs.
4. PCMS
A PCM, M , is a 5-tuple 〈V ,C ,Ω,F ,do(·)〉. V is a set of variables. Suppose R de-
notes a function from elements of V to sets of values: for all V ∈ V , R(V ) is the range of
V . In Halpern and Pearl’s (2005, 851–2) terminology, a formula Vi = vi, for Vi ∈ V and
vi ∈ R(V ), is a primitive event. C is the set of all those possible conjunctions of primitive
6D= 0 is multiply realizable: there is more than one alternative to the decision that you in
fact make. E.g. you could decide that you will place your Th-228 near the Geiger no matter
what, or that you will not do so no matter what. We can stipulate that the latter alternative is
much more probable.
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events, V1 = v1& . . .&Vn = vn, such that Vi ∈ V and vi ∈ R(Vi) and such that, for no pair of
conjuncts Vi = vi, Vj = v j is Vi ≡ Vj, and where no two elements of C differ only in the per-
mutation of their conjuncts. Such a conjunction is denoted V = v (primitive events and the
null event are limiting cases of such conjunctions). Abusing notation, the fact that vi ∈ R(Vi)
for each primitive event Vi = vi in the conjunction V = v, is abbreviated v ∈ R(V) and the set
of variables that appear in V = v is denoted V.
Call a conjunction V = v maximal if it contains a conjunct of the form Vi = vi for each
Vi ∈ V . Ω is the set of all maximal conjunctions of primitive events. F is a sigma algebra
on Ω. Finally, do(·) is a function from elements of C to probability distributions on F (cf.
Pearl 2009, 70, 110): for each element V = v of C , P(·|do(V = v)) is the probability (chance)
distribution on F that would obtain if interventions were performed to bring about V = v.
A PCM can be represented graphically by taking the variables in V as nodes and draw-
ing a directed edge from Vi to Vj (Vi,Vj ∈ V ) iff, where S = V \Vi,Vj, there is some assign-
ment of values s ′ ∈ R(S), some pair of values vi,v
′
i ∈ R(Vi) (vi 6= v
′
i) and some value v j ∈
R(Vj) such that P(Vj = v j|do(Vi = vi&S = s
′)) 6= P(Vj = v j|do(Vi = v
′
i&S = s
′)).
In constructing a PCM, MPre, of (ProbPre) we might take the variable set to be VPre =
{D,M,Y,T,E}. The range of each variable in VPre is the pair {0,1}. CPre, ΩPre, and FPre
are generated by VPre and RPre in the way described above. For each element of CPre, the
function do(·) returns the chance distribution on FPre that would obtain if interventions were
performed to bring about that element of CPre. The graph for MPre is given as figure 1.
M E
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FIGURE 1
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A directed path in a graph is an ordered sequence of nodes, 〈V1,V2, . . . ,Vn〉, such that there is
a directed edge from V1 to V2, and a directed edge from V2 to . . .Vn. 〈M,Y,T,E〉 is an example
of a directed path in the graph of MPre.
5. APPROPRIATE MODELS
In Section 6, I provide a definition of what it is for X = x (rather than X = x′) to count as
an actual cause of Y = y relative to a PCM. I then define a non-model-relativized notion of
actual causation by saying that X = x (rather than X = x′) counts as an actual cause of Y = y
simpliciter provided that X = x (rather than X = x′) counts as an actual cause Y = y relative
to at least one appropriate PCM.7 A similar strategy is commonly adopted by those analyzing
DAC in terms of SEMs (Hitchcock 2001, 287, 2007, 503; Weslake 2016). This requires an
account of ‘appropriate’ models.
Many of the criteria for an appropriate SEM for evaluating DAC carry over to PCMs,
including the following three:
(Partition) For all V ∈ V , the elements of R(V ) should form a partition (Halpern and Hitch-
cock 2010, 397–8; Blanchard and Schaffer 2016)
(Independence) For no two variables V,W ∈ V should there be elements v ∈ R(V ) and
w ∈ R(W ) such that the states of affairs represented by V = v andW = w
are logically or metaphysically related (Hitchcock 2001, 287; Halpern and
Hitchcock 2010, 397)
7As the parentheses indicate I define a contrastive relation of actual causation. Where
variables are binary – as in MPre – this is inconsequential and I will typically suppress such
parentheses. But it becomes important in cases of multi-valued variables (see Halpern and
Pearl 2005, 859).
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(Naturalness) For all V ∈ V , R(V ) should include only values that represent reasonably
natural and intrinsic states of affairs. (Blanchard and Schaffer 2016)
The analysis of actual causation proposed below takes all and only values of distinct variables
to be potential causal relata. (Partition) insures that we don’t thereby miss actual causal rela-
tions because they obtain between the values of a single variable. (Independence) insures that
we don’t mistake stronger-than-causal relations for causal relations. (Naturalness) insures that
unnatural or non-intrinsic states of affairs do not get counted as causes and effects (see Lewis
1986, 190, 263; Paul 2000, 245).8
A further condition is that a model is appropriate for evaluating whether X = x is an ac-
tual cause of Y = y in world θ only if it satisfies (Veridicality):
(Veridicality) For any conjunction V = v ∈ C taken as an input, the probability distribu-
tion P(·|do(V = v)) yielded as an output by do(·) should be the objective
chance distribution over F that wouldθ result from interventions setting V = v.
(‘Wouldθ ’ indicates that what is required is that this counterfactual be true in
θ .)
(Veridicality) is an analogue – for PCMs – of the requirement that SEMs encode only true
counterfactuals (Hitchcock 2001, 287, 2007, 503).
In the DAC/SEMs literature another condition on model appropriateness is typically
added:
(Serious Possibilities) V should not be such as to generate elements of Ω that represent pos-
sibilities “that we consider to be too remote” (Hitchcock 2001, 287;
8If absences are unnatural states of affairs (cf. Lewis 1986, 189–93), we might instead
require that each variable have at most one value representing such a state of affairs.
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cf. Woodward 2005, 86–91, Weslake 2016, Blanchard and Schaffer
2016).
We likely need this requirement too. A discussion of whether the vagueness and subjectivity
thereby introduced is problematic would take us too far afield.9 Still, it doesn’t put the present
account in any worse shape than its deterministic analogues. Moreover, traditional accounts
of actual causation – which don’t appeal to causal models – also stand in need of appeal to
‘serious possibilities’ (Woodward 2005, 86–8).
A final requirement – similar to one imposed in the DAC/SEM literature – for a model
M to be an appropriate one for evaluating whether X = x is an actual cause of Y = y in world
θ is:
(Stability) There is no model M ∗ (satisfying Partition, Independence, Naturalness, Veridi-
cality, and Serious Possibilities) with a variable set V ∗ such that V ∗ ⊃ V relative
to which X = x (rather than X = x′) is not an actual cause of Y = y. (Halpern and
Hitchcock 2010, 394–5; Blanchard and Schaffer 2016; Halpern 2014; Hitchcock
2007, 503).
The idea is that an appropriate model is a sufficiently rich representation of causal reality that
moving to a richer representation would not reveal an apparent actual causal relation to be
spurious.10
The converse requirement – that a negative verdict about actual causation should not be
overturned in a richer model – isn’t needed. This is because actual causation (simpliciter)
is defined in terms of actual causation relative to at least one appropriate model. A model
relative verdict that X = x is not an actual cause of Y = y thus automatically fails to translate
9See Woodward (2005, 86–91).
10(Stability) renders the notion of an appropriate model relative to the causal claim being
evaluated.
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into a verdict that X = x is not an actual cause (simpliciter) of Y = y if there is a richer (and
otherwise appropriate) model relative to which X = x is an actual cause of Y = y.
We can now state a definition of actual causation in terms of appropriate PCMs that han-
dles (ProbPre).
6. PAC
Actual causation simpliciter is defined in terms of actual causation relative to an appropriate
PCM. Model-relative actual causation is then defined.11
AC(S)
Where x,x ′ ∈R(X) and y ∈R(Y ), X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause
(simpliciter) of Y = y in world θ iff X = x (rather than X = x ′) is an actual cause of Y =
y relative to at least one model M (with X ,Y ∈ V ) that is appropriate for evaluating
whether X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause (simpliciter) of Y = y in θ .
11Those familiar with Halpern and Pearl’s (2001, 2005) analyses of DAC are invited to see
an analogy with AC(M-R). AC(M-R) was partly inspired by thinking about how a counter-
part of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis might be developed that is adequate to the probabilistic
case. Ultimately, I’m optimistic that an adequate account of DAC will fall out of an adequate
account of PAC as the special case where all probabilities are 1 or 0. This is why my defini-
tions take the definiendum to be ‘actual cause’ rather than ‘probabilistic actual cause’.
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AC(M-R)
Where x,x ′ ∈R(X) and y∈R(Y ), X = x (rather than X = x′) is an actual cause of Y = y
relative to a model M (with X ,Y ∈V ) in world θ iff there is a partition (Z,W) of V \X ,Y
and some setting W = w ′ of the variables in W such that the do(·) function associated
with M entails that, for all subsets Z′ of Z (where, for each such subset, Z′ = z∗ are the
values that the variables in Z′ have in θ ):
(IN) P(Y = y|do(X = x&W = w ′&Z′ = z∗))> P(Y = y|do(X = x ′&W = w ′))
AC(M-R) counts M = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre (and the world
described in (ProbPre)). Consider the partition of VPre\M,E such that W = {D,Y} and Z =
{T}. And consider the assignment {D= 1,Y = 0} of values to the variables in W. AC(M-R)
is satisfied because (IN) holds for both subsets of Z ( /0 and {T}), as shown by (4) and (5):
(4) P(E = 1|do(M = 1&D= 1&Y = 0))> P(E = 1|do(M = 0&D= 1&Y = 0))
(5) P(E = 1|do(M = 1&T = 1&D= 1&Y = 0))> P(E = 1|do(M = 0&D= 1&Y = 0))
Inequality (4) indicates that my action raises the probability of the explosion under the con-
tingency – i.e. holding fixed – that (you make your decision but) don’t place your Th-228 near
the Geiger. The existence of this contingent probability-raising reflects the fact that there is a
path – 〈M,T,E〉 – along which M = 1 promotes E = 1 (becauseM = 1 raises the probabil-
ity of E = 1 when we hold fixed the values of all variables off that path). It is the existence of
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such a path – representing the process via whichM= 1 produces E = 1 – that appears to drive
our intuitions about actual causation in this case (cf. Hitchcock 2001).
Inequality (5) indicates that, again holding fixed D = 1 and Y = 0, the probability of
E = 1 is higher if I place my U-232 near the Geiger and the threshold reading is reached than
if I’d simply never placed my U-232 near the Geiger in the first place. As will be seen, this
requirement ensures that, not only is there a potential process via whichM = 1 threatens to
bring about E = 1, but that process is complete.
Since AC(M-R) implies thatM = 1 is an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre, AC(S)
yields the (correct) result thatM = 1 is an actual cause (simpliciter) of E = 1 provided that
MPre is appropriate. MPre is appropriate. Clearly it satisfies (Partition) and (Independence).
It satisfies (Naturalness) because all of the states that its variables represent are reasonably
natural. It was stipulated that the do(·) function associated with MPre is such that (Veridi-
cality) is satisfied. MPre does not represent the sort of ‘non-serious’ possibility that (Serious
Possibilities) is introduced to rule out (cf. Hitchcock 2001; Woodward 2005, 86–91).
Finally, (Stability) is satisfied because the causal process from my action to the explo-
sion is complete. Holding fixed Y = 0, the probability of the explosion ifM = 1 and part(s)
of this process occur(s) is higher than the probability of the explosion if simplyM = 0. Any
variable (whose values represent reasonably natural states, form a partition, and are logically
and metaphysically independent from the variables in VPre) that might be added to VPre either
represents part of this process or it doesn’t. If it does, its actual value represents the occur-
rence of part of the process. So, if it is added to VPre, including it in Z will not prevent (IN)
from holding for all subsets Z′ of Z. If it doesn’t, then adding it to VPre, including it in W,
and holding it fixed at its actual value as part of the assignment W = w ′ will not make a dif-
ference to the fact that (IN) holds for all subsets Z′ of Z, since holding fixed Y = 0 as part of
W = w ′ is already sufficient to ensure this.
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AC(M-R) gives the verdict that D = 1 is not an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre.
Consider the partition of VPre\D,E such that W = {M} and Z = {Y,T}. Observe that:
(6) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&M = 0))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 0))
And:
(7) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&M = 1))> P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 1))
Thus, whichever possible value we hold fixedM at, the probability of E = 1 is higher if D= 1
than if D= 0. So D= 1 contingently raises the probability of E = 1.12 That’s because there’s
a path – 〈D,Y,E〉 – along which D= 1 promotes E = 1.
AC(M-R) nevertheless entails that D = 1 is not an actual cause of E = 1 relative to
MPre. Consider the subset {Y} of Z, and observe that:
(8) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0&M = 0))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 0))
And:
(9) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0&M = 1))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0&M = 1))
That is, whichever possible value we hold fixedM at, the probability of the explosion is no
higher if you make your decision but don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger than if you’d
12The obtaining of just one of (6) or (7) would suffice to show this.
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never made that decision in the first place. Thus (IN) does not hold for every subset of Z for
this partition of variables no matter what values we assign to the variables in W. This re-
flects the fact that, because you didn’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger, there is no com-
plete causal process by which your decision produces the explosion. Your non-placement of
your Th-228 ‘neutralizes’ the danger of your decision causing the explosion.
Is there an alternative partition (W, Z) of VPre and assignment W = w
′ such that (IN)
holds for all subsets Z′ of Z? (There need only be one for AC(M-R) to be satisfied.) There
isn’t. Assigning Y to W instead of Z won’t help, since the value of Y ‘screens off’ D from
E. So, where Y ∈ W, no assignment W = w′ will be such that, holding fixed W = w′, the
probability of E = 1 is higher when D = 1 (and the variables in /0 ⊆ Z are set to their actual
values) than when D= 0. So (IN) doesn’t hold for all subsets Z ′ of Z for any such partition.
On the other hand, if we leave Y in Z and also assignM to Z, then there are no variables
in W to hold fixed. Now consider the subset {Y} of Z, and observe that:13
(10) P(E = 1|do(D= 1&Y = 0))≤ P(E = 1|do(D= 0))
So, with M assigned to Z it remains the case that (IN) doesn’t hold for all subsets of Z.
So there’s no partition of VPre\D,E such that (IN) is satisfied for all subsets of Z when
we consider D = 1 as a putative cause of E = 1. AC(M-R) therefore doesn’t count D = 1 as
an actual cause of E = 1 relative to MPre.
But for AC(S) to count D= 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 simpliciter, there need only be
one appropriate model relative to which AC(M-R) counts D = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1.
Is there such a model? There isn’t. Suppose a candidate such model includes Y . Because D
is only relevant to E because of its relevance to Y , the value of Y ‘screens off’ the value of D
13Note: the fact that Y = 0 due to an intervention doesn’t makeM = 1 more likely.
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from that of E. This means that, if Y is included in W in the partition (W, Z) of the model’s
variable set and held fixed (either at 1 or 0) as part of the assignment W = w′, then (IN) won’t
be satisfied for the empty subset of Z. Alternatively, if Y is included in Z then, no matter what
other variables are included in the model and assigned to W, (IN) won’t be satisfied for the
subset {Y} of Z. Specifically, because D = 1 only threatens to bring about E = 1 because it
threatens to bring about Y = 1, no matter what we hold fixed by inclusion on both sides of
(IN), the probability of E = 1 is no higher if D= 1 and Y = 0 than if simply D= 0.
So AC(M-R) doesn’t count D= 1 as an actual cause of E = 1 relative to any appropriate
model with Y in its variable set. This means that any otherwise appropriate model relative to
which D = 1 is an actual cause of E = 1 can be expanded to a model in which D = 1 isn’t an
actual cause of E = 1 simply by the addition of Y . Provided the expanded model is appropri-
ate, the original model violates (Stability) and is inappropriate. So AC(S) will correctly not
count D= 1 as an actual cause simpliciter of E = 1.
Since the values of Y form a partition and represent natural states of affairs, (Partition)
and (Naturalness) will be satisfied by the expanded model if they were satisfied by the orig-
inal model. With regard to (Veridicality), it should be noted that there are multiple ways of
expanding the original model via the addition of Y , each associated with a different do(·)
function from elements of C ∗ to probability distributions over F ∗ (where C ∗ and F ∗ are
generated by the expanded variable set in the way described in Section 4). In looking for an
apt expanded model, we just select the one with the do(·) function that returns the objec-
tive chances on F ∗ that would obtain as a result of interventions bringing about the various
elements of C ∗. With regard to (Serious Possibilities) note that, given your decision, your
placing and your not placing your Th-228 near the Geiger are both salient possibilities in
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(ProbPre). So it doesn’t seem that the expanded model could represent any non-serious pos-
sibilities if the original model doesn’t. (Independence) is a little trickier. Might not the origi-
nal model include a variable whose values are logically or metaphysically related to those of
Y? Given that the variables in the original model are assumed to satisfy (Partition) it seems
that any variable logically or metaphysically related to Y – e.g. Y ′, which takes value Y ′ = 0 if
you don’t place your Th-228 near the Geiger, Y ′ = 1 if you place it 2.5-5cm from the Geiger,
and Y ′ = 2 if you place it 0-2.5cm from the Geiger – will also be such that its actual value
neutralizes the threat of D = 1 bringing about E = 1, so that AC(M-R) is not satisfied in the
original model. The exception to this would be if the original model included a variable that
represents a gerrymandered states of affairs – e.g. Y ′′, which takes value Y ′′ = 1 if you place
your Th-228 near the Geiger or Obama is US president, and Y ′′ = 0 otherwise – in which case
the original model will violate (Naturalness).
7. CONCLUSION
Drawing upon PCMs, an account of PAC has been given that gives a correct treatment of
probabilistic preemption on intuitive grounds. Traditional accounts of PAC misdiagnose this
central test case (Menzies, 1989, 1996; Hitchcock 2004). Examination of whether PCMs can
help tackle some of the other outstanding problems of PAC is warranted.
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Abstract
Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
I consider two arguments in favor of this claim. The first says that
insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not
have had under triple-blind review, an injustice is committed against
certain authors. I show that even well-meaning editors would commit
this wrong and I endorse this argument.
The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are
affected by information they would not have had under triple-blind
review, it will negatively affect the quality of published papers. I
distinguish between two kinds of biases that an editor might have. I
show that one of them has a positive effect on quality and the other
a negative one, and that the combined effect could be either positive
or negative. Thus I do not endorse the second argument in general.
However, I do endorse this argument for certain fields, for which I
argue that the positive effect does not apply.
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1 Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By
making the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and
which papers do not, they have a significant influence on what work is given
attention and what work is ignored in their field (Crane 1967).
In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be
informed about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to
publish a particular paper? Under a single- or double-blind reviewing proce-
dure, the editor has access to information about the author, whereas under a
triple-blind reviewing procedure she does not. So in other words the question
is: should journals practice triple-blind reviewing?
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-blind reviewing.
One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On this kind of
argument, revealing identity information to the editor will lead the editor to
(partially) base her judgment on irrelevant information (such as the gender
of the author, or whether or not the editor is friends with the author). This
harms the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument focuses on the effect on the journal and its
readers. Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity
information if given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that
as a result the journal will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to
accept or reject a paper is influenced by the editor’s biases, this suggests that
a departure has been made from a putative “objectively correct” decision.
This harms the readers of the journal, and is thus bad.
Here I provide a philosophical discussion of the reviewing procedure to
assess these arguments. I distinguish between two different ways the editor’s
judgment may be affected if the author’s identity is revealed to her. First,
the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors she does
not know. Second, the editor may treat authors differently based on their
membership of some group (e.g., gender bias). My discussion focuses on the
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following three claims.
My first claim is that the first kind of differential treatment the editor may
display (based on whether she knows a particular author) actually benefits
rather than harms the readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a
reduction in editorial uncertainty about the quality of submitted papers when
she knows their authors. I construct a model to show in a formally precise
way how such a benefit might arise—surprisingly, no assumption that the
scientists the editor knows are somehow “better scientists” is required—and
I cite empirical evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise. However, this
benefit only applies in certain fields. I argue that in other fields (in particular,
mathematics and the humanities) no significant reduction of uncertainty—
and hence no benefit to the readers—occurs (section 2).
My second claim is that either kind of differential treatment the editor
may display (based on whether she knows authors or based on bias against
certain groups) harms authors. I argue that any instance of such differential
treatment constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007)
against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epistemically) just,
she should prevent such differential treatment, which can be done through
triple-blind reviewing. So I endorse an argument of the first of the two kinds
I identified above: triple-blind reviewing is preferable because not doing so
harms authors (section 3).
My third claim is that whether differential treatment also harms the jour-
nal and its readers depends on a number of factors. Differential treatment
by the editor based on whether she knows a particular author may benefit
readers, whereas differential treatment based on bias against certain groups
may harm them. Whether there is an overall benefit or harm depends on the
strength of the editor’s bias, the relative sizes of the different groups, and
other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As a result I do not in general
endorse the second kind of argument, that triple-blind reviewing is preferable
because readers of the journal are harmed otherwise. However, I do endorse
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this argument for fields like mathematics and the humanities, where I claim
that the benefits of differential treatment (based on uncertainty reduction)
do not apply (section 4).
Note that, in considering the ethical and epistemic effects of triple-blind
reviewing, a distinction is made between the effects on the author and the
effects on the readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding
that in order to study the social epistemology of science, what is good for
an individual inquirer must be distinguished from what is good for the wider
scientific community (Kitcher 1993, Strevens 2003, Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011).
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on the
number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication, but he
does not focus specifically on the editor’s decisions and the uncertainty she
faces. Economists have studied models in which editor decisions play an im-
portant role (Ellison 2002, Faria 2005, Besancenot et al. 2012), but they have
not distinguished between papers written by scientists the editor knows and
papers by scientists unknown to her, and neither have they been concerned
with biases the editor may be subject to. And some other economists have
done empirical work investigating the differences between papers with and
without an author-editor connection (Laband and Piette 1994, Medoff 2003,
Smith and Dombrowski 1998, more on this later), but they do not provide a
model that can explain these differences. This paper thus fills a gap in the
literature.
2 A Model of Editor Uncertainty
As I said in the introduction, journal editors have a certain measure of power
in a scientific community because they decide which papers get published.1
An editor could use this discretionary power to the benefit of her friends or
1Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors
make the final decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define “the editor” to
be whomever makes the final decision whether to publish a particular paper.
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colleagues, or to promote certain subfields or methodologies over others. This
phenomenon has been called editorial favoritism. If anecdotal evidence is to
be believed, this phenomenon is widespread. Some systematic evidence of
favoritism exists as well. Bailey et al. (2008a,b) find that academics believe
editorial favoritism to be fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage
claiming to have perceived it firsthand. Laband (1985) and Piette and Ross
(1992) find that, controlling for citation impact and various other factors,
papers whose author has a connection to the journal editor are allocated
more journal pages than papers by authors without such a connection.2
In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to
accept papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not
know as connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989, Bailey
et al. 2008a,b). In both of the studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were
asked to rate the seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by
editors and reviewers, this disapproval was shown (using a factor analysis) to
be part of a general and strong disapproval of “selfish or cliquish acts” in the
peer review process. Thus it appears that the reason for the disapproval of
editors publishing papers by their friends and colleagues is that it shows the
editor acting on private interests, rather than displaying the disinterestedness
that is the norm in science (Merton 1942).
On the other hand, if connection bias was a serious worry for authors,
one would expect this to be a major consideration for them in choosing
where to submit their papers (i.e., submit to journals where they know the
editor), but Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find that this is not the case.3
2Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors’ willingness to push the
paper. The more obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is
accepted for publication. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies which measure
the influence of a relationship between the author and the editor on acceptance decisions
directly. Presumably this is because information about rejected papers is usually not
available in these kinds of studies.
3In particular, authors who know an editor and thus could expect to profit from con-
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Moreover, despite working scientists’ disapproval, there is some evidence that
connection bias improves the overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and
Piette 1994, Medoff 2003, Smith and Dombrowski 1998). Does that mean
scientists are misguided in their disapproval?
As indicated in the introduction, I distinguish between the effects of ed-
itors’ biases on the authors of scientific papers on the one hand, and the
effects on the readers of scientific journals on the other hand. In this section,
I use a formal model to show that these two can come apart: connection
bias may negatively affect scientists as authors while positively affecting sci-
entists as readers. Note that in this section I focus only on connection bias.
Subsequent sections consider other biases.
Consider a simplified scientific community consisting of a set of scientists.
Each scientist produces a paper and submits it to the community’s only
journal which has one editor.
Some papers are more suitable for publication than others. I assume that
this suitability for publication can be measured on a single numerical scale.
For convenience I call this the quality of the paper. However, I remain neutral
on how this notion should be interpreted, e.g., as an objective measure of
the epistemic value of the paper (which is perhaps an aggregate of multiple
relevant criteria), or as the number of times the paper would be cited in
future papers if it was published, or as the average subjective value each
member of the scientific community would assign to it if they read it.4
nection bias would find knowing the editor and the composition of the editorial board more
generally to be important factors in deciding where to submit, contrary to Ziobrowski and
Gibler’s evidence (these factors are ranked twelfth and sixteenth in importance in a list
of sixteen factors that might influence the decision where to submit). Similarly, authors
who do not know an editor would find a lack of (perceived) connection bias and the com-
position of the editorial board to be important factors, but these rank only seventh and
twelfth in importance in Ziobrowski and Gibler’s study. In a similar survey by Mackie
(1998, chapter 4), twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her
preferences is an important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
4For more on potential difficulties with interpreting the notion of quality, see Bright
(2015).
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Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time
it is submitted. The aim of this section is to show how uncertainty about
quality can lead to connection bias. To make this point as starkly as possible,
I assume that the editor cares only about quality, i.e., she makes an estimate
of the quality of a paper and publishes those and only those papers whose
quality estimate is high.
Let qi be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. Since there
is uncertainty about the quality, qi is modeled as a random variable. Since
some scientists are more likely to produce high quality papers than others,
the mean µi of this random variable may be different for each scientist. I
assume that quality follows a normal distribution with fixed variance: qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu).
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to
keep the mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the dis-
tribution of average quality in the scientific community and the distribution
of reviewers’ estimates of the quality of a paper. I see no reason to expect
the results I present below to be different when any of these assumptions are
changed.
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the av-
erage quality of scientist i’s work. This is reflected in the model by assuming
that the editor knows the value of µi. For scientists she does not know, the
editor is uncertain about the average quality of their work. All she knows is
the distribution of average quality in the larger scientific community, which
I also assume to be normal: µi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
sc).
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: the
scientific community is split in two groups (those known by the editor and
those not known by the editor) but average paper quality follows the same
distribution in both groups. If I assumed instead that scientists known by
the editor write better papers on average the results would be qualitatively
similar to those I present below. If scientists known by the editor write worse
7
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papers on average this would affect my results. However, since most journal
editors are relatively central figures in their field (Crane 1967), this would be
an implausible assumption except perhaps in isolated cases.
The editor’s prior beliefs about the quality of a paper submitted by some
scientist i reflects this difference in information. If she knows the scientist
she knows the value of µi, and so her prior is π(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu). If the
editor does not know scientist i she only knows the distribution of µi, rather
than its exact value. Integrating out the uncertainty over µi yields a prior
π(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc) for the quality of scientist i’s paper.
When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. In the
context of this model, the main purpose of the reviewer’s report is to provide
an estimate of the quality of the paper. But, I assume, even after reading the
paper its quality cannot be established with certainty. Thus the reviewer’s
estimate ri of the quality qi is again a random variable. I assume that the
reviewer’s report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the actual quality qi of the
paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to reflect the uncertainty:
ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ
2
rv).
5
The editor uses the information from the reviewer’s report to update her
beliefs about the quality of scientist i’s paper. I assume that she does this
by Bayes conditioning. Thus, her posterior beliefs about the quality of the
paper are π(qi | ri) if she does not know the author, and π(qi | ri, µi) if she
does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose
5The reviewer’s report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged
opinion of multiple reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which
case the report reflects her findings which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs
about the quality of the paper. The assumption I make in the text can be used to cover
any of these scenarios, as long as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of
reviewers used. If the number of reviewers is frequently different for different papers (and
in particular when this difference correlates with the existence or absence of a connection
between editor and author) the assumption of a fixed variance in the reviewer’s report is
unrealistic because a report from multiple reviewers may be thought to give more accurate
information (reducing the variance) than a report from a single reviewer.
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mean is a weighted average of ri and the prior mean, as given in proposition 1
(for a proof, see DeGroot 2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers
Bayesian statistics).
Proposition 1.
π(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
π(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
where
µUi =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
µ,
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
µi.
When does the editor choose to publish a paper? Here I assume that she
publishes any paper whose posterior mean is above some threshold q∗. So
a paper written by a scientist unknown to the editor is published if µUi >
q∗ and a paper written by a scientist known to the editor is published if
µKi > q
∗. This corresponds to being at least 50% confident that the paper’s
quality is above the threshold. Other standards could be used (risk-averse
standards might require more than 50% confidence that the paper is above
some threshold, while risk-loving standards might require less; in these cases
the threshold value needs to be adapted to keep the total number of accepted
papers constant) but for my purposes here it does not much matter.
Now compare the probability that the paper of an arbitrary scientist i
unknown to the editor is published to the probability that the paper of an
arbitrary scientist known by the editor is published. For this purpose it is
useful to determine the probability distribution of the posterior means (see
appendix A for proofs of this and subsequent results).
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Proposition 2. The posterior means are normally distributed, with µUi ∼
N (µ, σ2U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K). Here,
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
and σ2K =
σ4qu + σ
2
sc(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
.
Moreover, if σ2sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0, then σ
2
U < σ
2
K.
The main result of this section, which establishes the existence of con-
nection bias in the model, is a consequence of proposition 2. It says that
the editor is more likely to publish a paper written by an arbitrary author
she knows than a paper written by an arbitrary author she does not know,
whenever q∗ > µ (for any positive value of σ2sc and σ
2
rv). Since q
∗ = µ would
mean that exactly half of all papers gets published, the condition amounts
to a requirement that the journal’s acceptance rate is less than 50%. This
is true of most reputable journals in most fields (physics being a notable
exception). When acceptance rates are above 50% editorial favoritism is also
much less of a concern in the first place.
Theorem 3. If q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0, the acceptance probability
for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance probability for
authors unknown to the editor, i.e., Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 3 shows that in the model I presented, any journal with an
acceptance rate lower than 50% will be seen to display connection bias. Thus
I have established the surprising result that an editor who cares only about
the quality of the papers she publishes may end up publishing more papers
by her friends and colleagues than by scientists unknown to her, even if her
friends and colleagues are not, as a group, better scientists than average.
Why does this surprising result hold? The theorem follows immediately
from proposition 2, which says that the distribution of µUi is less “spread
out” than the distribution of µKi (σ
2
U < σ
2
K). This happens because µ
U
i is a
10
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weighted average of µ and ri, keeping it relatively close to the overall mean µ
compared to µKi , which is a weighted average of µi and ri (which tend to
differ from µ in the same direction).
Because the editor treats papers by authors she knows differently from
papers by authors she does not know, authors unknown to the editor are
arguably harmed. I pick up this point in section 3 and argue that this
constitutes an epistemic injustice against those authors.
What I have shown so far is that an editor who uses information about the
average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows in her acceptance
decisions will find that scientists she knows produce on average more papers
that meet her quality threshold. This is a subjective statement: the editor
believes that more papers by scientists she knows meet her threshold. Does
this translate into an objective effect? That is, does the extra information
the editor has available about scientists she knows allow her to publish better
papers from them than from scientists she does not know?
In order to answer this question I need to compare the average quality of
accepted papers. More formally, I want to compare the expected value of the
quality of a paper, conditional on meeting the publication threshold, given
that the author is either known to the editor or not.
Proposition 4. If σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0, the average quality of accepted
papers from authors known to the editor is higher than the average quality of
accepted papers from authors unknown to the editor, i.e., E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] >
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗].
Proposition 4 shows that the editor can use the extra information she
has about scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers
published in her journal. In other words, the surprising result is that the
editor’s connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the readers of
the journal. It is thus fair to say that, in the model, the editor can use her
connections to “identify and capture high-quality papers”, as Laband and
11
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Piette (1994) suggest.6
To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in reality
is the result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to editors
using their position of power to help their friends? At this point the model
is seen to yield an empirical prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due
to capturing high-quality papers, the quality of papers by authors the editor
knows should be higher than average, as shown in the model. If, on the
other hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of the editor accepting
for publication papers written by authors she knows even though they do
not meet the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of papers by
authors the editor knows should (presumably) be lower than average.
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality of a paper,7 a
simple regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors with
an author-editor connection have a higher or a lower average quality than
papers without such a connection. This empirical test has been carried out a
number of times, and the results univocally favor the hypothesis that editors
use their connections to improve the quality of published papers (Laband
and Piette 1994, Smith and Dombrowski 1998, Medoff 2003).
Note that in the above results, nothing depends on the sizes of the vari-
ances σ2qu, σ
2
sc, and σ
2
rv. This is because these results are qualitative. The
variances do matter when the acceptance rate and average quality of papers
are compared quantitatively. For example, reducing σ2rv (making the re-
viewer’s report more accurate) makes the differences in the acceptance rate
and average quality of papers smaller.
6This result applies to connection bias only. Below I consider other biases the editor
might have, which yields more nuanced conclusions.
7Recall that I have remained neutral on how the notion of quality should be inter-
preted. If quality is simply defined as “the number of citations this paper would get if it
were published” the connection between quality and citations is obvious. Even on other
interpretations of quality, citations have frequently been viewed as a good proxy measure
(Cole and Cole 1967, 1968, Medoff 2003). This practice has been defended by Cole and
Cole (1971) and Clark (1957, chapter 3), and criticized by Lindsey (1989) and Heesen
(forthcoming).
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Note also that the results depend on the assumption that σ2sc and σ
2
rv are
positive. What is the significance of these assumptions?
If σ2rv = 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer’s report, the re-
viewer’s report describes the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In
this case the “extra information” the editor has about authors she knows is
not needed, and so there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality
based on whether the editor knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to
expect reviewer’s reports to be this accurate.
If σ2sc = 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers
produced by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not
tell the editor anything about the expected quality of that scientist’s work.
In this case there is no value to the editor (with regard to determining the
quality of the submitted paper) in learning the identity of the author. So
here also there is no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based
on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected
to tell the editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper?
This seems to be most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of
the author, and hence the lab at which the experiments were performed, can
increase or decrease the editor’s confidence that the experiments were per-
formed correctly, including all the little checks and details that are impossible
to describe in such a paper. In a scientific paper, “[a]s long as the conclu-
sions depend at least in part on the results of some experiment, the reader
must rely on the author’s (and perhaps referee’s) testimony that the author
really performed the experiment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out
as reported” (Easwaran 2009, p. 359).
But in other fields, in particular mathematics and some or all of the
humanities, there is no need to rely on the author’s reputation. This is
because in these fields the paper itself is the contribution, so it is possible to
judge papers in isolation of how or by whom they were created. Easwaran
13
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(2009) discusses this in detail for mathematics, and briefly (in his section 4)
for philosophy. And in fact there exists a norm that this is how they should
be judged: “Papers will rely only on premises that the competent reader
can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only make inferences that the
competent reader would be expected to accept on her own consideration.”
(Easwaran 2009, p. 354).
Arguably then, the advantage (see theorem 3 and proposition 4) conferred
by revealing identity information about the author to the editor applies only
in certain fields. The relevant fields are those where part of the information
in the paper is conferred on the authority of testimony, in particular those
where experimental results are reported. Even in those fields, of course, what
is being testified is supposed to be reproducible by the reader. But this is still
different from the case in mathematics and the humanities, where a careful
reading of a paper itself constitutes a reproduction of its argument. In these
latter fields there is no relevant information to be learned from the identity
of the author (i.e., σ2sc = 0), or, at least, the publishing norms in these fields
suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
3 Bias As an Epistemic Injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about
paper quality. The first main result, theorem 3, established the existence of
connection bias in this model: authors known by the editor are more likely
to see their paper accepted than authors unknown to the editor. The second
main result, proposition 4, showed that connection bias benefits the readers
of the journal by improving the average quality of accepted papers.
Despite the benefit to the readers, I claim that authors are harmed by
connection bias. In this section I argue that an instance of connection bias
constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker (2007). Then I argue
that the editor is likely to display other biases as well, and that instances of
14
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these also constitute epistemic injustices.
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice.
Fricker (2007, pp. 17–23) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where
a speaker suffers a credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and
epistemically culpable, rather than being due to innocent error.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly
interested in what she calls “the central case of testimonial injustice” (Fricker
2007, p. 28). This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and
one or more attributes, where this association embodies a gen-
eralization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable)
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective
investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35)
Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial
injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many
different social spheres.
Applying this to the phenomenon of connection bias, it is clear that this is
not an instance of the central case of testimonial injustice. This would entail
that there is some negative stereotype associated with scientists unknown to
the editor, as a group, which is not normally the case. So I set the central
case aside (I return to it below) and focus on the question whether connection
bias can produce (non-central cases of) testimonial injustice.
Suppose scientist i and scientist i′ tend to produce papers of the same
quality, which is above average in the population (µi = µi′ > µ). Suppose
further that the actual papers they have produced on this occasion are of the
same quality (qi = qi′) and have received similar reviewer reports (ri = ri′).
If scientist i is not known to the editor, but scientist i′ is, then the paper
15
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written by scientist i′ is likely to be evaluated more highly by the editor.8
If the publication threshold q∗ is somewhere in between the two evaluations
then only scientist i′ will have her paper accepted.
In this example, the scientists produced papers of equal quality that were
evaluated differently. So scientist i suffers a credibility deficit. This deficit
is not due to innocent error, as it would be if, e.g., random variation led to
different reviewer reports (i.e., ri < ri′). The deficit is also not due to the
editor’s use of generally reliable information about the two scientists, as it
would be if there was a genuine difference in the average quality of the papers
they produce (i.e., µi < µi′).
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically
culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, as I stressed in section 2,
the editor is simply making maximal use of the information available to her.
It just so happens that she has more information about scientists she knows
than about others. But that is hardly the editor’s fault: she cannot be
expected to know everyone’s work. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know
the work of every scientist who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove
all information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done by
using a triple-blind reviewing procedure, in which the editor does not know
the identity of the author, and hence is prevented from using information
about scientists she knows in her evaluation. Using such a procedure, at
least all scientists are treated equally: any scientist who writes a paper of a
given quality has the same chance of seeing that paper accepted.
So a credibility deficit occurs which harms scientist i: her paper is re-
jected. Moreover, it harms her specifically as an epistemic agent: the rejec-
tion of the paper reflects a judgment of the quality of her scientific work. And
8The editor’s posterior mean for the quality of scientist i’s paper is µUi and her posterior
mean for scientist i′’s paper is µKi′ = µ
K
i , with µ
U
i < µ
K
i′ whenever σ
2
sc(ri − µi) < (σ
2
qu +
σ2rv)(µi − µ). The claim in the text is then justified by the fact that Pr(σ
2
sc(ri − µi) <
(σ2qu + σ
2
rv)(µi − µ) | µi > µ) > 1/2, assuming σ
2
sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0.
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this harm could have been prevented by the editor by using a triple-blind
reviewing procedure.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for this
credibility deficit, and hence a testimonial injustice is committed against
scientist i. However, one may insist that it cannot be the case that the
editor is committing a wrong simply in virtue of using relevant information
that is available to her. An evidentialist in particular may say that it cannot
possibly be an epistemic wrong to take into account all relevant information.
I disagree, for the reasons just given, but I need not insist on this point.
Even if it is granted that the editor does not commit an injustice by using
the information that is available to her, the end result is still that scientist i
is harmed as an epistemic agent. She has produced a paper of equal quality
to scientist i′’s, and yet it is not published.
Moreover, the presence of scientist i′ is irrelevant. Any time a paper
from an author unknown to the editor is rejected which would have been
accepted had the editor known the author (all else being equal), that author
is harmed. So even if one insists that differential editorial treatment resulting
from connection bias is not culpable on the part of the editor, connection bias
still harms authors whenever it influences acceptance decisions.
In the model of section 2, and the above discussion, I assumed that con-
nection bias is the only bias journal editors display. The literature on im-
plicit bias suggests that this is not true. For example, “[i]f submissions are
not anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that women’s work
will probably be judged more negatively than men’s work of the same qual-
ity” (Saul 2013, p. 45). Evidence for this claim is given by Wennerås and
Wold (1997), Valian (1999, chapter 11), Steinpreis et al. (1999), Budden
et al. (2008), and Moss-Racusin et al. (2012).9 So women scientists are at
9These citations show that the work of women in academia is undervalued in various
ways. None of them focus specifically on editor evaluations, but they support Saul’s claim
unless it is assumed that journal editors as a group are significantly less biased than other
academics.
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a disadvantage simply because of their gender identity. Similar biases exist
based on other irrelevant aspects of scientists’ identity, such as race or sex-
ual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013, for a critical survey of various biases in
the peer review system). As Crandall (1982, p. 208) puts it: “The editorial
process has tended to be run as an informal, old-boy network which has ex-
cluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and those from lower-prestige
institutions”.
I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. Any time a paper is
rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper would have been accepted
if the relevant part of the author’s identity had been different, all else being
equal), a testimonial injustice occurs for the same reasons outlined above.
Moreover, here the editor is culpable for having these biases.
Unlike instances resulting from connection bias, testimonial injustices
resulting from identity bias can be instances of the central case of tes-
timonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results from a negative
identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men) judge women’s
work, even when the person judging does not consciously believe in these
stereotypes. Moreover, those who think highly of their ability to judge work
objectively and/or are primed with objectivity are affected more rather than
less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007, Stewart and Payne 2008, p. 1333). Similar
claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or sexual orientation. Bi-
ases based on academic affiliation are not usually due to negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes, as these do not generally affect other aspects of the
scientist’s life.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices
against authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that authors are
harmed when journal editors do not use a triple-blind reviewing procedure.
This constitutes the first kind of argument for triple-blind reviewing which
I mentioned in the introduction, and which I endorse based on these consid-
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erations.
4 The Effect of Bias on Quality
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that
failing to use triple-blind reviewing harms the journal and its readers, because
it would lower the average quality of accepted papers. In section 2 I argued
that connection bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases average
quality. In this section I complicate the model to include identity bias.
Recall that the editor displays identity bias if she is more or less likely
to publish papers from a certain group of scientists based on some aspect of
their identity, e.g., their gender. I incorporate this in the model by assuming
the editor consistently undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the
others). More precisely, she believes the average quality of papers produced
by any scientist i from the group she is biased against to be lower than it
really is by some constant quantity ε. Conversely, the average quality of
papers written by any scientist not belonging to this group is raised by δ.10
So the editor has a different prior for the two groups; I use πA to denote her
prior for the quality of papers written by scientists she is biased against, and
πF for her prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may be familiar with a given scientist’s work (i.e.,
she knows the average quality of that scientist’s papers) or not. So there
are now four groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the
stigmatized group the editor’s prior distribution on the quality of scientist i’s
paper is πA(qi | µi) ∼ N(µi− ε, σ
2
qu). If scientist i is known to the editor but
is not in the stigmatized group the prior is πF (qi | µi) ∼ N(µi + δ, σ
2
qu). If
10This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple
groups of different strengths, or biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases
which intersect in various ways (Collins and Chepp 2013, Bright et al. 2016). However,
the assumption in the main text suffices to make the point I want to make. It should be
fairly straightforward to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones just
described.
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scientist i is not known to the editor and is in the stigmatized group the prior
is πA(qi) ∼ N(µ− ε, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc). And if scientist i is not known to the editor
and not in the stigmatized group the prior is πF (qi) ∼ N(µ+ δ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc).
11
The next few steps in the development are analogous to that in section 2.
After the reviewer’s report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about the
quality of the paper, yielding the following posterior distributions.
Proposition 5.
πA(qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKAi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
πF (qi | ri, µi) ∼ N
(
µKFi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
,
πA(qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUAi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
πF (qi | ri) ∼ N
(
µUFi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
,
where
µKAi = µ
K
i −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, µKFi = µ
K
i +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
,
µUAi = µ
U
i −
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, µUFi = µ
U
i +
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
.
As before, the paper is published if the posterior mean (µKAi , µ
KF
i , µ
UA
i ,
or µUFi ) exceeds the threshold q
∗. The respective distributions of the posterior
11Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized
group regardless of whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is
not triple-blind, the editor learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist who sub-
mits a paper. This information is usually sufficient to determine with reasonable certainty
the scientist’s gender. So at least for gender bias it seems reasonable to expect the editor
to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely, because negative
identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem reasonable to
expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows.
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means determine how likely this is. These distributions are given in the next
proposition.
Proposition 6. The posterior means are normally distributed, with
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
.
This yields the within-group acceptance rates and the unsurprising result
that the editor is less likely to publish papers by scientists she is biased
against.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0, the acceptance probability for
authors the editor is biased against is lower than the acceptance probability
for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping fixed whether or not the
editor knows the author). That is,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
and Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
Theorem 7 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors
that are subject to a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype are less likely to
see their paper accepted than authors who are not. As I argued in section 3,
whenever a paper is rejected due to identity bias this constitutes a testimonial
injustice against the author.
Now I turn my attention to the effect that identity bias has on the average
quality of accepted papers. In the current version of the model there is both
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connection bias and identity bias. Connection bias has been shown to have
a positive effect on average quality (see section 2). Whether the net effect of
connection bias and identity bias is positive or negative depends on various
parameters, as I illustrate below.
The benchmark for judging the average quality of accepted papers under
a procedure subject to connection bias and identity bias is a triple-blind
reviewing procedure under which the editor is not informed of the identity
of the scientist. As a result, she is both unable to use information about
the average quality of a given scientist’s papers and unable to display bias
against scientists based on their identity.
Under this triple-blind procedure, the editor’s prior distribution for the
quality of any submitted paper is π(qi) ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu+σ
2
sc), i.e., the prior I used
in section 2 when the author was unknown to the editor. Hence, under this
procedure, the posterior is π(qi | ri), the posterior mean is µ
U
i ∼ N(µ, σ
2
U),
the probability of acceptance is Pr(µUi > q
∗) and the average quality of
accepted papers is E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗].
In contrast, I refer to the reviewing procedure that is subject to connection
bias and identity bias as the non-blind procedure. The overall probability that
a paper is accepted under the non-blind procedure depends on the relative
sizes of the four groups. I use pKA to denote the fraction of scientists known to
the editor that she is biased against, pKF for the fraction known to the editor
that she is biased in favor of, pUA for unknown scientists biased against, and
pUF for unknown scientists biased in favor of. These fractions are nonnegative
and sum to one.
Let Ai denote the event that scientist i’s paper is accepted under the non-
blind procedure. The overall probability of acceptance under this procedure
is
22
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Pr (Ai) = pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
+ pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
+ pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers can then be written as E[qi | Ai]. I
want to compare E[qi | Ai] to E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗], the average quality of accepted
papers under a triple-blind procedure.12
In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor’s biases are such
that she believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal
to µ. In other words, her bias against the stigmatized group is canceled
out on average by her bias in favor of those not in the stigmatized group,
weighted by the relative sizes of those groups:
(pKA + pUA) ε = (pKF + pUF ) δ.
I use the above equation to fix the value of δ, reducing the number of free
parameters by one. The equation amounts to a kind of commensurability
requirement for the two procedures because it guarantees that the editor
perceives the average quality of submitted papers to be the same regardless
of whether or not a triple-blind procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the
parameter values that determine whether the non-blind procedure or the
triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted papers.
The question I will explore now, using some numerical examples, is how
biased the editor needs to be for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to
outweigh the epistemic benefits resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the
12Expressions for Pr(Ai) and E[qi | Ai] using only the parameter values and standard
functions are given in lemma 11 in appendix A. These expressions are used to generate
the numerical results below.
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parameters. First I set µ = 0 and q∗ = 2. Since quality is an interval scale in
this model, these choices are arbitrary. For the variances σ2qu, σ
2
sc, and σ
2
rv, I
choose a “small” and a “large” value (1 and 4 respectively).
For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that there is no correlation
between whether the editor knows an author and whether the editor has a
bias against that author (so, e.g., the percentage of women among scientists
the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among scientists the
editor does not know). I consider two cases for the editor’s identity bias:
either she is biased against half the set of authors (and so biased in favor
of the other half) or the group she is biased against is a 30% minority.13
Similarly, I consider the case in which the editor knows half of all scientists
submitting papers, and the case in which the editor knows 30% of them.
As a result, there are 32 possible settings of the parameters (23 choices for
the variances times 22 choices for the group sizes). Whether the triple-blind
procedure or the non-blind procedure is epistemically preferable depends on
the value of ε (and the value of δ determined thereby).
It follows from proposition 4 that when ε = 0 the non-blind procedure
helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing average
quality relative to the triple-blind procedure. If ε is positive but relatively
small, this remains true, but when ε is relatively big, the non-blind procedure
harms the readers. This is because the average quality of published papers
under the non-blind procedure decreases continuously as ε increases (I do
not prove this, but it is easily checked for the 32 cases I consider).
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big
does the editor’s bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity
bias on quality to cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
13Bruner and O’Connor (forthcoming) note that certain dynamics in academic life can
lead to identity bias against groups as a result of the mere fact that they are a minority.
Here I consider both the case where the stigmatized group is a minority (and is possibly
stigmatized as a result of being a minority, as Bruner and O’Connor suggest) and the case
where it is not (and so presumably the negative identity-prejudicial stereotype has some
other source).
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I determine the value of ε for which the average quality of published
papers under the non-blind procedure and the triple-blind procedure is the
same for each of the 32 cases. But reporting these numbers directly does not
seem particularly useful, as ε is measured in “quality points” which do not
have a clear interpretation outside of the model.
To give a more meaningful interpretation of these values of ε as measur-
ing “size of bias”, I calculate the average rate of acceptance of papers from
authors the editor is biased against and the average rate of acceptance of
papers from authors the editor is biased in favor of.14 The difference be-
tween these numbers gives an indication of the size of the editor’s bias: it
measures (in percentage points, abbreviated pp) how many more papers the
editor accepts from authors she is biased in favor of, compared to those she
is biased against.
This difference is reported for the 32 cases in figure 1. To provide a sense
of scale for these numbers, I plot them against the acceptance rate that the
triple-blind procedure would have for those values of the parameters, i.e.,
Pr(µUi > q
∗).
Already with this small sample of 32 cases, a large variation of results
can be observed. I illustrate this by looking at two cases in detail.
First, suppose that σ2qu = σ
2
sc = 1 and σ
2
rv = 4. In this extreme case
the triple-blind procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72%. If the
groups are all of equal size (pKA = pKF = pUA = pUF = 1/4) then under the
non-blind procedure the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in
favor of needs to be as much as 2.66 pp higher than the acceptance rate for
authors the editor is biased against, in order for the average quality under
14These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not.
In particular, the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased against is
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
+ pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
pKA + pUA
, and
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
+ pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
pKF + pUF
is the rate of acceptance for authors the editor is biased in favor of.
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Figure 1: The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs
of the non-blind procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage point
difference in acceptance rates), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the ac-
ceptance rate of the corresponding triple-blind procedure.
the two procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very large for a
journal that only accepts less than 1% of papers. If the bias is any less than
that there is no harm to the readers in using the non-blind procedure.
Second, suppose that σ2qu = σ
2
sc = 4 and σ
2
rv = 1. Then the triple-
blind procedure has an acceptance rate of 22.66%. If, moreover, the editor
knows relatively few authors (pKA = pKF = 0.15, pUA = pUF = 0.35) then
the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased in favor of needs to be
only 2.23 pp higher than the acceptance rate for authors the editor is biased
against, in order for the quality costs of the non-blind procedure to outweigh
its benefits. For a journal accepting about 23% of papers that means that
even if the identity bias of the editor is relatively mild the journal’s readers
are harmed if the non-blind procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are un-
likely to be known in practice, it is unclear whether the non-blind procedure
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or the triple-blind procedure will lead to a higher average quality of pub-
lished papers for any particular journal.15 So in general it is not clear that
an argument that the non-blind procedure harms the journal’s readers can be
made. At the same time, a general argument that the non-blind procedure
helps the readers is not available either. Given this, I am inclined to recom-
mend a triple-blind procedure for all journals because not doing so harms
the authors.
If there was reason to believe that the editor’s bias was very small, there
might be a case for the non-blind procedure using considerations of average
quality. Based on the empirical evidence I cited in section 3, it seems unlikely
that any editor could make such a case convincingly today. But if identity
bias were someday to be eliminated or severely mitigated, this question may
be worth revisiting.
So far I have argued in this section that in the presence of the positive
effect of connection bias on quality, the net effect of connection bias and
identity bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in section 2 that the positive
effect of connection bias may only exist in certain fields. In fields where
papers rely partially on the author’s testimony there is value in knowing the
identity of the author. But in other fields such as mathematics and some
of the humanities testimony is not taken to play a role—the paper itself
constitutes the contribution to the field—and so arguably there is no value
in knowing the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias, but
there is still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest case for
the triple-blind procedure emerges, as the non-blind procedure harms both
authors and readers.
15Note that the evidence collected by Laband and Piette (1994) does not help settle this
question, as they do not directly compare the triple-blind and the non-blind procedure.
Their evidence supports a positive epistemic effect of connection bias, but not a verdict
on the overall epistemic effect of triple-blinding.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-blind re-
view: one based on the consequences for the author and one based on the
consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the non-blind procedure introduces differential treat-
ment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to publish
papers by authors they know (connection bias, theorem 3) and less likely
to publish papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial stereo-
types to (identity bias, theorem 7). Whenever a paper is rejected as a result
of one of these biases an epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker 2007) is
committed against the author. This is an argument in favor of triple-blinding
based on consequences for the author.
From the readers’ perspective the story is more mixed. Generally speak-
ing connection bias has a positive effect on the quality of published papers
and identity bias a negative one. Thus whether the readers are better off
under the triple-blind procedure depends on how exactly these effects trade
off, which is highly context-dependent, or so I have argued. This yields a
more nuanced view than that suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994),
who focus only on connection bias, or by the argument for triple-blinding
based on the consequences for the readers, which focuses only on identity
bias.
However, in mathematics and some of the humanities there is arguably
no positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author’s
other work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009). So here the negative
effect of identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers’
perspective. In this situation, considerations concerning the consequences for
the author and considerations concerning the consequences for the readers
point in the same direction: in favor of triple-blind review.
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A The Acceptance Probability and the Aver-
age Quality of Papers
Proposition 2. µUi ∼ N (µ, σ
2
U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K). Moreover, σ
2
U < σ
2
K
whenever σ2sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0.
Proof. First consider the distribution of ri. Since ri | qi ∼ N(qi, σ
2
rv), qi |
µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu), and µi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
sc), it follows that ri | µi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
and ri ∼ N(µ, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv).
The latter can be used straightforwardly to determine the distribution
of µUi . Since ri − µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv) it follows that
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
(ri − µ) ∼ N
(
0,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
∼ N
(
0, σ2U
)
.
The result follows because µ is a constant and
µUi =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
µ =
σ2qu + σ
2
sc
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
(ri − µ) + µ.
Determining the distribution of µKi is slightly trickier because there are
two random variables involved: ri and µi. As noted above, ri | µi ∼
N(µi, σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv). Thus, writing Xi =
σ2
qu
σ2
qu
+σ2
rv
(ri − µi),
Xi | µi ∼ N
(
0,
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
.
Since
µKi =
σ2qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
ri +
σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
µi = Xi + µi
it remains to determine the convolution of Xi and µi. This can be done using
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the moment-generating function and the law of total expectation. Recall
that the moment-generating function of an N(m, s2) distribution is given by
M(t) = exp{mt+ 1
2
s2t2}. So the moment-generating function of µKi is
E[exp{tµKi }] = E[exp{t(Xi + µi)}]
= E[E[exp{tXi + tµi} | µi]]
= E[exp{tµi}E[exp{tXi} | µi]]
= exp
{
0t+
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2
}
E[exp{tµi}]
= exp
{
1
2
σ4qu
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2 + µt+
1
2
σ2sct
2
}
= exp
{
µt+
1
2
σ4qu + σ
2
sc(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
t2
}
,
which is exactly the moment-generating function of the desired normal dis-
tribution.
Finally, note that
σ2U =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2(σ2qu + σ
2
rv)
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv)(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
,
σ2K =
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)
2(σ2qu + σ
2
rv) + σ
2
scσ
4
rv
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv)(σ
2
qu + σ
2
rv)
.
So σ2U < σ
2
K whenever σ
2
sc > 0 and σ
2
rv > 0 (and σ
2
U = σ
2
K otherwise, assuming
the expressions are well-defined in that case).
Theorem 3. Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
> Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
if q∗ > µ, σ2sc > 0, and σ
2
rv > 0.
Proof. It follows from proposition 2 that
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Pr
(
µKi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
q∗ − µ
σK
)
and Pr
(
µUi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
q∗ − µ
σU
)
,
where Φ is the distribution function (or cumulative density function) of a
standard normal distribution. Since Φ is (strictly) increasing in its argument,
and σK > σU by proposition 2, the theorem follows immediately.
In order to prove proposition 4 a number of intermediate results are
needed.
Lemma 8.
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] = E[µUi | µ
U
i > q
∗],
E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] = E[µKi | µ
K
i > q
∗].
Proof. Because µUi is simply an (invertible) transformation of ri, it follows
that
qi | µ
U
i ∼ qi | ri ∼ N
(
µUi ,
(σ2qu + σ
2
sc)σ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
)
.
The distribution of qi | µ
K
i is a little trickier to find, because µ
K
i is a linear
combination of two random variables, ri and µi, and it is not obvious that
learning µKi is as informative as learning both ri and µi. But using the known
distributions of qi | µi and µ
K
i | qi, µi and integrating out µi it can be shown
that
qi | µ
K
i ∼ qi | ri, µi ∼ N
(
µKi ,
σ2quσ
2
rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
)
.
The important point here is that E[qi | µ
x
i ] = µ
x
i both for x = U and x = K.
Now the law of total expectation can be used to establish that
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E[qi | µ
x
i > q
∗] = E[E[qi | µ
x
i ] | µ
x
i > q
∗] = E[µxi | µ
x
i > q
∗],
for x = U,K.
Let X ∼ N(µ, σ2) be a normally distributed random variable. Then
X | X > a follows a left-truncated normal distribution, with left-truncation
point a. As a result of lemma 8 I am interested in the mean of left-truncated
normal distributions. According to, e.g., Johnson et al. (1994, chapter 13,
section 10.1), this mean can be expressed as
E[X | X > a] = µ+ σR
(
a− µ
σ
)
. (1)
Here
R(x) =
φ(x)
1− Φ(x)
for all x ∈ R, where φ is the probability density function of the standard
normal distribution, and Φ is its distribution function. R is the inverse of
what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills’ ratio.
It follows from the definitions that R(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and that
R′(x) = R(x)2 − xR(x). (2)
Proposition 9 (Gordon (1941)). For all x > 0, R(x) < x
2+1
x
.
Proposition 9 can be used to establish the next result.
Proposition 10. If X ∼ N(µ, σ2) and Y ∼ N(µ, s2) with s > σ > 0 then
E[Y | Y > a] > E[X | X > a].
Proof. It suffices to show that the derivative ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] is positive for
all σ > 0. Differentiating equation (1) (using equation (2)) yields
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∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] =
((
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1
)
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
−
a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)2
.
Since R
(
a−µ
σ
)
> 0, ∂
∂σ
E[X | X > a] > 0 if and only if
(
a− µ
σ
)2
+ 1−
a− µ
σ
R
(
a− µ
σ
)
> 0.
This is true whenever a−µ
σ
≤ 0 because then both terms in the sum are
positive. Proposition 9 guarantees that it is true whenever a−µ
σ
> 0 as well.
Proposition 4. E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] > E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] whenever σ2sc > 0, and
σ2rv > 0.
Proof. By lemma 8,
E[qi | µ
U
i > q
∗] = E[µUi | µ
U
i > q
∗],
E[qi | µ
K
i > q
∗] = E[µKi | µ
K
i > q
∗].
By proposition 2, µUi ∼ N (µ, σ
2
U) and µ
K
i ∼ N (µ, σ
2
K), with σU < σK . Hence
the conditions of proposition 10 are satisfied, and the result follows.
Proposition 6.
µKAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µKFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, σ2K
)
,
µUAi ∼ N
(
µ−
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
,
µUFi ∼ N
(
µ+
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, σ2U
)
.
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Proof. Since µKAi and µ
KF
i are simply µ
K
i shifted by a constant (see propo-
sition 5) they follow the same distribution as µKi except that its mean is
shifted by the same constant. Similarly µUAi and µ
UF
i are just µ
U
i shifted by
a constant. So the results follow from proposition 2.
For notational convenience, I introduce qKA, qKF , qUA, and qUF , defined
by
qKA = q∗ +
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
, qKF = q∗ −
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
rv
,
qUA = q∗ +
ε · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
, qUF = q∗ −
δ · σ2rv
σ2qu + σ
2
sc + σ
2
rv
.
Theorem 7. If ε > 0, δ > 0, and σ2rv > 0,
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
and Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
< Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
Proof. For the first inequality, note that
Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
< 1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
= Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
.
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established
in proposition 6. The inequality follows from the fact that Φ is strictly
increasing in its argument. By the same reasoning,
Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
= 1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
< 1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
= Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
.
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Lemma 11.
Pr (Ai) = pKA
(
1− Φ
(
qKA − µ
σK
))
+ pKF
(
1− Φ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+ pUA
(
1− Φ
(
qUA − µ
σU
))
+ pUF
(
1− Φ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
E [qi | Ai] = µ+
σK
Pr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+
σU
Pr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
Proof. The expression for Pr(Ai) follows immediately from the distributions
of the posterior means established in proposition 6.
To get an expression for E[qi | Ai], consider first the average quality of
scientist i’s paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in
the group of scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against.
This average quality is
E
[
qi | µ
KA
i > q
∗
]
= E
[
qi | µ
K
i > q
KA
]
= E
[
µKi | µ
K
i > q
KA
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
,
where the first equality simply rewrites the inequality µKAi > q
∗ in a more
convenient form, the second equality uses lemma 8, and the third equality
uses equation 1. Similarly,
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E
[
qi | µ
KF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σKR
(
qKF − µ
σK
)
,
E
[
qi | µ
UA
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
,
E
[
qi | µ
UF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+ σUR
(
qUF − µ
σU
)
.
The average quality of accepted papers E[qi | Ai] is a weighted sum of these
expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers
that are written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, au-
thors known to the editor that she is biased against form a pKA Pr(µ
KA
i >
q∗)/Pr(Ai) proportion of accepted papers. Hence
E [qi | Ai] =
1
Pr (Ai)
pKA Pr
(
µKAi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
KA
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pKF Pr
(
µKFi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
KF
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pUA Pr
(
µUAi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
UA
i > q
∗
]
+
1
Pr (Ai)
pUF Pr
(
µUFi > q
∗
)
E
[
qi | µ
UF
i > q
∗
]
= µ+
σK
Pr (Ai)
(
pKAφ
(
qKA − µ
σK
)
+ pKFφ
(
qKF − µ
σK
))
+
σU
Pr (Ai)
(
pUAφ
(
qUA − µ
σU
)
+ pUFφ
(
qUF − µ
σU
))
.
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Abstract 
I consider three explanatory strategies from recent systems biology that are 
driven by mathematics as much as mechanistic detail. Analysis of differential 
equations drives the first strategy; topological analysis of network motifs drives 
the second; mathematical theorems from control engineering drive the third. I 
also distinguish three abstraction types: aggregations, which simplify by 
condensing information; generalizations, which simplify by generalizing 
information; and structurations, which simplify by contextualizing information. 
Using a common explanandum as reference point—namely, the robust perfect 
adaptation of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli—I argue that each strategy invokes 
a different combination of abstraction types and that each targets its 
abstractions to different mechanistic details.  
 
 
1 Introductory Remarks 
 
The currently dominant paradigm for understanding explanation in biology puts 
mechanism at center stage (Nicholson 2012; Levy 2013). Leading accounts of 
mechanistic explanation, while differing in the particulars of their analysis of 
mechanism, agree that mechanistic explanations explain by alluding to mechanisms or 
models thereof (Machamer, Darden, Craver 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005).  
 
There is a small publishing industry devoted to discerning the scope of mechanistic 
explanation in scientific practice. Some claim to identify biological explanations that do 
not allude to mechanisms (Wouters 2007; Huneman 2010; Rice 2015). Fans of 
mechanistic explanation tend to resist making scope concessions, preferring instead to 
accommodate the putative explanations as mechanistic despite initial appearances, to 
broaden the scope of mechanistic explanation or the analysis of mechanism, or else to 
                                                          
Ώ
 Draft. For symposium on Integrating Explanatory Strategies Across the Life Sciences at 
the 2016 meeting of Philosophy of Science Association, Atlanta, GA. I thank audiences at 
Mississippi State University, the Alabama Philosophical Society, and the Society for 
Philosophy of Science in Practice for comments on earlier drafts. 
ΐ
 Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama in Huntsville, Huntsville AL  35899, 
nick.jones@uah.edu  
 
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -256-
 2 
deny that the putative explanations are explanations at all (Craver 2006; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2010; Brigandt 2013; Levy and Bechtel 2013). 
 
I set aside questions about what qualifies as an explanation as well as questions about 
whether only mechanisms—or models thereof—carry explanatory power. I focus, 
instead, on explanatory strategies, understood as patterns of reasoning directed toward 
providing explanations. I consider three explanatory strategies from recent systems 
biology that are driven by mathematics as much as, if not more than, mechanistic detail. 
Analysis of differential equations drives the first strategy; topological analysis of 
network motifs drives the second; mathematical theorems from control engineering 
drive the third.  
 
Systems biologists use these strategies to supplement the explanatory power of 
traditional molecular mechanisms (see Brigandt et al forthcoming). My aim is to identify 
how the strategies differ from each other, rather than how they differ from standard 
mechanistic explanations or what might unify them in those differences (for which see 
Green and Jones 2016). Doing so helps with understanding relations among the 
strategies, their tactics for integrating mechanistic detail, and explanatory affordances 
of their mathematical elements. 
 
They key to my analysis is a distinction among three abstraction types: aggregations, 
which simplify by condensing information; generalizations, which simplify by 
generalizing information; and structurations, which simplify by contextualizing 
information. Using a common explanandum as reference point—namely, the robust 
perfect adaptation of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli (Barkai and Leibler 1997; Ma et al 
2009; Yi et al 2000)—I argue that each strategy invokes a different combination of 
abstraction types and that each targets its abstractions to different mechanistic details. I 
begin with the typology of abstraction. 
 
 
2 Abstraction Typology 
 
I am interested in abstractions as representational rather than metaphysical. 
Abstractions, as I understand them, are ontologically innocent, so that characterizing 
features of representations as abstractions over some parts of reality carries no 
implication that features correspond to abstract objects (see also Cartwright 1989, 353-
354; Levy and Bechtel 2013, 243). So, for example, representing the relation between a 
person, a hotel, and a date range as a reservation does not entail that some abstract 
object, a reservation, eǆists; Ŷor does represeŶtiŶg the ŵotioŶs of aŶ oďjeĐt’s 
ĐoŶstitueŶts as the ŵotioŶ of the oďjeĐt’s ĐeŶter of ŵass eŶtail that soŵe aďstraĐt 
object, a center of mass, exists. 
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Levy and Bechtel characterize a representation as abstract insofar as a more concrete 
representation is possible (2013, 242).  Brigandt and colleagues suggest that biologists 
use aďstraĐtioŶs to ͞eluĐidate sǇsteŵ-level patterns of organization that may not be 
ǀisiďle at the leǀel of ŵoleĐular details͟ ;forthcoming). I concur. I understand 
abstractions as representing only some of the many elements—objects, relations, 
parameters—associated with their targets, thereby making apparent patterns obscured 
by more detailed representations. I add to these insights that biologists produce (at 
least) three types of abstraction. 
 
Following Ordorica, I call the first aggregation (2015, 163-164). An aggregation 
represents some relationship among multiple elements of a representational target as a 
higher-level object, or multiple elements of the target as a single, composite object. (See 
Figure 1a.) Paradigm cases of aggregations include representations of person-hotel-date 
relations as reservations; of costs of services and costs of goods as costs; and of the 
ŵotioŶs of aŶ oďjeĐt’s parts as the motion of a center of mass (from Ordorica 2015, 
164). Aggregations abstract from plurality to individual, ignoring differences among 
many in order to make salient some integrated unity among the elements of a 
representational target. They thereby simplify representations by condensing 
information about representational targets.  
 
Following Pincock, I call the second abstraction type generalization (2015, 864). A 
generalization represents some element of a representational target as a class of 
elements, where potential instances of the class might include elements not present in 
the target. (See Figure 1b.) For example, because the class of solution measures includes 
all soap-bubble-like surfaces, such as the cellular froth surrounding radiolarian protozoa, 
representing a soap-bubble surfaĐe as a ͞solution measure͟ is a geŶeralizatioŶ ;PiŶĐoĐk 
2015, 864). Generalizations abstract from an instance to a class thereof, ignoring 
differences between instances of the class in order to make salient some more general 
unity. They thereby simplify representations by generalizing from information about 
representational targets. 
 
I call the third abstraction type structuration. A structuration represents some element 
of a representational target as a position in a structure, such that potential occupants of 
the position might include elements not present in the target. (See Figure 1c.) I follow 
Haslanger in understaŶdiŶg struĐtures as ͞Đoŵpleǆ eŶtities ǁith parts ǁhose ďehaǀior is 
ĐoŶstraiŶed ďǇ their relatioŶ to other parts͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, ϭϭϴͿ. Paradigm cases of 
structurations include representating Barack Obama as President of the United States of 
America, or representing AIneias as son of Anchises and Aphrodite. Structurations 
abstract to a position in a structure, from an occupant of the position, ignoring intrinsic 
features of the occupant unrelated to its position in order to make salient the 
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oĐĐupaŶt’s role relatiǀe to occupants of other positions in the same structure. They 
thereby simplify by contextualizing information about representational targets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Visualizing Abstraction Types. (a) Aggregation A represents elements 
e1, e2, and e3 (and relations therein) as a single object. (b) Generalization C 
represents I1(c) as a class, instances of which also include I2(c) and I3(c). (c) 
Structuration p1 represents element o1 as a position in larger structure that also 
includes p2, p3, and p4. 
 
I understand aggregations as distinct from both generalizations and structurations, by 
virtue of being many-to-one, rather than one-to-one, simplifications. I also understand 
being a generalization as insufficient for being a structuration. For representations of 
positions carry information about functional relationships between their occupants and 
other positions in the same structure; but representations of classes do not. Finally, 
insofar as classes are sets, I understand being a structuration as insufficient for being a 
generalization. For, sometimes, representing target elements as classes carries some 
information about intrinsic features of those elements apart from their functional 
relations to elements occupying other positions in the same structure; but representing 
target elements as positions in structures never carries such information.  
 
 
3 Robust Perfect Adaptation of E.coli Chemotaxis 
 
My central claim is that different explanatory strategies from recent systems biology 
differ from each other, at least in part, by virtue of appealing to different abstraction 
types. I support this claim by considering a case in which multiple strategies target the 
same explanandum. Doing so minimizes confounds that confuse differences due to the 
nature of each explanatory strategy with differences due to the nature of each 
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explanatory target. I focus on a particular explanandum known as robust perfect 
adaptation of bacterial chemotaxis, following others who consider this a paradigmatic 
target for non-ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ ;Braillard ϮϬϭϬ; BrigaŶdt, GreeŶ, aŶd O’MalleǇ 
forthcoming; Matthiessen forthcoming). 
 
3.1 Explanadum Context 
Escherichia coli (E.coli) is popular model organism in biological research. It is very 
sensitive to small chemical changes over a very large range of background 
concentrations. It also has a simple and well-understood signal transduction network 
(Wadhams and Armitage 2004). 
 
E.coli manages two kinds of motion (Berg 2003). It runs by rotating its flagellar motor 
counterclockwise. This aligns all of its flagella into a synchronized bundle, resulting in 
movement in a straight line for about 1 second. E.coli also tumbles by rotating its 
flagellar motor clockwise. This breaks flagellar alignment, and the asynchronized flagella 
produce stationary changes of direction lasting for about 0.1 second. E.coli are randomly 
reoriented after each tumble. Moreover, while these tumbles occur with regular 
frequency, E.coli  with higher concentrations of CheR protein tumble more frequently 
(Spudich and Kochland 1975). 
 
E.coli’s ŵotioŶ iŶ a uŶiforŵ eǆterŶal eŶǀiroŶŵeŶt reseŵďles a raŶdoŵ ǁalk. E.coli has 
no ability to control or select its direction of motion, and its straight runs are subject to 
Brownian motion because of eddies. However, in the presence of a chemical 
attractant—amino acids such as serine or aspartic acid, or sugars such as maltose or 
glucose— E.coli taxis toward the attractant. This taxi behavior involves less frequent 
tumbles, leading to longer runs and so gradual motion toward the attractant. (There is 
an opposite behavior for repellants such as metal ions or leucine.) 
 
The biomolecular mechanism for E.coli chemotaxis is well-understood. When an 
environmental attractant attaches to a receptor, the receptor lowers the activity of the 
CheW-CheA protein complex. Less activity from this complex reduces the rate of CheY 
phosphorylation, which results in less phorphorylated CheY diffusing to the flagella. 
Because CheY induces clockwise rotation of the flagellar motor, the outcome is less 
frequent tumbling. 
 
3.2 Explanadum Question 
 
Alon and colleagues have experimental verification that, in the presence of a chemical 
attractant mixed uniformly into the environment at a constant concentration, E.coli 
chemotaxis perfectly adaptive (Alon et al 2009). After a brief period of decreased 
tumbling frequency, the frequency of E.coli tumbles increases toward and returns to the 
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exact frequency prior to the introduction of the attractant. The effect of the attractant, 
accordingly, becomes entirely forgotten despite its continuing presence. 
 
The biomolecular mechanism for the adaptiveness of chemotaxis for E.coli is also well-
understood. Some time after a new attractant has been detected by receptors, the 
lower activity of the CheW-CheA complex induces less CheB activity. This reduces the 
rate for removing methyl groups from the CheW-CheA complex and, together with 
continual methylation of the CheR receptor, CheW-CheA methylation increases. More 
methylation means more CheW-CheA activity, which in turn induces more CheY 
phosphorylation. This eventually results in more phosphorylated CheY diffusing to the 
flagellar motor, which increases clockwise motor rotation and thereby raises tumbling 
frequency.   
 
Alon and colleagues have further experimental verification that this perfectly adaptive 
chemotaxis of E.coli is robust across ranges of CheR concentrations 0.5 to 50 times 
higher thaŶ ĐoŶĐeŶtratioŶ leǀels iŶ ͞ǁild tǇpe͟ E.coli (Alon et al 2009). (By contrast, 
E.coli’s adaptatioŶ tiŵe—the time to return to 50% of its pre-stimulus tumbling 
frequency—is not robust to different CheR concentrations, because more CheR entails 
longer adaptation times.) This is the explanandum of interest: why is the perfect 
adaptation of E.coli chemotaxis, in the presence of a well-distributed chemical 
attractant, robust to CheR protein concentrations?  
 
There are (at least) three strategies for answering this question in recent systems 
biology literature. (For a fourth, see Kollman et al 2005.) I consider each in turn, first 
sketching the general strategy and then making explicit the abstractions at work.  
 
 
4 Distinguishing Explanatory Strategies through Abstraction Types 
 
4.1 Dynamical Modeling 
I call the first strategy dynamical modeling. This strategy begins by constructing a 
chemotaxis network for E.coli. This network represents the mechanism for E.coli 
chemotaxis, including specific biochemical details about when and how relevant 
proteins affect each other. (See Figurer 2.) For example, Barkai and Leibler (1997) 
construct a model according to which, among many other specifics, CheB demethylates 
only the active form of the CheW-CheA complex and CheR works only at saturation.  
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 Figure 2. Mechanistic network for E.coli chemotaxis (Rao and Ordal 2009). 
 
The dynamical modeling strategy proceeds by constructing a dynamical model—
typically a set of differential equations—from the network (see Jones and Wolkenhauer 
2012). One then demonstrates, via mathematical proof or simulation, that this model 
predicts perfect adaptation in the presence of a well-distributed chemical attractant for 
CheR concentration values varying over several orders of magnitude. (Raerinne 2013 
calls this sensitivity analysis.) The demonstration supports the inference that E.coli 
chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation because of its biochemical specifics. 
 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) call the product of this strategy a dynamical 
mechanistic explanation. I set aside the issue of whether the dynamical modeling 
strategǇ produĐes eǆplaŶatioŶs. But I eŶdorse BeĐhtel aŶd AďrahaŵseŶ’s iŶsight that 
the dynamical modeling strategy produces accounts that are mechanistic, by virtue of 
depending upon mechanistic details, as well as dynamical, by virtue of analyzing 
ŵatheŵatiĐal ŵodels ďuilt upoŶ those details. For eǆaŵple, Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ 
mathematical analysis is relevant to E.coli chemotaxis only insofar as their network 
details are relevant; and analysis of the network apart from the model cannot produce 
an inference about the robustness of E.coli’s perfeĐtlǇ adaptiǀe Đheŵotaǆis. 
 
Let’s treat the dǇŶaŵiĐal model driving this explanatory strategy as an initial baseline for 
evaluating the number and severity of abstraction in various explanatory strategies. The 
model is abstract in various ways. But we shall treat it as a recipient of further 
abstractions, in the way a vehicle receives freight. Just as we can determine the weight 
of the freight indirectly by subtracting the gross weight of vehicle and freight from the 
͞tare ǁeight͟ ;the ǁeight of ǀehiĐle aloŶeͿ, ǁe shall determine abstraction variety and 
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severitǇ/eǆteŶt for ŵodels driǀiŶg other eǆplaŶatorǇ strategies ďǇ ͞suďtraĐtiŶg͟ their 
total aďstraĐtioŶ ǀarietǇ aŶd seǀeritǇ froŵ the ͞tare͟ aďstraĐtioŶ. 
 
4.2 Topological Analysis 
I call the second explanatory strategy topological analysis. This strategy begins by 
identifying all possible minimal adaptation networks capable of predicting robust 
perfect adaptation for E.coli chemotaxis. These networks, like the networks for 
dynamical modeling, represent mechanisms for E.coli chemotaxis. Yet, unlike the 
networks for dynamical modeling, these networks are minimal: they contain the fewest 
possible nodes and links that suffice for robustly perfectly adaptive chemotaxis. The 
procedure for identifying all possible minimal networks of this sort is brute 
computational search. It turns out that there are exactly three, each of which has 
exactly three nodes and no more than three links (Ma et al 2009). 
 
The topological analysis strategy proceeds by identifying a chemotaxis network known 
to predict robust perfect adaptation. This strategy thereby relies upon the dynamical 
modeling strategy, but only for mathematical results. The biochemical details of the 
chosen chemotaxis network turn out to be largely irrelevant, because the topological 
analysis strategy proceeds by demonstrating that a reduced form of the chosen network 
is topological equivalent to one of the minimal adaptation models. Reduced forms for 
mechanistic networks functional equivalents for node groups, group nodes or 
equivalents into modules, and ignore links within modules in favor of links between 
modules. 
 
Consider, for example, one of the three minimal adaptation networks Ma and 
colleagues (2009) discover for E.coli chemotaxis. (See Figure 3.) The network has an 
input activating node A, A inhibiting being activated by B, A also activating C, and C 
aĐtiǀatiŶg soŵe output. Ma aŶd Đolleagues shoǁ that Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ŵodel 
for E.coli chemotaxis reduces to this minimal network. Barkai and Leibler have an input 
and CheR activating, and CheB inhibiting, receptors; these receptors activating the 
CheW-CheA complex; the complex activating CheB and CheY; and CheY activating some 
output. Ma aŶd Đolleagues reĐoŶĐeptualize Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s Ŷetǁork iŶto oŶe ǁhere 
the input activates a receptor complex; this complex activates CheY, which activates the 
output; the complex also activates CheB, which inhibits a methylation level also 
activated by CheR.; and this methylation level activates the receptor complex. Then, in a 
second reconceptualization that produces one of their minimal adaptation networks, 
they group the receptor complex and CheB into module A, group CheR and the 
methylation level into module B, and rename CheY module C.  
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Figure 3: Network topology for E.coli chemotaxis (Ma et al 2009). 
 
The topological analysis strategy infers, from the topological equivalence between a 
minimal adaptation network and the reduced form of a network known to predict 
robust perfect adaptation for chemotaxis, that E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect 
adaptation because of the topology of its chemotaxis network. Huneman (2010) calls the 
product of this strategy a topological explanation. Regardless of whether analyses such 
as Ma aŶd Đolleagues’s are eǆplaŶatorǇ, theǇ are topologiĐal ďǇ ǀirtue of demonstrating 
some consequence about the topological properties of a network. This means that, even 
if the mechanistic details of E.coli’s Đheŵotaǆis Ŷetǁork ǁere differeŶt, aŶd eǀeŶ if the 
biochemical specifics of the network chosen for reduction were different, the product of 
the topological analysis strategy would remain the same provided that the alternative 
networks preserve topological equivalence with the originals (see also Jones 2014).  
 
The topological model driving this second explanatory strategy is more abstract than the 
dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵodel driǀiŶg our iŶitial ;͞tare͟Ϳ strategǇ. The topologiĐal ŵodel ĐoŶtaiŶs 
more aggregations. For example, it represeŶts CheY aŶd Che) as ͞the ŵotor rotation 
group;͟ it represents CheA and CheW as "the receptor complex;" and it represents the 
receptor complex aŶd CheB as ͞the phosphorǇlatioŶ group.͟ The topologiĐal ŵodel also 
contains more structurations. For example, it represents the phosphorylation group as 
͞A͟ aŶd the ŵotor rotatioŶ group as ͞C.͟ These representations abstract entirely from 
any intrinsic marks that might distinguish instanĐes of ͞A͟ froŵ iŶstaŶĐes of ͞C," relǇiŶg 
instead upon extrinsic relations to distinguish the nodes from each other. So, for 
example, "A" but not "C" inhibits "B," "A" activates "C," and so on.  
 
4.3 Organizational Design 
I call the third explanatory strategy organization design. This strategy begins with a 
proof to the effect that systems exhibit robust perfect adaptation if and only if they 
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satisfy the characteristic equation for Integral Feedback Control (IFC). The proof is 
purely mathematical, well-known from control engineering theory in contexts involving 
mechanical systems that exhibit IFC such as thermostats. I am not aware of a complete 
and published version of this proof, but Yi and colleagues (2000) provide a sketch with 
relevant details. The organizational design strategy proceeds by inferring that E.coli 
chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation if and only if it satisfies the characteristic 
equation for IFC, and further inferring that E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect 
adaptation because it satisfies the characteristic equation for IFC. (For better 
explanatory details regarding this specific case, Braillard 2010; Green and Jones 2016.) 
 
The organizational design strategy invokes neither mechanistic specifics about the 
chemotaxis network for E.coli nor topological details about the structure of that 
network. The strategy takes the explanandum phenomenon as given, using a 
mathematical equivalence result to identify a principle both necessary and sufficient for 
the phenomenon. The strategy thereby has affinities with explanatory strategies that 
appeal to organizing principles (Green and Wolkenhauer 2013) and design principles 
(Green 2015).  
 
For siŵpliĐitǇ, let’s ͞reset͟ our aďstraĐtioŶ ͞tare͟ to the topologiĐal ŵodel, ďeĐause the 
model driving the organizational design strategy—call it the design model—is abstract in 
all the ways the topological model is abstract and more besides. The simplification 
thereby focuses attention on ways in which the design model differs from the 
topological model—and, by extension, from the initial dynamical model.  
 
Compared to the topological model, the design model contains more aggregations. For 
example, the design model represents CheY phosphorǇlatioŶ aŶd CheB aĐtiǀatioŶ as ͞k-
ďoǆ output.͟ This aggregation is, at the same time, a generalization and a structuration. 
For example, "k-box output" is a class, with instances biological as well as mechanical. 
The standard example of a mechanical instance is heater activation in a thermostat. The 
k-box representation is also a structuration, akin to the "A", "B," and "C" 
representations from the topological model. For the k-box represents whatever has 
such-and-such input and output (a position in a structure). (See Figure 4.) 
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Figure 4 Organizational design for bacterial Đheŵotaǆis…aŶd therŵostats (Yi et al 
2000). 
 
The topological model is more abstract than the dynamical model, by virtue of 
containing various abstractions over protein identities. The design model, in turn, is 
more abstract than the topological and dynamical models, by virtue of also containing 
various abstractions over protein interactions. We can, therefore, arrange the various 
explanatory strategies along a continuum of abstraction type and severity. The 
dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵodeliŶg strategǇ, as our ďaseliŶe, oĐĐupies the ͞loǁ͟ eŶd of our ĐoŶtiŶuuŵ. 
Next is topological analysis, which involves aggregations of and structurations from 
protein identities (or aggregations thereof). Then there is organizational design, which 
also involves aggregation of protein interactions as well as generalization and 
structuration of protein identities (or aggregations thereof). 
 
 
5 Confirming the Analysis 
 
I consider the foregoing to establish that each explanatory strategy invokes a different 
combination of abstraction types and that each targets its abstractions to different 
mechanistic details. Whether this result generalizes beyond my chosen case study 
awaits future research. There is some reason to expect an affirmative result. For if 
dynamical, topological, and design explanatory strategies differ as I claim—specifically, 
along dimensions of number and severity of generalizations and structurations—then 
we should expect the more abstract strategies to have wider scope. For the more 
general models likely have more instances, and the more structural models likely have 
more position occupants.  
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We find confirmation of this prediction for the case of robust perfect adaptation of 
Bacillus subtilis (B.subtilis) chemotaxis. Details of the organization design strategy for 
explaining why E.coli chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation also apply for 
explaining why B.subtilis chemotaxis exhibits robust perfect adaptation. But details of 
the corresponding dynamical mechanistic strategy do not. The organization design 
strategy, as we know, involves more generalization and structuration than the 
dynamical mechanistic strategy. This confirms our prediction. 
 
Allow me to be brief with the details. Rao and Ordal (2007) develop a dynamic 
mechanistic explanation for the perfect robustness of chemotaxis for B.subtilis. Their 
eǆplaŶatorǇ strategǇ folloǁs the saŵe patterŶ as Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s iŶ the Đase of 
E.coli. But details differ. For example, aĐĐordiŶg to Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s ŵodel, CheB iŶ 
E.coli demethylates only active receptor complexes; according to Rao and Ordal, CheB in 
B.subtilis deŵethǇlates iŶaĐtiǀe oŶes too. AgaiŶ, aĐĐordiŶg to Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s 
model, without CheY E.coli runs but does not tumble; according to Rao and Ordal, 
without CheY B.subtilis tumbles but does not run. One more: according to Barkai and 
Leiďler’s ŵodel, E.coli without CheB cannot run; according to Rao and Ordal, B.subtilis 
without CheB can run. See Figure 5. 
 
 
 Figure 5: Chemotaxis network for B.subtilis (Rao and Ordal 2009). 
 
 
“o Barkai aŶd Leiďler’s dǇŶaŵiĐal ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶ does Ŷot applǇ for the Đase of 
B.subtilis. But Yi aŶd Đolleague’s orgaŶizatioŶal desigŶ strategǇ does. For B.subtilis, like 
E.coli, exhibits robust perfect adaptation for chemotaxis if and only if it satisfies the 
characteristic equation for integral feedback control.  
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6 Toward Abstractive Mechanistic Explanation and its Affordances 
 
Systems biological strategies for explaining the robust perfect adaptation of bacterial 
chemotaxis (in E.coli, B.subtilis, etc) apply mathematical techniques to network models. 
Dynamical, topological, and design strategies apply different techniques to explain the 
same phenomenon. Each explanatory strategy, moreover, applies its mathematical 
techniques to network models that embody different kinds and severities of these 
abstractions such as aggregations, generalizations, structurations. These abstraction 
types, accordingly, help to explain how these systems biological explanatory strategies 
differ from each other.  
 
These abstraction types also provide a foundation for unifying various explanatory 
strategies from systems biology under the banner of mechanistic explanation. Let’s 
consider well known kinds of mechanistic explanation as standard. Let’s also folloǁ 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010) by considering dynamical mechanistic explanation as a 
mathematized species of standard mechanistic explanation.  
 
Then let an abstract network be any network representation obtained by aggregating, 
generalizing, or structurating mechanistic details of the sort familiar in standard 
mechanistic explanation. Also let an abstractive mechanistic explanation be any 
explanation driven by applying mathematical techniques to an abstract network. See 
Figure 6. 
 
 
 Figure 6. Relating standard and abstractive mechanistic explanation. 
 
Then topological and organizational design explanatory strategies are mechanistic 
strategies—albeit abstractive ones. Topological explanations apply topological analysis 
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to aggregated and generalized mechanism networks. Organizational design explanations 
apply control systems engineering to aggregated, generalized, and structurated 
mechanism networks.  
 
Both kinds of explanation are mechanistic, by virtue of being grounded upon 
mechanistic details. But both also provide explanatory affordances unavailable through 
standard mechanistic explanations, by virtue of being abstract. For example, by virtue of 
using generalizations, topological explanations should have a greater scope than their 
standard mechanistic counterparts. By virtue of using generalizations and 
structurations, organizational design explanations should have still greater scope.  
 
That these abstractive mechanistic strategies use novel mathematical techniques is a 
side effect of their using novel abstractions (in comparison with standard mechanistic 
explanations and their dynamical cousins). These techniques, of course, support more 
general conclusions, with wider scope, than the kind of differential equation analysis 
available for dynamical mechanistic explanations. But the techniques do not explain why 
the strategies have broader scope. 
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Abstract. Among the virtues of good theories are those appropriately labeled diachronic: durability, fruit-
fulness, and applicability—the last of which is insufficiently recognized. Diachronic theoretical virtues
cannot be instantiated in the original construction of a theory; subsequent development is required. By
contrast,  one  can assess  the  degree  to  which  a  theory  exhibits  the  following  nine  non-diachronic
theoretical virtues in a theory’s  original  construction: evidential accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory
depth, internal consistency, internal coherence, universal coherence, beauty, simplicity, and  unification.
The distinction between diachronic and non-diachronic virtues is important for understanding the role and
epistemic standing of each theoretical virtue.
Keywords. Theoretical virtues, durability, fruitfulness, prediction, and science-technology relations.
1. Introduction. Theoretical virtues are the traits of a theory that show it is probably true or worth accept-
ing. Although the identification, characterization, classification, and epistemic standing of theory virtues
are debated by philosophers and by participants in specific theoretical disputes, many scholars agree that
these virtues help us to infer which rival theory is the best explanation (Lipton 2004). The most widely ac-
cepted theories across the disciplines usually exhibit many of the same theoretical virtues listed below.
Each virtue class contains at least three virtues that sequentially follow a repeating pattern of progressive
disclosure or expansion. In another forthcoming essay (Keas 2017) I argue for this new systematization of
the theoretical virtues. In the present essay I focus on the diachronic class of virtues in contrast with the
non-diachronic virtues.  One can assess the degree to which a theory exhibits the non-diachronic virtues
from the time a theory is initially framed. However, no theory, in its original construction, can instantiate
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the diachronic virtues: durability, fruitfulness, or applicability. These virtues are instantiable only as a the-
ory is later refined or applied.
Evidential virtues
1. Evidential accuracy: A theory (T) fits the empirical evidence well (regardless of causal claims).
2. Causal adequacy: T’s causal factors plausibly produce the effects (evidence) in need of explanation. 
3. Explanatory depth: T excels in causal history depth or in other depth measures such as the range of
counterfactual questions that its law-like generalizations answer regarding the item being explained.
Coherential virtues
4. Internal consistency: T’s components are related to each other logically. 
5. Internal  coherence:  T’s  components  are  coordinated  into  an  intuitively  plausible  whole;
T lacks ad hoc hypotheses—theoretical components merely tacked on to solve isolated problems.
6. Universal coherence: T sits well with (or is not obviously contrary to) other warranted beliefs.
Aesthetic virtues
7. Beauty: T evokes aesthetic pleasure in properly functioning and sufficiently informed persons.
8. Simplicity: T explains the same facts as rivals, but with less theoretical content.
9. Unification: T explains more kinds of facts than rivals with the same amount of theoretical content.
Diachronic virtues
10. Durability: T has survived testing by successful prediction or plausible accommodation of new data.
11. Fruitfulness:  T has  generated  additional  discovery by  means  such as  successful  novel  prediction,
unification, and non ad hoc theoretical elaboration.
12. Applicability: T has guided strategic action or control, such as in science-based technology.
We will survey the first nine virtues only to the brief extent needed to recognize how one can assess the
degree to which a theory exhibits these theoretical virtues in its original construction. This will, by con-
trast, enable us to appreciate the unique temporal character of the diachronic theoretical virtues.
2.  Non-Diachronic  Theoretical Virtues. We begin  with  the  first  three  virtues.  Evidential  accuracy,
which is how well a theory fits the relevant data, can be assessed from the theory’s original construction.
Often a theory will also, from its inception, specify causally adequate mechanisms to produce the phe-
nomena in question. Such is not necessarily the case, as Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift illus-
trates. His theory enjoyed considerable evidential accuracy despite its lack of a plausible cause to move
the continents. Explanatory depth is also instantiated in a theory’s initial formulation if, for example, the
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theory answers a large range of counterfactual questions about a kind of phenomenon using the resources
of its law-like generalizations.
The  remaining  six  non-diachronic  theoretical  virtues  likewise  can  be  exhibited  in  the  initial
formation of a theory. A theory may be constructed in a logical manner so as to produce internal consis-
tency. Beyond that, the theoretical components might be well coordinated into an intuitively plausible
whole (avoiding ad hoc hypotheses), thus generating the theoretical virtue of  internal coherence. If the
theory sits well with (or is not obviously contrary to) other warranted beliefs, then it possesses the virtue
of universal coherence. A new theory might even evoke aesthetic pleasure in the minds of experts, which
constitutes theoretical  beauty. The closely related virtues of simplicity and unification also might be in-
stantiated in the initial formation of a theory: explaining the same facts as rival theories but with less theo-
retical content (simplicity), and explaining more kinds of facts than rivals with the same amount of theo-
retical content (unification).
Much more could be said about the first nine virtues outlined above (Keas 2017), but this is suffi-
cient to recognize them as a group of theoretical virtues that can, in principle, be instantiated in a theory’s
original formation. This common trait remains characteristic of these virtues even (largely) under the dis-
parate accounts found in the literature of how to characterize each virtue. Let us now explore the chief di-
achronic theoretical virtues in contrast to the non-diachronic virtues.
3.  Diachronic  Theoretical Virtues.  Durability, fruitfulness, and applicability, which I recognize as the
chief diachronic theoretical virtues, can only be instantiated as a theory is cultivated after its origin. This
necessarily extended temporal dimension of the diachronic virtues is, arguably, of considerable epistemic
importance. But even if one endorses the arguments that discount the epistemic significance of this tem-
poral component (Mayo 2014), one still should acknowledge a group of virtues that (unlike the other the-
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oretical virtues) can only be instantiated in a theory after its initial formulation. Time is of their essence in
a manner that goes beyond the trivial truth that all human endeavor is temporal. McMullin (2014) has lead
the way in articulating the epistemic significance of two of the three main diachronic virtues: durability
and fruitfulness (I recognize McMullin’s  third diachronic virtue of  “consilience”  as a mode of fruitful-
ness). Applicability, largely overlooked as a theory virtue, is another important member of this diachronic
category, as I shall demonstrate.
   3.1. Durability.  Durability, a virtue term McMullin (2014) recommended, refers to the favorable epis-
temic condition of a theory that has survived testing by successful prediction or by plausible accommoda-
tion of new unanticipated data (or both). Popular or long-lived theories are not necessarily durable in the
epistemic sense in view here. Equating durability with popularity or tradition is fallacious. While testabil-
ity is a pragmatically admirable trait of a theory, it is not an intrinsic epistemic characteristic of a theory;
many testable theories have failed too many tests to be acceptable. Steel (2010, 18) notes that the “more
precise and informative a theory’s empirical predictions are, the greater its testability.” The more testable
a theory is, the more durable it would prove itself to be if it passes the tests. A theory that scores low in
testability has little potential to exhibit durability.
Despite the leading role of  predictive success in many areas of science, it is less prominent in
some reputable scientific theories that are, nevertheless, well endowed with other virtues. Successful pre-
diction is very frequently part of explaining “how things work,” but less routine in explaining “how things
originated”—as in theories about the history of the cosmos, earth, and life (Cleland 2011, but Winther
2009 argues otherwise). Successful historical theories typically enjoy other forms of durability, most no-
tably a track record of plausible accommodation of new data that, although not predicted, came to light af-
ter the theory’s origin.  The durability of a theory suffers if one or more of its predictions are disconfirmed
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or when theorists respond to disconfirming evidence by modifying the theory with ad hoc hypotheses—
theoretical components merely “tacked on” to solve isolated problems. Although initially a theory may
exhibit a high degree of evidential accuracy (or any other of the first nine virtues in my systematization),
it is impossible for a newborn theory to instantiate the virtue of durability—this takes time in a sense not
required by the non-diachronic virtues. A similar necessary temporal dimension characterizes fruitfulness.
   3.2. Fruitfulness.  Fruitfulness, also known as fertility or fecundity, is another diachronic theoretical
virtue. A theory is fruitful if, over time, it generates additional discovery by means such as successful
novel prediction, unification, and non ad hoc theoretical elaboration. While durability is about conserva-
tion (a theory passing tests to survive), fruitfulness is about innovation (a theory stimulating further dis-
covery). When a prediction formulated in the context of a theory’s construction is later verified, this suc-
cessful predictive outcome increases the virtue of durability in that theory. By contrast, a novel prediction
is one that was not conceived in conjunction with a theory’s construction, but that nevertheless follows
reasonably from it. When such a novel prediction is confirmed by observation, a theory exhibits more
fruitfulness.
The closely related diachronic character of durability and fruitfulness is well illustrated in the dis-
covery of the first two planets beyond Saturn. Soon after Friedrich William Herschel unexpectedly dis-
covered Uranus in 1781, astronomers noted that its observed motion strayed from what contemporary
Newtonian mechanics predicted of such a planet. However, given the overall theoretically virtuous status
of Newtonian physics up through that time (including its durability due to its success in testing), most as-
tronomers expected a forthcoming way to make Uranus compliant with established theory. Even rejecting
the anomalous data as “inaccurate” seemed reasonable early on. By the 1830s, however, the possibility of
a perturbing planet beyond Uranus became a more reasonable and popular speculation, despite the ab-
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -276-
sence of a precise novel prediction of where to find such a planet. By this time many astronomers were
modestly confident in the accumulated data of Uranus’ positions in the sky.
This brings us to the celebrated successful novel prediction of 1845-1846. Based principally on
Newtonian physics and the well-known irregularities in Uranus’ motion, two astronomers independently
predicted where another unknown perturbing planet (later called Neptune) was likely located. Le Verrier’s
estimate of the planet’s location was the most accurate (correct within one degree), as confirmed by a Ger-
man astronomer on September 23, 1846. The (fruitful) novel prediction of Neptune was born within the
context of a  durable Newtonian orbital  mechanics research tradition and the unexpected discovery of
Uranus with its anomalous motions. The sensational success of this novel prediction (the discovery of
Neptune)  also rendered Uranus a  Newtonian-compliant  planet—thus further vindicating  earlier  provi-
sional toleration of Uranus’ anomalies, a toleration that had been justified by yet earlier Newtonian dura-
bility and fruitfulness. 
Smith’s (2010; 2014) landmark study of gravity theory from Newton to the present further illumi-
nates the durability and fruitfulness of this research tradition, and it includes the case histories of Uranus
and Neptune. Smith was surprised that the principal kind of question being tested was not “Do the calcu-
lated motions [e.g., of Uranus] agree with the observed motions?”  Rather it was:  “Can robust physical
sources compatible with Newtonian theory be found for each clear, systematic discrepancy between the
calculated and the observed motions?” Neptune (as novelly predicted) turned out to be such a robust phys-
ical source. However scientists failed over a half century to find a robust (detectable) physical source for
the Newtonian-defying behavior of Mercury—a tiny anomaly in the precession of its perihelion. But this
failure, which Einstein solved by way of theory replacement, does not completely diminish the enduring
epistemic significance of two centuries of Newtonian durability and fruitfulness, as Hanson (1962) inac-
curately suggested. Smith notes: “All the other discrepancies ended up revealing some detail of our plane-
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tary system, the least subtle of which was Neptune, that theretofore had not been taken into account in the
calculations” (2010, 552).
Such  serial  Newtonian  problem  solving  became  (almost  always)  ever  more  empirically  con-
strained in a spiral of upward progress. For example, Uranus’ temporarily Newtonian-defying behavior
“would have been masked if the significantly larger gravitational effects of Saturn on Uranus had not been
included in the calculation first.” Smith explains further:
So, the discovery of Neptune provided evidence not only for Newton’s theory, but also for the
specific aspects of Saturn that entered into calculating its effects on Uranus, for these were no
less presupposed in the anomaly that emerged than Newton’s theory was. The point general-
izes. Each time a discrepancy emerges and a robust physical source for it is found, that source
is  incorporated  into the new calculations,  and the process  is  repeated,  typically  with still
smaller discrepancies emerging that were often theretofore masked in the calculations.  So,
what was being tested each time when a new discrepancy emerged and a physical source for it
was being sought was not only Newtonian theory, but also all the previously identified details
that make a difference and the differences they were said to make without which the further
systematic discrepancy would not have emerged. (2010, 552-53)
On display is an interlocking of durability (passing tests to survive) and fruitfulness (stimulating further
discovery) that is supportive of scientific realism. “This shows that increasingly strong evidence was ac-
cruing to Newtonian theory over the first two hundred years of orbital research based on it,” Smith con-
cludes. This point (with some qualification) extends even to Einstein’s theoretical innovation that was
partly justified by the unruly perihelion of Mercury. Einstein’s achievement was, to some degree, a con-
tinuation of this same progressive spiral, as Smith deftly explains: 
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As is well known, Einstein required Newtonian gravitation to hold in an asymptotic limit as
he developed his new theory of gravity—specifically in a static, weak-field limit. That he did
so was just as well because the 43 arc-seconds per century anomaly in the perihelion of Mer-
cury that was initially the sole evidence for his theory presupposes Newtonian gravity…. As a
matter of historical fact, all of the details singled out as making detectable differences during
the two centuries of prior research carried over intact into post-Einstein orbital mechanics.
Save for some qualifications concerning levels of precision, the same details are still making
the same differences as before…. So, Newtonian theory must still have some sort of claim to
being knowledge. (2010, 556-57)
Smith’s continuity-of-knowledge claim invites comment. While much of the metaphysics associated with
Newtonian theory has been repudiated, we nevertheless see an impressive degree of fruitful scientific con-
tinuity from Newtonian to modern physics (at least in the particular ways that Smith documents). In sum,
Newtonian orbital mechanics enjoyed increasingly impressive interlocking durability and fruitfulness over
multiple centuries, and its approximate legitimacy (not counting discarded Newtonian metaphysics) re-
mains similarly well-grounded today under the revisionary umbrella of modern physics.
Though some philosophers have argued to the contrary (Collins 1994; Harker 2008), many scien-
tists and philosophers think that predictive success—especially novel predictive success—is a stronger in-
dicator of likely approximate truth than a theory’s accommodation of data (Douglas and Magnus 2013).
According to my systematization (which illuminates but does not settle this thorny issue), data accommo-
dation refers to a theory’s initial instantiation of the evidential virtues (evidential accuracy, causal ade-
quacy,  and  explanatory  depth),  and  a  theory’s  subsequent  instantiation  of  certain  diachronic  virtues,
namely non-predictive durability (plausibly making sense of new unanticipated data) and non-predictive
fruitfulness (especially non ad hoc theoretical elaboration that makes sense of new unanticipated data).
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   3.2.1 Unification as a Mode of Fruitfulness. Fruitful theory elaboration, whether by means of successful
novel prediction or non ad hoc theoretical elaboration that makes sense of unanticipated evidence, often
also makes sense of new kinds of data, and thus is additionally recognized as increasing a theory’s unifica-
tion. Earlier we encountered unification as a non-diachronic (aesthetic) theoretical virtue. The diachronic
increase of unification differs somewhat from its non-diachronic cousin. The historian and philosopher of
science William Whewell (1794–1866) called diachronic unification “consilience.” When a theory ex-
plains a new domain of facts in a surprising way, then it is fruitful in a consilient manner. McMullin
writes in this regard:
A good theory will often display remarkable powers of unification, making different classes of
phenomena “leap together” over the course of time. Domains previously thought to be dis-
parate  now become one, the textbook example,  of course,  being Maxwell’s unification of
magnetism, electricity, and light. Examples abound in recent science, a particularly striking
one being the development of the plate-tectonic model in geology. Assuming that this unifying
power manifests itself over time, it testifies to the epistemic resources of the original theory
and hence to that theory’s having been more than mere accommodation. (2014, 505)
McMullin contrasts diachronic unification with its non-diachronic counterpart:  “If the unification was
achieved by the original theory, however, the virtue involved would no longer be diachronic.” Instead, it
would count (in my systematization) as an aesthetic theoretical virtue that I simply call “unification,” and
that Lipton calls  “variety”  (and yet others call  “broad scope”). Lipton favors the assumption that such
“heterogeneous evidence provides more support than the same amount of very similar evidence” (Lipton
2004, 168). Despite my own inclination to accept Lipton’s point, I recognize this as a somewhat debatable
assumption about the epistemic significance of an aesthetic property. However, when unification increases
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over time, especially by means of surprising convergences, then unification is less likely the result of the
idiosyncratic aesthetic predispositions and clever accommodating skills of a theorist during theory forma-
tion. Thus fruitful diachronic unification has greater confirmatory power than a theory’s initial degree of
aesthetic unification.
   3.2.2 The Role of Prediction in the Diachronic Virtues. Drawing from Douglas’ work on the relationship
of prediction to inferring the best explanation, I argue that predictive success (in the first two diachronic
virtues explored above) extends the epistemic work of many non-diachronic theoretical virtues such as
causal adequacy, explanatory depth, beauty, simplicity, and unification. These latter theory traits, which
she collectively labels as “explanatory,”
appeal to us, not just because we are aesthetically driven creatures but because such virtues
help us to use the explanation to think and, in particular, to think our way through to new pre-
dictions, new tests, new rigors for our beautiful explanation. (2009, 460)
Douglas also notes:  
Predictions are valuable because they force us (when followed through) to test our theories,
because they have the potential to expand our knowledge into new realms and because they
hold out the possibility (if successful) of gaining some measure of control over natural pro-
cesses. (2009, 455)
Transposing Douglas’ insights into my taxonomic terms, predictions are valuable because they figure into
all three of the major diachronic virtues: durability (testing theories successfully), fruitfulness (expanding
“our knowledge into new realms”), and applicability (which includes “gaining some measure of control
over natural processes”). Moreover, the operation of prediction (“saying before” at least in a logical if not
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temporal sense) in these three theoretical virtues further supports my classification of them as diachronic.
Lets us now explore the last major diachronic virtue of applicability.
  3.3. Applicability.  Applicability refers to when a theory is used to guide successful action (e.g., prepare
for a natural disaster) or to enhance technological control (e.g., genetic engineering). High degrees of the
virtue of applicability obtain when a theory that is used to guide such action or control provides more ef-
fective outcomes than what is possible in the absence of the theory. Successful scientific theories consti-
tute knowledge of the world (knowing that), not control over the world (which is mainly knowing how)
for practical (non-theoretical) purposes. In this regard Strevens (2008, 3) notes: “If science provides any-
thing of intrinsic value, it is explanation. Prediction and control are useful … but when science is pursued
as an end rather than as a means, it is for the sake of understanding.” But even after the intrinsic good of a
theoretically virtuous explanation is in hand, one of several possible additional confirmatory diachronic
(predictive or controlling) virtues might be acquired by a theory, including applicability. In such cases a
good theory just gets better—even more confidence in its probable truth is justified.
Although scientific experiments use technological control, they do so to test scientific theories—
so the main function is still to understand nature, not to control it. However, especially in the case of theo-
ries supported by experimentally verified prediction, such foreknowledge and laboratory control might be
exploited to achieve practical aims such as device fabrication or medical intervention. But in any case,
one cannot apply scientific knowledge until after one first obtains it. This necessary time lapse makes ap-
plicability diachronic.
To obtain scientific knowledge we search for a theory that (initially) exhibits many of the non-di-
achronic theoretical virtues. Subsequent work aimed at theory testing and elaboration might produce the
additionally confirming presence of the diachronic virtues of durability and fruitfulness. At some point in
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this dance of virtue-driven theory assessment and refinement, sufficient confidence in a particular theory
might spur attempts to apply it as the basis for a new or improved technology. If the derived science-based
technology actually works, then the “applied theory” has acquired the additional theoretical virtue of ap-
plicability. Because this requires additional time after initial theory formation, the diachronic classifica-
tion of applicability is appropriate.
Although the application of scientific theories constitutes one aspect of technology, most of tech-
nology involves the empirical discovery of “know how” knowledge without crucially presupposing or im-
mediately applying any particular scientific theory. Indeed, the relation between science and technology is
not a simple one-way linear affair (Radder 2009; Douglas 2014). But this “emancipation” of technology
from subordination to science, accomplished by historians and philosophers of technology between 1960
and 1990 (Houkes 2009, 310), should not obscure the epistemic significance of instances of technological
innovation made possible, in part, by applied scientific theory.
This point is in harmony with the so-called demise of the “pure vs. applied science” dichotomy.
Understanding and controlling nature are closely related, as our study of the diachronic theoretical virtues,
including applicability, indicates. Douglas (2014, 62) surfaces some of the subtlety of this argument when,
on the one hand, she proclaims: “With the pure vs. applied distinction removed, scientific progress can be
defined in terms of the increased capacity to predict, control, manipulate, and intervene in various con-
texts.” But then, on the other hand, in a footnote she recoils partially: “To be clear, while I think this is a
useful rubric for scientific progress, it is not a remotely sufficient account for how one should assess sci-
entific theories.”  Other (non-diachronic) theoretical virtues that are complementary to, but less weighty
epistemically than, prediction and control also play important roles in theory assessment, she suggests.
Consideration of the nine major non-diachronic theoretical virtues systematized in Sections 1 and 2 drives
this point home.
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How exactly is applicability a diachronic theory trait that is epistemic (helping to indicate likely
truth) in view of the obvious  pragmatic orientation of  technological application?  Agazzi observes that
some technological projects “are designed or projected in advance, as the concrete application of knowl-
edge provided by a given science or set of sciences” (Agazzi 2014, 308). If a project of this kind actually
works as predicted, then this reinforces our confidence in the theory base that helped guide such action in
the world. Agazzi further notes:
The predictions  ‘contained’ in the project actually are the predictions made by the scientific
theories which have permitted the proposal of the complex noema that constitutes the project,
and contains not only prescriptions as to the way of realising the structure of the machine but
also as to its functioning. This functioning is something that happens; it is a state of affairs
that constitutes a confirmation of the theories used in projecting the machine. (309)
Although Agazzi’s scientific realism overstates the epistemic reach of applicability, it is helpful nonethe-
less as a corrective to other philosophical errors:
A mature science is a science that has given rise to a significant technology. This means, for
example,  that  we can  provisionally  admit  certain  theories  that  are  ‘empirically  adequate,’
without admitting their truth as van Fraassen says, until we have significant predictions con-
firming them. This fact (especially in conjunction with other ‘virtues’ discussed in the litera-
ture) already justifies attributing truth and ontological reference to them, but the existence of
technological applications is the last decisive step that assures that they have been able to ade-
quately treat those aspects of reality they intended to treat. These last words are very impor-
tant. They underline the fact that technological success does not eliminate the partial or lim-
ited scope of scientific theories. The fact that we can use classical mechanics in creating many
machines or for sending rockets into space certainly means that this mechanics is true of its
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objects and therefore ‘tells a true story’ about certain aspects of reality. This can also be ex-
pressed by saying that this theory is partially true of reality, but only if we mean that it does
not speak about the totality of the attributes of reality, and that, consequently, it can speak
properly only of such referents that possess these attributes. In other words, it is not correct to
say that this mechanics is true regarding the whole of reality because other aspects of reality
exist that must be accounted for by means of other theories which, in turn, can be used as a
basis for different technologies. (310-11)
To nuance Agazzi’s insightful but somewhat inflated epistemic role for applicability, we can observe that
this theoretical virtue is not commonly operative in certain scientific domains. For example, scientific the-
ories of “how things originated” (history of nature) lead to fewer technological applications than scientific
theories of “how things work.” Part of the reason for the infrequent applicability of origins theories is the
smaller role that experimentally controlled prediction plays in such theorization. For example, much of
the data that allows us to reconstruct the history of earth’s surface is collected by means of passive field
observations, rather than by laboratory experiments that make precise predictions and technological con-
trol more feasible.
4. Conclusion. The diachronic theoretical virtues possess a temporal dimension that is absent from the
other theoretical virtues. They can only be instantiated  after a theory’s initial formulation—when it has
had opportunity to be tested, elaborated, and applied. Durability, fruitfulness, and applicability build upon
the initial theory assessment process governed by the non-diachronic virtues (the evidential, coherential,
and aesthetic theoretical virtues). The cumulative result, when successful, is a mature theory with an even
greater probability of being true than an infant theory that has not yet had the opportunity to show whether
it will possess the diachronic theoretical virtues (anti-realists are invited to interject their own alternative
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to this realist understanding of the theoretical virtues). So, the distinction between diachronic and non-di-
achronic virtues is important for an adequate account of theory evaluation.
 The three major diachronic theoretical virtues are also better understood when they are recognized
as related to each other in the following progressive sequence. Durability is instantiated as a theory passes
more rigorous tests in a series of encounters with the world, especially by successful prediction and plau-
sible  accommodation  of  new  evidence.  Fruitfulness  discloses  a  theory’s  resourcefulness  yet  further
through innovation—stimulating additional discovery by successful novel prediction, unification, non ad
hoc theoretical elaboration, and other means. At last, applicability expands the epistemic accountability of
a theory into the final frontier: the vast domain of practical action. This virtue is instantiated when a the-
ory helps us to interact with the world successfully, most notably by technological control. Together, these
diachronic theoretical virtues provide an ongoing and epistemically intensified means of theory develop-
ment that complements the non-diachronic virtue assessment process that begins in a theory’s original
construction.
Applicability, as a theoretical virtue, has not received the attention it deserves. Surprisingly, it is
absent  from every theoretical  virtue  list I  have encountered.  My work sketches  a  way to understand
applicability in relation to the other  diachronic virtues, and the larger group of non-diachronic virtues.
This endeavor promises to illuminate, among other things, discussion of realism vs. anti-realism, science-
technology relations, and inference to the best explanation.
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Abstract
The debate between Fraser and Wallace (2011) over the foundations of
quantum field theory (QFT) has spawned increased focus on both the axiomatic
and conventional formalisms. The debate has set the tone for future foundational
analysis, and has forced philosophers to “pick a side”. The two are seen as
competing research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in
how each handles renormalization. In this paper I argue that the terms set by the
Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading. AQFT and CQFT should be viewed as
complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis. Further, the
focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly misleading.
Though their methods differ, both axiomatic and conventional QFT seek to use the
same physical principles to explain the same domain of phenomena.
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1 Introduction
Foundational invesitgation into quantum field theory (QFT) has emerged as a flourishing
enterprise in philosophy of science, thanks largely to work done in axiomatic QFT
(AQFT), particularly the C∗-algebraic approach enocoded by the Haag-Kastler axioms
(Haag and Kastler 1964). Despite the methodological disconnect with ‘conventional’
approaches to QFT (CQFT), AQFT has been defended by Fraser (2009) as supplying a
firmer foundation from which to conduct philosophical analyses. Though this is one of
few explicit defenses of AQFT, the widespread use of algebraic methods in philosophical
literature on QFT would lead one to believe that Fraser is merely making explicit the
assumptions in her field. Recently, Wallace (2006; 2011) has questioned the focus on
AQFT, arguing that CQFT is the better candidate for analysis. Since CQFT is the
theory that has been emprically successful—the Standard Model of particle physics is
built from CQFTs—and AQFT has yet to reproduce these results, Wallace argues that
we should focus analysis on CQFT rather than AQFT. Fraser’s (2011) reply has set up
what is now known as the Fraser-Wallace debate over the foundations of QFT. The
debate has set the tone for future foundational analysis, and seems to force philosophers
to “pick a side”—you either work in AQFT or CQFT. The two are seen as competing
research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in how each handles
renormalization. AQFT requires strict Poincare´ covariance at arbitrarily small length
scales, while the renormalization group (RG) methods in CQFT allow for a small-scale
cutoff, below which QFTs needn’t be well-defined.
In this paper I argue that the terms set by the Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading.
One needn’t view AQFT and CQFT as rival research programs; in fact, this view is
2
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detrimental to understanding the history and methodology of QFT. AQFT and CQFT
should be viewed as complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis.
Further, the focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly
misleading: AQFT can accommodate cutoffs and RG methods, and CQFT does not
explicitly require cutoffs. The focus on cutoffs as essential to CQFT could mistakenly be
taken to mean that CQFT depends on cutoffs actually being physical, in the same way
that cutoffs are physical in condensed matter physics (CMP). I will argue that this is not
the case: cutoffs needn’t be physical in any sense. Even if cutoffs are physically
significant, that does not entail that the cutoffs are themselves physical. Specifically, RG
methods provide no principled grounds for thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of
signifying a breakdown of field theories generally. Since Wallace (2011) set the terms of
the debate, the bulk of the arguments in this paper will be in reference to that paper. I
do not claim that Wallace holds all (or even most) of the views against which I argue;
rather, I use his paper to clarify potential misconceptions that could arise from the
debate. Renormalization is not central to the physical content of QFT, and the different
ways of handling renormalization do not mark AQFT and CQFT as different research
programs. We should instead view the formalisms as complementary: though their
methods differ, both seek to use the same physical principles to explain the same domain
of phenomena.
3
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2 Renormalization and the relationship between AQFT and
CQFT
Wallace (2011) emphasizes the ineliminable dependence on cutoffs in CQFT, along with
the success of RG methods for providing a physical motivation for cutoffs, as the wedge
which drives AQFT and CQFT apart. For Wallace, AQFT cannot deal with physical
cutoffs. Since RG methods have physically legitimized cutoffs, AQFT and CQFT have
differing physical content and must therefore be considered a different research program
(2011, Sec. 2). I disagree with this characterization on two fronts. First, AQFT has the
resources to incorporate RG methods when needed. Though typical axioms make no
metion of scaling behaviour, even the most rigid of axiomatic approaches—algebraic
QFT as codified in the Haag-Kastler axioms—can incorporate something like RG flows.1
Second, the calculational dependence on cutoffs in CQFT may not signal the physical
existence of cutoffs.
So, are cutoffs really that problematic for AQFT? Many axiomatic approaches to QFT
make no recourse to cutoffs, either explicitly or implicitly. An explicit forbidding of
cutoffs would mean that one of the axioms/postulates of the theory claimed that the
theory is empirically adequate at all spacetime length scales. Even if any axiomatization
contained such an axiom (none do), it would be hard to imagine what sort of work it
would do in derivations. Presumably, such a system could be modified to remove the
guilty axiom, without spoiling any physically useful theorems. One should therefore not
be concerned with an explicit ban on cutoffs in AQFT.
The more interesting case is when cutoffs are implicitly rejected by a particular theory.
1See Buchholz and Verch (1995) for an example of scaling algebras playing the role of RG flows.
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There are two common assumptions in AQFT that are problematic for handling cutoffs:
strongly continuous implementations of Lorentz invariance, and the association of
algebras with arbitrarily small open bounded regions of spacetime. Though the latter is
not common to all axiomatic QFTs (the Wightman axioms deal directly with quantum
fields, rather than algebras), the dominant axiomatization in terms of C∗ algebras—the
Haag-Kastler axioms—define QFTs in terms of algebras of observables corresponding to
open, bounded regions of spacetime.2 It is implicit that for any open bounded spacetime
region, no matter how small, one can define an algebra of observables satisfying the other
axioms defining QFT. If cutoffs are physical, one might conclude that there should be a
principled limit to the size of regions on which we can define algebras corresponding to
observables in QFT. If the cutoff scale is physically relevant, and only CQFT predicts its
existence, we might be tempted to conclude that the two are different, competing
theories. However, there are several possibilities for reconciling AQFT and cutoffs, which
I will outline below. These remedies are largely independent of one another, and
organized in terms of increasing foundational disagreement with Wallace’s view of
cutoffs. The “quick fixes” proposed first lead to further conceptual worries, and I
therefore endorse the option in Sec. 2.3, which is the biggest departure from taking
cutoffs as physical in CQFT. Nevertheless, all the options sketched below are
more-or-less viable. Section 2.4 outlines reasons for thinking that both AQFT and CQFT
suffer the same conceptual challenges if cutoffs really are physical.
2Since algebraic QFT is prima facie the most problematic, I will deal primarily with algebraic QFT in
this paper. The reader can take AQFT to stand for axiomatic QFT or algebraic QFT for the remainder
of this paper. The reader should also note that constructive QFT is another important strand of rigorous
QFT. Though it is conceptually distinct from AQFT, the two projects often overlap.
5
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2.1 Possibilities for cutoffs in AQFT
Just because we need to associate an algebra with any arbitrary open bounded region of
spacetime, we are not therefore compelled to make this algebra interesting. One way
that cutoffs could be introduced into AQFT is to specify that regions smaller than some
4-volume Λ are to be uniformly assigned trivial algebras, i.e., algebras containing only
multiples of the identity. Such assignments would be consistent with the demand that all
open bounded regions of spacetime be assigned an algebra, but it would make the cutoff
physically relevant, since no information about local parameters would be contained in
regions smaller than Λ.
Though this solution is available, it is admittedly somewhat ad hoc. Even worse, it
violates one of the crucial Haag-Kastler axioms: that of weak additivity. The axiom of
weak additivity states that, for every closed, bounded region O of Minkowski spacetime
M, the C∗ norm closure of the algebras A(O + α) for α ∈ R4 is just the quasilocal
algebra for the whole spacetime, A(M).3 There are two reasons why this is a problem
for introducing cutoffs in the way described above. First, we run into the problem that
the quasilocal algebra corresponding to the whole of M can be constructed from any
algebra corresponding to any closed, bounded region O. The norm closure of extensions
of a trivial algebra will not produce any interesting algebra as a result, so regions smaller
than the cutoff Λ will violate weak additivity. Second, extensions of an arbitrary region
O by some α < Λ should not be physical if Minkowski spacetime breaks down at scales
below Λ. In the spirit of the first ad hoc axiom modification, weak additivity could be
modified to exclude regions Osmall < Λ, and arbitrary extensions αsmall < Λ. However,
3See Ruetsche (2011), especially chapters 4 and 5 for an introduction to algebraic QFT. For a more
comprehensive review of algebraic QFT, see Halvorson and Mu¨ger (2007).
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there seems to be no principled reason for choosing a specific value of Λ, and one may
question the naturalness of such axioms. This makes the solution of simple axiom
modification less tempting, and forces us to admit that AQFT—at least in its current
guise—is in conflict with approaches to QFT that take cutoffs as physically meaningful,
since the basic axioms are currently in direct conflict with the introduction of cutoffs. If
we admit that there is currently no room in the formalism of AQFT for cutoffs, are we
doomed to take AQFT as (incorrectly) positing its own validity at all energy scales?
2.2 No cutoffs? No problem
If QFT methods are only applicable up to some cutoff energy, and we expect QFT to
incorporate this fact, we are saying that a good theory should signal its own demise. The
formal necessity of cutoffs in the formalism of CQFT has lead to the idea that our best
theories will continue to be an increasing hierarchy of effective field theories. Each field
theory requires cutoffs to be implemented at a certain energy scale, and this signals the
field theory’s domain of applicability. If supplanted by a successor field theory, one
expects that the new theory’s low energy regime reduces to the old theory, and further
that the new theory will itself have a higher energy cutoff. Following this approach, the
conventional formalism of field theories would allow us to climb higher and higher up the
ladder of energy scales, but we would never reach the top. We would require a theory of
a fundamentally different formal type in order to end the ladder of cutoffs. This is
presumably the view that Wallace holds, as he claims that if we replace one field theory
with another applicable at higher energies, “that field theory in turn will need some kind
of short-distance cutoff” (2011, p. 118).
As great as it may be to have a framework in which theories limit their own domain of
7
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applicability, this is certainly not a necessary condition that any good formalism need
satisfy. Even if AQFT does not contain cutoffs explicitly, this does not make it at odds
with CQFT. Many theories that have been useful in the past do not signal their ultimate
demise; on the contrary, most are mathematically well-defined well beyond their domain
of applicability. For example, classical theories of fluid dynamics treat fluids as classical
continua, and these continua are uniform to arbitrary precision. Classical continuum
fluid dynamics is a useful theory, and compatible with classical point mechanics, even
though classical point mechanics leads one to believe that the continuum is only an
approximation—at some point fluid dynamics must break down. There is nothing within
the formalism of fluid mechanics that signals its eventual breakdown; rather, the physical
systems we model using classical fluid dynamics, as well as the complementary formalism
of classical point particles, give us a physical motivation for the eventual breakdown of
the formalism. Deeper theories, such as quantum mechanics, also provide grounds for
believing in the limited applicability of both of the complementary classical formalisms.
Similarly, we can view AQFT as a complementary picture to the formalism of CQFT.
Both formalisms rely on the same general physical principles, though they are
implemented in different ways. Though the AQFT formalism does not demarcate its
domain of applicability in the form of explicit cutoffs, the necessity of some form of
cutoff in CQFT provides reason to believe that the AQFT formalism is only
approximately mapping the actual physics. Further, whatever extratheoretical grounds
we have for taking cutoffs to be physical—typically in the guise of speculative physics
beyond the Standard Model—can inform the scale at which we lose faith in the
predictions of both the AQFT and CQFT formalisms. When one does not view AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs, the two can work together to provide a deeper
8
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physical understanding of high energy physics, and the role of cutoffs is made clearer.
2.3 Physical significance versus being physical
Are cutoffs really that central? The arguments in the previous section assume that the
cutoffs required to generate predictions in CQFT are physical, in the sense that they
signal a breakdown of QFT. The fact that perturbative calculations within a particular
model diverge when the integrals are unbounded does not entail that field theoretic
methodology loses physical significance near these bounds. Undoubtedly we have
extratheoretical reasons for supposing that the QFTs making up the Standard Model are
not accurate to arbitrary energies—at some point gravity will surely play an important
role, to say nothing for possible unknown physics at higher energy scales—but this
needn’t signify a breakdown of QFTs in general beyond a cutoff. Nor is this notion built
in to the conceptual apparatus of RG methods, as Wallace claims.4 It remains entirely
possible that a QFT built with more terms in its Lagrangian could describe all relevant
physics and be well-defined at all energy scales. In fact, the renormalization group
procedure presupposes a theory given in terms of a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian with an
arbitrary number of terms. These terms are shown to go to zero in the low energy limit
(Wilson and Kogut 1974). We know—using the RG methods to determine the flow of
coupling constants—that for non-Abelian gauge theories, interactions become weaker at
higher energy scales. Total asymptotic freedom would be one way to eliminate cutoffs at
4“Wilsons explanation of the renormalisation procedure relies upon the failure of the QFT to which it
is applied at very short distances. It is then intriguing to ask how to put on a firm conceptual footing
a theory which relies for its mathematical consistency on its own eventual failure”. (Wallace 2006, 34,
emphasis added) Again, this passage can be read in a way that agrees with the arguments of this section.
I am attempting to argue against a naive reading, which takes the failure of one QFT (i.e., a single form
of interaction, encoded in a particular Lagrangian) to signal the failure of QFT methods in general.
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high energies. A successor QFT, such as a grand unified theory or supersymmetry, could
therefore unite the strong and electroweak coupling constants, while remaining
well-defined to arbitrarily high energies.5 All that RG methods rely on conceptually is
the ability to average out behaviour at high energy scales, and this is compatible with
many options for high-energy behaviour. First, our theories could be low-energy
approximations that break down at higher energy scales. This could be due to a
fundamental granularity or discreteness in the more fundamental theory, or due to the
absence of terms in the Lagrangian modelling high energy dynamics. Second, we could
have a well-defined high energy dynamics that is unimportant at the energy scales with
which we are concerned. In any case, RG methods provide no principled grounds for
thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of signifying a breakdown of field theories
generally. Unlike the breakdown of classical fluid mechanics—for which we have a more
fundamental successor theory (quantum mechanics) providing grounds to reject the
continuum as merely an approximation—there is as of yet no (empirically successful)
fundamental successor theory for which QFT can be considered a continuum
approximation.
One of the major reasons for thinking that cutoffs in QFT mark a regime beyond which
the methods of QFT can no longer be applied is the success of RG methods originating
from CMP (Wallace 2011, Sec. 1). RG methods were initially developed to investigate
long range correlations in materials approaching a phase transition. Long range
interactions are those most relevant to global transitions of a material, and so RG
5Whether a theory can be made well defined for arbitrarily high energies is a distinct issue from the
accuracy of that theory’s predictions at high energies. It may turn out that Standard Model QFTs can
be extended in a consistent way, but that the high energy predictions turn out to be false. This is the
case that is argued in Section 2.2 regarding AQFT.
10
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methods average out the unimportant short range behaviour near a critical point. The
apparatus of non-relativistic QFT (i.e., functional integrals using Galilean invariant
Lagrangians) is used in CMP as an approximation to the discrete atomic (or ionic)
physical makeup of bulk systems. Given the the CMP field theories are explicitly
constructed as approximations to a known underlying lattice model, we know that the
field theoretic methods must break down within CMP. RG flow equations are derived by
separating field variables ϕ into low- and high-momentum components ϕ = ϕlow + ϕhigh
(where the cutoff from low to high is chosen arbitrarily) and averaging over the high
momentum modes. The resulting Lagrangian L′(ϕlow) is then manipulated to fall into
the same form as the original Lagrangian L(ϕ). This process is repeated and generates
discrete recursive relations between the rescaled coupling parameters in the (n+ 1)th
Lagrangian in terms of the nth one. In the limit where the rescalings are continuous,
these become differential equations determining the flow of coupling constants under RG.
As the flows are taken to zero frequency—equivalent to the infinite spatial limit—only
those parameters relevant to phase transitions will remain in the renormalized
Lagrangian. One of the most qualitatively interesting features of successively averaging
out short distance (and therefore high energy) degrees of freedom is that, no matter how
complicated the initial field dynamics are (encoded as a Lagrangian), only the
renormalizable terms will contribute to the low energy dynamics of the theory. This
implies that a very broad class of higher energy Lagrangians can “reduce” to the relevant
dynamics at lower energy scales.
The success of RG methods in CMP lead to their quick application in QFTs (Wilson
1983)6, since the relevant formalism is shared between the two disciplines. If we choose
6Wilson even forms the QFT/statistical mechanics analogy explicitly, though the source analog in that
11
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to endow the RG methods with similar physical significance in QFT, then we can
interpret the high energy cutoffs required as marking the domain at which we expect
new physics to occur. The problem is that, because RG flows tell us that our low-energy
(effective) QFTs are largely insensitive to the dynamical details at higher energies, they
provide little insight our guidance into the high energy physics. Though the path to the
successor theory isnt apparent given our current QFTs, the up side is that our best
QFTs are protected from the details of our ignorance of high energy dynamics.
Where Wallace might be read to err is in the jump from believing that cutoffs have
physical relevance in QFTs to believing that cutoffs are physical :
“This, in essence, is how modern particle physics deals with the
renormalization problem: it is taken to presage an ultimate failure of
quantum field theory at some short lengthscale, and once the bare existence
of that failure is appreciated, the whole of renormalization theory becomes
unproblematic, and indeed predictively powerful in its own right” (Wallace
2011, p. 119).7
The difference is subtle. Cutoffs can be physically relevant in that they signal the
breakdown of the particular theory or model beyond a certain energy scale, but whether
cutoffs themselves are physical depends on the precise nature of the breakdown. If the
case is a classical Ising model (Wilson and Kogut 1974). Fraser (2016) has provided an in-depth analysis
of the elements of the analogies between QFT and the Ising model, as well as the process of describing
RG flow.
7Or at least this is a jump he is sometimes guilty of. In other places he is more careful to elaborate
on this view, and it appears that he at least appreciates the fact that field theoretic methods may not
break down at all (Wallace 2006, pp. 43-4). As mentioned in the introduction, this paper is not a critique
of Wallace’s view explicitly, but of the misleading way of framing AQFT and CQFT as rivals based on
their differing treatments of the arbitrarily small; for this reason I aim to clarify the mistakes in a “naive”
reading of Wallace.
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breakdown can be remedied by adding new terms in the Lagrangian—effectively
changing the particular theory, but retaining the field theoretic framework—then the
cutoffs signal new physics, but are not themselves physical. If the breakdown is due to
the inapplicability of field theoretic methodology beyond that scale, then the cutoffs are
themselves physical.8 Even if one takes the cutoffs to have physical significance, cutoffs
needn’t be physical in this stronger sense.
One possible reason for thinking that cutoffs are physical is based off of reading too
much into the analogy with CMP. We know that field theoretic methods are
approximations in bulk matter systems—the atomic theory implies that macroscopic
matter is composed of discrete components. The analogy between QFT and CMP is
based on the use of the same field theoretic formalism in both disciplines, not on a
well-grounded physical similarity.9 Cutoffs are physical in CMP field theory because field
theoretic methods have been introduced as an approximation. Given that discrete
quantum mechanics of 1023 particles is intractable, we sacrifice (a surprisingly small
amount of) precision in order to apply the more soluble methods developed in QFT. But
the fact that cutoffs signal the breakdown of field approximations in CMP does not
imply that the same is true in QFT. The reasons we treat cutoffs as physical in CMP are
absent in QFT; there is no empirically successful theory that claims QFT breaks down
due to an underlying discreteness of physics near cutoff scales. Speculative physics may
posit some underlying structure for which quantum fields are merely an approximation,
8Presumably, the failure of field theoretic methodology in general would require some physical granu-
larity at high energies. This is what I mean by the cutoff being physical and is in direct analogy with the
case of non-relativistic QFT in CMP.
9Fraser (2016) and Fraser and Koberinski (2016) provide two concrete examples of fruitful formal
analogies between QFT and CMP. In the former case, it is the RG flow that is formally analogous,
while the latter deals with the formal similarities between spontaneous symmetry breaking within the two
theories.
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but until any of these theories make successful empirical predictions their significance for
interpreting QFTs must be limited.
2.4 Why physical cutoffs are also a problem for CQFT
Even though, as I have argued, there is currently no physically motivated reason for
supposing cutoffs to be physical, it may be the case that we find such a reason in the
future. Perhaps we will need radically different methods from those of field theory to
describe physics beyond the Standard Model. There is no shortage of candidates that
claim to radically alter our picture of the world—from 11-dimensional string theory to
discrete spacetime to the emergent spacetime of loop quantum gravity. Though
experimental support for any of these speculative theories would mean that the axioms
of any AQFT must be at best only approximations, this does not mean that CQFT
would escape unscathed. Any observed violation of Lorentz invariance would signal bad
news for both AQFT and CQFT, and the extent to which we choose to reject or salvage
the former, we should do the same for the latter.
Though its importance is not encoded in a set of axioms, Poincare´ invariance is of
central importance to the physical content of CQFT. In constructing QFTs, one starts
by writing down a classical Lagrangian to encode the physical content of the theory. The
two major constraints on the form of candidate Lagrangians are renormalizability (dealt
with above) and Poincare´ invariance. Since the Lagrangian is a scalar, it must remain
strictly invariant under the action of the Poincare´ group on its component fields. All of
the fundamental forces—as described by the Standard Model—are encoded in
Lagrangians obeying strict Poincare´ invariance. If anything qualifies as physically
relevant to CQFT, the Lagrangian certainly does; it is the starting point for building a
14
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QFT, and determines the types of fields, their masses, and the particulars of their
interactions. A violation of Poincare´ invariance at a more fundamental level—be it in a
particular physical process or in the structure of some new spacetime picture—undercuts
to the same extent the physical significance of any and all theories that depend on
Poincare´ invariance for their formulation. Thus, despite the lack of rigid and precise
axioms demanding Poincare´ invariance, the physical content of CQFT stands or falls
with AQFT.10
Once again, the major difference between AQFT and CQFT lies in the formalism.
Though the physical content of CQFT is built upon Poincare´ invariance11, the formalism
is indifferent to the constraints placed upon the Lagrangian. The success of field
theoretic methods in CMP is evidence of the flexibility of the formalism; in CMP the
Galilean group is taken as the appropriate symmetry group, given the low energies dealt
with. In contrast, the formalisms of various AQFTs are constructed around the axioms.
Any theorems that rely on exact Poincare´ invariance will only hold in the real world if
nature is Poincare´ invariant.12 The greater precision of the formalism in AQFT makes it
more rigid in this regard.
If violations of Poincare´ invariance are problematic for all variants of QFT, should
investigators into the foundations of QFT fret if such violations are experimentally
10CQFT methods could still be useful, but the theoretical framework of CQFT—as encoded in the
Standard Model—depends on Poincare´ invariance.
11Depending on how one views Poincare´ invariance, this may seem odd. The specific transformation
properties of scalars, vectors, and tensors under the Poincare´ group are undoubtedly formal properties
of the particular field representations. However, the physical symmetries represented in this way have a
physical basis (e.g., rotation invariance implies that the physical system can be modelled the same way
when rotated).
12Though it isn’t always possible, proofs of the form “If Minkowski spacetime then x” are strengthened
and made more robust by also showing “If approximately Minkowski spacetime then approximately x.
Given that our best current theories lead us to believe that spacetime is only locally Minkowski, these are
the results for which we can have a high degree of confidence in their robustness.
15
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confirmed? No; the experimental success of QFT implies that the world is at least
approximately Poincare´ invariant, and any evidence revealing the limits of that
approximation has no bearing on the theory itself. We have good reason to believe that
the QFTs in the Standard Model are not the final story: General Relativity implies that
strong gravitational effects distort spacetime, and that our spacetime is only ever
Minkowski in small patches where gravity is negligible. Though this approximation
seems to hold for experiments at the LHC, if we want a theory that gets spacetime
symmetries exactly correct, QFTs relying on Poincare´ invariance will not do the trick.
Rather than abandoning foundations of QFT for being approximate at best,
investigation should proceed given that QFTs are highly successful within the energy
domain currently testable. To this extent, we are justified in viewing the world as
approximately described by QFTs, and should content ourselves with investigating an
incomplete (though highly accurate) picture of nature. Whether we are dealing with a
formalism that encodes Poincare´ invariance into its axiomatic framework, or a formalism
in which Poincare´ invariance has been used indirectly to construct empirically successful
theories, we should not take violations of Poincare´ invariance as signalling the failure of
either approach. Any robust results obtained within either formalism will still hold
approximately, and should be equally subject to foundational analysis.
3 Conclusions
I have tried to show that cutoffs do not provide physical grounds for separating AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs. First, RG methods can be incorporated into
AQFT without major issue, and cutoffs can be introduced as well—though explicit
16
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cutoffs provide a more pressing conceptual revision to AQFT. Second, we needn’t take
AQFT to be an exact description of the world. In the same way that classical fluid
dynamics is compatible with classical point mechanics, AQFT defined to arbitrary
precision can be compatible with a CQFT that requires cutoffs. The apropriate lesson is
that we should take AQFT to be approximately true in sufficiently low energy domains.
Finally, even if cutoffs are of physical significance, they don’t require a breakdown of
continuum methods in general. This idea stems from pushing an analogy with CMP,
which appears to be unjustified.
Though the Fraser-Wallace debate has spawned increased investigations into the
foundations of QFT, it has set the boundaries of the debate in such a way as to create a
false dichotomy: one is forced to choose whether to immerse oneself in the AQFT or
CQFT formalisms. When we discard the false dichotomy and recognize AQFT as
complementary to CQFT, we open the door to the synthesis of axiomatic methods with
Lagrangian QFT. In this way the general features of QFTs can be investigated rigorously
in AQFT, and we can be confident that—insofar as the axioms of AQFT capture the
physical assumptions of CQFT—the results carry over to CQFT.
Though it is true that there do not yet exist AQFT models that incorporate interactions
in four-dimensional spacetime, the successes of AQFT have been compatible with
CQFT. Free field theories and φ4
2
interaction theories constructed in AQFT give
predictions in agreement with comparable CQFTs. Insofar as AQFT is a successful
formalism, its results should be thought of as complementary to those of CQFT: one
uses the same physical principles to construct differing formalisms.
In essence, I advocate for a position similar to Wallace’s earlier view (though note that
in this passage he refers only to specific results of AQFT, such as the spin-statistics
17
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theorem):
the foundational results which have emerged from AQFT have been of
considerable importance in understanding QFT and in general they apply
also to Lagrangian QFTs. This paper should be read as complementary to,
rather than in competition with, these results (2006, p. 35).
The particular choice of formalism will depend on the scope of the foundational
investigation. If the goal is to prove general results applicable to any relativistic QFT,
then AQFT is the appropriate formalism; if the goal is to determine the consequences of
specific physical interactions, then CQFT should be used.
18
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On	Epistemically	Detrimental	Dissent:		
Contingent	Enabling	Factors	v.	Stable	Difference-Makers.	
	
Soazig	Le	Bihan	and	Iheanyi	Amadi	
	
Abstract.	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	
characterization	(2015)	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	
context	of	science.		We	argue	that	the	presence	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	severe	
non-epistemic	consequences	are	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	conditions	for	EDD	
to	obtain.		We	clarify	their	role	by	arguing	that	they	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	
not	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	
difference-makers	are	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	
and	effective	public	dissemination.		
	
	
Introduction.		
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	critically	build	on	Justin	Biddle	and	Anna	Leuschner’s	
characterization	of	epistemologically	detrimental	dissent	(EDD)	in	the	context	of	
science	(2015).		We	follow	their	lead	in	taking	‘dissent’	to	be	a	particular	kind	of	
criticism,	i.e.	the	act	of	objecting	to	a	widely	held	conclusion.		When	done	properly,	
dissent	is	welcome	within	scientific	practice.		As	Helen	Longino	has	clearly	
established,	“scientific	knowledge	is	produced	collectively	through	the	clashing	and	
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meshing	of	a	variety	of	points	of	view	(1990,	69).		Criticism,	when	done	properly,	is	
integral	to	the	collective	advancement	of	science.1		Dissent,	when	an	instance	of	
proper	criticism,	is	thus	epistemically	valuable	in	the	context	of	science.			
Now	there	are	some	instances	of	dissent	that	come	out	as	epistemically	detrimental.		
That	is	to	say,	some	instances	of	dissent	seem	to	impede,	not	promote,	the	collective	
advancement	of	science.		Many	examples	come	to	mind,	that	have	been	well	
described	in	the	recent	literature	(Oreskes	and	Conway	2010,	Biddle	and	Leushner	
2015,	Harker	2015).		Roughly	speaking,	EDD	is	about	manufacturing	controversy	in	
a	particular	scientific	field.		The	typical	story	goes	something	like	the	following.		The	
research	involved	has	some	severe	non-epistemic	consequences	in	terms	of,	on	one	
side,	industry	profit,	and,	on	the	other	side,	public	welfare;	large	amounts	of	money	
are	invested	by	industry-related	groups	to	(1)	produce	some	skewed	research,	(2)	
largely	publicize	the	results	through	the	media,	(3)	produce	an	atmosphere	of	
confusion	and	doubt	within	the	public,	(4)	launch	some	campaign	against	the	lead	
scientists	of	the	field	in	the	media	and	political	world	(often	through	personal	
attacks	and	threats);	this	results	in	an	atmosphere	in	which	the	scientists	
subjectively	feel	a	lot	of	pressure	and	discomfort,	and	also	objectively	waste	
precious	time	and	limited	resources	to	address	the	well-publicized	skewed	research.		
At	this	point,	the	collective	advancement	of	science	is	clearly	impeded.		We	have	an	
instance	of	EDD.		
																																																								
1	Longino	(1990)	offers	an	account	of	some	of	the	various	kinds	of	epistemically	
beneficial	criticism	within	science.		
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The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	properly	distinguish,	in	that	story,	between	(1)	
contingent	enabling	factors,	and	(2)	stable	difference-makers,	in	the	production	of	
EDD.		Our	most	contentious	claim	is	that	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	and	
presence	of	severe	non-epistemic	risks	are	contingent	enabling	factors,	not	stable	
difference-makers	for	EDD.		We	maintain	that	two	stable	difference-makers	are	core	
to	the	production	of	EDD:	production	of	skewed	science	and	effective	public	
dissemination.		
In	Section	1,	we	offer	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	straightforward	argument	for	the	
claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	in	the	production	of	
EDD:	it	may	lead	to	EDD	only	if	it	leads	to	skewed	science.		In	Section	2	we	argue	
that	it	is	not	necessary	either.		Section	3	is	devoted	to	a	clarification	of	the	role	of	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	in	EDD	on	the	basis	of	a	distinction	between	
contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers.		Section	4	investigates	the	
consequences	of	our	analysis	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	proposed	by	
Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).	
	
Section	1.	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	sufficient	for	EDD	
That	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	sufficient	to	the	production	of	EDD	
has	been	discussed	by	Wilholt	(2009),	and	Biddle	and	Leuschner	(2015).		Roughly,	
the	point	is	simply	that,	unless	intrusion	of	background	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
such	that	the	work	produced	fails	to	satisfy	some	of	the	conventional	standards	for	
proper	science,	there	is	no	problem.	We	offer	here	what	we	take	to	be	the	most	
straightforward	argument	for	this	point.			
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As	the	community	of	philosophers	of	science	have	recently	come	to	recognize,	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	is	quite	common	(Douglas	
2009).		Now	obviously,	that	does	not	necessarily	result	in	skewed	science.		If	a	
scientist	defends	a	conclusion	C	on	the	basis	of	evidence	E,	the	fact	that	some	
background	non-epistemic	values	enters	in	her	reasoning	does	not	matter	if	(1)	she	
can	publicly	produce	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	C,	and	if	(2)	that	reasoning	can	be	
assessed	as	adequate	scientific	reasoning	by	her	peers,	including	peers	who	do	not	
share	the	same	background	non-epistemic	values.		If	these	two	conditions	are	met,	
then	the	conventional	standards	for	proper	science	are	met,	and	we	do	not	have	a	
case	of	skewed	science.		Now	if	proper	scientific	work	was	produced,	there	is	no	a	
priori	reason	to	think	that	her	work	cannot	partake	in	the	collective	advancement	of	
scientific	knowledge.		It	might	do	so	at	various	degrees,	but	that	will	depend	on	its	
heuristic	value,	which	is	a	priori	unrelated	to	whether	or	not	there	was	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic	values.		
Let	us	push	this	line	of	argument	a	little	further.		It	is	important	here	to	underline	
the	fact	that	the	reasoning	rendered	public	by	the	scientist	might	not	be	the	actual	
reasoning	through	which	she	came	to	accept	either	E	or	its	relevance	with	regard	to	
C.		From	a	subjective	point	of	view,	for	example,	she	might	well	have	had	accepted	C	
well	before	she	produced	E	and	the	reasoning	defending	the	relevance	of	E	as	
supporting	C.		She	might	well	have	accepted	C	for	non-epistemic,	value-laden,	
reasons.		However,	such	considerations	over	the	subjective	state	of	scientists	do	not	
matter.		The	collective	assessment	of	scientific	research	is	not	in	the	business	of	
mind	reading.		No	matter	what	kind	of	reasoning	(or	non-reasoning)	actually	
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brought	a	scientist	to	believe	C,	the	relevant	question	is	whether	she	is	capable	of	
producing	a	reasoning	in	defense	of	E	and	its	relevance	with	regard	to	C	that	can	be	
publicly,	and	positively,	assessed	by	the	experts	in	her	field.		To	put	it	bluntly:	the	
most	biased	and	ill-intentioned	scientists	are	a	priori	capable	of	producing	good	
scientific	work.2			
This	line	of	argument	applies	to	the	production	of	dissenting	views.	Dissenting	
claims	proposed	by	scientists	motivated	by	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
necessarily	lead	to	skewed	science	and	hence	to	of	EDD.		If	a	reasoning	can	be	
publicly	produced,	and	if	the	members	of	the	scientific	community,	including	
members	of	that	community	who	do	not	share	the	same	values	as	the	dissenting	
views’	proponents,	assess	that	reasoning	as	scientifically	adequate,	then	we	do	not	
have	an	instance	of	skewed	dissent.		As	an	instance	of	work	that	satisfies	the	agreed-
upon	standards	of	proper	scientific	practice,	the	dissenting	view	could	well	
participate	in	the	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge.		It	could	do	so	at	various	
degrees,	depending	on	how	important	the	dissenting	views	are,	but	that	would	not	
depend	on	whether	or	not	the	dissenting	views	are	the	product	of	scientists	with	
non-epistemic	agendas.		Considerations	about	the	subjective	intentions,	or	
background	beliefs,	of	the	scientists	are	irrelevant,	unless	one	can	show	that	skewed	
science	was	produced.		
																																																								
2	This	is	not	denying	the	actuality	of	implicit	bias.		By	definition,	implicit	bias	is	still	
bias.		As	such,	it	can	be	recognized	by	the	scientific	community	for	what	it	is.		What	
is	implicit	about	it	is	that	the	biased	author	(and	possibly	some	of	her	peers	as	well)	
is	not	even	realizing	her	own	bias.			
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Section	2	Non-epistemic	agendas:	not	necessary	for	EDD	
At	this	point,	we	have	shown	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
necessarily	result	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Note	that	EDD	does	not	require	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	either.		What	would	it	take	to	have	a	case	of	EDD	
without	any	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas?		We	know	that	EDD	is	about	
manufacturing	controversy	within	a	scientific	field.		First,	the	controversy	is	
“manufactured”,	not	genuine,	because	the	dissenting	view	is	not	based	on	proper	
science;	it	violates	some	of	the	commonly	accepted	standards	for	proper	scientific	
practice;	it	is	an	instance	of	skewed	science.		Now	skewed	science	can	come	to	be	in	
many	ways.		It	does	not	have	to	result	from	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		
One	can	imagine	the	case	of	a	scientist,	say	Jack,	who	is	genuinely	interested	in	
partaking	in	the	collective	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge,	but	is	also	a	poor	
scientist.		One	can	imagine	that	Jack	is	very	wealthy,	and	thus	has	both	the	time	and	
financial	resources	to	pursue	his	research,	and	produce	a	large	amount	of	work	
challenging	the	commonly	held	views	in	a	given	scientific	field.		Jack,	albeit	
misguided	in	many	ways,	could	conceivably	do	all	of	this	with	the	“purest”	goal	in	
mind.	
Now	one	immediately	sees	that	the	production	of	bad	science	is	not	enough	to	
produce	EDD.		Jack’s	research	is	likely	to	be	simply	ignored	by	the	scientific	
community.		So	what	would	it	take	to	“manufacture”	a	controversy	on	the	basis	of	
Jack’s	research?		The	answer	seems	rather	straightforward:	Jack’s	research	needs	to	
be	effectively	disseminated,	so	that	scientists	feel	pressured	to	respond	to	Jack’s	
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challenges.		The	standard	avenues	for	dissemination	of	scientific	research,	i.e.	peer-
reviewed	publication,	however,	are	not	likely	to	be	an	option	for	Jack,	since	his	work	
is	widely	recognized	by	the	community	as	being	of	poor	scientific	quality.		He	must	
then	bypass	these	avenues,	and	manage	to	effectively	disseminate	his	research	
among	the	public.		Mass	media	would	be	a	likely	option	for	this.		This	in	turn	forces	
scientists	in	the	field	to	waste	time	and	resources	to	address	Jack’s	research.		Hence	
a	case	of	EDD,	with	the	purest	epistemic	goal	at	its	source.		
The	case	above	might	seem	far-fetched.		One	objection	could	be	that,	unless	some	
non-epistemic	values	were	at	stake,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	media	and	the	public	
would	get	interested	in	Jack’s	research,	and	Jack	would	fail	to	be	able	to	
manufacture	the	controversy.		It	might	be	unlikely,	but	it	is	surely	conceivable.		If	
Jack’s	public	dissemination	machinery	is	effective	enough,	(mis-)	understandings	
over	the	state	of	research	in	the	field	of	concern	could	well	have	serious	
repercussions	on	public	funding.		Jack	could	well	have	a	very	strong	network	of	
communication	–	he	could	well	be	the	owner	of	a	very	large	cable	and	press	
network.		Repeated	reporting	on	public	funding	of	supposedly	controversial	science	
could	well	spur	outrage	in	the	public.		“Debates”	on	mass	media	would	ensue.		As	
soon	as	the	scientists	would	engage	in	that	conversation,	Jack’s	claims	would	gain	in	
credibility.3		At	the	end,	Jack’s	campaign	could	well	be	so	effective	that	scientists	
																																																								
3	This	is	a	point	that	Hannah	Arendt	made	clear	in	her	insightful	analysis	of	
controversy-	and	doubt-manufacturing	in	a	completely	different	context,	i.e.	the	
(non-)issue	of	the	reality	of	the	Holocaust	during	WWII	(1966/2010).	
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would	indeed	be	forced	to	repeatedly	address	his	research	to	defend	their	own.		So,	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	necessary	to	the	production	of	EDD.		
	
Section	3.	Stable	Difference-Makers	v.	Contingent	Enabling	Factor	
From	the	discussion	above,	we	conclude	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD.		Such	a	conclusion	might	
strike	many	as	unsatisfactory,	however.		Isn’t	it	the	case	that	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	was	an	important	factor	in	the	production	of	the	common	cases	
of	EDD	that	we	have	witnessed	over	the	last	50	years?		Some	may	even	want	to	
claim	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	in	all	of	the	cases	we	know	of	in	recent	history,	no	EDD	
would	have	occurred	if	it	were	not	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas.		This	
is	an	important	intuition,	and	arguably,	any	satisfactory	account	of	EDD	ought	to	
make	sense	of	it.		Fortunately,	we	believe	there	is	a	way	to	do	so,	that	is,	by	
appealing	to	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	
difference-makers	as	discussed	by	Thomson	(2003)	and	Woodward	(2010).		
Thomson	(2003)	makes	the	point	(contra	many	theories	of	causation)	that	just	
because	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’,	it	does	not	follow	that	‘C	has	caused	
E’.		She	argues	that	the	proposition	‘E	would	not	have	happened	without	C’	only	
entails	that	‘C	was	physically	necessary	for	E’.		Consider	her	example.		John	built	a	
bridge	over	the	Rapid	River.		The	Rapid	River	is	notoriously	wild,	and	only	John,	a	
master-builder,	could	have	done	it.		From	the	bridge	being	built,	it	ensues	that	Smith	
crosses	the	river.		Now	John’s	building	the	bridge	was	physically	necessary	to	
Smith’s	crossing	the	Rapid	River,	but	most	would	agree	that	it	is	misguided	to	take	it	
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as	a	cause	for	it.		John’s	building	the	bridge,	even	if	“physically	necessary”	in	the	
whole	process,	remains	largely	irrelevant	to	Smith’s	crossing	the	river.		It	belongs	to	
the	background	conditions,	or	environmental	conditions,	that	make	Smith’s	crossing	
possible,	without	causing	it	in	any	genuine	sense	of	causation.		In	Thomson’s	
vocabulary,	it	is	only	an	enabling	factor.	
Woodward	(2010)	is	interested	in	analyzing	a	similar	distinction	between	the	core	
difference-makers	and	the	background	conditions.		His	analysis	is	useful	to	flesh	out	
some	of	the	characteristics	of	enabling	factors	à	la	Thomson.4		One	of	intuitions	
Woodward	is	trying	to	capture	is	that	some	causal	relationships	are	robust,	i.e.	
insensitive	to	environmental	change,	while	others	are	contingent	on	the	presence	of	
a	specific	environment.		To	do	so,	he	articulates	the	notions	of	“stability”.5		A	causal	
relationship,	according	to	Woodward,	is	stable	if	and	only	if	it	holds	over	a	wide	
range	of	background	conditions.		Some	examples	might	be	useful	at	this	point.		
																																																								
4	Note	that	we	do	not	claim	(and	neither	does	Woodward)	to	have	unveiled	the	set	
of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	factors	to	qualify	as	enabling	factors	by	
contrast	to	stable	difference-makers.		We	will	only	claim	that	being	enabling	factors	
are	typically	unstable,	and	hence,	that	lack	of	stability	serves	as	a	good	indicator	for	
a	factor	to	be	only	enabling,	not	causing.	
5	Two	other	notions	are	articulated	in	the	article.		The	notion	of	proportionality	
serves	to	address	the	issue	of	the	proper	levels	of	explanation.		The	notion	of	
specificity	serves	to	address	the	issue	of	coarse	v.	fine-grain	causal	influence.		
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A	paradigmatic	example	of	an	unstable	relation	would	be	the	following.6		“Star”	
professor	P	writes	a	letter	of	recommendation	for	Jane,	thanks	to	which	Jane	gets	a	
job	at	university	U.		She	would	not	have	gotten	the	job	without	it.		Jane	meets	Joe	at	
U,	they	get	married,	and	have	children.		Challenged	by	the	difficulties	of	coupling	an	
academic	career	with	quality	parenting,	Jane	goes	into	depression.		Now	consider	
the	following	claim:	‘P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	caused	Jane's	depression’.		Given	the	
story	that	is	given,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	P's	writing	a	letter	for	Jane	enabled	
Jane's	suffering	from	depression,	but	there	is	also	a	strong	sense	in	which	it	is	
misguided	to	take	it	as	a	cause	for	it.		The	reason	is	that	the	relation	between	P’s	
writing	the	letter	and	Jane’s	suffering	from	the	disease	would	cease	to	hold	under	
many	small,	contingent,	changes	in	the	background	conditions	for	the	story	(Jane	
and	Joe	could	not	have	met,	they	could	have	decided	to	not	have	children,	U	could	
have	had	a	very	progressive	parental	leave	policy,	etc.).		The	causal	relationship	
between	the	letter	and	the	depression	is	thus	highly	unstable	because	it	holds	only	
in	a	very	specific	environment.	
Now	contrast	this	with	a	paradigmatic	example	of	a	stable	relation.		I	turn	on	the	
heat	under	my	closed	pressure	cooker	(with	some	water	in	it).		The	pressure	goes	
up	and	the	valve	shuts	down.		Clearly,	heating	up	the	pressure	cooker	is	a	stable	
cause	of	the	pressure	valve	to	shut	down.		Many	of	the	most	stable	causal	relations	
are	backed	up	by	what	the	kind	of	generalizations	that	we	take	to	be	the	laws	of	
physics,	or	chemistry.		These	generalizations	hold	over	a	wide	range	of	background	
conditions.	
																																																								
6	This	example	is	inspired	by	Woodward	(2010)	himself	inspired	by	Lewis	(1986).	
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There	are	obviously	various	degrees	of	stability	in	between	these	two	extreme	
cases.		Stability	is	not	an	all	or	nothing	affair.		It	might	also	be	difficult	to	figure	out	
which	causal	relationships	are	more	or	less	stable.		That	said,	it	could	also	be	worth	
the	effort	looking	into	it,	because,	how	stable	a	factor	is	could	be	a	measure	of	how	
well	we	can	target	change	by	targeting	that	factor	in	a	given	situation.		As	
Woodward	explains	(2010,	315):	“other	things	being	equal,	causal	relationships	that	
are	more	stable	are	likely	to	be	more	useful	for	many	purposes	associated	with	
manipulation	and	control	than	less	stable	relationships.”		Applied	to	our	case,	if	
ultimately	we	hope	to	be	able	to	alter	the	manufacturing	of	controversy	and	EDD,	it	
could	turn	out	to	be	very	useful	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	behind	EDD	by	
distinguishing	between	the	contingent	enabling	factors	and	the	more	stable	
difference-makers.			
Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	analyses	are	clearly	related.		Thomson’s	bridge	
example	is	a	clear	case	of	a	very	unstable	causal	relationship:	it	holds	only	under	
very	specific	background	conditions	(The	Rapid	River	could	have	been	gently,	Smith	
could	have	decided	not	to	cross	the	bridge,	etc.)	Some	unstable	causal	relationships	
as	discussed	by	Woodward	are	so	at	least	partially	because	they	are	relationships	of	
contingent	“physical	necessity”	à	la	Thomson.		So,	a	causal	factor	may	be	highly	
unstable,	despite	being	‘necessary’	to	the	causal	process,	if	its	influence	on	the	
process	is	highly	contingent	on	a	specific	environment.		No	matter	how	“necessary”	
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in	that	sense	a	factor	F	is,	F	being	unstable	points	F	being	a	enabling	factor,	not	a	
stable	difference-maker.7		
The	discussion	above	allows	us	to	bring	home	two	important	points.		First,	it	allows	
us	to	identify	two	stable	difference-makers	for	the	production	of	EDD:	the	
production	of	skewed	scientific	research	and	its	effective	public	dissemination.		That	
the	combination	of	these	two	factors	produces	an	instance	EDD	holds	over	a	wide	
range	of	conditions.		What	changes	in	background	conditions	would	make	that	
causal	relation	to	fail?	First,	one	could	think	of	a	world	in	which	scientists	could	
ignore	even	well-advertised	skewed	science.		For	example,	that	could	possibly	be	
the	case	in	a	world	in	which	production	of	scientific	research	would	not	depend	on	
getting	public	founding,	or	in	a	world	in	which	the	public	is	generally	knowledgeable	
about	(the	philosophy	of)	science,	and	hence,	is	able	to	recognize	that	the	well-
																																																								
7	Two	points	of	clarification	are	in	order.	First,	Woodward	convincingly	argues	that	
the	extent	to	which	a	cause	is	stable	is	related,	but	not	equivalent	to,	its	
distal/proximate	character	vis	à	vis	the	effect.		Second,	Woodward	also	argues	that	
stability	is	not	dependent	on	the	level	of	explanation:	degrees	of	stability	are	not	
necessarily	to	how	“reductive”	the	explanation	is.		So,	our	distinction	between	
contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-makers	is	not	trivial	in	the	sense	
that	the	most	stable	difference-makers	would	always	be	the	most	proximate	causes	
described	at	the	level	of	fundamental	particles.		
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advertised	science	is	skewed.		Arguably,	these	do	not	qualify	as	small	changes	in	the	
background	conditions	for	scientific	practice.8			
The	second	point	is	a	clarification	of	the	role	played	by	the	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	in	the	production	of	EDD.		Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	
not	a	stable	difference-maker	for	the	production	of	EDD.		This	is	because	there	is	a	
large	range	of	conditions	under	which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	do	not	
result	in	EDD.		These	include	the	conditions	for	all	the	cases	in	which	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic	agendas	do	no	result	in	skewed	science.		If	we	take	seriously	recent	
work	on	science	and	value,	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	is	actually	the	rule,	not	
the	exception	within	the	practice	of	science	(Douglas	2009,	Intemann	2001,	2015,	
and	references	therein).		Note	that,	if	our	take	on	Thomson’s	and	Woodward’s	
analyses	is	correct,	then	the	claim	that	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	not	a	
stable	difference-maker	but	only	a	contingent	enabling	factor	is	consistent	with	the	
fact	that	it	has	been	“physically	necessary”	in	many	of	the	well-known	instances	of	
EDD.		One	can	consistently	say	that,	while	not	a	stable	difference-maker,	it	has	been	
an	important	enabling	factor	for	the	production	of	well-publicized	skewed	science.		
Intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	has	been	necessary	for	some	groups	to	develop	
an	interest	in	funding	the	production	and	public	dissemination	of	skewed	research.		
																																																								
8	There	is	also	a	possibility	that	some	cases	of	EDD	could	come	out	of	seemingly	
proper	science	“distracting”	the	public	from	the	most	widely	held	views	within	the	
scientific	community.		We	believe	that	even	in	these	cases,	dissenting	views	do	not	
entail	EDD	unless	there	is	violation	of	some	conventional	standards	for	proper	
science.		This	interesting	issue	belongs	to	another	paper.		
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That	said	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	factors	that	are	characterized	by	
this	kind	of	‘necessity’	(the	bridge	or	letter	kind	of	necessity)	and	factors	that	are	
true	stable	difference-makers.		It	is	all	the	more	important	that,	if	one	of	our	goals	is	
to	alter	the	production	of	EDD,	then	our	analysis	suggests	that	intrusion	of	non-
epistemic	agendas	is	not	the	proper	target.		Once	again,	non-epistemic	values	are	the	
common	rule	within	the	practice	of	science.		A	more	efficient	approach	in	the	
prevention	of	EDD	would	be	to	understand	the	various	ways	skewed	science	may	be	
produced.		This	includes	the	important	discussion	on	the	distinction	between	
legitimate	and	illegitimate	use	of	non-epistemic	values	in	scientific	practice	(Hicks	
2014,	Intemann	2015).		This	in	turn	includes	an	investigation	of	the	mechanisms	by	
which	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	does	result	in	skewed	science.		Implicit	bias	
might	one	of	these	mechanisms.		Inductive	risk	bias,	as	we	shall	explain	in	the	next	
section,	is	another	one.		Before	we	turn	to	this	point,	let	us	take	stock.		
We	have	clarified	the	causal	landscape	for	the	production	of	EDD.		We	have	
identified	two	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science	and	its	
effective	public	dissemination;	and	we	have	characterized	the	important	role	of	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	within	science	as	contingent	enabling	factors	for	
the	production	and	dissemination	of	skewed	research,	hence	for	EDD.		
	
Section	4.	Consequences	for	the	Inductive	Risk	Account	of	EDD	
Biddle	and	Leuschner	have	articulated	what	they	call	the	“inductive	risk	account”	of	
EDD	(2015).		According	to	this	account,	the	following	set	of	conditions	are	jointly	
sufficient	for	the	production	of	EDD	(2015,	273):		
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Dissent	from	a	hypothesis	H	is	epistemically	detrimental	if	each	of	the	following	
obtains:	
(1) The	non-epistemic	consequences	of	wrongly	rejecting	H	are	likely	to	be	severe	
(2) The	dissenting	research	that	constitutes	the	objection	violates	established	
conventional	standards.		
(3) The	dissenting	research	involves	intolerance	for	producer	risks	at	the	expense	
of	public	risks.		
(4) Producer	risks	and	public	risks	fall	largely	upon	different	parties.		
Biddle	and	Leushner	admit	that	these	conditions	are	not	necessarily	related	to	the	
production	of	EDD	(275):	
“We	are	not	arguing	that,	in	all	possible	worlds,	research	that	meets	the	conditions	
of	the	inductive	risk	account	inhibits	the	progress	of	science.	It	is	possible,	for	
example,	to	organize	science	and	to	regulate	industry	in	such	a	way	that	dissent	that	
meets	these	conditions	is	not	widely	disseminated,	does	not	acquire	political	
authority,	and	is	not	used	to	attack	mainstream	scientists.		But	this	is	not	the	way	in	
which	science	and	society	are	currently	organized.		Dissent	that	meets	the	
conditions	of	the	inductive	risk	account	is,	given	current	societal	arrangements,	
likely	to	inhibit	knowledge	production,	particularly	because	of	the	success	of	
political,	economic,	and	ideological	interests	in	structuring	the	dissemination	of	
research.”	
We	think	that	the	framework	used	in	Section	3	can	help	clarify	the	causal	landscape	
for	the	production	of	EDD	offered	in	the	Inductive	Risk	Account.		Our	contention	is	
that	Biddle	and	Leuschner,	by	focusing	on	inductive	risk,	have	identified	a	
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particular,	important,	but	still	contingent,	enabling	factor,	but	have	failed	to	clearly	
distinguish	the	proper	core	of	stable	difference-makers,	for	the	production	of	EDD.		
Let	us	make	that	point	in	more	details.		
The	four	conditions	above	can	be	seen	as	dividing	into	three	groups.		Condition	(2)	
identifies	one	of	the	stable	difference-makers	–	production	of	skewed	science.		
Conditions	(1)	and	(4)	together	specify	some	particular	enabling	conditions	for	the	
formation	of	non-epistemic	agendas	–	the	presence	of	severe	and	opposing	non-
epistemic	consequences	(SONEC).		Condition	(3)	identifies	a	mechanism	by	which	
intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	may	enable	the	production	of	
skewed	science.		In	other	words,	the	inductive	risk	account	of	EDD	identifies	an	
important	series	of	enabling	causes	leading	to	one	of	the	two	stable	difference-
makers	we	have	identified	in	Section	1-3,	i.e.	production	of	skewed	science.		That	
series	of	cause	is	something	like	this:	from	the	presence	of	SONEC	to	biased	
inductive	risk	reasoning,	and	to	skewed	science.		This	is	an	important	contribution	
to	the	understanding	of	EDD	precisely	because	it	not	only	identifies	some	particular	
enabling	factors	(the	presence	of	SONEC)	for	the	formation	of	epistemic	agendas,	
but	also	a	mechanism	by	which	intrusion	of	SONEC-related	non-epistemic	agendas	
may	enable	the	production	of	skewed	science	(via	inductive	risk	bias).		Now	it	is	also	
important	to	clarify	the	causal	landscape	and	recognize	that	fulfillment	of	Condition	
(2)	is	the	stable	difference-maker	which	fulfillment	of	Conditions	(1),	(4),	and	then	
(3)	enable	as	a	matter	of	contingent	fact.		Biddle	and	Leuschner	seem	to	have	missed	
that	useful	distinction.		
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If	our	analysis	in	Section	3	is	correct,	they	also	have	failed	to	include	the	second	
stable	difference-maker	for	EDD,	i.e.	effective	public	dissemination.		As	they	admit	in	
the	paper	(see	quote	above),	the	presence	of	SONEC	obviously	does	not	imply	that	
effective	public	dissemination	will	ensue.		Conversely,	as	Jack’s	case	shows,	effective	
public	dissemination	could	well	be	obtained	without	the	presence	of	SONEC.		How	
(un-)likely	this	is	obviously	is	an	empirical	question.		No	matter	how	unlikely,	
however,	it	is	important	for	our	understanding	of	EDD	to	mention	effective	public	
dissemination	as	a	core	stable	difference-maker.		The	inductive	risk	account	fails	to	
do	so.		Let	us	underscore,	however,	that	Biddle	and	Leuschner	once	again	have	
identified	an	important	mechanism	by	which	presence	of	SONEC	enables	effective	
public	dissemination	and	the	manufacturing	of	controversy:	the	presence	of	SONEC	
not	only	enables	the	production	of	skewed	science,	but	also	the	establishment	of	
“sophisticated,	private-funded	network	for	disseminating	[dissenting]	results”	
(2015,	275).		
This	brings	us	to	our	conclusion	on	the	Inductive	Risk	Account:	Biddle	and	
Leuschner	have	successfully	identified	an	important	contingent	enabling	factor	for	
EDD,	i.e.	the	presence	and	influence	of	SONEC.		That	said,	they	have	failed	to	
distinguish	between	the	different	roles	that	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-
makers	play	in	the	production	of	EDD.		We	hope	to	have	clarified	the	situation.		
	
Conclusion		
Well-known	cases	of	EDD	seem	to	have	in	common	various	forms	of	intrusion	of	
non-epistemic,	often	SONEC-related,	agendas	within	the	science.		We	have	argued	
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that	such	intrusion	is	not	core	to	the	production	of	EDD:	neither	necessary	nor	
sufficient,	it	is	also	not	a	stable	difference-maker.		We	have	clarified	its	causal	role:	
intrusion	of	non-epistemic	agendas	is	a	contingent	enabling	factor.		Reduced	to	its	
core,	EDD	is	just	well-advertised	bad	science.	Because	it	is	well	advertised,	it	has	an	
impact	on	the	collective	building	of	scientific	knowledge.		Because	it	is	bad	science,	it	
does	not	advance	that	endeavor,	but	any	case	negatively	impacts	it	instead.	
To	make	the	distinction	between	contingent	enabling	factors	and	stable	difference-
makers	is	important	for	at	least	three	reasons.		First,	it	is	important	to	clarify	the	
causal	landscape	that	leads	to	the	production	of	EDD,	as	it	simply	increases	our	
understanding	of	EDD.		Second,	it	might	suggest	more	efficient	avenues	for	targeting	
change.		Finally,	it	is	crucial	to	make	room	for	the	intrusion	of	non-epistemic	values	
within	the	science	without	it	being	epistemologically	detrimental.		As	the	
community	of	philosophers	of	science	comes	to	recognize	that	such	intrusion	is	the	
rule	rather	than	the	exception,	one	must	leave	conceptual	room	for	a	distinction	
between	“legitimate”	and	“illegitimate”	role	for	non-epistemic	values	within	science	
(Hick	2014,	Intemann	2015).		
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Abstract
The problem of motion in general relativity is about how exactly
the gravitational field equations, the Einstein equations, are related
to the equations of motion of material bodies subject to gravitational
fields. This paper compares two approaches to derive the geodesic mo-
tion of (test) matter from the field equations: ‘the T approach’ and
‘the vacuum approach’. The latter approach has been dismissed by
philosophers of physics because it apparently represents material bod-
ies by singularities. I shall argue that a careful interpretation of the
approach shows that it does not depend on introducing singularities
at all, and that it holds at least as much promise as the T approach. I
conclude with some general lessons about careful vs. literal interpre-
tations of scientific theories.
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1 Introduction
It is a bit of an irony that one of the most widely embraced definitions of
what it means to be a scientific realist is due to the arch-anti-realist Bas van
Fraassen. His definition starts by stating that “Science aims to give us, in its
theories, a literally true story of what the world is like”.1 And indeed, scien-
tific realists often see themselves as committed to ‘taking scientific theories at
face value’: if the best theories of particle physics say that quarks exist, then
we should believe that they exist; if general relativity tells us that gravity
is really just an aspect of spacetime structure, then we should believe it; if
quantum mechanics tells us that the world is at its core non-deterministic,
then we should believe that too.
The problem is that scientific theories, or at least the theories of modern
physics, are not that straightforward with us. They may seem so at first,
but if you listen to the details of their respective stories, if you take your
time to look under the surface, what exactly we should take them to tell
us about the world is far from clear. Murray Gell-Mann, the inventor of
the concept of quarks, for a long time did not think that quarks should
be interpreted as literally existing; neither did Richard Feynman. Albert
Einstein passionately resisted the interpretation of general relativity that says
that the gravitational force field of Newtonian theory is ontologically reduced
to the geometry of spacetime in general relativity. And of course, there is
a long-standing battle in foundations of physics about whether quantum
mechanics really does tell us that the world is non-deterministic.2
In this paper I shall introduce a new case study that provides further
evidence for the position that, whether you are a realist or not, the literal
interpretation of a scientific theory, especially in physics, can be rather mis-
leading. I will argue that what we should aim for is a careful interpretation;
1Van Fraassen [1980], p.8.
2For a discussion of different interpretations of the quark concept see Pickering [1999],
for Einstein’s opposition to interpreting general relativity as a geometrization of gravity see
Lehmkuhl [2014], and for debate on whether quantum mechanics is really indeterministic
see e.g. Saunders et al. [2010].
2
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an interpretation of the theory or model or formalism that engages with its
details, both with the details of its mathematical structure and with how it
is applied to the natural world. Philosophy of science must be willing to look
under the hood.
The case study I want to look at is the so-called problem of motion in
the general theory of relativity (GR). It asks about the precise relationship
between the two sets of equations that are at the very heart of GR. On the
one hand there are the Einstein field equations, which give us the dynamics
of the gravitational potential (the metric tensor) gµν :
Rµν −
1
2
gµν = κETµν . (1)
On the other hand, we have the geodesic equation that determines which
paths through spacetime are geodesics of the connection Γνµσ compatible
with the metric gµν :
d2xτ
ds2
+ Γτµν
dxµ
ds
dxν
ds
= 0. (2)
In GR, material bodies subject only to gravitational fields are supposed to
move on the geodesics determined by equation (2).3 The problem of motion
in GR is the question of whether the equations of motion of matter subject to
gravitational fields (2) can be derived from the gravitational field equations
(1).
Einstein himself, in his first publication on the topic, a paper co-written
with Jakob Grommer and published in 1927, compares different classes of
attempts to give such a derivation. In particular, Einstein and Grommer
distinguish between two classes of attempts at deriving the geodesic motion
of matter from the gravitational field equations, which I will term the T
approach and the vacuum approach, respectively. The T approach starts from
the realization that the field equations (1) imply the conservation condition,
namely that the covariant divergence of the energy-momentum tensor Tµν
vanishes:
∇
µTµν = 0 . (3)
3It is a big question which systems are actually included under ‘material bodies’ here.
The minimal position is that only test particles are referred to: particles with negligible
extension, spin, and self-gravity. However, many actual bodies can be approximated well
by test particles in this sense; planets orbiting a star are an example, as we shall see below.
3
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From this, together with certain conditions on the energy-momentum
tensor Tµν , the T approach derives that material particles move on time-
like geodesics. It is this kind of approach to the problem of motion that
philosophers have engaged with almost exclusively up to now.4
Einstein and Grommer end up dismissing the T approach, and suggest an
alternative path to deriving geodesic motion instead. It is a particular version
of a vacuum approach to the problem of motion. Einstein and Grommer start
from the vacuum form of the Einstein field equations,
Rµν = 0 , (4)
and attempt to derive that the equations (4) imply that material particles
move on geodesics.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have quickly dismissed it because it seems to model material bodies
by singularities in spacetime; while singularities, by definition, are not even
part of spacetime. However, in this paper I shall argue that this dismissal
was far too fast, and that indeed the vacuum approach deserves at least as
much attention by philosophers as the T approach. The vacuum approach,
despite first appearances, engages more closely with some of the most major
predictions of GR: both the prediction of the perihelion of Mercury and
the prediction of light bending by the Sun utilise the vacuum approach to
the derivation of motion of material systems. Indeed, even the prediction
of gravitational waves resulting from a binary black hole merger that was
recently confirmed rests on the vacuum field equations, for black holes are
described by vacuum solutions.5
My argument in this paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will argue
that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion promises certain ad-
vantages that the T approach lacks. Second, I will argue that the problems
of the vacuum approach for which it has been dismissed are artefacts of a
too literal interpretation of the formalism and its application to the problem
at hand. Third, I will argue that a careful interpretation makes the prob-
lems disappear; I will argue that the approach does not need to interpret
singularities as representing material bodies.
4For a comprehensive review of the early history of this approach see Havas [1989]
and Kennefick [2005]; for two particularly beautiful exemplars from within this class of
proofs see Geroch and Jang [1975] and Ehlers and Geroch [2004], which are investigated
by Brown [2007], Malament [2012], and Weatherall [Forthcoming, 2011].
5See Abbott et al. [2016] and references therein.
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2 A critical comparison of the two research
programmes
I said above that the T approach to the problem of motion proceeds via
the fact that the Einstein field equations (1) imply the conservation con-
dition (3), which in turn implies the geodesic motion of matter. However,
as Malament [2012] pointed out, the conservation condition by itself is not
sufficient to prove that the geodesic equation is the equation of motion of ma-
terial particles. One of the most general proofs from within the T approach,
proposed by Geroch and Jang [1975] and further generalised by Ehlers and
Geroch [2004], rests not only on the conservation condition (3), but also on
the strengthened dominant energy condition, which states:
Given any timelike covector ξµ at any point in M , T
µνξµξν ≥ 0
and either T µν = 0 or T µνξµ is timelike.
The first clause is effectively the weak energy condition, which states that
the mass-energy-momentum density associated with the body in question is
always non-negative. The second clause states that every observer will judge
the mass-energy-momentum of the body to propagate along time-like curves
only.6
It would be rather attractive if we did not have to presume that mate-
rial particles move on time-like curves to then show that these curves are
actually time-like geodesics, and if we did not have to presume that matter
cannot have non-negative mass-energy. These are weak assumptions about
the nature of matter, but they are assumptions.
The vacuum approach to the problem of motion, on the other hand, aims
to make no assumptions about the nature of matter and its properties at all,
and to still derive that matter moves on geodesics. It starts from the question
of whether just knowing the exterior gravitational field of a material body,
and how this gravitational field interacts with the gravitational field of its
surroundings, is enough to derive that the body will move on a geodesic of the
metric surrounding it. Arguably, this programme is far more ambitious than
the T approach, for it starts with fewer assumptions.7 And yet, if successful,
it would really fit much better the virtues that philosophers have associated
6For more on the interpretation of the strengthened dominant energy condition
seeWeatherall [2011], Weatherall [Forthcoming] and especially Curiel [Forthcoming].
7One might be tempted to argue that despite first appearances the vacuum approach
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with the geodesic theorem(s) in the first place: deriving the inertial motion
of matter from knowledge of the dynamics of gravitational fields alone.8
Einstein was deeply skeptical of the role of the energy-momentum ten-
sor in GR. Throughout the decades, he emphasised that Tµν provides only
a ‘phenomenological representation of matter’.9 In Einstein and Grommer
[1927], Einstein elaborates that general relativity with an energy-momentum
tensor as a source term on the right-hand side of (1) is just not a com-
plete theory: it does not tell us what kind of matter is present, only that
it has a certain mass-energy distribution. This perspective on GR was fur-
ther strengthened by Tupper [1981, 1982, 1983], who showed that knowing
the energy-momentum tensor of a material system does not suffice to tell
us what kind of matter is present. For example, one and the same mass-
energy-momentum distribution Tµν featuring on the right-hand side of the
Einstein equations, and solving the Einstein equations for the same metric,
can correspond either to an electromagnetic field or a viscous fluid. Knowing
the energy-momentum tensor is just not sufficient to know which of these
two material systems it is that interacts with the metric field.
Einstein’s aim is then to instead start with the vacuum field equations
starts with more demanding assumptions than the T approach. For the vacuum Einstein
equations (4) logically imply that the strengthened dominant energy condition (SDEC)
holds for the Ricci tensor Rµν . The opposite is not true, so that demanding Ricci flatness is
clearly a stronger constraint on the Ricci tensor than demanding that it obeys the SDEC.
But concluding from this that the vacuum approach starts from stronger assumptions than
the T approach would be a mistake. For the T approach assumes i.) the full Einstein field
equations (1); and ii.) that the energy-momentum tensor (and thus the Einstein tensor)
adheres to the SDEC. The vacuum approach only assumes the vacuum Einstein equations
(4), and thus starts with weaker assumptions than the T approach. However, it might
well be that depsite starting with weaker assumptions than the T approach, a particular
manifestation of the vacuum approach might end up with stronger assumptions than
a particular manifestation of the T approach. For example, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer
vacuum approach, discussed below, involves, among other demands, a so-called equilibrium
condition which is supposed to relate solutions to the non-linear field equations to solutions
of the linearized field equations in a particular way; no such demand is included in, say,
the Geroch-Jang version of the T approach. Thus, further analysis might well show that
Einstein and Grommer use stronger assumptions than Geroch and Jang. Einstein himself
would likely have been content with that, as long as it allowed him to avoid the introduction
of Tµν , for reasons discussed below.
8Cf. Brown [2007], p. 141 and 163.
9See, for example, Einstein [1922], Einstein to Michele Besso, 11 August 1926 (EA-7-
361), and Einstein [1936].
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(4), treat material particles as singularities in the metric field,10 and derive
that they move on geodesics of a metric gµν that solves the vacuum field
equations (4) in the region through which the particle moves.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have already dismissed it at this point. The main criticism is that
the very idea of the approach is flawed: A singularity is not even part of
spacetime. How should it be possible to describe its motion in said spacetime?
Both Torretti and Earman essentially answer that this is not possible and
that the whole programme is ill-conceived. Earman [1995], p. 12, writes:11
[S]ingularities in the spacetime metric cannot be regarded as tak-
ing place at points of the spacetime manifold M. Thus, to speak
of singularities in gµν as geodesics of the spacetime is to speak in
oxymorons.
The most detailed discussion of the Einstein-Grommer paper in the philo-
sophical literature is due to Tamir [2012]. After quoting the above statement
by Earman, Tamir goes on to write (p.142):
The proponent of such a “vacuum-cum-singularity” technique is
faced with the rather paradoxical challenge of explaining in what
sense we can say that a singular curve (ostensibly constituted
by the missing points in the manifold) is actually a geodesic of
the spacetime from which it is absent. Not only is no metric
defined at the singularity, but also technically there are not even
spacetime points there: the geodesic does not exist.
Tamir then mentions a key ingredient of the Einstein-Grommer approach,
namely the distinction between an ‘inner metric’ and an ‘outer metric’.12
Einstein and Grommer aim to show that the particle characterized by a
10In recent years, the adequate definition of a singularity in GR has been a subject of
extensive debate, see e.g. Earman [1995] and Curiel [1999]. For Einstein’s thoughts on
singularities see Earman and Eisenstaedt [1999]; in the context of the Einstein-Grommer
paper Einstein clearly thinks of a singularity in the metric field gµν as a region where the
components of the metric tend to infinity.
11For similar statements see Torretti [1996], section 5.8.
12There is an interesting relationship between Einstein and Grommer’s distinction be-
tween inner and outer metric (discussed further in section 3) on the one hand and the later
distinction between interior and exterior black hole solutions on the other. I do believe
that bringing together results and concepts developed in the context of black hole solu-
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singular inner metric moves on geodesics of the non-singular outer metric.
Tamir states that the “suggested implication” is that we are to compare
a second spacetime whose metric is that of the regular outer metric with
the singular first spacetime, and identify the regular geodesic of the second
spacetime with the singular curve of the first one. He then argues that the
thought that the second singularity-free spacetime can teach us anything
about the singular original spacetime is “spurious”.
My point in the following will be this. Even if this argument were con-
vincing, its premise (the ‘suggested implication’ that Einstein and Grommer
intended to deduce something about a singular spacetime by comparing it
to a non-singular spacetime) is not. I shall argue that by looking at the de-
tails of the Einstein-Grommer approach we come to a different interpretation
of the approach, one that sheds a completely different light on the alleged
presence of singularities. We will see that a careful (rather than literal) in-
terpretation of the vacuum approach, and the Einstein-Grommer paper in
particular, does not actually depend on introducing singularities at all.
3 The vacuum approach to the problem of
motion
3.1 Two ways of looking at Einstein’s model of the
Sun-Mercury system
In a way, the story of the vacuum approach to the problem of motion starts
in 1915, with Einstein’s treatment of the orbit of Mercury around the Sun
in the context of GR. It is a two-body problem: a small body (Mercury)
with a comparatively small mass orbits a large body (the Sun). Einstein
seems to postulate (more on the ‘seems’ below) that the Sun be represented
by what would soon be recognized as an approximation to the Schwarzschild
metric. He definitely postulates (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic of said
metric.13 In a way, the problem of motion in GR is about the question of
tions (a special case of vacuum solutions) on the one hand and the vacuum approach to the
problem of motion on the other hand is very promising indeed. I will have to postpone a
detailed discussion to a later paper; it will include the problem of motion of a binary black
hole, the black hole equivalent of the Sun-Mercury two-body system discussed below.
13For a careful analysis of Einstein’s Mercury paper and how it rests on the Einstein-
Besso manuscript see Earman and Janssen [1993], and Janssen’s Editorial Note on the
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whether this second postulate is really necessary.
If we now look at Einstein’s Mercury paper and recall the kind of criticism
that was launched against the vacuum approach to the problem of motion,
we may find ourselves feeling puzzled. After all, the Schwarzschild metric is a
solution to the vacuum field equations, and it has a singularity at its center.14
If representing material bodies by singular metrics is so problematic, how
does it come about that Einstein [1915] successfully predicted the perihelion
motion of Mercury? Why is it not problematic to represent the Sun by the
singular Schwarzschild metric?
The answer lies in denying the premise of the question. Einstein’s treat-
ment of the Sun-Mercury system should not be interpreted as involving him
representing the Sun by (an approximation of) the Schwarzschild metric. We
know that the Sun is a material body with non-vanishing mass-energy, and
that it does not have a spacetime singularity at its center. What Einstein
really does is to convert the two-body problem Sun-Mercury into a one-body
problem, where one body (Mercury) is subject to an external gravitational
field. It is the exterior gravitational field of the Sun, not the Sun itself, that
is represented by the Schwarzschild metric. And that is enough to predict
the perihelion of Mercury: we don’t need to know what the Sun is made of
or what happens in its interior; all that matters is the exterior gravitational
field that Mercury is subject to.
Thus, worrying about the singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild
metric just misses the point: we do not have to interpret the interior part of
the Schwarzschild metric literally, at least not in this application.
In the following I shall argue that we should interpret the appearance of
singularities in the Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the problem of
motion in a similar vein.
3.2 The Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the
problem of motion
The general scheme of the Einstein-Grommer approach proceeds as follows.15
Einstein-Besso manuscript in Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (CPAE).
14For the history and interpretation of the Schwarzschild metric and its analytic exten-
sions see Eisenstaedt [1989] and Bonnor [1992].
15The genesis of the Einstein-Grommer approach has been a bit of a mystery up to now,
as pointed out by Kennefick [2005]. However, the work on the 15th volume of Einstein’s
collected papers has revealed the context and correspondence leading up to that paper,
9
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1. Reformulate the vacuum Einstein equations in terms of a surface in-
tegral over a three-dimensional hyper-surface such that we can ask
whether gravitational energy-momentum represented by the pseudo-
tensor tτα passes through the surface.
16
2. Pick a curve that is supposed to represent the path of a material par-
ticle.
3. Impose the linear approximation according to which gµν = ηµν + γµν ,
i.e. assume that, at least close to the curve, the metric deviates from
Minkowski spacetime only slightly.
4. Realise that not all solutions to the linearized field equations will corre-
spond to solutions of the non-linear field equations that the linearized
field equations approximate. Argue that in the case where an ‘equilib-
rium condition’ for the energy-pseudo-tensor of the gravitational field
holds, the γµν of the linearized field equations will solve the full non-
linear equations reformulated as a surface integral.17
5. Now split the γµν in the immediate neighborhood of the particle into
the ‘inner metric γ¯µν that the particle itself gives rise to and the ‘outer
metric γ¯µν that is due to other sources (or lack thereof). Observe that
the ‘outer metric’ is entirely regular, even if extended to the point at
which the material particle is supposed to be located.
6. Integrate the surface integral that is equivalent to the vacuum field
equations ‘around’ the curve that is supposed to represent the path
of a material particle. For the case where the integration surface is a
sphere, the equilibrium condition for tτα simplifies to
∂γ¯44
∂xσ
= 0.
and how it fits into Einstein’s overall research program. It is a fascinating story; alas, it
will have to wait for a separate paper.
16There has been a long debate on whether gravitational energy can be adequately
represented by a pseudo-tensor; I will not be able to do it justice here. For some details
see the introduction to Volume 8 CPAE for the debate between Einstein, Klein, Levi-Civita
and Lorentz, for conceptual analysis Hoefer [2000] and especially Trautmann [1962].
17This step is very intricate and it would take me a few pages to do it justice. This point
of the Einstein-Grommer paper has not been adressed by the literature at all (neither in
physics nor in philosophy); I will argue elsewhere that it sheds new light on Einstein’s
later doubts as to whether the gravitational wave solutions of the linearized equations
correspond to gravitational wave solutions in the full non-linear theory.
10
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -338-
7. Conclude that the curve that represents the path of a material particle
is a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν .
18
4 Interpreting the Einstein-Grommer approach
to the problem of motion
The reader might think that the argument presented in the last section cannot
be a faithful representation of the Einstein-Grommer approach; after all,
where is the claim that the material particle is represented by a singularity,
the reason the approach was dismissed by Earman and Tamir? Indeed, I
have omitted that after step 5 of the argument Einstein and Grommer do
say that one could assume that the inner metric γ¯µν is given by what is
effectively a three-dimensional counterpart of the Schwarzschild metric: it is
spherically symmetric and has a singularity at the center. And yet, Einstein
and Grommer never use this assumption in their argument. They call the
material particle ‘the singularity’ all the time, but their argument does not
depend on assuming any particular form for the inner metric, let alone one
that is necessarily singular. As a matter of fact, they do not even mention a
concrete candidate metric for the outer metric γ¯µν ; all they need is that γµν
is split into the inner metric γ¯µν and the outer metric γ¯µν in such a way that
γ¯µν is non-singular everywhere.
Note that this does not mean that we know that the inner metric γ¯µν
is non-singular. We don’t know anything about the inner metric, for the
argument is independent of γ¯µν having any particular form, just like the
derivation of Mercury’s perihelion was independent of whether there is a
singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild metric that represented the
exterior field of the Sun.
With regard to the Sun-Mercury system I argued that we should not
interpret the Schwarzschild metric as representing the Sun, but as represent-
ing its exterior gravitational field. The part of the Sun that is within the
event horizon, including the singularity at the center, should not be taken
18Einstein and Grommer then go on to generalise this result to the ‘non-stationary case’,
i.e. the case where it is not demanded that the external gravitational field, to which the
particle is subject to, does not change in time. They conclude that in this case, too, the
particle will move on a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν that is a solution to the field
equations. For the following this generalisation does not make a difference; I will thus
refer only to the stationary scenario described above.
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as a representation of the actual interior of the Sun, but as a placeholder
or a blind spot within the current description of the Sun-Mercury system: a
docking station for a theoretical model of the Sun not included in Einstein’s
Sun-Mercury model.19
Likewise, we should interpret the inner metric γ¯µν in the Einstein-Grommer
approach as a placeholder for a representation of matter not included in the
current theoretical approach. Sure, you can set γ¯µν to be a Schwarzschild-like
metric with a singularity at the center. But you don’t have to do that to
make the Einstein-Grommer argument work, and even if you do make that
assumption, you should still take this particular inner metric with a singu-
larity at its center as a placeholder for a representation or theory of matter
not yet provided.20
But now wait a minute. You might have disliked the occurence of sin-
gularities as representations of particles, but at least the singularity (in lieu
of a non-vanishing energy-momentum tensor) gave you an idea of where in
spacetime the particle was supposed to be. True, Earman and Tamir rightly
pointed out that the singularity is not actually part of spacetime, and so it
can hardly serve to localize the particle in spacetime. Still, you might think
that we’re throwing the baby out with the bath water by not choosing any
inner metric. After all, is it not the case then that the curve we have been
focusing on is just any curve, without any reason to think of this curve as
the curve of a material particle?21
Again, I think we can counter this criticism by comparing the Einstein-
Grommer approach to Einstein’s treatment of the Sun-Mercury system in
19Note that there are interior extensions of the Schwarzschild metric that model the
interior of the Sun by solutions of the non-vacuum field equations (1), for example by an
incompressible perfect fluid. See Bonnor [1992], section 5.
20If I had given more historical details, I could have, I believe, shown that Einstein
himself saw the occurence of a singularity in the inner metric in exactly this way. This
exegetical argument would have started with evidence that, from early on, he saw GR as a
theory of the pure gravitational field without any constraints on what kinds of matter give
rise to the gravitational field. Furthermore, I would have argued that even in the Einstein-
Grommer paper he clearly forbids singularities outside of material particles (where the
theory is supposed to give an adequate and deterministic representation of gravitational
fields) but has no problem with them appearing inside of material systems, where the
theory can provide at best phenomenological placeholders for a future ‘proper’ theory of
matter anyhow. Thus, for Einstein energy-momentum tensors as alleged representatives
of material systems were on a par with singularities: both were only placeholders for a
proper theory of matter.
21I thank Jim Weatherall for putting this question to me.
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Einstein [1915]. What Einstein did there was to assume that Mercury would
move on some geodesic of the exterior gravitational field produced by the
Sun. He calculated an approximation to the external gravitational field of a
static, spherically symmetric and asymptotically flat body; this gravitational
field he saw as represented by the connection components Γνµσ of a metric
gµν which deviated only slightly from the flat Minkowski metric. He then
inserted these gravitational field components Γνµσ into the geodesic equation
(2). He showed that this law contained Newton’s first law and Newton’s
second law with a gravitational potential giving rise to a force as a limiting
case, and showed how the resulting Keplerian laws for orbits differ in his
theory as compared to its Newtonian limit. In the end, he obtained that
according to the new theory the perihelion ǫ of any geodesic orbit around
the Sun is given by
ǫ = 24π3
a2
T 2c2(1− e2)
(5)
Here a denotes the length of the semimajor axis of the orbit in question, e
its eccentricity, c the speed of light, and T the orbital period of the planet in
question. Einstein then takes the astronomically known values for Mercury,
plugs them into equation (5), and thereby predicts that Mercury’s perihelion
changes by 43” per century.
Note that there is nothing in the theoretical description that singles out
any particular path as that of Mercury. There is no theoretical representation
of Mercury, no model. All that is there is the assumption that Mercury will
move on one of the geodesics of the affine connection determined by the
spherically symmetric field of the Sun. A general equation that all possible
geodesic orbits have to fulfil is derived. And then external knowledge is used
to single out one of these orbits as that of Mercury. Einstein trusts that
the astronomers have measured the orbital period, the semimajor axis and
the eccentricity of Mercury correctly. It is this external knowledge, plugged
into his theoretical model, which does not in itself contain a representation
of Mercury or its path, that produces the prediction.
In many ways, the whole vacuum approach to the problem of motion
is about the question as to whether in this kind of scenario we really have
to assume the geodesic equation as the equation of motion of matter over
and above the gravitational field equations. Indeed, let us look at the Sun-
Mercury system within the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach. The problem
of motion, then, is the question whether Einstein really had to introduce the
13
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gravitational field equations (to describe the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun) and the geodesic equation (to describe the path of Mercury subject
to this gravitational field) as separate assumptions.22 Could he have only
assumed the gravitational field equations and derived that Mercury moves
on a geodesic of the exterior field of the Sun? My point is that, just like
in Einstein’s 1915 treatment, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach does not
need to commit to a theoretical model that allows us to localise Mercury
internally. It is fine to ask whether the exterior gravitational field around
a given curve ‘forces’ that curve to be a geodesic. Just like in the 1915
treatment, Einstein and Grommer could then use external knowledge about
whether that particular curve is actually the curve of a material object, or
of Mercury in particular. No inner metric, no singularity to represent the
material body, is actually needed.
Let us take a step back though, for there is an important difference be-
tween the structure of Einstein’s 1915 treatment of Mercury on the one hand
and the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach on the other. In the Mercury case
Einstein had assumed (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic, i.e. a special
kind of curve, and model-external knowledge about the period, eccentricity
and semimajor axis of Mercury could then be used to determine which of
the many geodesics of the Schwarzschild metric corresponded to the path
of Mercury. But in the case of the Einstein-Grommer argument, what is in
question is whether we can prove that the path of Mercury, say, is a geodesic.
Thus, at first sight it looks as if while the 1915 argument only needed ex-
ternal knowledge to determine which geodesic is that of Mercury, appeal to
external knowledge in the Einstein-Grommer case would have to determine
a.) that this curve is a geodesic and b.) that it is the curve of a material
body.
Einstein and Grommer did not aim to derive both a.) and b.). Instead,
while Einstein in 1915 used external knowledge at the end of his argument,
Einstein and Grommer in 1927 use it at the beginning. They start out by
assuming that a given curve is the curve of a material particle, and then
ask whether having a regular outer metric (which solves the vacuum field
equations) around the curve means that the curve of this material particle,
22Interestingly, Einstein did not yet have the final gravitational field equations in the
Mercury paper; he found them a week later, in his fourth paper of November 1915. How-
ever, the approximation of the Schwarzschild metric that he uses in the Mercury paper is
an approximative solution of both the field equations from the Mercury paper, and of the
final Einstein field equations.
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given the further conditions summarized in section 3.2, must be a geodesic.
Rather than finishing the argument by appeal to external knowledge (as
in Einstein 1915), the Einstein-Grommer argument starts with an appeal to
external knowledge, which singles out a particular curve as that of a material
body.23
Either way, both in Einstein’s 1915 treatment and in the Einstein-Grommer
approach there is no reason to interpret the singularity (appearing in the
Schwarzschild metric or the inner metric, respectively) literally. In both
cases, the singularity should be interpreted to signify a placeholder or a blind
spot of the theoretical treatment, rather than something that should be inter-
preted literally, as referring and approximately true. Indeed, both Einstein’s
1915 treatment of the Sun-Mercury system and Einstein’s and Grommer’s
treatment of an arbitrary material particle subject to an external gravita-
tional field work just as well if, in the former case, no interior metric (to
describe the interior of the Sun) or, in the latter case, no inner metric (to
represent the location of the particle on the curve), is ever specified.
5 Conclusion
I started out by saying that whether we are realists or antirealists, we should
aim for a careful interpretation, rather than a literal interpretation, of the
scientific theory that we want to be realists or anti-realists about. As a case
study, I argued that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion in GR,
and the Einstein-Grommer approach in particular, is far more sensible and
promising if we interpret the singularities not as representing material bodies
but as placeholders for a representation of material bodies that is not included
in the model. Indeed, I argued that the approach does not even need the
23There is a further disanalogy between Einstein’s 1915 derivation of the perihelion of
Mercury and the Einstein-Grommer argument of 1927. In the former the choice of (an
approximation) the Schwarzschild metric to represent the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun does important work in the derivation of Mercury’s perihelion. In the Einstein-
Grommer approach, no choice of a concrete outer metric is necessary to derive that the
curve of the particle which is surrounded by the outer metric must be a geodesic. The
reason for this difference is that the Einstein-Grommer approach aims to be more general;
it only aims to derive that a material body moves on some geodesic of the outer metric.
However, note that it is not the case that any outer metric is allowed by the approach:
the class of outer metrics that the approach can work with is heavily constrained by steps
2 and 3 of the Einstein-Grommer argument (see section 3.2).
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introduction of singularities to represent material bodies; their introduction
does not do any work in answering the question at hand.24
Given that in their paper Einstein and Grommer seem to take the singu-
larities as representing material bodies, one might wonder whether this al-
legedly more careful interpretation does not fall prey to the criticism that the
careful interpreter presumes to understand the theory/formalism in question
better than its originators. This might seem at odds with the realist tenet
of taking scientists and science ‘seriously’. I do indeed think that putting
the Einstein-Grommer paper into its proper historical context by analysing
Einstein’s correspondence leading up to the paper and by relating it to his
overarching research project at the time would convincingly show that he
subscribed to something very much like the ‘placeholder interpretation’ I de-
fended above. Showing this in detail will have to wait for a much longer
paper, and I do not ask the reader to just take my word for it. So let us say,
for the sake of the argument, that Einstein and Grommer did indeed intend
the singularities as representatives of material objects in a rather straight-
forward way. I believe that we should not take their word for it either. And
neither did Einstein. Just a few years after the Einstein-Grommer paper, in
his famed 1933 Spencer lectures at the University of Oxford, Einstein told
us in his opening words: “If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist
anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following
advice: Don’t listen to his words, examine his achievements.”25
In philosophy of science, I believe there is no better way of examining a
scientist’s achievements than by looking for the best possible interpretation
24The argument that we should thus not see a realist as comitted to being a realist about
the singularities appearing in the Einstein-Grommer paper resonates well with selective
or posit realism as introduced by Vickers [2013]. The idea there is that we should only
be realists with respect to components of a prediction that ‘fuel the success’ of the pre-
diction, i.e. that are indispensable in the derivation of what is predicted. Using Vickers’
distinction the introduction of a singular inner metric in the Einstein-Grommer approach
is an idle rather than a working posit. However, note that the call for careful rather than
literal interpretations with which I started is independent of / complementary to aiming
for identification of the idle posits in a derivation. For even if we had found that the
introduction of the singular inner metric did do work in the derivation of geodesic mo-
tion could we have argued (with less force) that the singularity should be interpreted as
a placeholder for a future theory of matter, as a temporary measure within an effective
theory, and thus not as something that we should interpret as possesing as much ‘reality’
or ‘referring power’ as the regular outer metric governed by the field equations.
25See Einstein [1934], and van Dongen [2010] for a detailed analysis of the text.
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of his or her theories. To do that, we have to not just listen to the words
of the scientist who created or discovered it; we have to see what the theory
does in practice, how it is used ; which of its parts really do the work.
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Holism, or the Erosion of Modularity –  
a Methodological Challenge for Validation 
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Johannes Lenhard, Bielefeld University 
 
abstract 
Modularity is a key concept in building and evaluating complex simulation models. My main 
claim is that in simulation modeling modularity degenerates for systematic methodological 
reasons. Consequently, it is hard, if not impossible, to accessing how representational (inner 
mathematical) structure and dynamical properties of a model are related. The resulting problem 
for validating models is one of holism. 
The argument will proceed by analyzing the techniques of parameterization, tuning, and 
kludging. They are – to a certain extent – inevitable when building complex simulation models, 
but corrode modularity.  As a result, the common account of validating simulations faces a major 
problem and testing the dynamical behavior of simulation models becomes all the more 
important. Finally, I will ask in what circumstances this might be sufficient for model validation. 
 
1. Introduction 
For the moment, imagine a scene at a car racing track. The air smells after gasoline. The pilot of 
the F1 racing car has just steered into his box and is peeling himself out of the straight cockpit. 
He puts off his helmet, shakes his sweaty hair, and then his eyes make contact to the technical 
director with a mixture of anger, despair, and helplessness. The engine had not worked as it 
should, and for a known reason: the software. However, the team had not been successful in 
attributing the miserable performance to a particular parameter setting. The machine and the 
software interacted in unforeseen and intricate ways. This explains the exchange of glances 
between pilot and technical director. The software’s internal interactions and interfaces proved to 
be so complicated that the team had not been able to localize an error or a bug, rather remained 
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suspicious that some complex interaction of seemingly innocent assumptions or parameter 
settings was leading to the insufficient performance. 
The story happened in fact
1
 and it is remarkable since it displays how invasive computational 
modeling is into areas that smell most analogous. I reported this short piece for another reason, 
however, namely because the situation is typical for complex computational and simulation 
models. Validation procedures, while counting on modularity, run against a problem of holism. 
Both concepts, modularity and holism, are notions at the fringe of philosophical terminology. 
Modularity is used in many guises and is not a particularly philosophical notion. It features 
prominently in the context of complex design, planning, and building – from architecture to 
software. Modularity stands for first breaking down complicated tasks into small and well-
defined sub-tasks and then re-assembling the original global task with a well-defined series of 
steps. It can be argued that modularity is the key pillar on which various rational treatments of 
complexity rest – from architecture to software engineering. 
Holism is a philosophical term to a somewhat higher degree and is covered in recent compendia. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia, for instance, includes (sub-)entries on methodological, 
metaphysical, relational, or meaning holism. Holism generically states that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, meaning that the parts of a whole are in intimate interconnection, such 
that they cannot exist independently of the whole, or cannot be understood without reference to 
the whole. Especially W. V. O. Quine has made the concept popular, not only in philosophy of 
language, but also in philosophy of science, where one speaks of the so-called Duhem-Quine 
thesis. This thesis is based on the insight that one cannot test a single hypothesis in isolation, but 
that any such test depends on “auxiliary” theories or hypotheses, for example how the 
measurement instruments work. Thus any test addresses a whole ensemble of theories and 
hypotheses. 
Lenhard and Winsberg (2010) have discussed the problem of confirmation holism in the context 
of validating complex climate models. They argued that “due to interactivity, modularity does 
not break down a complex system into separately manageable pieces.” (2010, 256) In a sense, I 
want to pick up on this work, but put the thesis into a much more general context, i.e. pointing 
                                                
1
 In spring 2014, the Red Bull team experienced a crisis due to recalcitrant problems with the 
Renault engine, due to a partial software update. 
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out a dilemma that is built on the tension between modularity and holism and that occurs quite 
generally in simulation modeling. The potential philosophical novelty is debated controversially 
in philosophy of science, for instance Humphreys (2009) vs. Frigg and Reiss (2009). The latter 
authors deny novelty, but concede issues of holism might be an exception. My paper confirms 
that holism is a key concept when reasoning about simulation. (I see more reasons for 
philosophical novelty, though.) 
My main claim is the following: According to the rational picture of design, modularity is a key 
concept in building and evaluating complex models. In simulation modeling, however, 
modularity erodes for systematic methodological reasons. Moreover, the very condition for 
success of simulation undermines the most basic pillar of rational design. Thus the resulting 
problem for validating models is one of (confirmation) holism. 
Section 2 discusses modularity and its central role for the so-called rational picture of design. 
Herbert Simon’s highly influential parable of the watchmakers will feature prominently. It 
paradigmatically captures complex systems as a sort of large clockwork mechanism. This 
perspective suggests the computer would enlarge the tractability of complex systems due to its 
vast capacity for handling (algorithmic) mechanisms. Complex simulations then would appear as 
the electronic incarnation of a gigantic assembly of cogwheels. This viewpoint is misleading, I 
will argue. Instead, I want to emphasize the dis-analogy to how simulation models work. The 
methodology of building complex simulation models thwarts modularity in systematic ways. 
Simulation is based on an iterative and exploratory mode of modeling that leads to a sort of 
holism that erodes modularity.  
I will present two arguments for the erosion claim, one from parameterization and tuning 
(section 3), the other from klu(d)ging (section 4). Both are, in practice, part-and-parcel of 
simulation modeling and both make modularity erode. The paper will conclude by drawing 
lessons about the limits of validation (section 5). Most accounts of validation require, if often not 
explicitly, modularity and are incompatible with holism. In contrast, the exploratory and iterative 
mode of modeling restricts validation, at least to a certain extent, to testing (global) predictive 
virtues. This observation shakes the rational (clockwork) picture of design and of the computer. 
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2. The rational picture 
The design of complex systems has a long tradition in architecture and engineering. At the same 
time, it has not been much covered in literature, because design was conceived as a matter for 
experienced craftsmanship rather than analytical investigation. The work of Pahl and Beitz 
(1984, plus revised editions 1996, 2007) gives a relatively recent account of design in 
engineering. A second, related source for reasoning about design is the design of complex 
computer systems. Here, one can find more explicit accounts, since the computer led to complex 
systems much faster than any tradition of craftsmanship could grow. A widely read example is 
Herbert Simon’s “Sciences of the Artificial” (1969). Still up to today, techniques of high-level 
languages, object-oriented programming, etc. make the practice of design change on a fast scale. 
One original contributor to this discussion is Frederic Brooks, software and computer expert (and 
former manager at IBM) and also hobby architect. In his 2010 monograph “The Design of 
Design”, he describes the rational model of design that is widely significant, though it is much 
more often adopted in practice than explicitly formulated in theoretical literature. The rational 
picture starts with assuming an overview of all options at hand. According to Simon, for 
instance, the theory of design is the general theory of search through large combinatorial spaces 
(Simon 1969, 54). The rational model then presupposes a utility function and a design tree, 
which are spanning the space of possible designs. Brooks rightly points out that these are 
normally not at hand. Nevertheless, design is conceived as a systematic step-by-step process. 
Pahl and Beitz aim at detailing these steps in their rational order. Also, Simon presupposes the 
rational model, arguably motivated by making design feasible for artificial intelligence (see 
Brooks 2010, 16). Wynston Royce, to give another example, introduced the “waterfall model” 
for software design (1970). Royce was writing about managing the development of large 
software systems and the waterfall model consisted in following a hierarchy (“downward”), 
admitting to iterate steps on one layer, but not with much earlier (“upward”) phases of the design 
process. Although Royce actually saw the waterfall model as a straw man, it was cited positively 
as paradigm of software development (cf. Brooks on this point). 
Some hierarchical order is a key element of the rational picture of design and presumes 
modularity. Let me illustrate this point. Consider first a simple brick wall. It consists of a 
multitude of modules, each with certain form and static properties. These are combined into 
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potentially very large structures. It is a strikingly simple example, because all modules (bricks) 
are similar. 
A more complicated, though closely related, example is the one depicted in figure 1 where an 
auxiliary building of Bielefeld University is put together from container modules.  
 
Figure 1: A part of Bielefeld University is built from container modules. 
 
These examples illustrate how deeply ingrained modularity is in our way of building (larger) 
objects. Figure 2 displays a standard picture for designing and developing complex (software) 
systems. 
 
Figure 2: Generic architecture of complex software, from the AIAA Guide for the Verification and 
Validation of Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations (1998). Modules of one layer might be used by 
different modules on a higher layer. 
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Some complex overall task is split up into modules that can be tackled independently and by 
different teams. The hierarchical structure shall ensure the modules can be integrated to make up 
the original complex system. Modularity not only plays a key role when designing and building 
complex systems, it also is of crucial importance when taking account of the system. Validation 
is usually conceived in the very same modular structure: independently validated modules are 
put together in a controlled way for making up a validated bigger system. The standard account 
of how computational models are verified and validated gives very rigorous guidelines that are 
all based on the systematic realization of modularity (Oberkampf and Roy 2010, see also Fillion 
2017). In short, modularity is key for designing as well as for validating complex systems.  
This observation is paradigmatically expressed in Simon’s parable of the two watchmakers. You 
find it in Simon’s 1962 paper “The Architecture of Complexity” that has become a chapter in his 
immensely influential “The Sciences of the Artificial” (Simon 1969). There, Simon investigates 
the structure of complex systems. The stable structures, so Simon argues, are the hierarchical 
ones. He expressed his idea by telling the parable of the two watchmakers named Hora and 
Tempus (1969, 90-92). P. Agre describes the setting with the following words: 
“According to this story, both watchmakers were equally skilled, but only one of them, Hora, 
prospered. The difference between them lay in the design of their watches. Each design involved 
1000 elementary components, but the similarity ended there. Tempus' watches were not 
hierarchical; they were assembled one component at a time. Hora's watches, by contrast, were 
organized into hierarchical subassemblies whose "span" was ten. He would combine ten 
elementary components into small subassemblies, and then he would combine ten subassemblies 
into larger subassemblies, and these in turn could be combined to make a complete watch.” 
(Agre 2003) 
Since Hora takes additional steps for building modules, Tempus’ watches need less time for 
assembly. However, it was Tempus’ business that did not thrive, because of an additional 
condition not yet mentioned, namely some kind of noise. From time to time the telephone rings 
and whenever one of the watchmakers answers the call, all cogwheels and little screws fall apart 
and he has to re-start the assembly. While Tempus had to start from scratch, Hora could keep all 
finished modules and work from there. In the presence of noise, so the lesson goes, the modular 
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strategy is by far superior. Agre summarizes that modularity, he speaks of the functional role of 
components, comes out as a necessary element when designing complex systems: 
“For working engineers, hierarchy is not mainly a guarantee that subassemblies will remain 
intact when the phone rings. Rather, hierarchy simplifies the process of design cognitively by 
allowing the functional role of subassemblies to be articulated in a meaningful way in terms of 
their contribution to the function of the whole. Hierarchy allows subassemblies to be modified 
somewhat independently of one another, and it enables them to be assembled into new and 
potentially unexpected configurations when the need arises. A system whose overall functioning 
cannot be predicted from the functionality of its components is not generally considered to be 
well-engineered.” (Agre 2003) 
Now, the story works with rather particular examples insofar as watches exemplify complicated 
mechanical devices. The universe as a giant clockwork has been a common metaphor since the 
seventeenth century. Presumably, Simon was aware the clockwork picture is limited and he even 
mentioned that complicated interactions could lead to a sort of pragmatic holism.
2
 Nonetheless, 
the hierarchical order is established by the interaction of self-contained modules. 
There is an obvious limit to the watchmaker picture, namely systems have to remain manageable 
by human beings (watchmakers). There are many systems of practical interest that are too 
complex – from the earth’s climate to the aerodynamics of an airfoil. Computer models open up 
a new path here, since simulation models might contain a wealth of algorithmic steps far beyond 
what can be conceived in a clockwork picture.
3
 From this point of view, the computer appears as 
a kind of amplifier that helps to revitalize the rational picture. Do we have to look at simulation 
models as a sort of gigantic clockworks? In the following, I will argue that this viewpoint is 
seriously misleading. Simulation models are different from watches in important ways and I 
                                                
2	This kind of holism hence can occur even when modules are “independently validated”, since 
these modules when connected together could interact with each other in unpredicted ways. This 
is a strictly weaker form of holism than the one I am going to discuss.	
3
 Charles Babbage had designed his famous „Analytical Engine“ as a mechanistic computer. 
Tellingly, it did encounter serious problems exactly because of the mechanical limitations of its 
construction. 
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want to focus on the dis-analogy.
4
 Finally, we will learn from the investigation of simulation 
models about our picture of rationality. 
 
3. Erosion of modularity 1: Parameterization and tuning 
In stark contrast to the cogwheel picture of the computer, the methodology of simulation 
modeling erodes modularity in systematic ways. I want to discuss two separate though related 
aspects, firstly, parameterization and tuning and, secondly, kluging (also called kludging). Both 
are, for different reasons, part-and-parcel of simulation modeling; and both make modularity of 
models erode. Let us investigate them in turn and develop two arguments for erosion. 
Parameterization and tuning are key elements of simulation modeling that stretch the realm of 
tractable subject matter much beyond what is covered by theory. Furthermore, simulation models 
can make predictions even in fields that are covered by well-accepted theory only with the help 
of parameterization and tuning. In this sense, the latter are success conditions for simulations. 
Before we start with discussing an example, let me add a few words about terminology. There 
are different expressions that specify what is done with parameters. The four most common ones 
are (in alphabetical order): adaptation, adjustment, calibration, and tuning. These notions 
describe very similar activities, but also valuate differently what parameters are good for. 
Calibration is commonly used in the context of preparing an instrument, like calibrating a scale 
one time for using it very often in a reliable way. Tuning has a more pejorative tone, like 
achieving a fit with artificial measures, or fitting to a particular case. Adaptation and adjustment 
have more neutral meanings. 
Atmospheric circulation is a typical example. It is modeled on the basis of accepted theory (fluid 
dynamics, thermodynamics, motion) on a grand scale. Climate scientists call this the “dynamical 
core” of their models and there is more or less consensus about this part. Although the employed 
theory is part of physics, climate scientists mean a different part of their models when they speak 
of “the physics”. It includes all the processes that are not completely specified from the 
dynamical core. These processes include convection schemes, cloud dynamics, and many more. 
                                                
4
 There are several dis-analogies. One I am not discussing is that clockworks lack multi-
functionality. 
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The “physics” is where different models differ and the physics is what modeling centers regard 
as their achievements and try to maintain even if their models change into the next generation. 
The physics acts like a specifying supplement to the grand scale dynamics. It is based on 
modeling assumptions, say which sub-processes are important in convection, what should be 
resolved in the model and what should be treated via a parameterization scheme. Often, such 
processes are not known in full detail, and some aspects (at least) depend on what happens on a 
sub-grid scale. The dynamics of clouds, for instance, depends on a staggering span of very small 
(molecular) scales and much larger scales of many kilometers. Hence even if the laws that guide 
these processes would be known, they could not be treated explicitly in the simulation model. 
Modeling the physics has to bring in parameterization schemes.
5
 
How does moisture transport, for example, work? Rather than trying to investigate into the 
molecular details of how water vapor is entrained into air, scientists use a parameter, or a scheme 
of parameters, that controls moisture uptake so that known observations are met. Often, such 
parameters do not have a direct physical interpretation, nor do they need one, like when a 
parameter stands for a mixture of processes not resolved in the model. The important property 
rather is that they make the parameterization scheme flexible, so that the parameters of such a 
scheme can be changed in a way that makes the properties of the scheme (in terms of climate 
dynamics) match some known data or reference points. 
From this rather straightforward observation follows an important fact. A parameterization, 
including assignments of parameter values, makes sense only in the context of the larger model. 
Observational data are not compared to the parameterization in isolation. The Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC acknowledges the point that “parameterizations have to be understood in the 
context of their host models” (Solomon et al. 2007, 8.2.1.3) 
The question of whether the parameter value that controls moisture uptake (in our oversimplified 
example) is adequate can be answered only by examining how the entire parameterization 
behaves and, moreover, how the parameter value in the parameterization in the larger simulation 
model behaves. Answering such questions would require, for instance, looking at more global 
properties like mean cloud cover in tropical regions, or the amount of rain in some area. Briefly 
                                                
5
 Parameterization schemes and their more or less autonomous status are discussed in the 
literature, cf. Parker 2013, Smith 2002, or Gramelsberger and Feichter 2011. 
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stated, parameterization is a key component of climate modeling and tuning is part-and-parcel of 
parameterization.
6
 
It is important to note that tuning one parameter takes the values of other parameters as given, be 
they parameters from the same scheme, or be they parts of other schemes that are part of the 
model. A particular parameter value (controlling moisture uptake) is judged according to the 
results it yields for the overall behavior (like cloud cover). In other words, tuning is a local 
activity that is oriented at global behavior. Researchers might try to optimize parameter values 
simultaneously, but for reasons of computational complexity, this is possible only with a rather 
small subset of all parameters. A related issue is statistical regression methods that might be 
caught up in a local optimum. In climate modeling, skill and experience remain to be important 
for tuning (or adjustment). 
Furthermore, tuning parameters is not only oriented at the global model performance, it tends to 
blur the local behavior. This is because every model will be importantly imperfect, since it 
contains technical errors, works with insufficient knowledge, etc. – which is just the normal case 
in scientific practice. Now, tuning a parameter according to the overall behavior of the model 
then means that the errors, gaps, and bugs get compensated against each other (if in an opaque 
way). Mauritsen et al. (2012) have pointed this out in their pioneering paper about tuning in 
climate modeling. 
In climate models, cloud parameterizations play an important role, because they influence key 
statistics of the climate and, at the same time, cover major (remaining) uncertainties about how 
an adequate model should look like. Typically, such a parameterization scheme includes more 
than two dozens of parameters; most of them do not carry a clear physical interpretation. The 
simulation then is based on the balance of these parameters in the context of the overall model 
(including other parameterizations). Over the process of adjusting the parameters, these schemes 
become inevitably convoluted. I leave aside that models of atmosphere and oceans get coupled, 
which arguably aggravates the problem. 
                                                
6
 The studies of so-called perturbed physics ensembles convincingly showed that crucial 
properties of the simulation models hinge on exactly how parameter values are assigned 
(Stainforth et al. 2007). 
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Tuning is inevitable, part-and-parcel of simulation modeling methodology. It poses great 
challenges, like finding a good parameterization scheme for cloud dynamics, which is a recent 
area of intense research in meteorology. But when is a parameterization scheme a good one? On 
the one side, a scheme is sound when it is theoretically well motivated, on the other side, the key 
property of a parameterization scheme is its adaptability. Both criteria do not point into the same 
direction. There is, therefore, no optimum; finding a balance is still considered an art. I suspect 
that the widespread reluctance against publishing about practices of adjusting parameters comes 
from reservations against aspects that call for experience and art rather than theory and rigorous 
methodology. 
I want to maintain that nothing in the above argumentation is particular to climate. Climate 
modeling is just one example out of many. The point holds for simulation modeling quite 
generally. Admittedly, climate might be a somewhat peculiar case, because it is placed in a 
political context where some discussions seem to require that only ingredients of proven physical 
justification and realistic interpretation are admitted. Arguably, this expectation might motivate 
using the pejorative term of tuning. This reservation, however, ignores the very methodology of 
simulation modeling. Adjusting parameters is by no means particular to climate modeling, nor is 
it confined to areas where knowledge is weak. 
Another example will document this. Adjusting parameters is also occurring thermodynamics, an 
area of physics with very high theoretical reputation. The ideal gas equation is even taught in 
schools, it is a so-called equation of state (EoS) that describes how pressure and temperature 
depend on each other. However, actually using thermodynamics requires to work with less 
idealized equations of state than the ideal gas equation. More complicated equations of state find 
wide applications also in chemical engineering. They are typically very specific for certain 
substances and require extensive adjustment of parameters as Hasse and Lenhard (2017) describe 
and analyze. Clearly, being able to process specific adjustment strategies that are based on 
parameterization schemes is a crucial success condition. Simulation methods have made 
applicable thermodynamics in many areas of practical relevance, exactly because equations of 
state are tailored to particular cases of interest via adjusting parameters. 
One further example is from quantum chemistry, namely the so-called density functional theory 
(DFT), a theory developed in the 1960s that won the Nobel prize in 1998. Density functionals 
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capture the information of the Schroedinger equation, but are much more computationally 
tractable. However, only many-parameter functionals brought success in chemistry. The more 
tractable functionals with few parameters worked only in simpler cases of crystallography, but 
were unable to yield predictions accurate enough to be of chemical interest. Arguably, being able 
to include and adjust more parameters has been the crucial condition that had to be satisfied 
before DFT could gain traction in computational quantum chemistry, which happened around 
1990. This traction, however, is truly impressive. DFT is by now the most widely used theory in 
scientific practice, see Lenhard (2014) for a more detailed account of DFT and the development 
of computational chemistry. 
Whereas the adjustment of parameters – to use the more neutral terminology – is pivotal for 
matching given data, i.e. for predictive success, this very success condition also entails a serious 
disadvantage.
7
 Complicated schemes of adjusted parameters might block theoretical progress. In 
our climate case, any new cloud parameterization that intends to work with a more thorough 
theoretical understanding has to be developed for many years and then has to compete with a 
well-tuned forerunner. Again, this kind of problem is more general. In quantum chemistry, 
many-parameter adaptations of density functionals have brought great predictive success but at 
the same time render the rational re-construction of why such success occurs hard, if not 
impossible (Perdew et al. 2005, discussed in Lenhard 2014). The situation in thermodynamics is 
similar, cf. Hasse and Lenhard (2017). 
Let us take stock regarding the first argument for the erosion of modularity. Tuning, or adjusting, 
parameters is not merely an ad hoc procedure to smoothen a model, rather it is a pivotal 
component for simulation modeling. Tuning convolutes heterogeneous parts that do not have a 
common theoretical basis. Tuning proceeds holistically, on basis of global model behavior. How 
particular parts function often remains opaque. By interweaving local and global considerations, 
and by convoluting the interdependence of various parameter choices, tuning destructs 
modularity. 
Looking back to Simon’s clockmaker story, we see that its basic setting does not match the 
situation in a fundamental way. The perfect cogwheel picture is misleading, because it 
presupposes a clear identification of mechanisms and their interactions. In our examples, we saw 
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 There are other dangers, like over-fitting, that I leave aside. 
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that building a simulation model, different from building a clockwork, cannot proceed top-down. 
Moreover, different modules and their interfaces get convoluted during the processes of mutual 
adaptation. 
 
4. Erosion of modularity 2: kluging 
The second argument for the erosion of modularity approaches the matter from a different angle, 
namely from a certain practice in developing software known as kluging (also spelled kludging)
8
. 
“Kluge” is a term from colloquial language that became a term in computer slang. I remember 
when back in my childhood our family and another, befriended one drove towards holidays in 
two cars. In the middle of the night, while crossing the Alps, the exhaust pipe of our friends 
before us broke, creating a shower of sparks where the pipe met the asphalt. There was no 
chance of getting the exhaust pipe repaired, but the father did not hesitate long and used his 
necktie to fix it provisionally.  
The necktie worked as a kluge, which is in the words of Wikipedia “a workaround or quick-and-
dirty solution that is clumsy, inelegant, difficult to extend and hard to maintain, yet an effective 
and quick solution to a problem.” The notion has been incorporated and become popular in the 
language of software programming and is closely related to the notion of bricolage. 
Andy Clark, for instance, stresses the important role played by kluges in complex modular 
computer modeling. For him, a kluge is “an inelegant, ‘botched together’ piece of program; 
something functional but somehow messy and unsatisfying”, it is—Clark refers to Sloman—“a 
piece of program or machinery which works up to a point but is very complex, unprincipled in its 
design, ill-understood, hard to prove complete or sound and therefore having unknown 
limitations, and hard to maintain or extend”. (Clark 1987, 278) 
Kluges carried forward their way from programmers’ colloquial language into the body of 
philosophy guided by scholars like Clark and Wimsatt who are inspired both by computer 
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 Both spellings „kluge“ and „kludge“ are used. There is not even agreement of how to 
pronounce the word. In a way, that fits to the very concept. I will use “kluge“, but will not 
change the habits of other authors cited with “kludge“. 
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modeling and evolutionary theory.
9
 The important point in our present context is that kluges may 
function for a whole system, i.e. for the performance of the entire simulation model, whereas it 
has no meaning in relation to the submodels and modules: “what is a kludge considered as an 
item designed to fulfill a certain role in a large system, may be no kludge at all when viewed as 
an item designed to fulfill a somewhat different role in a smaller system.“ (Clark 1987, 279) 
Since kluging stems from colloquial language and is not seen as a good practice anyway, 
examples cannot be found easily in published scientific literature. This observation 
notwithstanding, kluging is a widely occurring phenomenon. Let me give an example that I know 
from visiting an engineering laboratory. There, researchers (chemical process engineers) are 
working with simulation models of an absorption column, the large steel structures in which 
reactions take place under controlled conditions. The scientific details do not matter here, since 
the point is that the engineers build their model on the basis of a couple of already existing 
modules, including proprietary software that they integrate into their simulation without having 
access to the code. Moreover, it is common knowledge in the community that this (unknown) 
code is of poor quality. Because of programming errors and because of ill-maintained interfaces, 
using this software package requires modifications on the part of the remaining code outside the 
package. These modifications are there for no good theoretical reason, albeit for good practical 
reasons. They make the overall simulation run as expected (in known cases); and they allow 
working with existing software. The modifications thus are typical kluges. 
Again, kluging occurs in virtually every site where large software programs are built. Simulation 
models hence are a prime instance, especially when the modeling steps of one group build on the 
results (models, software packages) of other groups. One common phenomenon is the increasing 
importance of “exception handling”, i.e. of finding effective repairs when the software, or the 
model, performs in unanticipated and undesired ways. In this situation, the software might 
include a bug that is invisible (does not affect results) most of the time, but becomes effective 
under particular conditions. Often extensive testing is needed for finding out about unwanted 
behavior that occurs in rare and particular situations that are conceived of as “exceptions”, 
indicating that researchers do not aim at a major reconstruction, but at a local repair, 
                                                
9
 The cluster of notions like bricolage and kluging common in software programming and 
biological evolution would demand a separate investigation. See, as a teaser, Francois Jacob’s 
account of evolution as bricolage (1994). 
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counteracting this particular exception. Exception handling can be part of a sound design 
process, but increased use of exception handling is symptomatic of excessive kluging. 
Presumably all readers who ever contributed to a large software program know about 
experiences of this kind. It is commonly accepted that the more comprehensive a piece of 
software gets, the more energy for exception handling new releases will require. Operating 
systems of computers, for example, often receive weekly patches. Many scientists who work 
with simulations are in a similar situation, though not obviously so. 
If, for instance, meteorologists want to work on, say, hurricanes, they will likely take a meso-
scale (multi-purpose) atmospheric model from the shelf of some trusted modeling center and add 
specifications and parameterizations relevant for hurricanes. Typically, they will not know in 
exactly what respects the model had been tuned, and also lack much other knowledge about 
strengths and weaknesses of this particular model. Consequently, when preparing their hurricane 
modules, they will add measures into their new modules that somehow balance out undesired 
model behavior. These measures can also be conceived as kluges. 
Why should we see these examples as typical instances and not as exceptions? Because they 
arise from practical circumstances of developing software, which is a core part of simulation 
modeling. Software engineering is a field that was envisioned as the “professional” answer to the 
increasing complexity of software. And I frankly admit that there are well-articulated concepts 
that would in principle ensure software is clearly written, aptly modularized, well maintained, 
and superbly documented. However, the problem is that science in principle is different from 
science in practice. 
In practice, there are strong and constant forces that drive software development into resorting to 
kluges. Economic considerations are always a reason, be it on the personal scale of research 
time, be it on the grand scale of assigning teams of developers to certain tasks. Usually, software 
is developed “on the move”, i.e. those who write it have to keep up with changing requirements 
and a narrow timeline, in science as well as industry. Of course, in the ideal case the 
implementation is tightly modularized. A virtue of modularity is that it is much quicker 
incorporating “foreign” modules than developing them from scratch. 
If these modules have some deficiencies, however, the developers will usually not start a 
fundamental analysis of how unexpected deviations occurred, but rather spend their energy for 
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adapting the interfaces so that the joint model will work as anticipated in the given 
circumstances. In common language: repair, rather than replace. Examples reach from 
integrating a module of atmospheric chemistry into an existing general circulation model up to 
implementing the new version of the operating system of your computer. Working with complex 
computational and simulation models seems to require a certain division of labor and this 
division, in turn, thrives on software traveling easily. At the same time, this will provoke kluges 
on the side of those that try to connect software modules. 
Kluges thus arise from unprincipled reasons: throw-away code, made for the moment, is not 
replaced later, but becomes forgotten, buried in more code, and eventually fixed. This will lead 
to a cascade of kluges. Once there, they prompt more kluges, tending to become layered and 
entrenched.
10
  
Foote and Yoder, prominent leaders in the field of software development, give an ironic and 
funny account of how attempts to maintain a rationally designed software architecture constantly 
fail in practice. 
“While much attention has been focused on high-level software architectural patterns, what is, in 
effect, the de-facto standard software architecture is seldom discussed. This paper examines this 
most frequently deployed of software architectures: the BIG BALL OF MUD. A big ball of mud 
is a casually, even haphazardly, structured system. Its organization, if one can call it that, is 
dictated more by expediency than design. Yet, its enduring popularity cannot merely be 
indicative of a general disregard for architecture. (…) 2. Reason for degeneration: ongoing 
evolutionary pressure, piecemeal growth: Even systems with well-defined architectures are prone 
to structural erosion. The relentless onslaught of changing requirements that any successful 
system attracts can gradually undermine its structure. Systems that were once tidy become 
overgrown as piecemeal growth gradually allows elements of the system to sprawl in an 
uncontrolled fashion.” (Foote and Yoder 1999, ch. 29) 
I would like to repeat the statement from above that there is no necessity in the corruption of 
modularity and rational architecture. Again, this is a question of science in practice vs. science in 
principle. “A sustained commitment to refactoring can keep a system from subsiding into a big 
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 Wimsatt (2007) writes about “generative entrenchment” when speaking about the analogy 
between software development and biological evolution, see also Lenhard and Winsberg (2010). 
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ball of mud,” Foote and Yoder concede. There are even directions in software engineering that 
try to counteract the degradation into Foote’s and Yoder’s big ball of mud. The movement of 
“clean code“, for instance, is directed against what Foote and Yoder describe. Robert Martin, the 
pioneer of this school, proposes to keep code clean in the sense of not letting the first kluge slip 
in. And surely there is no principled reason why one should not be able to avoid this. However, 
even Martin accepts the diagnosis of current practice. 
Similarly, Richard Gabriel (1996), another guru of software engineering, makes the analogy to 
housing architecture and Alexander’s concept of “habitability”, which intends to integrate 
modularity and piecemeal growth into one “organic order”. Anyway, when describing the 
starting point, he more or less duplicates what we heard above from Foote and Yoder. 
Finally, I want to point out that the matter of kluging is related to what is discussed in philosophy 
of science under the heading of opacity (like in Humphreys 2009). Highly kluged software 
becomes opaque. One can hardly disentangle the various reasons that led to particular pieces of 
code, because kluges are sensible only in the particular context at the time. In this important 
sense, simulation models are historical objects. They carry around – and depend on – their 
history of modifications. There are interesting analogies with biological evolution that have 
become a topic when complex systems had become a major issue in discussion computer use. 
Winograd and Flores, for instance, come to a conclusion that also holds in our context here: 
“each detail may be the result of an evolved compromise between many conflicting demands. At 
times, the only explanation for the system's current form may be the appeal to this history of 
modification.“ (1991, 94)
11
 
Thus, the brief look into the somewhat elusive field of software development has shown us that 
two conditions foster kluging. First, the exchange of software parts that is more or less motivated 
by flexibility and economic requirements. This thrives on networked infrastructure. Second, 
iterations and modifications are easy and cheap. Due to the unprincipled nature of kluges, their 
construction requires repeated testing whether they actually work in the factual circumstances. 
Kluges hence fit to the exploratory and iterative mode of modeling that characterizes 
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 Interestingly, Jacob (1994) gives a very similar account of biological evolution when he writes 
that simpler objects are more dependent on (physical) constraints than on history, while history  
plays the greater part when complexity increases. 
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simulations. Furthermore, layered kluges solidify themselves. They make code hard or 
impossible to understand; modifying pieces that are individually hard to understand will 
normally lead to a new layer of kluges – and so on. Thus, kluging makes modularity erode and 
this is the second argument why simulation modeling systematically undermines modularity. 
 
5. The limits of validation 
What does the erosion of modularity mean for the validation of computer simulations? We have 
seen that the power and scope of simulation is built on the tendency toward holism. But holism 
and the erosion of modularity are two sides of the same coin. The key point regarding 
methodology is that holism is driven by the very procedure that makes simulation so widely 
applicable! It is through adjustable parameters that simulation models can be applied to systems 
beyond the control of theory (alone). It is through this very strategy that modularity erodes. 
One ramification of utmost importance is about the concept of validation. In the context of 
simulation models the community speaks of verification and validation, or “V&V”. Both are 
related, but the unanimous advice in the literature is to keep them separate. While verification 
checks the model internally, i.e. whether the software indeed captures what it is supposed to, 
validation checks whether the model adequately represents the target system. A standard 
definition states that “verification [is] the process of determining that a model implementation 
accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description of the model and the solution to the 
model.” While validation is defined as “the process of determining the degree to which a model 
is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the 
model.” (Oberkampf and Trucano 2000, 3) Though there is some leeway of defining V&V, you 
get the gist of it from the saying: verification checks whether the model is right
12
, while 
validation checks whether we have the right model. 
Due to the increasing usage and growing complexity of simulations, the issue of V&V is itself a 
growing field in simulation literature. One example is the voluminous monograph by Oberkampf 
and Roy (2010) that meticulously defines and discusses the various steps to be included in V&V 
procedures. A first move in this analysis is to separate model form from model parameters. Each 
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 This sloppy saying should not obscure that the process of verification comprises a package of 
demanding tasks. 
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parameter then belongs to a particular type of parameter that determines which specific steps in 
V&V are required. Oberkampf gives the following list of model parameter types: 
“  - measurable properties of the system or the surroundings, 
- physical modeling parameters, 
- ad hoc model parameters, 
- numerical algorithm parameters, 
- decision parameters, 
- uncertainty modeling parameters.” (Oberkampf and Roy 2010, section 13.5.1, p.623) 
My point is that the adjustable parameters we discussed are of a type that is evading the V&V 
fencing. These parameters cannot be kept separate from the model form, since the form alone 
does not capture representational (nor behavioral) adequacy. A cloud parameterization scheme 
makes sense only with parameter values already assigned and the same holds for a many-
parameter density functional. Before the process of adjustment, the mere form of the functional 
does not offer anything to be called adequate or inadequate. In simulation models, as we have 
seen, (predictive) success and adaptation are entangled. 
The separation of verification and validation thus cannot be fully maintained in practice. It is not 
possible to first verify that a simulation model is ‘right’ before tackling the ‘external’ question 
whether it is the right model. Performance tests hence become the main handle for confirmation. 
This is a version of confirmation holism that points toward the limits of analysis. This does not 
lead to a complete conceptual breakdown of verification and validation. Rather, holism comes in 
degrees
13
 and is a pernicious tendency that undermines the verification-validation divide.
14
  
Finally, we come back to the analogy, or rather dis-analogy between computer and clockwork. In 
an important sense, computers are not amplifiers, i.e. they are not analogous to gigantic 
clockworks. They do not (simply) amplify the force of mathematical modeling that has got stuck 
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 I thank Rob Muir for pointing this out to me. 
14
 My conclusion about the inseparability of verification and validation is in good agreement 
with Winsberg’s more specialized claim in (2010) where he argues about model versions that 
evolve due to changing parameterizations, which has been criticized by Morrison (2015). As far 
as I can see, her arguments do not apply to the case made in this paper, which rests on a tendency 
toward holism, rather than a complete conceptual breakdown. 
	
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -367-
 
20 
in too demanding operations. Rather, computer simulation is profoundly changing the setting of 
how mathematics is used.  
In the present paper I questioned the rational picture of design. Also Brooks did this when he 
observed that Pahl and Beitz had to include more and more steps to somehow capture an 
unwilling and complex practice of design, or when he refers to Donald Schön who criticized a 
one-sided “technical rationality” that underlies the Rational Model (Brooks 2010, chapter 2). 
However, my criticism works, if you want, from ‘within’. It is the very methodology of 
simulation modeling, and how it works in practice, that challenges the rational picture by making 
modularity erode. 
The challenge to the rational picture has quite fundamental ramification because this picture 
influenced so many ways we conceptualize our world. I will spare the philosophical discussion 
of how simulation modeling is challenging our concept of mathematization and with it our 
picture of scientific rationality for another paper. Just let me mention the philosophy of mind as 
one example. How we are inclined to think about mind today is deeply influenced by the 
computer and by our concept of mathematical modeling. Jerry Fodor has defended a most 
influential thesis that mind is composed of information-processing devices that operate largely 
separately (Fodor 1983). Consequently, re-thinking how computer models are related to 
modularity invites to re-thinking the computational theory of the mind. 
 
I would like to thank … 
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Abstract
Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism
appear to have a signicant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals.
They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to
decrease the inaccuracy of ones beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that
conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide range of mea-
sures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that among the measures in
the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditional-
ization, others from which one can prove probabilism, and none from
which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based ap-
proach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.
A central concern of epistemology is uncovering the rational constraints
on an agents credences, both at a time and over time. At a time, it is typi-
cally maintained that an agents credences should conform to the probability
axioms, and over time, it is often maintained that an agents credences should
conform to conditionalization. How could such norms be justied? The tra-
ditional approach is to show that if your credences violate these norms, then
there is a set of bets, each of which you consider fair, but which collectively
are such that if you accept them all you will lose money whatever happens.
Since you do not want to be a money pump, you should adopt coherent cre-
dences. However, this Dutch book strategy rests on controversial assumptions
concerning prudential rationality and its connection to epistemic rationality.
The prudential elements may not be essential to the Dutch book approach
(Vineberg 2012). But even so, it would be better to be able to derive prob-
abilism and conditionalization from a clearly epistemic basic norm. A more
1
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recent approach seeks to do precisely that: to derive probabilism and condi-
tionalization from the intuitive epistemic norm that you should endeavor to
make your credences as accurateas close to the truthas possible. Drawing
on the work of Joyce (1998; 2009), Greaves and Wallace (2006) and Predd et
al. (2009), Pettigrew (2013) argues that the accuracy-based approach vindi-
cates both probabilism and conditionalization. We argue that this conclusion
is too strong: at present, the accuracy-based approach can vindicate either
conditionalization or probabilism, but not both.
Our argument turns on the features of various proposed measures of accu-
racy. The accuracy-based approach is predicated on the assumption that the
accuracy of your credences can be measured. Pettigrew (2013, 905) argues
that it is a strength of the accuracy-based approach that conditionalization
and probabilism follow from a wide range of measures, so that it doesnt
matter which measure is used to assess the accuracy of an agents credences.
Our counter-argument is that it does matter: of the known measures, some
vindicate conditionalization, and some vindicate probabilism, but there is
no known measure of inaccuracy from which both conditionalization and
probabilism can be derived.
1 Accuracy and conditionalization
First, let us briey run through the argument via which conditionalization
and probabilism are claimed to follow from considerations of accuracy, start-
ing with conditionalization. Suppose you have credences b = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
in propositions X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn), where the propositions form a parti-
tion, i.e. they are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, so that exactly one of
them is true. The accuracy approach takes it that your primary epistemic
goal is having credences that are as accurate as possible, where complete ac-
curacy is a credence of 1 in the true proposition and a credence of 0 in each
of the false propositions. The closer your credences are to complete accuracy,
the better.
For this epistemic goal to make sense, we need a measure of closeness. In
what follows we will discuss several such measures, expressed as measures of
inaccuracy: the larger the measure, the further your credences are from the
truth. Hence your goal is to minimize the value of this inaccuracy measure.
By far the dominant measure in the literature is the quadratic rule or Brier
rule, which takes the square of the di¤erence between your credence in each
2
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -372-
proposition and its truth value, and sums the results. So for a partition, if
Ii(b) is the inaccuracy of credences b when proposition Xi is true, then the
Brier rule can be expressed as follows:1
Simple Brier rule: Ii(b) = (1  bi)
2 +
P
j 6=i b
2
j :
The Brier rule has been defended by epistemologists (Joyce 2009, 290; Leitgeb
and Pettigrew 2010, 219), and is frequently cited as the prime example of an
inaccuracy measure (Greaves and Wallace 2006, 627; Pettigrew 2013, 899).
Suppose you obtain evidence E that is consistent with some but not
all of the propositions X. How should you distribute your credence over
the remaining propositions? If your goal is to minimize your inaccuracy,
presumably the best you can do is to minimize your expected inaccuracy
given your prior credences b. So suppose that after you learn E, you shift
your credence in proposition Xi from bi to x. If Xi is true, the contribution
of this new credence to your overall inaccuracy is (1  x)2, and if Xi is false,
the contribution is x2. Given your prior credences b, you judge that the
chance that Xi is true is bi, and the chance that Xi is false is
P
E i bj, where
the notation E   i indicates that the sum is over all propositions consistent
with E except Xi. That is, the total contribution C of this new credence to
your expected inaccuracy is given by:
C = (1  x)2 bi + x
2
P
E i bj:
Your goal is to minimize C. So consider where dC=dx = 0:
dC
dx
=  2 (1  x) bi + 2x
P
E i bj
=  2bi + 2x
P
E bj;
where the sum in the last line is now over all propositions consistent with E.
This expression is zero when
x =
biP
E bj
:
1We call the version of the Brier rule applicable to a partition the simple Brier rule
only for ease of reference (and similarly for the simple log rule and simple spherical rule
to be introduced later).
3
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But note that this value for x is just your prior credence in Xi conditional
on E:
c(XijE) =
c(Xi ^ E)
c(E)
=
biP
E bj
:
That is, conditionalizing on E minimizes your expected inaccuracy.2 So if
your epistemic goal is to minimize inaccuracy, you should conditionalize on
new evidence.
Greaves and Wallace (2006) generalize this proof to cover measures of
inaccuracy other than the Brier rule. In particular, they show that condi-
tionalization minimizes expected inaccuracy for any measure of inaccuracy
Ii(b) satisfying strict propriety:
Strict propriety: For any distinct probabilistic credences b and b0,
P
i biIi(b) <P
i biIi(b
0).
Strict propriety says that the expected inaccuracy of your current credences
b is lower than the expected inaccuracy of any alternative credences b0 you
might adopt, where the expectation is calculated according to your current
credences. If it fails, then the injunction to minimize inaccuracy makes your
beliefs pathologically unstable: you can lower your expected inaccuracy by
shifting your credences, even in the absence of new evidence. Hence strict
propriety serves as a reasonable constraint on measures of inaccuracy. The
Brier rule is strictly proper, as are several other proposed inaccuracy mea-
sures to be discussed below.
Greaves and Wallace begin by introducing some terminology. They say
that a set of credences b recommends a set of credences b0 i¤ the expected
inaccuracy of b0 is at least as low as the expected inaccuracy of b, where the
expectation is calculated using credences b:
Recommendation: b recommends b0 i¤
P
i biIi(b) 
P
i biIi(b
0)
Note that if the inaccuracy measure Ii(b) satises strict propriety, then b
only recommends itself.
They further dene quasi-conditionalization as a belief updating rule
that stipulates that your credences on learning E should be some set rec-
ommended by your prior credences conditional on E. They then prove
2This proof is a simplied version of the one in Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010).
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that quasi-conditionalization is always optimal: whatever measure of inac-
curacy you choose, strictly proper or not, the expected inaccuracy of quasi-
conditionalizing is at least as low as the expected inaccuracy of any other
updating rule. Then if your measure of inaccuracy is strictly proper, con-
ditionalization itself is optimal, since for strictly proper measures, credences
only recommend themselves. In fact, since the inequality in strict propriety
is strict, conditionalization is strictly better than any other updating rule:
it uniquely minimizes expected inaccuracy. As Pettigrew (2013, 905) notes,
this is a strong result: any inaccuracy measure satisfying strict propriety can
be used to vindicate conditionalization, and strict propriety is a constraint
we would expect any reasonable inaccuracy measure to obey anyway.
2 Accuracy and probabilism
Now let us turn to the arguments that your credences at a time should obey
the probability axioms. So far, we have been assuming that the propositions
we are interested in form a partition. But the probability axioms include
constraints on your credences in disjunctions, and to model such constraint
we need to allow that more than one of the propositions you are considering
can be true. To that end, suppose that you have credences b = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
in propositions X = (X1; X2; : : : ; Xn), where now the set of propositions
forms a Boolean algebra, i.e. it is closed under negation and disjunction. So
now we can no longer model a possible world simply as an index (picking
out the unique true proposition); instead, we need to label each proposition
separately as either true or false. That is, a possible world is specied by
! = (!1; !2; : : : !n), where !i = 1 when Xi is true and !i = 0 when Xi is
false. In this context, the Brier rule can be rewritten as follows:
Symmetric Brier rule: I(!;b) =
P
i (bi   !i)
2 :
As before, the inaccuracy of your beliefs according to the Brier rule is given
by the sum of the squares of the distance of each belief from the relevant
truth value. That is, the Brier rule is symmetric, in the sense that distance
from the truth for a true proposition plays the same role as distance from
falsity plays for a false proposition. This property will be important later.
The general strategy for defending probabilism based on accuracy goes as
follows. Suppose that your current credences are incoherentthat is, they
5
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Figure 1: De Finettis construction for a two-element partition (Joyce 1998,
582).
violate the probability axioms. Then one can appeal to a measure of inaccu-
racy to show that there are coherent credences that dominate your current
credencesthat are more accurate than your current credences whatever the
truth values of the propositions concerned. If your goal is to minimize in-
accuracy, this gives you a clear reason to avoid incoherent credences: there
are always coherent credences that are more accurate, whatever the world is
like.
De Finetti (1974, 87) constructs a dominance argument of this kind based
on the Brier rule.3 For illustration, consider the simple case of a proposi-
tion and its negation: that is, the propositions under consideration are just
(X;:X). In this case the space of possible credences forms a plane, as shown
in gure 1: your credence inX is the horizontal coordinate, and your credence
in :X is the vertical coordinate. The two possible worlds are represented by
the points (1; 0) and (0; 1), and your credences obey the probability axioms if
and only if they lie on the straight line that connects these two points, since
along this line your credences in X and :X sum to 1.
Suppose that your credences are incoherent: they are represented by a
point c = (c1; c2) that lies o¤ this diagonal. And suppose rst that the
3As Joyce (1998, 580) notes, de Finetti sets up this argument in terms of bets. However,
as Pettigrew (2013, 901) points out, it can be redescribed as an accuracy-based argument.
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actual world is represented by the bottom-right corner (1; 0)i.e. X is true
and :X is false. Then the inaccuracy of your credences according to the
Brier rule is I(!; c) = (1   c1)
2 + (c2)
2. Note that this is just the square of
the Euclidean distance between (c1; c2) and (1; 0). That is, every point on the
circle segment C has the same inaccuracy as c, and every point between C
and (1; 0) has a lower inaccuracy. Now suppose instead that the actual world
is represented by the top-left corner (0; 1)i.e. X is false and :X is true.
Then the inaccuracy of your credences is I(!; c) = (c1)
2 + (1  c2)
2the
square of the Euclidean distance between (c1; c2) and (0; 1). That is, every
point on the circle segment C 0 has the same inaccuracy as c, and every point
between C and (0; 1) has a lower inaccuracy.
Consider the area enclosed by the circle segments C and C 0. The cre-
dences represented by the points in this area have a lower inaccuracy than c
if X is true and :X false, and a lower inaccuracy than c if X is false and :X
true. That is, they have a lower inaccuracy whatever the world is like. And
this area includes part of the diagonal that represents coherent credences.
So for any incoherent set of credences, there is a coherent set that is less
inaccurate whatever the world is like. In this simple case, accuracy gives you
a motive to adopt coherent credences.
In the general case, the space of possible credences is n-dimensional, where
there are n propositions in the Boolean algebra. Each possible assignment
of truth values to the n propositions is represented by a point in this space,
and the set of coherent credences consists of these points plus the points
on the straight lines that connect them, the points on the straight lines
that connect those latter points, and so on. This set is called the convex
hull V + of the possible truth value assignments V . Via a generalization
of the construction of gure 1, de Finetti shows that if your credences are
represented by a point that lies outside V +, then there are points in V +
that are more accurate (according to the Brier rule) whichever point in the
space represents the actual truth values of the propositions. Hence if you
have incoherent credences, there are always coherent credences with a lower
inaccuracy as measured by the Brier rule.
Predd et al. (2009) generalize this proof strategy to cover a wider range
of inaccuracy measures. Their proof relies on two assumptions. The rst is
additivity:
Additivity: I(!;b) can be expressed as
P
i s(!i; bi), where s is a continuous
function of your credence in proposition Xi and its truth value.
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Additivity states that the inaccuracy of your beliefs in a set of propositions is
just the sum of your inaccuracies in the propositions taken individuallythat
is, s(!i; bi) is the inaccuracy of your belief in proposition Xi, and I(!;b) is
just the sum of these inaccuracies for all the propositions you are considering.
Note that it also contains the requirement that the inaccuracy measure should
be continuous. The Brier rule is obviously additive, since it is expressed as
a sum over propositions.
The second assumption is a version of strict propriety. For an additive
inaccuracy measure, strict propriety can be expressed in terms of your inac-
curacy function for a single proposition s(bi; !i) as follows:
Strict propriety (for an additive measure): bis(x; 1)+(1  bi)s(x; 0) is
uniquely minimized at x = bi.
Predd et al. (2009) prove that any additive, strictly proper inaccuracy
measure entails probabilism. De Finettis construction appeals to the natural
distance measure implicit in the Brier rulethe Euclidean distance between
two points in the space of your possible credences. But in the current case
we have no explicit measure of inaccuracy, so Predd et al. appeal to a
generalized distance measure4 called the Bregman divergence, dened for
a strictly convex function (x) as d(y;x) = (y) (x) r(x)  (y x).
They show that if the inaccuracy measure s(bi; !i) for a single proposition
Xi is strictly proper, then the function '(bi) =  bis(bi; 1)   (1   bi)s(bi; 0)
is strictly convex. In terms of this function, Predd et al. show that for
any additive, strictly proper inaccuracy measure, I(!;b) = d(!;b), where
(!) =
P
i '(!i) and (b) =
P
i '(bi).
The set of coherent credences forms a closed, convex subspace V + of
the space of all possible credences. It is a fact from the theory of Bregman
divergences that for any point c outside V +, there is a unique point c in
V + such that d(c
; c)  d(y; c) for all y in V
+. That is, c is the unique
closest point in V + to c, using the Bregman divergence as a distance measure.
It is a further fact that d(y; c
)  d(y; c)   d(c
; c) for all y in V + and
c outside V +. Note in particular that V + contains every possible world !,
since a consistent truth value assignment is also a coherent set of credences.
So setting y = !, we have d(!; c
)  d(!; c)   d(c
; c). Since d is a
positive-valued function, d(c
; c) > 0, so d(!; c
) < d(!; c), and hence
4The reason for the scare quotes is that the Bregman divergence is not symmetric, and
distance measures are typically symmetric.
8
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -378-
I(!; c) < I(!; c). That is, for any incoherent set of credences c, there is a
coherent set c that is less inaccurate than c in every possible world.
As Pettigrew (2013, 905) notes, this is a strong result: any inaccuracy
measure satisfying strict propriety and additivity can be used to vindicate
probabilism, and while additivity is perhaps not forced on us in the way
that strict propriety is, it is certainly intuitive. As we shall see, there are
several available measures satisfying additivity and strict propriety, so it
initially looks like the accuracy-based program can justify both probabilism
and conditionalization based on minimal premises. Our purpose in this paper
is to argue that matters are not so straightforward.
3 Measures of inaccuracy
Let us return to the argument for conditionalization. This argument restricts
inaccuracy measures to those that are strictly proper. Note that strict pro-
priety is only a condition on expected inaccuracy. But expected inaccuracy is
calculated on the basis of the actual inaccuracy that the measure in question
ascribes to credences, and presumably there are a number of constraints any
such measure must obey if it is to genuinely measure epistemic inaccuracy
rather than something else. For example, if one of your credences shifts to-
wards the truth, while your other credences stay the same, then clearly your
actual inaccuracy should decrease. We wish to focus on one such constraint.
The constraint can be motivated by thinking about elimination cases.
Suppose you are considering a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
propositions, and suppose that your credences are coherent and that you
conditionalize on evidence. You acquire some evidence that eliminates one
false propositionyour credence in it becomes zerobut is uninformative
regarding the other hypothesesyour credences in them remain in the same
proportions. How does this a¤ect the accuracy of your credences?
It seems obvious that your beliefs have become more accurate. If you
believe that Tom, Dick or Harry might be the murderer (when in fact Tom
did it), and you eliminate Harry while learning nothing about Tom or Dick,
then you have made epistemic progress towards the truth, or at least away
from falsity. It is true that your credence in the false proposition Dick did
it goes up, but only by the same proportion that your credence in the true
proposition Tom did it goes up.
Unfortunately, the simple Brier rule does not always concur. Let X1 be
9
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Tom did it, X2 be Dick did it, and X3 be Harry did it, where unknown
to you X1 is true. Suppose that your initial credences in (X1; X2; X3) are
b = (1=7; 3=7; 3=7). Then according to the simple Brier rule, your initial
inaccuracy is 54=49 = 1:10. Now suppose you acquire some evidence that
eliminates X3, but is uninformative regarding X1 and X2. That is, your
credence in X3 becomes 0 and your credences in X1 and X2 stay in the
same proportions, so that your nal credences are b = (1=4; 3=4; 0). Then
according to the simple Brier rule, your nal inaccuracy is 18=16 = 1:13.
That is, the Brier rule erroneously says that the inaccuracy of your beliefs
has gone up.
For a measure to genuinely measure the actual inaccuracy of your beliefs,
it should not be susceptible to counterexamples of this kind; it should count
elimination cases as epistemically positive. That is, measures of inaccuracy
should obey the following principle:
M: For coherent credences over a partition, if b assigns a zero credence
to some false proposition to which b0 assigns a non-zero credence, and
credences in the remaining propositions stay in in the same ratios, then
b is epistemically better than b0.
The simple Brier rule, as the example shows, violates M, and hence does not
plausibly measure the actual inaccuracy of your beliefs.5
Fortunately, though, there are alternative inaccuracy measures for parti-
tions we can appeal to. The two most frequently mentioned are the simple
log rule and the simple spherical rule:
Simple log rule: Ii(b) =   ln bi
Simple spherical rule: Ii(b) = 1  bi=
qP
j b
2
j :
As before, Ii(b) is the inaccuracy of credences b when proposition Xi is true.
Both of these measures satisfy M, and hence are not susceptible to elimination
counterexamples.6 Hence each can plausibly be claimed to measure epistemic
inaccuracy. Furthermore, each is strictly proper, and so each can be used to
5One might reasonably think that acceptable measures of accuracy should obey a
stronger principle than M; see (reference removed).
6This is trivial for the log rule, and easily proven for the spherical rule. See (reference
removed).
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underwrite conditionalization via the above argument strategy. So there
are some inaccuracy measures that vindicate conditionalization, but not all
strictly proper measures do so. In particular, the simple Brier rule cannot
be used to vindicate conditionalization.
But what about probabilism? The simple log rule and simple spherical
rule are not applicable to a Boolean algebra, and so cannot be used to prove
probabilism as they stand. Perhaps the most straightforward way to general-
ize them is simply to sum the contribution given by the simple rule for each
true proposition in the Boolean algebra, while ignoring the false propositions
in the algebra:
Asymmetric log rule: I(b;!) =
P
i F (!i; bi), where F (0; bi) = 0 and
F (1; bi) =   ln bi.
Asymmetric spherical rule: I(b;!) =
P
i F (!i; bi), where F (0; bi) = 0
and F (1; bi) = 1  bi=
qP
j b
2
j .
Both these rules are asymmetric, in the sense that inaccuracy is calculated
di¤erently for true and false propositions. These rules satisfy principle M:
for coherent credences, if your credence in a false proposition goes down and
your remaining credences stay in the same ratios, then your credence in each
true proposition goes up, and so your inaccuracy according to the relevant
asymmetric rules goes down. Hence the asymmetric log and spherical rules
are immune from elimination counterexamples.
But these rules do not satisfy the combination of additivity and strict
propriety required for the proof of probabilism. The asymmetric spherical
rule is not additive: F (1; bi) is not a function of bi alone. The asymmetric
log rule is additive, but it is not strictly proper in the required sense: F (1; bi)
is strictly proper, but F (0; bi) is not. Indeed, it is straightforward to show
directly that these rules cannot be used as the basis of a dominance argu-
ment for probabilism. Consider, for example, a two element partition, and
the incoherent credence assignment (1; 1). The asymmetric log rule counts
these incoherent credences as perfectly accurate (since the credence in the
false proposition is ignored), so no coherent credences can dominate them.
According to the asymmetric spherical rule, multiplying all credences by a
constant has no e¤ect on inaccuracy, so this assignment has the same inaccu-
racy as the coherent credence assignment (1=2; 1=2). If coherent assignments
cannot be dominated, then neither can the initial incoherent assignment.
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But if coherent assignments can be dominated then the dominance proof of
probabilism fails anyway.
So the asymmetric versions of the log rule and the spherical rule cannot
be used to prove probabilism. But for a Boolean algebra, the log rule and
the spherical rule are usually given a formulation that is symmetric between
truth and falsity:
Symmetric log rule: I(!;b) =
P
i  ln j(1  !i)  bij
Symmetric spherical rule: I(!;b) =
P
i 1 
j(1  !i)  bijp
b2i + (1  bi)
2
(see e.g. Joyce 2009, 275). These measures are additive, and each term in
the sum is individually strictly proper, so they can each be used to prove
probabilism via the proof of Predd et al.
But unfortunately, in their symmetric forms all three rulesBrier, log and
sphericalare subject to elimination counterexamples. For the Brier rule, the
counterexample is the same as before, since the symmetric Brier rule reduces
to the simple Brier rule when applied to a partition.7 That is, consider a
credence shift from b = (1=7; 3=7; 3=7) to b = (1=4; 3=4; 0) when X1 is true.
According to the symmetric Brier rule, your initial inaccuracy is 1:10, and
your nal inaccuracy is 1:13, so your inaccuracy goes up. And this example
works equally well against the symmetric spherical rule: according to this
rule, your initial inaccuracy is 1.24 and your nal inaccuracy is 1.37, so your
inaccuracy goes up. This particular counterexample does not work against
the symmetric log rule, but a similar one does. Suppose your initial credences
are b = (1=13; 6=13; 6=13), and your nal credences are b = (1=7; 6=7; 0).
Then according to the symmetric log rule your initial inaccuracy is 3.80, and
your nal inaccuracy is 3.89: your inaccuracy goes up. Hence the symmetric
measures all violate principle M, and so none of them can be used to prove
conditionalization.
7Strictly, applying these rules to a Boolean algebra requires including credences in the
negations :X1, :X2 and :X3, plus the tautology X1 _ X2 _ X3 and the contradiction
:(X1 _ X2 _ X3). But for coherent credences the inaccuracies of the tautology and the
contradiction are zero, and for symmetric rules the inaccuracy of :Xi is the same as that
of Xi, so the inaccuracy calculated over the entire Boolean algebra is simply twice the
inaccuracy over the partition (X1; X2; X3).
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4 The extent of the problem
Let us sum up. The simple Brier rule cannot be used to prove conditionaliza-
tion, but the simple log and spherical rules can. The obvious generalizations
of the simple log and spherical rules to a Boolean algebrathe asymmetric
log and spherical rulescannot be used to prove probabilism. The symmet-
ric Brier, log and spherical rules can be used to prove probabilism, but none
of them underwrites conditionalization. So we have found no measure that
can be used to prove both conditionalization and probabilism.
Could there be such a measure? Perhaps, although it is worth noting
that one can prove that any inaccuracy measure that satises additivity,
strict propriety and a plausible symmetry principle is subject to elimina-
tion counterexamples. The symmetry principle is precisely the one discussed
abovethat the inaccuracy measure treats truth the same as falsity, in the
sense that it is a function of the distance between each credence and its
respective truth value. For an additive inaccuracy measure, the symmetry
principle can be expressed in terms of the inaccuracy function for a single
proposition s(!i; bi) as follows:
Symmetry: s(!i; bi) = s(j1  !ij ; j1  bij):
It is certainly highly plausible that this is part of what it means for s to
measure your distance from the truth, and as discussed above, the typical
Boolean algebra forms of the Brier rule, log rule and spherical rule all satisfy
it.
Let us see how this symmetry principle, together with additivity and strict
propriety, lead to elimination counterexamples. Consider a single proposition
Xi in which your credence is bi = 1=2. According to strict propriety, the
quantity (1=2)s(1; x) + (1=2)s(0; x) must be uniquely minimized at x = 1=2.
In particular, the value of this expression for x = 1=2 must be lower than its
value for x = 1:
(1=2)s(1; 1=2) + (1=2)s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 1) + (1=2)s(0; 1);
and for x = 0:
(1=2)s(1; 1=2) + (1=2)s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 0) + (1=2)s(0; 0):
Adding these:
s(1; 1=2)+ s(0; 1=2) < (1=2)s(1; 1)+(1=2)s(0; 1)+(1=2)s(1; 0)+(1=2)s(0; 0):
13
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But by symmetry, s(1; 1=2) = s(0; 1=2), s(1; 1) = s(0; 0) and s(0; 1) = s(1; 0).
Substituting:
2s(0; 1=2) < s(0; 1) + s(0; 0):
Now consider your credences in three exhaustive and mutually exclusive
propositions X = (X1; X2; X3). Consider in particular the credence shift
from m = (0; 1=2; 1=2) to b = (0; 1; 0) for truth values ! = (1; 0; 0). By
separability, I(!;m) = s(1; 0) + 2s(0; 1=2), and I(!;b) = s(1; 0) + s(0; 1) +
s(0; 0). So since 2s(0; 1=2) < s(0; 1) + s(0; 0) it follows that I(!;m) <
I(!;b): your inaccuracy goes up. But the shift from m = (0; 1=2; 1=2) to
b = (0; 1; 0) is an elimination case: a false proposition is eliminated, and your
credences in the remaining hypotheses stay in the same proportions. And lest
one worry about the fact that your initial credence in the true proposition
is zero, we can modify the example. Consider the credence assignments
m0 = (=(2 + ); 1=(2 + ); 1=(2 + )) and b0 = (=(1 + ); 1=(1 + ); 0). For
small  these are close to m and b, and hence by the continuity clause of
additivity, the inaccuracy of m0 remains lower than that of b0. Again, the
transition fromm0 to b0 is an elimination case, and now your credence in the
true proposition is non-zero.
So elimination counterexamples a­ict any inaccuracy measure that satis-
es additivity, strict propriety and symmetry. That is, any symmetric mea-
sure that satises the assumptions of Predd et al.s proof of probabilism
violates principle M, and hence cannot be used to prove conditionalization.
Symmetry is not a premise in the Predd argument, so it is possible that an
asymmetric measure might allow the derivation of both probabilism and con-
ditionalization. But the only plausible asymmetric measure in the literature
is the log rule (Bernardo 1979), and we have seen that the asymmetric log
rule does not vindicate probabilism.
5 Conclusion
Pettigrew notes that conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide
range of measures of inaccuracy, and the implication is that it doesnt much
matter which measure you pick. But we think it does matter. There are mea-
sures that vindicate conditionalization, and there are measures that vindicate
probabilism, but nobody has yet identied a measure that vindicates both.
Hence the accuracy-based approach does not, as yet, give us the justication
we might want for the constraints on our credences.
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Abstract
The flatness problem in cosmology draws attention to a surprising fine-tuning of the spatial geometry of
our universe towards flatness. Several physicists, among them Hawking, Page, Coule, and Carroll, have
argued against the probabilistic intuitions underlying such fine-tuning arguments in cosmology and instead
propose that the canonical measure on the phase space of Friedman-Robertson-Walker spacetimes should
be used to evaluate fine-tuning. They claim that flat spacetimes in this set are actually typical on this
natural measure and that therefore the flatness problem is illusory. I argue that they misinterpret typicality
in this phase space and, moreover, that no conclusion can be drawn at all about the flatness problem by
using the canonical measure alone.
For several decades now cosmologists have maintained that the old standard model of cosmology, the highly
successful hot big bang (HBB) model, suffers from various fine-tuning problems (Dicke and Peebles, 1979;
Linde, 1984). They claim that the spacetimes on which the HBB model is based, the Friedman-Robertson-
Walker (FRW) spacetimes, require seemingly “special” initial conditions, such that when they are evolved
forward in time by the dynamical law of the general theory of relativity (GTR) they yield presently observed
cosmological conditions. For example, the flatness problem depends on the existence of special initial
conditions in the HBB model which are required to explain the observationally-inferred spatial flatness of
the universe. Due to their extreme precision or intuitive “unlikeliness,” these initial conditions are thought
to be unduly special, such that many cosmologists have felt that the initial conditions themselves are in need
of explanation and, moreover, present a significant conceptual problem for the HBB model.
Although physical fine-tuning could be interpreted in a variety of ways, cosmologists typically under-
stand it to mean that observationally-required initial conditions are in some sense unlikely (Smeenk, 2013;
McCoy, 2015). In order to substantiate this interpretation, one must show that initial conditions in the HBB
model which reproduce present conditions are in fact unlikely. This task presupposes that there is a justi-
fiable way of assessing the likelihoods of cosmological models (Gibbons et al., 1987; Hawking and Page,
1988). Many arguments found in the cosmological literature, however, rely on ad hoc, unjustified likelihood
measures. Gibbons et al. (1987) propose a “natural” measure (hence the GHS measure) on the set of FRW
spacetimes (with matter contents represented by a scalar field) as a natural and justified way of evaluating
likelihoods. The GHS measure is simply the canonical Liouville measure associated with the phase space of
FRW spacetimes when GTR is put into a Hamiltonian formulation and in a precise sense “comes for free”
with the phase space.
While I would maintain that the GHSmeasure cannot be successfully used to make arguments about fine-
tuning in cosmology quite generally, I argue here only for its inapplicability to the flatness problem. Some
∗Eidyn Research Centre, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK. email: casey.mccoy@ed.ac.uk
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authors (Gibbons and Turok, 2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010) have attempted to make probabilistic arguments,
in analogy to familiar probabilistic arguments in statistical mechanics, by making the GHS measure into a
probability measure. However, as the total measure of the FRW phase space is infinite, there is no canonical
choice of probability measure with which to make probabilistic arguments, a point that has been recognized
already by some (Hawking and Page, 1988; Schiffrin and Wald, 2012). Accordingly, any justification of a
particular probability measure is completely independent of the justification of the GHS measure—in short,
these probability measures are not in any substantive sense the GHS measure. On the other hand, one
might try to use the GHS measure by itself to make typicality arguments in analogy to typicality arguments
in statistical mechanics (Goldstein, 2012). Carroll in particular advocates this approach and, interestingly,
claims that the GHS measure alone tells us that almost all spacetimes are spatially flat (Carroll and Tam,
2010; Remmen and Carroll, 2013; Carroll, forthcoming)—that there is in fact no flatness problem (Hawking
and Page (1988, 803-4) and Coule (1995, 468) suggest the same). Carroll’s claim, however, rests on a subtle
mistake in interpreting typicality. I claim, on the contrary, that the GHS measure cannot tell us anything
about likelihood without substantive additional assumptions such as those made in statistical mechanics,
e.g. a partition of phase space into “macroproperties” or similar. These necessary assumptions, however, are
doubtfully justifiable in the cosmological context. Thus I ultimately conclude that the GHS measure cannot
be used to clarify the nature of fine-tuning in cosmology.
1 The Gibbons-Hawking-Stewart Measure
An adequate view of what the GHS measure is and can do relies on understanding the details of how it is
introduced. For this reason I develop here the measure with considerably more care than other accounts
in the literature, which tend to jump straight to a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian formulation of GTR without
elucidating the geometrical origin of their variable choices and the relations between physical parameters.
My starting point is the initial value formulation of GTR, in which the “position” initial data of space-
time are represented by the spatial metric hab on a spacelike Cauchy surface Σ and the “momentum” initial
data by the extrinsic curvature πab (Wald, 1984; Malament, 2012). FRW spacetimes are spacetimes with
homogeneous and isotropic spacelike hypersurfaces, so one can foliate the spacetimes by a one-parameter
family of these spacelike hypersurfaces Σt that are orthogonal to a smooth, future-directed, twist-free, unit
timelike field ξa on M, where I define ξa = ∇at.For FRW spacetimes the extrinsic curvature of an initial data
surface Σt is Hhab, where H is the so-called Hubble parameter.Thus the initial data for an FRW spacetime are
completely represented by two objects: (1) the spatial metric hab and (2) the Hubble parameter H associated
with a spatial hypersurface Σ.
The space of initial data is therefore the product of the set of homogeneous and isotropic Riemannian
manifolds Σ (with metric hab) and the set of (real-valued) Hubble parameters H. Homogeneous and isotropic
Riemannian manifolds have constant curvature κ. Complete, connected Riemannian manifolds of constant
sectional curvature are called space forms. It is a theorem that every simply-connected three-dimensional
space form is isometric to the sphere S 3(
√
(1/κ)) if κ > 0, R3 if κ = 0, or the hyperbolic space H3(
√
(1/κ)) if
κ < 0 (Wolf, 2010). The standard metrics on each of these manifolds is understood to be the metric induced
on them by embedding them in R4. Every Σ is therefore isometric to one of these three classes of space
forms. Spaceforms of each of the three kinds are moreover homothetic, i.e. they are isometric up to the
square of a scale factor a (McCabe, 2004). Accordingly one has the means to represent curvature κ as a
function of the scale factor; in particular, for any Σ, a2κ is some constant k. Hence one can set any spatial
metric hab = a
2γab, where γab is the standard metric on the appropriate space form. This is useful in the
initial value formulation of FRW spacetimes because all time dependence of hab is thereby located solely in
2
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the scale factor rather than in the radius of curvature of the space form.
The Einstein equation reduces to two constraint equations and two evolution equations in the initial value
formulation (Geroch, 1972):
R − (π aa )2 + πabπab = −16πTabξaξb; (1)
Dcπ
c
a − Daπ cc = 8πTmrhmaξr; (2)
£ξ(πab) = 2π
c
a πcb − πccπab + Rab − 8πh ma hnb(Tmn −
1
2
Thmn); (3)
£ξ(hab) = 2πab, (4)
where R is the Ricci scalar of Σ, Rab is the Ricci tensor of Σ, and Da is the derivative operator on Σ. For
FRW spacetimes, these equations simplify to the following three (the second equation from above is trivial
since πab does not vary across Σ:
R − 6H2 = −16πρ; (5)
H˙hab =
(
− H2 − 4π
3
(ρ + 3p)
)
hab; (6)
h˙ab = 2Hhab, (7)
where ρ is the energy density and p the pressure of the matter. The first two equations are known as the
Friedman equations. Since hab = a
2γab, h˙ab = 2aa˙γab, and 2Hhab = 2Ha
2γab, it follows from the third
equation above that
H =
a˙
a
, (8)
which is the usual definition of the Hubble parameter H. To simplify matters somewhat and to make contact
with the literature, I shall henceforth take the matter contents of spacetime to be a scalar field φ in a potential
V which evolves according to the coupled Einstein-Klein Gordon equation.1 Then one has the following
equations of motion (Hawking and Page, 1988, 790):
R − 6H2 = −16π
(
1
2
φ˙2 + V(φ)
)
(9)
H˙ = −H2 − 8π
3
(
1
2
φ˙2 − V(φ)
)
(10)
φ¨ + 3Hφ˙ + V ′(φ) = 0, (11)
where V ′ is the derivative of the potential with respect to φ.2 (The third equation can be derived from the
previous two, and so is in fact redundant.)
For FRW spacetimes the spatial Ricci scalar is R = −6κ. As noted before, one can cast κ in terms of the
scale factor and a constant k: κ = k/a2. By using the scale factor a to replace κ, one has introduced a constant
k which has no physical significance beyond identifying whether the space form is flat, positively-curved, or
negatively-curved. One therefore usually takes equivalence classes of curves according to these three cases
and chooses k = +1, 0, and −1 as representatives. Then one may write R = −6k/a2, so that one finally has
Friedman’s equation in its usual form (for a scalar field in a potential):
(
a˙
a
)2
=
8π
3
(
1
2
φ˙2 + V(φ)
)
− k
a2
. (12)
1The scalar field is meant to be the inflaton, the field that drives inflation in the early universe.
2If our interest were solely in assessing the HBB model’s fine-tuning, one could do the following analysis for perfect fluid matter
contents. The results would be qualitatively similar however, as shown by Carroll and Tam (2010, §4.2).
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The foregoing indicates that our FRW initial data hab and πab are equivalently representable in the space
{a, a˙, φ, φ˙, k}. This space is not the space of initial data, however, since the previous equation is a constraint
that must be satisfied by initial data. One must also keep in mind that k is an index for three separate copies
of the space {a, a˙, φ, φ˙}. There is no continuous path between the three spaces.
Have identified the relevant spaces for representing FRW space forms, I next put the theory into a Hamil-
tonian formulation (Wald, 1984, Appendix E) in order to obtain a symplectic structure and, hence, the canon-
ical measure. I begin with the Lagrangian for our theory of FRW spacetimes with a scalar field as the matter
contents, where I have re-introduced the lapse function N as a Lagrange multiplier:
L = √−g
(
R
16π
+
1
2N2
φ˙2 − V(φ)
)
. (13)
In terms of the variables I have chosen, this is
L = − 1
8π
(
3
N
aa˙2 − 3Na3 k
a2
) +
1
2N
a3φ˙2 − Na3V(φ), (14)
in agreement with (Hawking and Page, 1988; Gibbons and Turok, 2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010). The
momenta of a and φ are
pa ≡ ∂L
∂a˙
=
−3aa˙
4πN
; pφ ≡ ∂L
∂φ
=
a3φ˙
N
. (15)
The Hamiltonian on this phase space is
H = paa˙ + pφφ˙ − L = N
(
− 2πp
2
a
3a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V(φ) − a3 3
8π
k
a2
)
, (16)
from which one recovers (after setting N = 1) our constraint (the Friedman equation) as the Hamiltonian
constraint C:
C ≡ −2πp
2
a
3a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V(φ) − a3 3
8π
k
a2
= 0. (17)
The phase space γ of our system is thus the four-dimensional space {a, pa, φ, pφ} equipped with the canonical
symplectic form
ωpa,a,pφ,φ = dpa ∧ da + dpφ ∧ dφ. (18)
The dynamically accessible phase space points are constrained to be on the three-dimensional hypersur-
face C. Thus it would be inappropriate to use ω for constructing a canonical volume measure on phase space.
One can, however, pull the symplectic form back onto the constraint surface by first solving the constraint
for pφ:
3
pφ = a
3
(
4π
3
p2a
a4
+
3
4π
k
a2
− 2V(φ)
)1/2
. (19)
Following Carroll and Tam, I also switch coordinates from pa to H, so that
pφ = a
3
(
3
4π
(H2 + k/a2) − 2V(φ)
)1/2
(20)
3The scalar field can have positive or negative momentum, so strictly speaking there should be a ± in the following equation. The
reader is welcome to annotate the equations that follow.
4
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -389-
and
dpa = − 3
4π
(
2aHda + a2dH
)
. (21)
The differential of pφ is then
dpφ =
(3/4π)a3HdH − a3V ′dφ + 6a2((3H2 + 2k/a2)/8π − V)da
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 . (22)
Substituting these into ω then gives the pullback of the symplectic form onto C. The result is the following
(pre-symplectic) differential form:
ωa,H,φ = ΘHa(dH ∧ da) + ΘHφ(dH ∧ dφ) + Θaφ(da ∧ dφ), (23)
where
ΘHa = − 3
4π
a2; (24)
ΘHφ =
(3/4π)a3H
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 ; (25)
Θaφ =
6a2((3H2 + 2k/a2)/8π − V)
((3/4π)(H2 + k/a2) − 2V)1/2 . (26)
This form is not symplectic (it is degenerate), so one cannot construct a natural volume measure on C.
Ideally, the “real” phase space of our system would be given by “solving the dynamics,” and then taking
equivalence classes of phase points that are part of the same trajectory. In this way one would obtain the
space of motions, onto which one could then pull back the degenerate form to obtain a new symplectic form
(of degree two less than ω) and construct a canonical measure. This is quite complicated in general due to
the differential equation that must be solved. The usual approach to take instead is to set H to some value
H∗ in the differential form and define their measure accordingly, i.e. set
dΩ = ωa,H,φ|H=H∗ = Θaφ|H=H∗dadφ. (27)
One may do this because surfaces of constant Hubble parameter in phase space are transverse to temporal
evolution, and the measure is preserved under translation of these surfaces along the Hamiltonian flow.
Finally, one may naturally define the GHS measure µGHS on Lebesgue measurable sets U by
U 7→
∫
U
dΩ = −6
∫
U
a2
(3H2∗ + 2k/a
2)/8π − V
((3/4π)(H2∗ + k/a2) − 2V)1/2
dadφ. (28)
This expression of the GHS measure is equivalent to those derived in (Carroll and Tam, 2010; Schiffrin and
Wald, 2012).4
4There are some complications with the k = 1 case. See (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012, 8) for the details. I have however chosen not
to set 8πG = 1, but rather maintained consistency with the rest of this dissertation’s use of “geometrical units” by only setting G = 1.
Gibbons et al. (1987) use a simplifying, but less transparent coordinate choice. They also choose to investigate only the special case
where V = m2φ2/2. It can be shown with some work that their expression is equivalent to this one as well with this potential.
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2 The Flatness Problem
The GHS measure clearly diverges for large scale factors, a point originally recognized by Gibbons et al.
(1987, 745); it also converges to 0 for small scale factors. Due to the divergence, one may readily say that,
given any choice of Hubble parameter H∗, almost all spacetimes will have a “large” scale factor. More
precisely, pick any scale factor a∗; the set of spacetimes with a < a∗ is a negligible set: the total measure of
this set is finite whereas the total measure of its complement is infinite. What is the significance of this fact
about the GHS measure, specifically for the flatness problem?
Hawking and Page (1988, 803-4) suggest the following:
“Thus for arbitrarily large expansions (and long times), and for arbitrarily low values of the en-
ergy density, the canonical measure implies that almost all solutions of the Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker scalar equations have negligible spatial curvature and hence behave as k = 0 models. In
this way a uniform probability distribution in the canonical measure would explain the flatness
problem of cosmology...”
By “arbitrarily large expansions” (and “arbitrarily low values of energy density”), they appear to mean
the following. Pick any arbitrary a∗ (and any arbitrary φ∗).5 According to the GHS measure almost all
spacetimes have a > a∗ (and φ > φ∗), or, equivalently, the spacetimes with a < a∗ (and φ < φ∗) compose a
negligible set. Furthermore, since this holds for any choice of a∗, one may infer that almost all spacetimes
are arbitrarily close to having κ = 0 (since κ = k/a2) in exactly the same sense. It is perhaps somewhat
misleading to say that curved FRW spacetimes with large scale factors “behave as k = 0 models;” the
curvature does not change in such models. It is, however, surely false to say that a “uniform probability
distribution” with respect to the GHS measure would explain the flatness problem of cosmology. There is in
fact no such uniform probability distribution, since the GHS measure is not finite. Moroever, there is also no
canonical probability distribution ρ at all which would make U 7→
∫
U
ρdΩGHS into a probability measure—
one has to make a choice in order to obtain a probability measure in the case of infinite total measure, a
choice which appears completely arbitrary in this context.
Carroll and Tam (2010, 14) invite us to consider the question in more “physically transparent” terms by
looking at the curvature κ, which I previously exchanged in favor of the scale factor a when deriving the
GHS measure. One can recast the scale factor a as the curvature κ using the relation from before, namely
κ = k/a2. (Note especially that this switch maps the entire set of scale factors for the k = 0 case to the single
point κ = 0.) One then defines the GHS measure (at least for curved FRW spacetimes) by the map
U 7→
∫
U
dΩ = −6
∫
U
1
|κ|5/2
(3H2∗ + 2κ)/8π − V
((3/4π)(H2∗ + κ) − 2V)1/2
dκdφ. (29)
It is clear that the measure diverges for small values of curvature, i.e. curvatures close to flat, due to the
curvature term in the denominator. This is pointed out by Carroll and Tam (2010, 15). They suggest the
following interpretation of this fact:
“Considering first the measure on purely Robertson-Walker cosmologies (without perturba-
tions) as a function of spatial curvature, there is a divergence at zero curvature. In other words,
curved [FRW] cosmologies are a set of measure zero—the flatness problem, as conventionally
understood, does not exist.”
5Gibbons and Turok (2008, 6) point out that φ is always bounded given H∗, so it is not really necessary to pick an arbitrary φ∗.
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As stated these claims are highly suspect.
Firstly, Carroll and Tam assert that all values of their curvature coordinate Ωk (essentially equivalent to
κ) can be integrated over. While this is perhaps true, portraying the phase space in terms of curvature is
misleading. For curved FRW spacetimes, it is true that the measure diverges for small values of curvature
κ, as I indicate above and as Hawking and Page suggest in the passage from their paper quoted above. The
recast measure, however, is infinite at zero curvature because the entire set of k = 0 scale factors is mapped
to κ = 0. The GHS measure diverges for large scale factors in the case of flat FRW spacetimes just as it
does for curved FRW spacetime. Thus it is misleading to describe a “divergence at zero curvature;” there is
nothing special going on in flat FRW spacetimes (at least in this respect).6
Secondly (and relatedly), curved FRW spacetimes are clearly not a set of measure zero—at least accord-
ing to the GHS measure. The initial data of FRW spacetimes is representable in the space {a, a˙, φ, φ˙, k}. The
curvature constant k serves as an index for three different phase spaces, each of which has an infinite total
measure—even after taking into account constraints and choosing a hypersurface in the constraint surface
according to GHS’s procedure. The unboundedness of the total phase space measure for each kind of FRW
spacetime is due, again, to the unbounded range of the scale factor Schiffrin and Wald (2012, 11).7 This is
quite plain when one expresses the GHS measure in terms of the scale factor. Transforming to the curvature
coordinate κ should not change the fact that the total measure of each phase space is infinite. So, while it
is true that the GHS measure attributes infinite measure to flat FRW spacetimes (as Carroll and Tam appear
to recognize), it also does so both to positively curved FRW spacetimes and to negatively curved space-
times. Therefore it is false that the curved FRW cosmologies are a set of measure zero according to the GHS
measure; hence one cannot conclude on this basis that the flatness problem does not exist.
One might try to rescue Carroll and Tam’s claim about the flatness problem by interpreting flatness
more broadly, namely by including “nearly flat” curved spacetimes. This requires specifying what the set
of “nearly flat” curved spacetimes is to be, e.g. a specification of the set of spacetimes with curvature less
than some κ∗ (at some time corresponding to Hubble parameter H∗). Almost all spacetimes will have a
“small” curvature κ in comparison to this curvature κ∗. In other words, the set of spacetimes with κ > κ∗ is a
negligible set. Since our universe’s spatial curvature is thought to be “nearly flat,” i.e. it should be less than
κ∗ (whatever it is), it follows from this argument that our universe is actually typical, contra what is assumed
in the flatness problem. Unfortunately this argument does not follow from the GHS measure alone, since one
had to make an independent choice in choosing κ∗, a choice that is not natural in any clear sense whatever.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that there is any reasonable argument to justify a choice of κ∗—an explication of
“close to flat” in the context of FRW models; it appears to be a completely arbitrary choice.
Here is a slightly different tack into the same stiff headwind. Suppose κ∗ is the (non-zero) spatial curva-
ture of our universe at the present time. The GHS measure can be used to infer that almost all spacetimes
with the same Hubble parameter will have flatter spatial curvatures. In such circumstances, one might be in-
clined to wonder “Why is my universe’s spatial curvature so large? It seems like it ought to be much smaller
if my universe is typical!” On this line of thought, it seems like one actually has a curvature problem rather
than a flatness problem. Of course one would say this for any κ∗ whatsoever, regardless of its magnitude,
6Carroll and Tam appear to equivocate several times between there being a divergence at κ = 0 and the measure diverging as κ → 0:
“The integral diverges near [κ = 0], which is certainly a physically allowed region of parameter space” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 17);
“The measure diverges on flat universes” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 28).
7Besides in (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012), this fact is correctly pointed out in (Gibbons et al., 1987; Hawking and Page, 1988). While
Carroll and Tam (2010, 20-1) observe that “this divergence was noted in the original GHS paper, where it was attributed to ‘universes
with very large scale factors’ due to a different choice of variables,” they object to this as an interpretation: “This is not the most
physically transparent characterization, as any open universe will eventually have a large scale factor.” For this reason they exchange
the scale factor for curvature; it is not clear, however, how this characterization is more physically transparent since it amounts to the
same thing.
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so it is not clear how one would ever be in the position to be satisified with one’s curvature in an FRW
universe—at least insofar as one expects things in our universe to be typical (in accord with Copernican
principle-style reasoning). No matter. The measure suggests this question. What is the answer?
The answer is that the curvature depends on the actual dynamical history of the universe, and so it has no
explanation within the context of the HBB model (apart from one depending on an initial condition). That
answer may be unsatisfying, but the question is a bad one anyway, driven by misleading intuitions. There is
no such thing as a typical FRW spacetime, and the GHS measure is not going to explain why the universe’s
curvature is what it is. This kind of thinking is clearly motivated by supposing that the GHS measure can be
used as a likelihood measure, as Carroll and Tam clearly do:
“When we consider questions of fine-tuning, however, we are comparing the real world to what
we think a randomly-chosen history of the universe would be like” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 11).
Some popular, specious conceptions (in physics and beyond) of statistical mechanics encourage this line
of thought. Putatively successful typicality arguments in statistical mechanics (Goldstein, 2012) depend,
however, not only on having a phase space measure, but also on both the dynamics of the system and on
a specification of macroproperties or macrostates (defined as regions of phase space) (Frigg, 2009; Frigg
and Werndl, 2012). Accordingly, any claim of fine-tuning in FRW spacetimes on the sole basis of the GHS
measure (which does at least incorporate the FRW dynamics) is bound to miss the mark without additional
assumptions (such as a well-motivated standard of flatness).
Gibbons and Turok (2008) take a different approach from Carroll and Tam. They correctly observe that
universes with large scale factors are universes with small spatial curvatures. They then claim that the scale
factor is neither “geometrically meaningful” nor “physically observable” and therefore propose to identify
all the “indistinguishable” nearly flat spacetimes on the surface identified by H∗.8 They do so by effectively
choosing a “cutoff” curvature κ∗ and throwing out all the spacetimes with curvatures smaller than it. The
advantage to doing this is that the total measure of FRW spacetimes with curvatures larger than κ∗ is finite,
so that one can then define a probability measure in a natural way.
The disadvantage is that this makes no sense. Carroll and Tam (2010, 20) comment, “to us, this seems to
be throwing away almost all the solutions, and keeping a set of measure zero. It is true that universes with
almost identical values of the curvature parameter will be physically indistinguishable, but that doesn’t affect
the fact that almost all universes have this property.” Indeed, doing what Gibbons and Turok do is throwing
away almost all the solutions (although the remaining set has finite measure, not measure zero as Carroll
and Tam claim). They are also right to point out that if nearly flat universes are physically indistinguishable,
so are “nearly-κ” universes for almost any κ. Gibbons and Turok do not throw out these universes however
(else they would not have been left with any universes at all). Their justification for an additional assumption
therefore fails.
Ironically, Carroll and Tam make essentially the same error as Gibbons and Turok, by identifying the
flat and nearly flat spacetimes. Instead of throwing out all the flat and nearly flat spacetimes like the latter
pair, however, the former pair throws out the complement of the flat and nearly flat spacetimes by assigning
them zero measure. They then triumphantly conclude that all FRW spacetimes are essentially flat! Carroll
and Tam propose to tame the remaining divergence in the GHS measure by regularizing the integral, in
effect making the measure finite. The problem with doing this is that, since the GHS measure is not finite,
8It is not clear what they mean by “geometrically meaningful.” The scale factor is clearly geometric in the relevant sense, since
it relates spaceforms of the same kind by scalings. It is moreover physically meaningful because space is expanding (or contracting)
in FRW spacetimes. The precise value of a does not matter, as it can be re-scaled, but that does not undermine its meaningfulness.
It is also unclear how the fact that a is physically unobservable should matter, since most features of spacetime are not observable,
e.g. the metric g, the spatial curvature κ, etc. The physically relevant content of these, including the scale factor, can be inferred from
observations and appropriate assumptions.
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regularizing the measure makes it no longer the GHS measure, in which case any justification the measure
had by its “naturalness” is lost since a choice was made.9 In short, one may as well have just assumed the
probability distribution they end up with from the very beginning.Their stated justification for this move is
pragmatic: “This non-normalizability is problematic if we would like to interpret the measure as determining
the relative fraction of universes with different physical properties” (Carroll and Tam, 2010, 17). However
this is obviously an inadequate justification for the propriety of their measure.
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Abstract
In this paper I assess the ‘Invariance Principle’, which states that only quantities
that are invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real. I argue,
contrary to current orthodoxy, that the variance of a quantity under a theory’s sym-
metries is not a sufficient basis for interpreting that theory as being uncommitted to
the reality of that quantity. Rather, I argue, the variance of a quantity under symme-
tries only ever serves as a motivation to refrain from any commitment to the quantity
in question. In the process of this discussion, I address the related but importantly
distinct issue of when symmetries can be said to prompt a mathematical reformulation
of the relevant theory.
1 Introduction
Take the Invariance Principle to be the principle that only quantities that are
invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real.1 It is a
doctrine with a distinguished pedigree: acclaimed theorists as diverse as the
physicist Paul Dirac, the mathematician Hermann Weyl, and the philosopher
Robert Nozick were all apparent signatories during their respective lifetimes.2
Prima facie, however, it is something of a mystery as to how and why the
principle is supposed to work. Nevertheless, there appear to be at least some
uncontroversial cases where it—or something very close to it—does work.
One such example can be found in Newtonian Gravitation Theory (NGT),
i.e., the theory comprising Newton’s three laws, plus his inverse square gravita-
tional law, governing the behaviour of point particles in Newtonian spacetime.
As is well known, this theory is Galilean invariant. This implies, among other
things, that if one takes any solution to NGT and “boosts” it—that is, uniformly
alters the absolute velocity of each point particle by the same amount through-
out its history—one will invariably get back a solution to NGT. Boosts, in other
words, are a symmetry of NGT: they are transformations that invariably map
solutions of the theory to solutions.
1I draw the term from Saunders (2007). Compare also Dasgupta’s (forthcoming)
“symmetry-to-reality inference”.
2See, e.g., Dirac (1930, vii), Weyl (1952, 132), and Nozick (2001, 82).
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Which quantity varies under this particular symmetry? The answer is obvi-
ous: absolute velocity. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we should
conclude that absolute velocity is not a genuine physical quantity. Conversely,
which quantities are invariant under this particular symmetry? Again, the an-
swer is obvious: relative (inter-particle) distance and velocity, temporal inter-
vals, and absolute acceleration. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we
should conclude that NGT’s boost symmetry does not threaten these quantities’
status as genuinely physical.
As it turns out, one can successfully purge Newtonian theory of the spacetime
structure required to make absolute velocity a physically meaningful quantity.
More specifically, one can move to Galilean spacetime. (Sometimes also called
“Neo-Newtonian spacetime”.)3 Here, the Newtonian posit of persisting points
of absolute space—persisting points which, crucially, allow for the notion of ab-
solute velocity to be physically meaningful—is done away with, but an affine
structure is nevertheless preserved, which defines the “straight” or force-free (in-
ertial) paths through spacetime. Absolute velocity is therefore not a physically
meaningful quantity in Galilean spacetime, as it is in Newtonian spacetime.
Nevertheless, all other Newtonian notions, including the notion of absolute ac-
celeration, remain well-defined in Galilean spacetime. To the extent that one
opts for Galilean over Newtonian spacetime, then, one has excised an ostensibly
odious piece of theoretical structure from NGT.
Three important caveats are worth noting, however. First, and most obvi-
ously, none of this is to say that Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime
is therefore the true and complete theory of the world. (It isn’t.) Second, nor
is this to say that by moving to Galilean spacetime one has thereby purged
Newtonian theory of all its “variant” structure. (One hasn’t. The symmetry
group of Newtonian theory is actually wider than the Galilean group: it has
additional symmetries.)4 Third, nor is this even to say that the invariant quan-
tities one ends up with following such an application of the Invariance Principle
will invariably be preserved in future theories. (For instance, there is no notion
of “relative spatial distance” simpliciter in special relativity.) Given all of these
caveats, however, one might well ask: What good is the Invariance Principle,
exactly? What purpose, in particular, does it serve?
As I see it—and, I take it, as many other contemporary theorists also see
it—the purpose of the Invariance Principle is essentially comparative. That is, it
is simply supposed to lead you to a better theory—or a better interpretation, or
characterisation, of the same theory—than the one you started with. To take the
case at hand: Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime is a better theory than
Newtonian theory set in Newtonian spacetime. It is a theory which possesses
all of the theoretical virtues of its rival, but lacks any apparent ontological
commitment to the unwanted variant quantity in question.
In summary, the Galilean invariance of NGT, in conjunction with the In-
variance Principle, is supposed to indicate that neither absolute velocity nor
3See, e.g., Earman (1989, §2.4).
4See, e.g., Knox (2014). I discuss this point further in Section 4 below.
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any corresponding persisting points of absolute space are genuinely real. Now
to lay my cards on the table: I actually think that something very close to
this general kind of inference—that is, from the variance of a quantity under
symmetries to that quantity’s nonreality—is legitimate. The devil, however, is
in the details. In particular, I don’t believe that the mere Galilean invariance
of NGT is enough to establish absolute velocity’s nonreality. And in general, I
don’t believe that the mere variance of a quantity under symmetries is enough to
establish that quantity’s nonreality. These beliefs, as far as I can determine, put
me in the minority camp in the contemporary philosophical literature on sym-
metries. Nevertheless, I think they are correct beliefs—and they are precisely
the ones that I will attempt to argue for in the remainder of this paper.
2 Interpretational vs Motivational
In arguing for the above claims, it will prove extremely useful first to distinguish
between two very different ways of thinking about symmetries.
Close cousins of the distinction that I have in mind have already been drawn
in the literature. Thus, Greaves and Wallace write:
There is a widespread consensus that two states of affairs related
by a symmetry transformation are really just the same state of affairs
differently described. That is, if two mathematical models of a physical
theory are related by a symmetry transformation, then those models
represent one and the same physical state of affairs. (Greaves and
Wallace 2014, 60)
They continue:
Although we agree with this consensus [...] even those who do not
agree that symmetry-related states of affairs are identical at least
agree that they are empirically indistinguishable from one another.
(Greaves and Wallace 2014, 60, fn 1)
To illustrate the difference between these two ways of thinking about symme-
tries, consider again the example of boosts in NGT. According to the “widespread
consensus” view alluded to, and endorsed by, Greaves and Wallace, boosted
models of NGT are to be taken to represent the same physical state of affairs
even when the theory is putatively set in Newtonian spacetime. In other words,
according to this view, one needn’t make the move to Galilean spacetime in or-
der not to be committed to absolute velocities; there is a way of understanding
boosted models’ physical equivalence, and their associated noncommitment to
the notion of absolute velocity, prior to making this move.5
Things are very different according to the second conception of symme-
tries described, and rejected, by Greaves and Wallace. According to this view,
boosted models of NGT are to be regarded as physically inequivalent: they are
not to be construed as representing the same physical state of affairs. Instead,
5See, e.g., Healey (2007, 114-7), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
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such models are taken to represent physically distinct scenarios, which differ in
what absolute velocity they ascribe to the world’s total material content. Never-
theless, such models still represent empirically indistinguishable states of affairs:
in a Newtonian universe, no experiment could ever help an observer determine
what her absolute velocity actually is. Such boosted models therefore represent
physically distinct ways for the world to be, albeit ones that are indiscernible
on the basis of measurement.6
As previously mentioned, this distinction between different ways of thinking
about symmetries is close, but not identical, to the one that I want to draw.
The key reason why it is not identical is because Greaves and Wallace say
nothing to the effect that the person who subscribes to the second conception
of symmetries—that is, who believes that symmetry-related models invariably
represent empirically indistinguishable, but not necessarily physically equiva-
lent, states of affairs—should still be motivated to seek an alternative theory, or
an alternative interpretation or characterisation of the same theory, according
to which such models do not merely represent empirically indistinguishable sce-
narios, but rather represent physically equivalent states of affairs.7 Moreover, I
claim, it is precisely this notion of motivation which plays a central role in cor-
rectly understanding the philosophical significance of symmetries in the general
case.8
Here, then, is what I take to be the appropriate distinction between these
two different ways of thinking about symmetries:
• Interpretational: Symmetries allow us to interpret theories as being com-
mitted solely to the existence of invariant quantities, even in the absence
of a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is
alleged to underlie symmetry-related models.
• Motivational: Symmetries only motivate us to find a metaphysically
perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
symmetry-related models, but they do not allow us to interpret that theory
as being solely committed to the existence of invariant quantities in the
absence of any such characterisation.
The central claim of this paper may now be neatly summarised: the (orthodox)
interpretational view is mistaken; the (unorthodox) motivational view is correct.
Drawing the distinction in the way that I have done, however, invites the
rather obvious question: What, precisely, is meant by a “metaphysically per-
spicuous characterisation” of reality? This is the question addressed in the next
section.
6See, e.g., Maudlin (1993, 192), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
7Compare (again) Maudlin’s (1993, 192) discussion in the Newtonian context.
8Note that I do not intend any of this as a criticism of Greaves and Wallace’s paper.
Indeed, as Greaves and Wallace (2014, 60, fn 1) are careful to remark, the distinction they
draw is orthogonal to the central topic of their paper, namely the issue of which symmetries
have “direct empirical significance” (i.e., have analogues to Galileo’s ship).
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3 More on Metaphysical Perspicuity
In intuitive terms, a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of reality is one
which corresponds to, or “limns”, reality’s structure in some suitably faithful
way. To use another common (Platonic) metaphor, a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of reality is one which “carves nature at its joints”. (In
comparative terms: a description of reality is more metaphysically perspicuous
than another precisely to the extent that it corresponds to, or limns, reality’s
structure more faithfully than its rival does.)
As many readers will be aware, such a notion is frequently alluded to, and
made use of, in contemporary analytic metaphysics.9 But metaphysical per-
spicuity is also, I think, a notion that is reasonably serviceable in physical (rather
than “merely metaphysical”) contexts. One particularly illustrative example—
albeit a slightly misleading one, for reasons that I will soon explain—drawn
from physics may plausibly be found in classical electromagnetism.10 As is well
known, this theory may be formulated in two different ways.11 According to
one such formulation, EM1, the theory is expressed in terms of the Faraday
tensor, Fab, satisfying the (Maxwell) equations ∇[aFbc] = 0 and ∇aF
ab = Ja,
where Ja is a vector field representing the charge current density. According to
the second formulation, EM2, however, the theory is expressed in terms of the
vector potential, Aa, satisfying the equation ∇a∇
aAb −∇b∇aA
a = Jb.
These two formulations of electromagnetism are related to one another.
In particular, any model 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 of EM2 corresponds to a unique model
〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, via the equation Fab = ∇[aAb]. The converse, however,
is not true. That is, a typical model of EM1 does not typically correspond to
a unique model of EM2. More specifically, if 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 is a model of EM2
corresponding to a model 〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, then so will any other model of
EM2 〈M,ηab, A
′
a〉, where A
′
a is related to Aa by a “gauge transformation” A
′
a
= Aa + ∇aχ, where χ is some smooth scalar field.
It is EM1 which, I take it, constitutes the metaphysically perspicuous charac-
terisation of this theory. That is, it is the tensor Fab which faithfully represents
the fundamental ontology of the theory, namely the electromagnetic field. Not so
EM2. This second formulation may, of course, be useful for various calculational
or heuristic purposes. But the key point is that the vector potential Aa does not
directly represent a genuinely real field: rather, it is merely a mathematically
convenient “shorthand” way of characterising and determining the values of the
Faraday tensor, which is taken to represent the genuine material ontology of
the theory.12 Moreover, it is precisely by construing the vector potential in this
9See, e.g., O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens (1995, 154-7).
10Here and below, I take this theory to be set in Minkowski spacetime. Thus, the spacetime
models of this theory are of the form 〈M,ηab〉, where M is a four-dimensional differentiable
manifold, and ηab is the Minkowski metric.
11For a recent, intriguing study of the relationship between these two different formulations
of electromagnetism, see Weatherall (forthcoming). I draw heavily on his discussion over the
next couple of paragraphs.
12Modulo, that is, certain concerns that arise as a result of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. See,
e.g., Healey (2007).
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way which plausibly allows us to explain and understand, in a fully transpar-
ent way, gauge-symmetry models’ physical equivalence in EM2—namely, for the
reason that they are merely notationally distinct ways of representing the same
fundamental physical ontology.
As mentioned above, I think this example of metaphysical perspicuity is apt
to be slightly misleading, at least when taken on its own. This is because this
example might make it seem as though having a metaphysically perspicuous
characterisation of the (putative) reality underlying symmetry-related models
crucially relies upon one having to mathematically reformulate the relevant the-
ory (or at least upon having such a mathematical reformulation already in hand),
and in particular upon having to reformulate the theory so as to remove any
relevant representational redundancy. However, I think this is incorrect. That
is, I believe that one can, in fact, be in possession of a metaphysically perspicu-
ous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even in
the absence of any mathematical (re-)formulation of the theory which removes
the relevant representational redundancy.
Let me illustrate this point with two simple examples. First, consider the
case of shift symmetry in NGT. This symmetry is subtly different from the case
of boost symmetry, discussed above. Here, instead of uniformly altering the
absolute velocity of each particle throughout its history, one enacts a global,
time-independent repositioning of all matter in space. Thus, for instance, in the
shifted world all of the world’s material content will (prima facie) be located
three metres to the left of where it is in the original world. The basic idea
behind the “Leibniz shift” argument—the famous argument associated with
this symmetry—is that the substantivalist’s admission of points of space as
primitive objects (allegedly) has the undesirable consequence of committing her
to regarding shifted worlds as physically distinct, yet nevertheless empirically
indistinguishable:13 in intuitive terms, everything would look, feel, taste, touch
and sound the same in the two (putatively distinct) shifted worlds, just as in
the case of boosted worlds.
It will prove helpful to express all of this in terms of the models of the theory.
Thus, take a generic model of NGT to be of the formM = 〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, ρ, φ〉,
where M is a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, tab is the temporal metric,
hab is the spatial metric, σa is the timelike vector field whose integral curves rep-
resent the persisting points of absolute space, and ρ and φ represent the matter
density and the gravitational potential field respectively.14 A shift symmetry
can then be characterised as the application of the appropriate diffeomorphism
(corresponding to a spatial translation) d so as to yield a new model Mstatic =
〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, d∗ρ, d∗φ〉. It is then alleged thatM andMstatic differ precisely
13Though see Maudlin (1993), who notes that there is an interesting (epistemological) sense
in which shifted worlds in NGT are not indiscernible after all.
14Note that the canonical presentations of Newtonian spacetime (e.g., Earman 1989, §2.5)
take the affine connection as ideologically primitive. I find such presentations unsatisfactory for
historical rather than for philosophical reasons: in particular, it threatens to make the move
to Galilean spacetime seem almost trivial, and the associated timelike vector field trivially
superfluous. For more on this point, see Pooley (MS, §4.4-§4.5).
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insofar as they each represent the world’s matter content as being located at
distinct places in absolute space. More specifically, such Leibniz-shifted scenar-
ios are alleged to differ precisely with regard to which particular points of space
are underlying various parts of the matter fields.
For a second example, consider diffeomorphism symmetry in general relativ-
ity (GR). Here, similarly, the existence of this symmetry is alleged to commit
the substantivalist to a plurality of physically distinct possibilities that are nev-
ertheless empirically indistinguishable. In terms of the models of the theory:
taking a generic model of GR to be of the formM = 〈M, gab, Tab〉 and applying
an arbitrary diffeomorphism d to yield a new model Mdiff = 〈M,d
∗gab, d
∗Tab〉
(where M is again a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, gab is the metric
tensor, and Tab is the stress-energy tensor which, roughly speaking, represents
the model’s matter content), the two scenarios represented are alleged to differ
with regard to which particular points of the spacetime manifold are underlying
various parts of the metric and matter fields.15
It is my contention that neither the shift symmetry of NGT, nor the diffeo-
morphism symmetry of general relativity, by themselves motivate any mathe-
matical reconstrual of the respective theories. This is because I believe there
is a perfectly transparent, anti-haecceitist, “modestly structuralist”—but nev-
ertheless fully substantivalist—way of understanding such models’ representa-
tional equivalence even in the absence of any such mathematical reformulation.
On this view, spacetime points are construed as genuinely real, fundamental
entities. However, they are “contextually individuated”: they are not to be
understood as being anything more—or less—than “nodes” in the relational,
geometrical structures in which they are embedded. Shifted models in NGT
and diffeomorphically-related models in GR are thus to be understood as rep-
resenting the same physical state of affairs precisely because the exact same
pattern of relational, geometrical structures is represented as obtaining in each
case. Moreover, this view denies that there are any primitive, singular (“haec-
ceitistic”) facts about spacetime points which would even allow for a distinction
between shifted or diffeomorphically-related scenarios to be coherently drawn.16
Whence the difference, then, between the case of gauge symmetry in electro-
magnetism on the one hand, and shift and diffeomorphism symmetry in NGT
and GR on the other? I think the answer is straightforward. In the latter cases,
the models in question are isomorphic: they represent worlds which differ at
most with regard to which particular objects are playing which qualitative roles,
i.e., they represent at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. Hence,
adopting modest structuralism (which implies anti-haecceitism) about space-
time transparently collapses the number of possibilities represented by these
models to one. In the former such case, however, the relevant models are not
isomorphic—read “literally”, gauge-related models of EM2 assign qualitatively
distinct arrangements of the vector field over spacetime—hence adopting a mod-
estly structuralist ontology does not by itself collapse the number of represented
15For further details see, e.g., Earman (1989, §9).
16For further defence of this view—which is sometimes also called sophisticated substanti-
valism in the literature—see, e.g., Saunders (2003), Ladyman (2007), and Pooley (2013).
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possibilities to one. In order to transparently understand such models’ physical
equivalence, then, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
To summarise the claims made thus far: according to the motivational view
of symmetries, one is invariably only motivated to regard symmetry-related
models as physically equivalent; moreover, one is justified in regarding such
models as physically equivalent only insofar as one is in possession of a meta-
physically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
them. However, it is possible to be in possession of a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even
in the absence of a mathematical formulation of the theory which removes the
relevant representational redundancy. Such a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation is possible just in case the symmetry-related models in question are
isomorphic, or are naturally understood as representing at most haecceitistically
distinct possibilities. In brief: symmetry-related, isomorphic models invariably
do not motivate a mathematical reformulation of the relevant theory (modest
structuralism invariably suffices); but symmetry-related, non-isomorphic models
invariably do.17
4 In Defence of the Motivational View
Let us return once more to the case of NGT. As alluded to in Section 1, the
symmetry group of this theory is quite large. For not only does it include trans-
formations corresponding to global velocity boosts of solutions’ matter content,
but it also includes transformations corresponding to time-dependent transla-
tional accelerations of such content (so long as the gravitational potential field
is also appropriately transformed). Thus, read “literally”, the symmetries of
this theory include transformations that map solutions to solutions that repre-
sent physically distinct, but nevertheless empirically indistinguishable, states of
affairs in which a given material system is:
1. Force-free and stationary with respect to absolute space.
2. Force-free and moving at constant absolute velocity.
3. Absolutely accelerating under a gravitational force-field.
According to the interpretational conception of symmetries, we may legit-
imately take all of these symmetry-related solutions to in fact represent the
same physical state of affairs—despite the fact that they are naturally under-
stood as representing radically distinct physical situations. Things are very
different, however, according to the motivational conception of symmetries. On
this view, we are merely motivated to regard all such solutions as representing
the same physical state of affairs, the motivation arising from the general Oc-
camist principle that, other things being equal, our preferred scientific theories
should not allow for solutions that represent physically distinct but nevertheless
empirically indistinguishable possible worlds. According to the motivational
17See also Pooley (2013, 576-7) and Weatherall (forthcoming) for recent, related arguments
to this effect.
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view, then (and to repeat slightly), absent a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation of the reality underlying these symmetry-related models, we have
no choice but to regard them as representing physically distinct states of affairs.
For our purposes, the crucial thing to note about all of these models is
that none of them are isomorphic—naturally understood, they do not represent
at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. According to the criterion
laid down in the previous section, then, in order to be able to transparently
understand how it could be that such models may be said to represent physically
equivalent scenarios, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
As it turns out, such a mathematical reformulation of the theory is pos-
sible. In brief, in this reformulation one replaces the vector field σa with a
new kind of dynamical inertial connection ∇NC , with models of the formMNC
= 〈M, tab, h
ab,∇NC , ρ〉. Up to isomorphism, any two symmetry-related mod-
els of NGT correspond to a unique model of Newtonian gravity geometrised
in this way. Thus, it is said, by moving to this “Newton-Cartan” theory one
successfully removes the undesirable “gauge-redundancy” inherent in all non-
geometrised versions of Newtonian gravitation theory.18
What might the defender of the interpretational view of symmetries say in
defence of her view—in this context, that the move to Newton-Cartan theory
is not required in order to be able to legitimately regard all symmetry-related
solutions of NGT as physically equivalent?
I anticipate two likely lines of response. First, she might attempt to establish
the preferability of her view over the motivational view by noting that the
defender of the motivational view is committed, at least prior to the appropriate
theory’s reformulation (in the context of NGT), to the existence of in principle
undetectable (symmetry-variant) matters of fact. Moreover, the defender of
the interpretational view might argue, this is an unpalatable consequence, one
which we would do best to avoid—and one which, she might point out, the
interpretational view does in fact avoid.
I agree that the admission of such in principle undetectable facts is an un-
desirable consequence of the motivational view. However, I do not think that
this admission is sufficiently unpalatable so as to be capable of refuting the
motivational view, or even of establishing the preferability of the interpreta-
tional view over the motivational view. After all, prohibitively strong versions
of verificationism aside, there is nothing obviously absurd about admitting in
principle undetectable facts into one’s ontology; nor is there any obvious reason
why we should always be capable of discovering a theory, or a perspicuous char-
acterisation thereof (the case of isomorphic models excepted), which succeeds
in transparently explaining such solutions’ empirical equivalence by virtue of
18For further details, see, e.g., Knox (2014). Note also the important point that moving
to Newton-Cartan theory is not by itself sufficient for one to be able to transparently under-
stand as physically equivalent all symmetry-related models of Newtonian theory set in flat
spacetime. This is because—as mentioned above—such symmetry-related models will typi-
cally correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan theory only up to isomorphism. Thus,
in order to have a fully transparent understanding of how it is that symmetry-related models
of Newtonian theory set in flat spacetime can correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan
theory, a modestly structuralist conception of spacetime ontology is also required.
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their actual physical equivalence; nor indeed is there even any obvious way of
guaranteeing that there will always be such a theory or characterisation (again,
isomorphic models excepted) waiting in logical space to be discovered.
Furthermore, although it is to be admitted that the Newtonian who sub-
scribes to the merely motivational view of symmetries might indeed be com-
mitted to the possibility of there being facts beyond her epistemic grasp, it
nevertheless bears emphasising that for such a Newtonian there is a perfectly
good explanation as to why such facts are epistemically inaccessible: they are in-
accessible precisely because the world is in fact accurately described by the laws
of NGT, with associated models of the form 〈M, tab, h
ab, σa, ρ, φ〉, and because
all any Newtonian observer ultimately has empirical access to are the relative
distances and velocities between material entities. For such a Newtonian, then,
the empirical phenomena underdetermine the genuine physical facts; but the
theory itself is able to provide a perfectly transparent explanation of the re-
ality behind the phenomena in terms of which the underdetermination can be
straightforwardly understood.
The Newtonian who adopts the interpretational construal of symmetries,
however, would appear to lose this explanatory transparency. In other words,
she might know that she may legitimately regard all symmetry-related solutions
as physically equivalent; but the reality in terms of which this physical equiv-
alence is to be understood will (absent a reformulation of the theory) remain
opaque to her; she is offered no immediate explanation as to how such physical
equivalence is to be construed, or how it could even be said to arise.
These considerations naturally suggest a second possible line of response for
the defender of the interpretational view. In particular, she might claim that
she does, in fact, have a transparent understanding of the reality underlying
NGT’s symmetry-related models, and that such a transparent understanding is
in fact attainable prior to the move to Newton-Cartan theory.19
Such a response evidently leads into deep philosophical waters very quickly.
(After all, what does it mean to be in possession of a “transparent under-
standing” of anything?) But let me make a brief remark as to why I find this
particular claim to be implausible. For note that in NGT the persisting points
of absolute space are not merely “idly turning wheels” that can simply be ex-
punged from the theory without explanatory loss: they are not “explanatorily
idle” posits. This is for two main reasons. First, such points play a crucial
role in the metaphysical explanation of what quantities like relative velocity and
absolute rotation and absolute acceleration truly are: for the Newtonian, facts
about particular inter-particle velocities and absolute rotations and absolute ac-
celerations are naturally understood as being grounded in particular facts about
(rates of change of) absolute velocities.20 Second, such points provide the cru-
cial transtemporal standard which is required in the realist’s causal explanation
of the observable effects of noninertial motion (e.g., Newton’s famous “bucket
experiment”): a standard without which Newton’s laws simply cannot be formu-
19Dewar (2015, esp. 322)—who is a recent, explicit defender of the interpretational view—is
plausibly read as making this claim.
20Cf. Pooley (MS, 118).
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lated (at least, absent any other way of construing the transtemporal structure
required to underwrite the distinction between inertial and noninertial motion).
In short—and to the extent that the interpretational view is not supposed to
reduce to a rather uninteresting form of scientific instrumentalism—it is simply
not clear what causal-explanatory, realistic picture of the world is being pro-
pounded by the defender of the interpretational view, at least in this particular
(Newtonian) context; it is simply opaque what, according to her, the world is
really like.
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The information loss paradox is often presented as an unavoidable consequence of
well-established physics. However, in order for a genuine paradox to ensue, not-trivial
assumptions about, e.g., quantum effects on spacetime, are necessary. In this work
we will be explicit about these additional, speculative assumptions required. We will
also sketch a map of the available routes to tackle the issue, highlighting the, often
overlooked, commitments demanded of each alternative. In particular, we will display
the strong link between black holes, the issue of information loss and the measurement
problem.
1 Introduction
The so-called information loss paradox is usually introduced as an unavoidable conse-
quence of standard, well-established physics. The paradox is supposed to arise from a
glaring conflict between Hawking’s black hole radiation and the fact that time evolution
in quantum mechanics preserves information. However, the truth is that, in order for a
genuine paradox to appear, a sizable number of additional, non-standard assumptions
is required. As we will see, these extra assumptions involve thesis regarding the fun-
damental nature of Hawking’s radiation, guesses regarding quantum aspects of gravity
and even considerations in the foundations of quantum theory.
In this work, we will be explicit about the additional assumptions required for
a genuine conflict to arise and delineate the available options in order to tackle the
issue. In particular, we will stress the connection between information loss and the
measurement problem, and display the often non-trivial commitments that each of the
available alternatives to solve the information loss issue demands.
1
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -408-
2 The classical setting: black holes hide informa-
tion
We start by reviewing some properties of classical black holes. Gravity, being always
attractive, tends to draw matter together to form clusters. In fact, if the mass of a
cluster is big enough, nothing will be able to stop the contraction until, eventually, a
black hole will form. That is, the gravitational field at the surface of the body will
be so strong that not even light will be able to escape and a region of spacetime from
which nothing is able to emerge will form. The boundary of such a region is called the
event horizon and, according to general relativity, its area never decreases.
In general, the collapse dynamics that leads to the formation of a black hole can, of
course, be very complicated. However, it can be shown that all such systems eventually
settle down into one of the few stationary black hole solutions, which are completely
characterized by the mass, charge and angular momentum of the the Kerr-Newman
spacetimes. In fact, the so-called black hole uniqueness theorems guarantee that, as
long as one only considers gravitational and electromagnetic fields, then these solutions
represent the complete class of stationary black holes. Moreover, the so-called no-hair
theorems ensure that the set of stationary solutions does not grow, even if one considers
other hypothetical fields.
The above mentioned results seem to suggest that when a cluster collapses to form a
black hole, a large amount of information is lost. That is, details such as the multipole
moments of the initial mass distribution, or the type of matter involved, seem to be
altogether lost when the black hole settles. Note however that such apparent loss of
information corresponds only to that available to observers outside of the black hole.
While at early times there are Cauchy hypersurfaces1 completely contained outside
of the black hole, at later times all Cauchy hypersurfaces have parts both inside and
outside it (see Figure 1). Therefore, using data located both outside and inside of the
black hole, the whole spacetime can always be recovered. We conclude that, in the
classical setting, information is not really lost. All that happens is that, when a black
hole forms, a new region of no escape emerges and some of the information from the
outside of the black hole moves into such new region. One could still argue that, since
there are points inside of the horizon which are not in the past of future null infinity,2
1A Cauchy hypersurface is a subset of spacetime which is intersected exactly once by every inex-
tensible, non-spacelike curve.
2Future null infinity is the set of points which are approached asymptotically by null rays which
2
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then it is impossible to reconstruct the whole spacetime by evolving backwards the
data on it. However, future null infinity is not a Cauchy hypersurface so one should
not expect to reconstruct the whole spacetime from such data.
I
−
I
+Horizon
Singularity
Collapsing body
Figure 1: Penrose diagram for a collapsing spherical body. I+ and I− denote past and
future null infinity.
3 QFT on a fixed curved background: black holes
radiate
The most dramatic change in our understanding of black hole physics came as a result
of Hawking’s famous analysis. What this analysis showed was that the formation of
a black hole would modify the state of any quantum field in such a way that, at late
times, there would be an outgoing flux of particles carrying energy towards infinity.
Moreover, Hawking showed that the flux was characterized by the surface gravity κ of
the resulting asymptotic stationary state of the black hole. This discovery transformed
our perception of the formal analogy, originally pointed out in Bekenstein (1972),
between the laws of black hole dynamics, and the standard laws of thermodynamics
(see Wald (1994) for a discussion). In particular, it led to the view that the surface
gravity is in fact a measure of the black hole’s temperature T = κ
2pi
, and that the event
horizon’s area A is a measure of the black hole’s entropy S = A/4.
Hawking’s result is probably the most famous of the effects that arise from the
natural extension of special relativistic quantum field theory to the realm of curved
spacetimes. It imposes a dramatic modification on the classical view of black holes as
can escape to infinity.
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absolutely black and eternal regions of spacetime. It is important to stress, though,
that Hawking’s calculation, being a result pertaining to quantum field theory on a
fixed spacetime, does not encompass back-reaction effects. These are in fact notoriously
difficult to deal with and a general framework for doing so is lacking. At any rate, some
straightforward physical considerations, which have rather dramatic consequences, are
often brought to bear in this context.
4 Back-reaction and first quantum gravity input:
black holes evaporate
As can be expected, Hawking’s result also suggests a dramatic modification in our
expectation for the ultimate fate of a black hole. That is, while before Hawking’s
discovery, one would have expected that, once formed, a black hole would be eternal,
the fact that the radiation is caring energy away, assuming overall energy conservation,
leads one to expect that the mass of the black hole will start diminishing. The context
in which this problem is standardly set is that of asymptotically flat spacetimes, for
which we have a well defined notion of overall energy content given by the ADM mass3
of the spacetime, a quantity which is known to be conserved.
As we noted, Hawking’s calculation cannot deal with back-reaction. However, our
confidence on energy conservation in the appropriate situations is so robust that it is
difficult not to conclude that, as the radiation carries away energy, the black hole mass
will have to diminishing. If this takes place, the surface gravity of the black hole—which
is no longer really stationary, but can be expected to deviate from stationarity only to a
very small degree—would change as well. As it turns out, the surface gravity is inversely
proportional to the black hole’s mass, so the black hole temperature can be expected to
increase, leading to a ever more rapid rate of energy loss and a correspondingly faster
decrease in mass.
The run away picture for the evaporation process suggests a complete disappearance
of the black hole in a finite amount of time. Of course, we cannot really be sure about
this picture because, in order to perform a solid analysis, we would need to deploy
a, currently lacking, trustworthy theoretical formalism adept to the challenge. The
3The ADM mass is a quantity associated with the asymptotic behavior of the induced spatial
metric of a Cauchy hypersurface. In asymptotically flat spacetimes, it is known to be independent of
the hypersurface on which it is evaluated (see Arnowitt et al. (1962)).
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problem is that, by the removal of energy from the black hole, one can expect to
eventually reach a regime where quantum aspects of gravitation become essential to
the description of the process. At such point, one might contemplate the possibility
that, as a result of purely quantum gravitational aspects, the Hawking evaporation of
the black hole will stop, leaving a small stable remnant. This, in turn, might open
certain possibilities regarding the information issue. For the time being, though, we
will ignore such an option.
Then, in order to simplify the discussion at this point, we will ignore the possibility
of remnants and assume that there is nothing to stop the Hawking radiation. Then,
if the black hole’s mass decreases in accordance with energy conservation, one expects
that the black hole to simply disappear and the spacetime region where it was located
to turn flat (see Figure 2).
I
−
I
+
Horizon
Singularity
Collapsing body
Figure 2: Penrose diagram for a collapsing spherical body, taking into account Hawk-
ing’s radiation.
At this point, we seem to come face to face with an information loss problem: the
original massive object that collapses, leading to the formation of a black hole, might
have required an incredibly large amount of detail for its description. However, the
final state that results from the evaporation is simply described in terms of the thermal
Hawking flux, followed by an empty region of spacetime. More to the point, even if
the initial matter that collapses to form a black hole was initially in a pure quantum
state, after the complete evaporation of the black hole there would be a mixed one,
corresponding to the thermal Hawking flux. These considerations seem to indicate
that, even at the fundamental level, we have a fundamental loss of information. The
final state, even if described in full detail, does not encode the information required
to retrodict the details of the initial one. At the level of quantum theory, we would
5
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be facing a non-unitary (and non-deterministic) relation between the initial and final
states of the system, a situation that seems at odds with the unitary evolution provided
by the Schrödinger equation.
There are, however, various caveats to the above conclusion. The first one is opened
up by the possibility of the evaporation eventually stopping, leading to a stable rem-
nant. The mass of said remnant can be estimated by considering the natural scales at
which the effects of quantum gravity are expected to become important. This leads to
an estimate of the order of Plank’s mass (≈ 10−5 gr). Then, if one wants the remnant
to encode all the information present in the initial state, one is led to the conclusion
that such a small object would have a number of possible internal states as large as
that of the original matter that collapsed to form the black hole, which can, of course,
have had a mass as large as one can imagine. It is hard, then, to envisage what kind of
object, with such rather unusual thermodynamical behavior, would this remnant have
to be. For this reason, this possibility is usually not considered viable (although we
acknowledge that these considerations might be overturned; for a discussion of these
issues see Banks (1994)). At any rate, we will not consider this possibility any further.
We should also mention another proposal which uses the idea that, while curing
singularities, quantum gravity might open paths to other universes, which could be
home to the missing information. Such information would be encoded either in a
new universe or in correlations between it and ours. Besides the dramatic ontological
burden, such proposal leaves open the possibility of these alternative universes emerging
even in ordinary processes (which could, e.g., involve virtual black holes), leading
to information loss in such standard scenarios. Alternatively, the information could
be preserved, but impossible to retrieve in principle. We will also not consider this
possibility any further.
A much more important caveat is the following: we have very solid results indicat-
ing that, associated with the formation of a black hole, there is always a singularity
of spacetime appearing withing it. The strongest results in this regard are a series of
theorems proved by Hawking (see Hawking and Ellis (1973)) showing that, under quite
general conditions, and assuming reasonable properties for the energy and momentum
of the collapsing matter, the formation of singularities is an inevitable result of Ein-
stein’s equations. The issue is that, at the classical level, these singularities represent
a breakdown of the theory and, in fact, a failure of the spacetime description. The
singularities are, therefore, to be thought of as representing boundaries of spacetime,
rather that points within it. Once a spacetime has additional boundaries, it is clear
6
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that the issue of information has to be confronted on a different light. Of course, if one
considers the description of the system at an initial Cauchy hypersurface and wants a
final hypersurface to encode the same information, one has to make sure that the final
one is also Cauchy.
The formation of singularities then implies that, if we want to have spacetime
regions where the system’s state could be thought of as encoding all the information,
then we must surround the singularities by suitable boundaries. In other words, if the
singularities force us to include further boundaries of spacetime, then the comparison of
initial and final information has to be done between the initial Cauchy hypersurface and
the late-time collection of surfaces that, together, act as a Cauchy hypersurface. That
collection could naturally include asymptotically null future, but also the hypersurfaces
surrounding the singularities. The same kind of calculation as the one done by Hawking
would then show that all the information present on the initial hypersurface would also
be encoded in the state associated with this late-time Cauchy hypersurface. That is,
if we include the boundary of spacetime that arises in association with the singularity,
then there is no issue regarding the fate of information. We conclude that, under these
circumstances, still there is no information loss.
5 Second quantum gravity input: black holes do
not involve singularities
As we noted above, singularities represent a breakdown of the spacetime description
as provided by general relativity and thus indicate the need to go beyond such theory.
The expectation among theorists is that quantum gravity is going to be the theory
that cures these failures of classical general relativity, replacing the singularities by
a description in the language appropriate to quantum gravity. This is, in fact, what
occurs with various other theories that are known to be just effective descriptions of
a physical system’s behavior in a limited context, but that have to be replaced with a
more fundamental description once the system leaves that regime. Think for instance
of the description of a fluid by, say, the Navier-Stokes equations. We know that this
description works very well in a large variety of circumstances, but that a breakdown of
such description occurs, for instance, when there are shock waves or when other types
of singularities are formed. However, under such circumstances, the underlying kinetic
theory, including the complex inter-molecular forces, is expected to remain valid. The
7
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point is that, just as in those cases, one expects the emergence of singularities in general
relativity to indicate the end of the regime where the classical description of spacetime
is valid and, therefore, where a quantum gravity description would have to take over
(see Figure 3 and Ashtekar and Bojowald (2005) for details).
I
−
I
+
Figure 3: “Quantum spacetime diagram” for a black hole.
Of course, if quantum gravity does in fact cure the singularities, and removes the
need to consider, in association with the corresponding regions, a boundary of space-
time, the issue of the fate of information in the Hawking evaporation of black holes
resurfaces with dramatic force. So, do we finally have a genuine paradox in our hands.
Not quite yet; a few elements are still missing. In order for a paradox to arise, we need
to couple a genuine loss of information with a fundamental theory which does not allow
for information to be lost.
6 A paradox?
When is it, then, that the Hawking radiation by a black hole leads to an actual paradox?
We are finally in a position to enumerate the various assumptions required in order to
construct a genuine conflict:
1. As a result of Hawking’s radiation carrying energy away from the black hole, the
mass of the black hole decreases and it either evaporates completely or leaves a
small remnant.
2. In the case where the black hole leaves a small remnant, the number of its internal
degrees of freedom is bounded by its mass in such a way that these cannot possibly
encode the information contained in an arbitrarily massive initial state.
8
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3. Information is not transfered to a parallel universe.
4. As a result of quantum gravity effects, the internal singularities within black
holes are cured and replaced by something that eliminates the need to consider
internal boundaries of spacetime.
5. The outgoing radiation does not encode the initial information.
6. Quantum evolution is always unitary.
We have already discussed the arguments in support of assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4
and saw that, although by no means conclusive, they are reasonable. But what about
5 and 6? Well, in order to avoid a paradox, and assuming the first four assumptions
to be true, at least one of them has to be negated. In order to explore the motivations
and consequences of doing so, we must think clearly about how to interpret Hawking’s
calculation in a context in which 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the case.
As we remarked above, Hawking’s calculation is performed in the setting of a quan-
tum field theory over a fixed curved background. What one finds there is that an initial
pure state of the field evolves into a final one which, when tracing over the inside re-
gion, reduces to a mixed thermal state. The key question at this point, then, is how
to interpret such a final mixed state in a setting in which i) the black hole is no longer
there, so there is no interior region to trace over, and ii) in which there is no singularity
(or parallel universe) for the information to “escape into.” As far as we can see, there
are two alternatives: either one assumes that the mixed state arises only as a result
of tracing over the interior region and maintains that the outgoing radiation somehow
encodes the initial information—which amounts to negating 5; or one takes Hawking’s
result seriously and maintains that, even in this scenario, information is lost—which
amounts to negating 6. Below we explore each option in detail.
6.1 The outgoing radiation encodes information
In the last couple of decades, the community’s position on the information loss subject
has been strongly influenced by developments in String theory. Such framework has
permitted exploration of questions, regarding black holes, using settings where event
horizons and singularities play no relevant roles. This is possible due to the AdS/CFT
correspondence (see e.g., Strominger (2001)), which allows the mapping of compli-
cated spacetime geometries in the “bulk” of asymptotically Anti-de Sitter spacetimes,
9
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including ones involving black holes, onto corresponding states of an ordinary quantum
field theory living on the Anti-de Sitter boundary (which is, in fact, a flat spacetime).
These considerations have led people to conclude that, as a breakdown of unitarity is
not expected to take place in the context of a quantum field theory in flat spacetimes,
there should be no room for a breakdown of unitarity in the corresponding situation
involving black holes either.4
The proposal, then, is that unitarity is never broken and that information is never
lost. As a result, Hawking’s calculation has to be somehow attuned to assure consis-
tency. In particular, the proposal is that the outgoing radiation must encoded all of
the initial information. There is, however, a high price to pay in order to achieve this.
As has been shown in Almheiri et al. (2013), in order for the outgoing radiation to
encode the necessary information, each emitted particle must get entangled with all
the radiation emitted before it. However, due to the so-called, “monogamy of entan-
glement,” doing so entails the release of an enormous amount of energy, turning the
event horizon into a firewall that burns anything falling through it. The upshot then,
is a divergence of the energy-momentum tensor of the field over the event horizon and
a radical breakdown of the equivalence principle over such a region.
6.2 Unitarity is broken
The discovery of the Hawking radiation was initially taken as a clear indicative of
information loss at the fundamental level. In fact, Hawking (1976) even introduced
a notation for this general type of evolution which was supposed to account for the
transformation from (possibly pure) initial states ρi into final mixed ones ρf . Hawking
denoted the general linear, non-unitary, operator characterizing such transformation
by the sign $, i.e., ρf = $ρi. Likewise, Penrose pointed out that, in order to have a
consistent picture of phase space for situations involving black holes in thermal equilib-
rium with an environment, one has to assume that ordinary quantum systems undergo
something akin to a self-measurement, by which he meant quantum state reduction
that was not the result of measurement by external observers or measuring devices
(see Penrose (1981)). Penrose (1999) further argued that quantum state reduction is
probably linked to aspects of quantum gravity.
The early assessments of these ideas in Banks et al. (1984) indicated that they
4Note however that the argument can be easily reversed to show exactly the opposite. Since
Hawking’s result shows that unitarity breaks when black holes are present, one must conclude that
quantum evolution cannot be unitary even in a quantum field theory on flat spacetimes.
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where likely to lead to a very serious conflict with energy and momentum conservation
or to generate unacceptable non-local features in ordinary physical situations. However,
further analysis in Unruh and Wald (1995) showed that these assessments where not
that solid and that there where various possibilities to evade the apparently damning
conclusions.
In (omitted references) we have explored the viability of breaking unitarity both
qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, we have successfully adapted objective
collapse models, developed in connection with foundational issues within quantum
theory, in order to explicitly describe the transition from the initial pure state into
a mixed one. Our view on the subject is based on the conviction that, contrary to
the prevailing opinion in the community working on the gravity/quantum interface,
there are good reasons to think that quantum theory requires modifications to deal
with its basic conceptual difficulties. Below we discuss these issues and explore their
consequences for the information loss paradox.
7 Information loss and the measurement problem
Most discussions of black holes and information loss do not implicate foundational
issues of quantum theory. Of course, ignoring such issues, particularly with pragmatic
interests in mind, is often acceptable. However, when deep conceptual questions are
involved, such as in the present case, the pragmatic attitude might not be the right
way to go.
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics involves a profoundly instru-
mentalist character, with notions such as observer or measurement playing a crucial
role. Such an instrumentalist trait becomes a problem as soon as one intends to re-
gard the theory as a fundamental one, useful not only to make predictions in suitable
experimental settings, but also to be applied to the measurement apparatuses, to the
observers involved, or to non-standard contexts such as black holes or the universe as a
whole. The resulting problem, often referred to as the measurement problem, has been
discussed at length in numerous places and many different concrete formulations of it
have been given. A particularly useful way to state it, given in Maudlin (1995), is as
a list of three statements that cannot be all true at the same time:
A. The physical description given by the quantum state is complete.
B. Quantum evolution is always unitary.
11
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C. Measurements always yield definite results.
Maudlin’s formulation of the measurement problem is noteworthy because of its
generality and its preciseness. Moreover, it is extremely useful in order to motivate
and classify strategies to solve the problem. For example, by negating A, one arrives
at so-called hidden variable theories, such as Bohmian mechanics; by removing B,
one gets so-called objective collapse theories, such as GRW; and by discarding C,
Everettian interpretations emerge. Of these three options, the last one is, by far, the
most contentious. Among its most urgent matters, we can mention the problem of
the preferred basis, the one of making sense of probabilities in the theory and the
general and basic issue of establishing a clear and precise link between the abstract
mathematical objects of the theory and concrete empirical predictions. Of course, brave
attempts to deal with these and other issues within Everettian frameworks abound.
However, be believe that, at least for the time being, they are far from being successful.
Returning to the measurement problem and its relation to the information loss
issue, we note that assumptions 6 and B are in fact identical. Therefore, the strategy
one decides to adopt in order to avoid complications regarding the information loss
issue (e.g., negating 5 or 6 above) has implications with respect to what one must
say regarding the measurement problem (e.g., negating A, B or C). In particular, if
regarding the information loss, one decides to maintain the validity of 6 (and thus
to hold that the outgoing radiation encodes all of the initial information), then one
necessarily has to either negate A or C (i.e., either to entertain a hidden variables theory
or an Everettian scenario). In other words, insisting on a purely unitary evolution,
not only demands a violation of the equivalence principle and a divergence of the
energy-momentum tensor, but also a commitment either with many worlds or with an
acknowledgment that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete. On the other hand,
if regarding the information loss problem, one decides to abandon unitarity, the same
move automatically not only avoids a breakdown of the equivalence principle, but also
guarantees success with respect to the measurement problem. The upper hand of the
second option seems evident to us.
8 Conclusions
Since the publication of Hawking’s analysis, more than forty years ago, the issue of black
hole information loss has been a central topic in theoretical physics. The AdS/CFT
12
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correspondence, proposed almost twenty years latter, came to further propel an already
notorious debate. Yet, even after all these years, the discussion is often engulfed by
confusion and misunderstanding among participants. The objective of this work is to
develop a clear analysis of some of the key conceptual issues involved. Our hope is
that, by doing so, significant progress on this important topic could soon be achieved.
We have presented the basic theoretical setting of the black hole information issue,
paying special attention to elements, arising from not yet well-established physics, that
presently have to be regarded merely as reasonable assumptions. Moreover, we have
argued that the information loss issue is closely related to the measurement problem,
and claimed that it is precisely within the context of certain proposals put forward to
deal with the latter that the former finds one of its most conservative resolutions.
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1 Introduction
The homology thinking, the idea that the same anatomical structure repeat-
edly appears in different species or parts of the same organism, has a long
history in biology (Amundson, 2005). While the existence of such anatomi-
cal similarities among or within species is now explained by the descent from
a common ancestor, the conceptual issues surrounding the notion have in-
vited philosophical as well as methodological debates and skepticism. Owen
famously defined homology as “the same organ in different animals under ev-
ery variety of form and function,” but this definition is perplexing rather than
enlightening: what characterizes and warrants the sameness of “organs,” if
not their form or function? What, in other words, is the unit of homology?
There are three conceptual problems. The first and foremost problem is
its definition: what exactly is homology? Evolutionary theory tells us that
homology is identity due to a common origin, but an identity of what? Is
it morphological characters, activities, clusters of properties, or genetic net-
works that are regarded to be same? And what is the criterion to judge
whether or not two such things are actually the “same”? The second prob-
lem is metaphysical. As Ghiselin (1997) points out, the homology-as-identity
partitions the whole tree of life into equivalence classes. But doesn’t the sup-
position of such universal classes, reminiscent of Aristotelian essence, commit
us to an anti-evolutionary thinking? And thirdly, there is a pragmatic ques-
tion: why do we care about homology at all? Some neo-Darwinians such
2
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as G. C. Williams see homologs as mere “residues,” i.e. a relic of the past
common ancestry not yet washed out by natural selection (Amundson, 2005,
pp. 237-8). If that is the case homology by itself would have no explanatory
role in evolutionary theory, and the quest for its definition, however well-
defined and metaphysically sound, becomes a mere armchair exercise with
no scientific value.
There is at least one usage of the concept free from these issues: homology
of DNA sequences. Here the “sameness” is well-defined by matching bases
that can be one of the four chemical kinds, G, C, T, A. Moreover, the scien-
tific importance of orthologs and paralogs is undeniable in reconstructing the
evolutionary history and predicting gene function, to name a few. Things
become different for phenotype, in particular complex phenotypes like mor-
phological or behavioral traits. First of all, there is no clear-cut definition of
“phenotypic units” as that for nucleotides. Continuous traits such as height
or weight usually lack objects breakpoints by which we classify them into
discrete equivalence classes. In sum, there seem to be no non-arbitrary and
non-controversial units for phenotype of which we can talk about the same-
ness, and thus homology.
Our first task, therefore, is to identify the units on which the pheno-
typic homology relationship can be defined. This presentation proposes that
this purpose is best served by causal graphs which formally represent de-
velopmental or behavioral mechanisms. Homology is thus defined as graph
isomorphism over lineages, or conservation of the underlying causal structure
3
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over evolutionary history (Section 2). I will argue in Section 3 that the for-
mal treatment of homology (i) solves the philosophical as well as empirical
puzzles and criticisms regarding the homology concept; (ii) provides clear
meanings to some key but elusive concepts such as constraints, evolvabil-
ity, and novelty; (iii) and suggests a broad perspective that accommodates
evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary research projects. Section 4 compares
the present approach to other existing accounts of homology, and discusses
its relative strengths, challenge, and philosophical implication. As will be
stressed there, the primary objective of this presentation is to facilitate or
open up new empirical as well as theoretical questions. The last section con-
cludes with some of these research prospects that are prompted by the new
homology concept.
2 Defining homology with graphs
The idea of characterizing homology in terms of causal structures is not
new. Various biologists have suggested, albeit in different fashions, that the
developmental or behavioral mechanisms underlying phenotype can or should
serve as a unit of homology (e.g. Riedl, 1978; Wagner, 1989, 2014; Gilbert
and Bolker, 2001; Mu¨ller, 2003). These proposal, however, are mostly based
on independent examples or qualitative descriptions, and the lack of a unified
treatment has blurred their philosophical as well as theoretical implications.
4
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The aim of this section is to give a formal representation to the ideas of
developmental sameness by using causal graphs, in view of exploring the
conceptual nature of homology in the later sections.
A causal graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a set of phenotypic or
genetic variables of organisms and E is a set of edges representing causal
relationships among these traits. Development is understood as a causal web
connecting embryological, morphological, and behavioral traits, and the set
of edges E characterizes these causal links. Note that such connections may
remain invariant even under considerable modifications in phenotypic values
or the functional form that determines the quantitative nature of each edge.
The same set of E is consistent with a variety of phenotypic states and forms
of causal production; it only defines the qualitative feature of the causal
networks, i.e. which causes which.
Once modeled in this way, it becomes meaningful to compare causal struc-
tures of different organisms. A causal graph G1 = (V1,E1) is isomorphic
to another G2 = (V2,E2) if they have the same structure, or more for-
mally if there is a bijection f : V1 → V2 such that if (v, w) ∈ E1 then
(f(v), f(w)) ∈ E2. Likewise, isomorphism can be defined for subgraphs,
which are just parts of the causal graphs restricted to a subset V′ ⊂ V. We
write G1 ∼ G2 if two (sub)graphs are isomorphic. It is easy to see ‘∼’ is
symmetric, reflexive, and transitive, and thus defines a equivalence class.
Each individual is assigned one causal graph that models a particular
part of its developmental or behavioral mechanism. Let us denote the causal
5
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structure of an organism a by G(a). Collectively, G(A) is a set of causal
structures for a set of organisms A. We assume usual ancestor/descendant
relationships over a set of organism Ω (which may include more than one
species). If b is an ancestor of a, the lineage between b and a is a set of every
individual between them. Given this setup homology is defined as follows.
For two sets of organisms A,B ⊂ Ω, let G ′ be a subgraph of all
g ∈ G(A), and G ′′ be a subgraph of all g ∈ G(B). Then G ′ and
G ′′ are homologous iff
1. G ′ ∼ G ′′;
2. there is a set of common ancestors C ⊂ Ω of A and B1; and
3. for every d in all the lineages from C to A and C to B, G(d)
has a subgraph G ′′′ such that G ′′′ ∼ G ′ ∼ G ′′.
The definition explicates the idea that homology is the identity between
causal structures due to common ancestry. Two (sets of) organisms share
a homologous causal structure if, in addition to the graph isomorphism, ev-
ery individual on the lineage connecting them shares the same causal graph,
capturing the idea that the structure has been conserved through the evolu-
tionary history.
The same treatment applies to serial homology, i.e. the homology re-
lationship among parts of the same organism, such as teeth, limbs, or tree
1Note that C may be A or B themselves. Also note the condition 1 is redundant if a
lineage includes the both ends. But here it is retained for clarity.
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leaves. We can just set A = B, and compare different but isomorphic sub-
parts G ′,G ′′ of the same overall structure G(A). Then the homology hy-
pothesis is that there is an organism c in which the mechanism in question
was duplicated, and the lineages from c to A have conserved the duplicated
structures.
The above definition is illustrated with a case of special homology in figure
1, which depicts a particular region of the tree of life for (groups of) organisms
A to G. Two mutationsM1,M2 on the developmental mechanism occurred in
the lineage leading to F , in which one causal edge V1 → V3 was first removed
and then restored. In this example, the causal structure G(D) of population
D is homologous to G(E), for they are both inherited from the ancestral graph
G(B) and G(A). In contrast, it is not homologous to G(F ) even though they
are graph-isomorphic. This is because the lineages connecting D and F do
not conserve the causal structure in question: particularly it is not shared
by C.
The example, though too simplistic to capture any real biological phe-
nomena, makes explicit the idea that homology is a concordance of devel-
opmental mechanisms due to common ancestry. Note the criterion makes
no reference to the resulting phenotype represented by particular values or
distributions of variables. It does not require or forbid that, for example, two
populations E and D show similar morphological distributions. Nor does it
assume the graphs consist of the variables of the same nature. If the causal
graphs in figure 1 represent a genetic network, kinds of genes/variables that
7
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
∗
M1(V1 ̸→ V3)
∗
M2(V1 → V3)
Genealogy Causal graphs
V3
V2 V1
V3
V2 V1
Figure 1: Illustration of graph homology. On the left is a genealogy tree for
hypothetical populations A,B,C,D,E, F,G, while the graphs on the right
describe causal structures of these populations over three characters, V1, V2,
and V3. Two asterisks (∗) on the tree denote mutation events on the causal
structure. See text for explanation.
constitute the network may vary across populations, as long as they serve the
same causal roles within the overall structure. It is structural, rather than
material, identity that defines homology. Theoretical as well as philosophical
implications of this view will be explored in the following sections.
3 Conceptual advantages of the view
The above account is intended to provide a theoretical platform to formulate
and evaluate hypotheses or explanations regarding homology. This section
explicates the conceptual benefits of thinking homology in terms of causal
graphs. Discussions on the empirical adequacy are differed to the next sec-
8
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tion.
As discussed in the introduction, the major obstacle in defining homology
is the absence of definite phenotypic units. Homology is an identity rather
than similarity relationship (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997; Mu¨ller, 2003; Wagner, 2014),
whereas no two or more phenotypic characters are identical in a strict sense
— there are always subtle differences in, say, shape or size. The problem
could be solved if we could find a natural and non-arbitrary way to factorize
the phenotypic space into discrete regions so that two phenotypes within the
same region are regarded “identical” despite their apparent differences. This
is a difficult task, especially because we do not know the topological feature
of the phenotypic space (Wagner and Stadler, 2003). To solve this issue the
present analysis adopts a different strategy: instead of trying to impose a cer-
tain structure on the phenotypic space, it takes the generative mechanisms as
basic units. Once these mechanisms are represented by causal graphs, which
by nature are discrete mathematical entities, the desired identity relation-
ship is given by graph isomorphism regardless of differences in the resulting
morphology/phenotype. The graphical representation thus provides natural
units prerequisite to define homology.
It is granted that a graph representation is not determined uniquely, be-
cause the same developmental mechanism can be modeled in various levels of
abstraction, yielding causal graphs of different complexities. However, I take
this to be a strength rather than weakness of my view, because homology
too is often treated as description-dependent. Teleost fins and tetrapod limbs
9
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are said to be homologous as paired vertebrate appendages, but not as fins
or limbs. In contrast, our hands and pectoral fins of the whale are homol-
ogous not only as appendages but also as limbs. One tempting hypothesis
is that such degrees of homology relationship correspond to isomorphisms of
causal structures described at different granularities. In the above example,
it is hypothesized that teleost fins and tetrapod limbs are represented by the
same, but rather course-grained, causal graph, while tetrapod species share
the causal structure to much finer details.
Fixing the level of abstraction determines not only the equivalent classes
but also the degree of similarity between these classes. Two distinct causal
graphs may be closer or further depending on the number of changes required
to obtain one from the other. If G ′′ is obtained by removing one edge from G ′
which in turn lacks one of the edges of G, G ′′ is one step further than G ′ from
the original G. Each such deletion or addition of causal connection is called
novelty. Novelty in this framework is a modification of the causal graph, and
as such creates a new equivalence class of causal graphs, namely homology.
Evolutionary novelty also comes in different degrees. In general, a single
modification in abstract graphs will correspond to multiple edge additions
or deletions in detailed ones, and thus is weighted more. In this regard a
change in the causal graph shared both by teleosts and tetrapods will count
as a significant novelty and possibly a creation of a new “bauplan.”
This brings us to one of the central contentions in today’s evolutionary
biology, namely the alleged inadequacy of the Modern Synthesis framework,
10
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in particular population genetics, to incorporate macro-scale evolutionary
phenomena uncovered by evolutionary developmental biology (e.g. Pigliucci
and Mu¨ller, 2010). It has been claimed that homology (macro-scale conser-
vatism) and novelty (a large phenotypic change) not only resist explanations
by the Neo-Darwinian gradualism, but also constrain evolutionary trajec-
tories as modeled in population genetics (e.g Amundson, 2005; Brigandt,
2007). The theoretical relationship between Evo-Devo and population ge-
netics, however, remains elusive, which makes difficult to evaluate the call
for the “new synthesis.”
The present approach, by expressing homolgy and novelty in terms of
graph equivalence and modification, suggests a perspective on this connec-
tion and a way to turn these claims into empirical hypotheses. Because causal
models induce evolutionary changes as studied in population and quantita-
tive genetics (Otsuka, 2015, 2016), the graphical representation allows one to
analyze how developmental structures generate and constrain evolutionary
dynamics. In particular, topological features of the graph such as modularity
yield, via the so-called Markov condition, patterns of probabilistic indepen-
dence on the phenotypic distribution and determine possible evolutionary
trajectories or evolvability. The causal graph approach thus supports the
view that a homolog constitutes a unit of morphological evolvability (Brig-
andt, 2007).
The graph structures that yield population dynamics are usually not
study objects of population genetics. They rather serve as background frame-
11
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works in which evolutionary models are build to study changes in genetic or
phenotypic frequencies. These frameworks, however, must come from some-
where, and this evolutionary process is a primary interest of Evo-Devo. Stud-
ies on homology and novelty — graph stasis and change — amount to “higher
order” evolutionary analyses that deal with changes in the theoretical frame-
work used in population genetics to predict local population dynamics. The
graphical conception of homology thus suggests a broad perspective that ac-
commodates these different, and sometimes seen antagonistic, research fields
as complementary approaches to understand evolution.
Finally, let us turn to the metaphysical problem. As seen above, homol-
ogy is defined as an equivalence class over a set of causal graphs. But to
what do such classes correspond, if not some ideal types or essences? Ho-
mology thinking has been criticized as anti-evolutionary due to its alleged
commitment to essentialism. These critics thus re-interpret homology as a
lineage that connects individual parts, rather than as a universal class to be
instantiated by its members/homologs (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997). A detailed ex-
amination of this criticism must await another occasion, but here I just want
to propose a different way to look at the issue. A metaphysical implication
from the present study is that homology stands to concrete parts of organ-
isms not as a universal to individuals, nor as a whole to parts, but rather as a
model to phenomena to be modeled. A homology hypothesis is based on an
observation that two or more individuals or parts thereof can be modeled by
12
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the same causal graph.2 Hence the proper relationship is not instantiation or
mereology, but representation (Suppes, 2002). Once conceived in this way,
the metaphysical ghost of essentialism vanishes away. Just like the same
oscillator model characterizes various kinds of pendulum clocks, homology-
as-model is a mathematical entity (directed graph) that may represent more
than one actual individual, but that does not force us to commit to any form
of essentialism.
The individual-universal distinction has also cast a shadow on the prag-
matic issue regarding the epistemic role and significance of the concept of
homology. It has been argued that the study of homology cannot be any
more than a historiography since there is no such thing as a law for in-
dividuals (Ghiselin, 1997). A very different picture, however, emerges from
the present thesis. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis regarding
causal isomorphism— that two or more (sets of) organismal parts can be rep-
resented by the same causal model — and as such makes various predictions.
For example, it supports extrapolations from model organisms, predicting
that homologous organs will respond in the same or similar fashion to phys-
iological, chemical, or genetic interventions. In addition, since isomorphic
developmental structures will generate similar patterns of phenotypic vari-
ation (see above), their evolutionary changes are expected to follow similar
trajectories. Establishing homologous relationships therefore is not a mere
2This, in turn, implies these individuals would respond in a more or less same fashion
to hypothetical interventions (Woodward, 2003). Hence homology statements eventually
boil down to counterfactual claims.
13
PSA 2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -434-
historical description, but has predictive implications both on physiological
and evolutionary studies.
4 Comparisons and possible objections
This section compares the present proposal with some of the existing ac-
counts of homology and also discusses possible objections. A number of
philosophers and biologists have recently proposed to define homology as a
homeostatic property cluster, a cluster of correlated properties maintained by
“homeostatic mechanisms” (e.g. Boyd, 1991; Rieppel, 2005; Brigandt, 2009;
Love, 2009). Since clustering and correlations are a matter of degree, homol-
ogy according to this view is not an identity but a similarity relationship. It
thus confronts with the boundary problem — to what extent properties must
be clustered to form a homolog? The underlying “homeostatic mechanism”
is supposed to clarify this boundary, but without a clear definition of what
it is such an attempt only leads to a circularity. In particular, if it is defined
as “those causal processes that determine the boundary and integrity of the
kind (Brigandt, 2009, p.82),” the charge of circularity cannot be avoided.
This kind of problem will not arise if the generative mechanisms are de-
fined explicitly in terms of causal graphs. While my approach proposes a
formal framework to represent these mechanisms, it does not make any as-
sumption or restriction on their structure: in particular it does not require
the mechanism to be homeostatic, circumventing the criticism that a home-
14
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ostatic mechanism by definition cannot evolve (Kluge, 2003). Moreover, the
reference to “clusters” or even properties becomes superfluous, because the
variational properties of phenotype are mere derivatives of the underlying
causal graph. Of course, covarying traits suggest some ontogenetic connec-
tions, and thus may serve as a useful heuristics for finding homologs. They
are, however, only “symptoms” — what define homology are not properties,
clustered or homeostatic, but rather generative mechanisms.
The present approach has a closer affinity to the so-called biological ho-
mology concept that attempts to explain the phenomena of homology on the
basis of a particular feature of the underlying causal structure, such as gene
regulatory networks (e.g. Wagner, 1989, 2014). Indeed, one motivation of
this presentation is to give a formal platform for these empirical hypotheses
to elucidate their theoretical as well as philosophical implications. An impor-
tant empirical challenge to the biological homology concept, and any other
attempts to identify a homolog with a certain developmental structure, is the
well-known fact that morphological similarity does not entail developmental
sameness (Wagner and Misof, 1993). It has been reported that apparently
homologous characters in related species may develop from different genes,
cell populations, or pathways — the phenomena called developmental system
drift (True and Haag, 2001). Although these phenomena present a challenge
to my account as well, not all of them count as counter evidence. If, for
example, “drift” concerns only genetic or cell materials, topological features
of the causal network may remain invariant. Descriptive levels also matter.
15
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Even if two causal structures differ at a fine-grained description, they may
coincide at a more abstract level. Finally, my view does not require the en-
tire developmental system to be conserved: if causal graphs share some part,
they may still be homologous in that aspect. Indeed, it would be surprising if
two apparent homologs turn out to share no developmental underpinnings at
all. Some degree of flexibility may be expected, but so is inflexibility. Rep-
resenting and comparing homologs in terms of the underlying causal graphs
will serve as a heuristics to identify which part of the overall developmental
system is responsible for generating similar morphological patterns.
From a philosophical perspective, a distinguishing feature of my account
is its explicit reference to models. Homology has traditionally considered to
be a relationship among concrete biological entities or properties thereof: it
is organs or phenotypic features that are said to be homologous. In contrast,
homology in my view is a relationship among abstract entities, i.e. causal
graphs. How and why does such an abstract relationship reveal anything
interesting about the concrete evolutionary history? That scientific theories
and concepts should directly describe actual phenomena is a predominant
view of science both in lay and scholarly circles. Under this conception
logical positivists made it their primary task to define theoretical terms by
the observable. In the same vein philosophers of biology have tried (not
successfully in my view) to justify the concepts like homology or species by
identifying necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of visible or directly
verifiable features of organisms.
16
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This apparently intuitive picture, however, has been criticized to be an
overly simplistic view on the relationship between a scientific theory and
reality (e.g. Suppes, 1967; Cartwright, 1983; Suppe, 1989). According to the
critics the primary referents of scientific theories, concepts, and laws are not
actual phenomena but idealized models. These models are not exact replicas
of reality, but extract only certain features that are supposed to play essential
roles in the scientific problem at hand. The present analysis is in line with this
tradition. Causal graphs are highly idealized and thus possibly incomplete
representations of complex causal interactions in living systems, but it is this
idealization that affords explanatory power and general applicability. That
is, on the condition that a model extracts the common causal structure of a
population can it be used to predict the population’s evolutionary trajectory
or consequences of hypothetical interventions.
Most of these models, however, are still idiosyncratic to particular popula-
tions — e.g. population geneticists usually build, customize, or parameterize
their model for each study object.3 Homology thinking aims at even higher
generality: its core idea is that some distinct species or organs allow for the
same treatment/model in the analyses of their evolutionary fate or physiolog-
ical performance. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis as to why
such a unified explanation is possible at all. That is, it justifies the use of the
same causal model based on evolutionary history, i.e. by the descent of the
3Models of adaptive evolution, however, may be extrapolated to the same or similar
environmental conditions. In this regard, the analogical thinking and homological thinking
represent two distinct ways to generalize evolutionary models.
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causal graph from common ancestry. Hence homology is far from “residual,”
but has a significant explanatory value in biology — it allows an extrapo-
lation of an evolutionary or physiological model to other contexts, and thus
provides a basis for the highest-level generality in biological sciences.
5 Conclusion
The concept of homology presupposes phenotypic units on which identity
relationships can be defined. The present analysis identified these units with
causal graphs representing developmental or behavioral mechanisms and de-
fined homology as graph isomorphism over lineages. The advantage of this
formal concept is that it acknowledges the distinctive role of the study of ho-
mology while suggesting its connection to the traditional population genetics
framework. That is, it not only provides definite meanings to such con-
cepts like constraints, evolvability, and novelty, but also presents homology
as a historical account or justification of the generalizability of evolutionary
or physiological models. This is paralleled with the shift in the ontological
nature of what can be said to be homologous: homology is a relationship
between theoretical models, rather than concrete biological entities such as
organs. Hence the proper relationship between homology to actual biological
phenomena is not instantiation, but representation. Once conceived in this
way the metaphysical problem of the alleged essentialism fades away.
The new account of homology prompts empirical, theoretical, and philo-
18
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sophical researches on various topics, including the study of novelty and
evolvability, the interplay between Evo-Devo and population genetics, im-
plications of developmental flexibility, and the generalizability of biological
models, to name a few. Another interesting philosophical question not men-
tioned above is the possibility of extending the current approach to another
vexing concept in evolutionary biology, namely species. If homology is a par-
tial matching of the causal structures between distinct species, it is tempting
to define species by the whole causal structure — so that two organisms
belong to the same species if their entire ontogeny and life history are rep-
resented by the same causal graph. This is a big question that requires an
independent analysis, but will be briefly discussed in the presentation if time
permitted.
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Abstract  
The unpredictability of the development and results of a research program is often invoked in 
favor of a free, desinterested science that would be led mainly by scientific curiosity, in 
contrast with a use-inspired science led by definite practical expectations. This paper will 
challenge a crucial but underexamined assumption in this line of defense of scientific 
freedom, namely that a free science is the best system of science to generate unexpected 
results. We will propose conditions favoring the occurrence of unexpected facts in the course 
of a scientific investigation and then establish that use-inspired science actually scores better 
in this area.  
  
1. Introduction 
“I didn’t start my research thinking that I will increase the storage capacity of hard drives. 
The final landscape is never visible from the starting point.” This statement made by the 
physicist Albert Fert (2007), winner of the 2007 Noble Prize for his work on the giant 
magnetoresistance effect, expresses a very common belief, especially among scientists, about 
the unpredictable nature of the development and results of a research program. Such 
retrospective observations feed a type of “unpredictability argument” often invoked in favor 
of a pure, disinterested science led by scientific curiosity, in contrast with a use-inspired or 
applied science led by practical considerations. Polanyi gave a somewhat lyrical form of this 
kind of unpredictability argument in his classical essay “The Republic of Science” (1962). 
Science, says Polanyi (1962, 62), “can advance only by unpredictable steps, pursuing 
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problems of its own, and the practical benefits of these advances will be incidental and hence 
doubly unpredictable. … Any attempt at guiding research towards a purpose other than its 
own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of science… You can kill or mutilate the 
advance of science, but you cannot shape it.” In Polanyi’s view, claims about the 
unpredictable nature of scientific development go hand in hand with a plea for an internal 
definition of research priorities: a problem should be considered important in light of 
considerations internal to a field of scientific inquiry and not (at least not primarily) in light of 
external considerations, such as practical utility. The orientation of the inquiry by practical 
objectives is then deemed epistemically counter-productive and vain: one should not attempt 
to predict the unpredictable.  
 In response to this line of defense of free science, some authors emphasize the 
epistemic fecundity of use-inspired science (Stokes 1997, Wilholt 2006, Carrier 2004) 
showing that the presence of practical objectives does not run counter to the building of 
fundamental knowledge: more fundamental knowledge may be needed to achieve some 
particular practical ends. Industry research on the giant magnetoresistance effect in the 1990s 
is a telling example of research undertaken under considerable pressure to produce applicable 
results but which nevertheless produced, along the way, new fundamental knowledge 
(Wilholt 2006). 
 Our aim in this paper is to develop another line of defense of the epistemic fecundity 
of applied science, by challenging a crucial but often implicit assumption in the traditional 
defense of scientific freedom based on scientific unpredictability (such as Polanyi’s or Fert’s), 
namely the assumption that a free science is the best system of science to generate unexpected 
facts. But what are actually the conditions favoring the emergence of novelty in the course of 
a scientific investigation? This important issue has not received much epistemological 
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attention.1 We will fill this gap by first distinguishing two kinds of unpredictability arguments 
often mixed when debating on scientific freedom, to wit, unpredictability as unforeseen 
practical applications and unpredictability as serendipity (cases, as we will explain in more 
details, where unexpected facts open up new lines of inquiry). Focusing on the latter, we will 
propose two conditions that favor the occurrence of unexpected facts in the course of a 
scientific investigation. In light of these two criteria we will then compare pure, disinterested 
science and applied science as regards their capacity to generate novelty.  
 
2.Two types of unpredictability arguments 
Appeals to the unpredictability of scientific results actually refer to various kinds of 
situations, which need to be clearly distinguished. First, the notion of unpredictability of 
scientific results can designate unforeseen practical applications of fundamental knowledge. 
Second, it can refer to a serendipitous dynamics of scientific progress: a line of research may 
sometimes lead to a totally unexpected, surprising result, which opens a new direction of 
inquiry. These two kinds of unpredictability give rise to distinct arguments in favor of 
scientific freedom, unfortunately often mixed in discussions about the relative merits of pure 
science and application oriented science.  
 
2.1 Unpredictability as unforeseen practical applications 
When unpredictability refers to unexpected applications, the argument is the following: 
freedom of research should be preserved since a free, disinterested science is needed to 
generate a reservoir of fundamental knowledge, which then can be used to develop 
																																																								
1 Wilholt and Glimell (2011, 353) do touch upon this issue when discussing the link made by 
proponents of the autonomy of science between freedom of research and diversity of 
approaches favoring the epistemic productivity of science. But they just note that it is a strong 
assumption and do no further discuss its validity. 
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applications. This argument was typically developed by Vannevar Bush who appealed to the 
now classically called linear model of innovation: 
 
“Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates the 
fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New 
products and new processes do not appear full-grown" (1945, 20). 
 
The development of the H-bomb in the frame of the Manhattan project is a paradigmatic case, 
also invoked by Bush: “basic discoveries of European scientists" (1945, 20) about the 
structure of the matter is what made possible the military application. Another frequently 
cited example of unpredictable application is the invention of the laser, a widely-used 
technological device nowadays, made possible by pure theoretical developments in quantum 
physics during the first half of the XXth century.  
We will not in this paper discuss further this first version of the unpredictability 
argument. Let us just mention that its underlying linear model of innovation linking pure 
science and practical applications has already been challenged on several grounds by various  
authors (e.g. Brooks, 1994; Leydesdorff, 1997; Edgerton, 2004; Rosenberg, 1992). We rather 
want to focus on the second (and also widespread) type of unpredictability arguments, whose 
validity has been much less scrutinized.   
 
2.2 Unpredictability as serendipity 
This second type of argument appeals to unpredictability in the sense of serendipity: an 
unexpected observation or result opens up a new line of research leading to a fundamental 
discovery. A very well known historical episode illustrating such a serendipitous scientific 
dynamics is the invention of the first antibiotic by Flemings, after he had accidentally 
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observed the effect of a fungi (Penicilium) on bacteria colonies (Flemings, 1929). Also often 
cited is the discovery of radioactivity by Henri Becquerel (1896): when working with a crystal 
containing uranium, Becquerel noted that the crystal had fogged a photographic plate that he 
had inadvertently left next to the mineral. This observation led to the hypothesis that uranium 
emitted its own radiations. Another, perhaps less cited instance of serendipitous scientific 
dynamics is the discovery of the chemotherapeutic cisplatine molecule by scientists initially 
working on the effects of an electric field on bacteria growth (Rosenberg et al.,1967). They 
observed that cell division was inhibited because of the unexpected formation of a chemical 
compound with the Platinum atoms contained in the electrode. This chemical compound, 
which they named cisplatine, was then successfully tested as an anti-proliferative agent 
against tumoral cells.  
When unpredictability refers to such serendipitous discoveries, freedom of research is 
defended on the grounds that scientists should be able to freely change the direction of their 
research or open up new lines of inquiry, in order to be able to follow up on unexpected 
results, thereby generating new knowledge (which in turn will possibly lead to new 
applications). But to properly work as an argument favoring free, disinterested research over 
applied research, this “serendipity argument” actually presupposes that the occurrence of 
surprising facts is more likely to happen in the first system of science than in the second. For 
increasing the production of new knowledge (and possibly new applications) does not only 
depend on being able to freely follow up on unexpected facts, it also (obviously) depends on 
whether occurrences of unexpected facts are favored, to start with. Two types of 
considerations are thus mixed in the serendipity argument: considerations on the occurrence 
of unexpected facts and considerations on the (institutional, material) possibility to follow up 
on them.   
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We will not for the moment discuss the second type of considerations and focus on the 
first, which has been largely neglected in the literature on scientific freedom, namely the 
conditions that favor the occurrence of surprising facts. Our central issue is thus the 
following: is a use-inspired science less likely to generate unexpected results than a free 
science mainly fuelled by curiosity? After having clarified the notion of unexpected result, we 
will propose two criteria that, we will argue, favor the occurrence of such results and in light 
of which free science and applied science can be compared.   
 
3. Conditions of emergence of unexpected facts 
By “unexpected facts” occurring in the course of an inquiry, we simply mean here results 
(observations, outcomes of an experiment, etc.) that cannot be accounted for within the 
theoretical or, more largely, the epistemic framework in which the empirical inquiry has been 
conceived and conducted. This kind of “exteriority” is what leads scientists to move away 
from the initial explanatory framework and open up new lines of inquiry in search of an 
alternative one that could accommodate the unexpected results. 
 
3.1 Isolation and purification of phenomena 
It is now a well-known feature of contemporary experimental sciences that many of 
their objects under study are “created” in the laboratory rather than existing “as such” in the 
real world. When drawing our attention to this epistemologically important feature, Hacking 
(e.g. 1983, chap. 13) specified that we should not read this notion of “creation” of phenomena 
as if we were making the phenomenon, suggesting instead that a phenomenon is “created” in 
the laboratory to the extent that it does not exist outside of certain kinds of apparatus. This is 
typically the case for a phenomenon like the Hall effect: it did not exist “until, with great 
ingenuity, [Hall] had discovered how to isolate, purify it, create it in the laboratory” (Hacking 
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1983, 226, our italics). In other words, Hall created in 1879 the material arrangement  - a 
current passing through a conductor, at right angles to a magnetic field –, for the effect to 
occur and “if anywhere in nature there [were] this arrangement, with no intervening causes, 
then the Hall effect [would] occur” (1983, 226, our italics). Isolation, purification, control of 
intervening causes (i.e. control of physical parameters) are noticeable features of an 
experimental protocol that have a straightforward consequence directly relevant for our 
philosophical interrogation on serendipity: they tend to limit the number of causal pathways 
which can influence the response of the object or phenomenon under study experimentally. 
Unknown causal pathways existing in the real world are thus inoperant (or less operant) in 
laboratory conditions, thereby limiting the occurrence of unexpected results. Hence our first 
criterion to evaluate whether a certain system of science favors surprising results: the more 
the phenomena under study in that system are isolated, purified in highly regimented 
experimental conditions, the less likely the occurrence of unexpected results is.   
Moreover, isolation, purification of phenomena often go hand in hand with another 
noticeable feature of laboratory sciences, described by Hacking as follows: “as a laboratory 
science matures, it develops a body of types of theory and types of apparatus and types of 
analysis that are mutually adjusted to each other” (1992, 30). In particular, a given theoretical 
framework determines the type of questions that can be probed experimentally, guides the 
design of apparatus and defines the type of data produced. Consequently, “data 
uninterpretable by theories are not generated” (Hacking 1992, 55). This process of mutual 
constraints is well illustrated for instance by recent experimental inquiries in particle physics, 
such as the quest for the Higgs Boson. Its existence was postulated in the frame of the 
Standard Model of theoretical physics (Higgs, 1964) and complex experimental apparatus 
have been developed with the explicit goal of “discovering” it (LEP, 2003). The “discovery” 
occurred in 2012 (ATLAS, 2012) but the high degree of tailoring of the apparatus to the 
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theory postulating the particle can be considered as imposing some kind of a priori structure 
on the phenomenon, so that particles such as the Higgs boson are not so much “discovered” 
than “manufactured” (Falkenburg, 2007, 53). In any case, the “discovery” of the Higgs boson 
was hardly a surprise and illustrates Hacking’s more general contention about experimental 
inquiries typical of contemporary laboratory sciences as opposed to real-world experiments: 
“[their] results are more often expected than surprising” (1992, 37, our italics).  
 
3.2 Theoretical unifying ambition  
Another relevant characteristic of an experimental inquiry is the degree of generality of its 
theoretical framework. Scientists working within a theoretical framework with a large 
unifying scope will be reluctant to “leave” it and search for an alternative one when facing an 
unexpected result, and for good epistemological reasons: there is (obviously) a high epistemic 
cost of abandoning a theoretical framework that provides explanations for a large set of 
phenomena. The right move is rather to try to accommodate the surprising result by adopting, 
if necessary, ad hoc hypothesis or tinkering with some ingredients of the existing theoretical 
framework, so that the result looses its “exteriority” and ends up being integrated. And 
because of this well-known “plasticity” and integrative power of well-established theoretical 
frameworks with a large unifying scope2, when a (at first sight) surprising result occurs, it 
rarely leads to the opening up of a new line of inquiry in search of an alternative explanatory 
framework, but rather gets integrated within the existing one, thereby losing its 
unexpectedness. 
 There is another reason why a high degree of theoretical generality does not favor the 
occurrence of unexpected results, which is linked to our previous remarks on the process of 
																																																								
2 Classical references on these ideas of plasticity or integrative power are of course Kuhn’s 
description (1962) of scientists being busy working on resolving anomalies in normal science 
and Lakatos’ concept of “protective belt” of a research program (1978). 
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mutual adjustment between theoretical ingredients, apparatus and data. By constraining the 
type of experimental procedures developed and the type of data generated, a theoretical 
framework with a large unifying scope tends to homogenize the experimental works 
conducted to probe the various phenomena that it accounts for. And since a diversity of 
experimental approaches increases the possible sources of emergence of surprising facts, we 
can conclude that by reducing this diversity, theoretical generality makes the occurrence of 
unexpected facts less likely to happen.  
 The case of the etiology of cancer provides interesting illustrations of these two 
unexpectedness-diminishing effects of theoretical generality. The classical theory of cancer, 
the Somatic Mutations Theory (SMT), has been challenged for fifteen years or so by a new 
theoretical approach, the Tissue Organization Field Theory (TOFT) (Sonnenschein and Soto, 
2000). First developed in the 1970's, the SMT rapidly became the dominant research 
theoretical framework on carcinogenesis (Mukherjee, 2010). This hegemony led to a high 
degree of homogenization of the experimental inquiries:  the experimental procedures were all 
dedicated to the very standardized search for genetic mutations, in the context of molecular 
biology. Moreover, many, if not all surprising observations were made compatible with SMT 
by using ad hoc hypothesis (Soto, 2011). For instance, it was observed that various types of 
cancer were exhibiting large-scale disorganization of the genome. This observation was 
unexpected to the extent that it could not fit with SMT’s fundamental postulate of punctual 
mutations. To integrate it in the frame of SMT, the existence of an original genetic instability 
of the cancer cells was then postulated (Rajagopalan, 2003).  
 
4 Use-inspired science, pure science, and unexpected facts 
In light of the criteria that we proposed above, how does pure, disinterested science score 
compared to applied science when it comes to favoring the occurrence of unexpected facts? A 
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helpful starting point is provided by Martin Carrier’s insightful characterization of applied 
science: 
 
“Three methodological features can be observed whose combined or marked 
appearance tends to be characteristic of applied science: local models rather than 
unified theories, contextualized causal relations rather than causal mechanisms, real-
experiments rather than laboratory experiment conducted for answering theoretical 
questions" (2004, 4). 
 
4.1 Local models 
Let us start with the contrast between local models and unified theories. Whereas pure science 
often aims at providing comprehensive and unifying theoretical frameworks (think of the 
Standard Model in particle physics or the Big Bang model in cosmology), use-inspired 
research is characterized by the coexistence of numerous local models, each determining the 
development of specific experimental procedures. An extreme case of this locality are for 
instance the design-rules used in the industry, which are built as laws guiding action (Wilholt, 
2006). They are experimentally confirmed rules providing relations among different relevant 
parameters to manufacture industrial products. These rules are extremely specific: they apply 
to a very few number of situations and each of them determines a singular experimental 
practice. The use of local models is also widespread in the biomedical sciences, a typically 
use-inspired field of research. We will again draw on oncology to illustrate our point. 
Consider for instance the case of the development of radiotherapy protocols in the first half of 
the XXth century. The aim was to intervene on cancer to cure it, without any general model 
describing the mechanism of carcinogenesis. This program promoted the development of a 
variety of exploratory approaches using X-rays against cancer (Pinell, 1992). As there were 
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no standardized protocols, many experimental procedures were tested, changing the density of 
X-rays received, the distance of emission, the frequency of the radiotherapy sessions. In order 
to improve the efficiency of the therapeutic methods, scientists tried to build various local 
models describing the action of X-rays on cancer, corresponding to the variety of 
experimental procedures implemented. Grubbe (1949) formulated a model based on the 
inflammatory reaction to explain the effects of radiotherapy on cancer: the inflammation of 
the surrounding tissue beyond the effects of X-rays is responsible for the decrease of tumoral 
mass. This model is applicable to his specific use of X-rays: he applied very high doses, 
necessary to generate an inflammatory response. In parallel, Tribondeau and Bergonié, using 
more moderate doses, developed a model based on the proliferation of the cells in tumoral 
context, which led to the "Bergonié law": X-rays have a higher impact on proliferating cells 
(Tribondeau, 1959).  
 What lessons can be drawn from this first contrast between local models and unified 
theories? The answer is rather straightforward, given the link spelled out in the previous 
section between the level of generality of theoretical models and the occurrence of 
unexpected facts (our second criterion): by promoting the use of a diversity of local models 
and heterogeneous experimental protocols, applied science favors the occurrence of 
unexpected facts, whereas the penchant of pure science for comprehensive unifying 
theoretical frameworks, hence homogenized experimental protocols, does not.    
 
4.2 Causal incompletness 
Let us compare now pure science and applied science in light of our first criterion based on 
the degree of isolation and purification of the phenomena under study. A directly relevant 
feature of applied science is the use of what Carrier calls “contextualized causal relations” 
rather than full causal chains. Use-inspired science typically aims at directly intervening on a 
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process or phenomenon often disposing only of a partial knowledge of the causal chains 
involved and without being able to isolate it from various causal influences exerted by the rest 
of the physical world. A direct consequence of this feature of applied science is the low 
degree of control of its experimental protocols. By contrast, since pure science aims primarily 
at answering fundamental theoretical questions, it designs highly regimented experimental 
procedures that isolate and purify phenomena in order to be able to get empirical answers 
about the specific fundamental processes questioned in the theoretical investigation3. 
Moreover, building highly regimented experimental procedures requires knowledge of full 
causal chains in order to be able to better control the response of the system under study. The 
outcome of the application of our criterion is then again straightforward: compared with pure 
science, applied science favors the occurrence of unexpected facts to the extent that its 
experimental procedures are less controlled and based only on partial knowledge of the causal 
influences exerted on the phenomenon under study.  
 The etiology of cancer provides again interesting illustrations of our claim. Indeed, 
many current cancer therapies built in the frame of use-inspired research are based on 
contextualized causal relations. Typically, if a cellular agent is found to be massively 
expressed in cancer cells, drugs are designed to inhibit it, even if the whole causal chain 
determining its action is not known. For instance, a large amount of proteins promoting 
angiogenesis (the growth of blood vessels), notably VEGF (Vascular Endothelial Growth 
Factor), was found in tumoral cells, leading to the design of anti-VEGF molecules (Sitohy, 
																																																								
3 Carrier sums up this contrast as follows: “Empirical tests often proceed better by focusing on 
the pure cases, the idealized ones, because such cases typically yield a more direct access to 
the processes considered fundamental by the theory at hand. But applied science is denied the 
privilege of epistemic research to select its problems according to their tractability (...). 
Practical challenges typically involve a more intricate intertwinement of factors and are thus 
harder to put under control". (2004a, 4) In the life sciences, this focus on “pure cases” means 
using “model organisms” or a limited  number of well spread cell lines (e.g.  the HeLa cells or 
the Saccharomyces Cerevisiae yeast) to elucidate fundamental biological mechanisms. And 
the use of such standardized objects tends to homogenize the experimental protocols.  
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2012). These molecules are used without considering the complete causal chain in which the 
VEGF is embedded. Only their known action on angiogenesis is considered. The clinical tests 
have led to unexpected observations: the use of an anti-VEGF molecule (Avastin) can 
stimulate tumor growth (Lieu et al., 2013)4. This example shows that the use of 
contextualized causal relations promotes the appearance of surprising facts by allowing 
unknown mechanisms to intervene in the experimental procedure.  
 
 
5. Concluding discussion 
 
Our previous analysis has established that several features of pure, disinterested science make 
it less hospitable than use-inspired science to the occurrence of unexpected facts. For all that, 
it does not follow that proponents of freedom of science cannot appeal anymore to 
unpredictability in the sense of serendipity to make their case. For the issue of which 
conditions favor the occurrence of unexpected facts is only half of the story. The other half is 
the possibility to actually follow up on these occurrences and open new lines of inquiry. And 
this other half raises different issues. What are the institutional, social structures of science 
that make it easier for scientists to re-orient their research when needed? To what extent an 
initial orientation of a scientific investigation by “external” practical needs is less compatible 
with the opening of new lines of inquiry than an initial orientation by epistemic considerations 
internal to the dynamics of a scientific field? When appealing to the serendipity argument, 
																																																								
4 Interestingly, this observation led to new use-inspired research programs, aiming at 
identifing the molecular causal pathways giving rise to this tumoral resistance phenomenon. It  
has notably strongly oriented the research toward the precise understanding of the VEGF 
pathways (Moens, 2014). For instance, the study of the mechanisms of expression in cancer 
cells of various kinds of  VEGF agents is becoming an important program of research (Li, 
2014) and these works allow to build new fundamental knowledge about the action of the 
VEGF proteins.  
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proponents of free, disinterested science not only presuppose that it is the best system of 
science to generate unexpected facts to start with – a contention that we have challenged in 
this paper – but also that it actually gives more freedom to scientists to follow up on 
unexpected results. In other words, the issue of scientists’ given possibility to change the 
direction of their research when needed is somewhat mixed, confused with the normative 
issue of what the aims of science should be (in short, increase knowledge following 
considerations internal to science vs. answer external practical needs). But it seems to us that 
the two issues should be kept separate. After all, one can very well conceive a system of 
science whose aims are primarily to answer society needs but which nevertheless leaves 
scientists free to choose the lines of inquiry that seem to them the most promising ways of 
fulfilling these needs (which includes changing research directions if needed). Otherwise put, 
one can very well conceive a use-inspired science which is not a programmed science in 
which scientists are asked to plan every step of their inquiry in order to achieve a given aim. 
And note that a pure, disinterested science may be as much programmed as a use-inspired 
science: the fact that scientists are left free to choose the aims of their research does not 
protect them from having to plan every step to reach these aims. In any case, our purport in 
this paper was not to attack pure, disinterested science. There are, no doubt, many good 
reasons to defend it, but the widespread, traditional one grounded on the unpredictability of 
scientific inquiry is certainly not the most epistemologically cogent and solid one.  
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Abstract
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a 
signiﬁcant role to play in core parts of the scientiﬁc process.  A question that 
naturally arises is: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose 
values should be used?  A common answer to this  question turns to political 
values — i.e. the values of the public or its representatives.  In this paper, I argue 
that this imposes a morally signiﬁcant burden on certain scientists, effectively 
requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with.  I 
conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justiﬁed.
1.  Values in Science and the Political View
By now, most philosophers of science probably agree that there is an important place for 
so-called contextual (i.e. personal, ethical, political) values in core parts of the scientiﬁc process, 
especially in areas where science is connected to policy-making.  Values may appropriately play 
a role in evaluating evidence (Douglas 2009), choosing scientiﬁc models (Elliott 2011), 
structuring quantitative measures (Reiss 2013, ch. 8; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010; Hausman 
 For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Alex Rajczi and the students in a seminar on science and values at 1
Claremont McKenna College.  For discussions on related topics, I thank Gil Hersch, Daniel Steel, and Branwen Williams. This 
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2015), and/or in preparing information for presentation to non-experts (Elliott 2006; Hardwig 
1994; Resnik 2001; Schroeder 2016).  The natural follow-up question has received less sustained 
attention:  when scientists should make use of values, which (or whose) values should they use?   2
In some cases, philosophers of science criticize a value choice on substantive ethical 
grounds (e.g. Shrader-Frechette 2008; Hoffmann and Stempsey 2008).  This suggests that the 
values to be used are the objectively correct ones.  A second common view gives scientists 
latitude to choose whatever (reasonable) values they prefer or think best, usually supplemented 
by a requirement of transparency.  This is suggested by many existing codes of scientiﬁc ethics, 
which impose few constraints on scientists in making such choices.   Finally, a third view says 3
that scientists ought to use the appropriate political values — that is, the values held or endorsed 
by the public or its representatives — at least when those values are informed and substantively 
reasonable.   The most straightforward argument for this view grounds it in considerations of 4
democracy or political legitimacy.  If certain value choices are going to ultimately inﬂuence 
policy, then the public or its representatives have a right to make those choices (Douglas 2005; 
Intemann 2015; cf. Steele 2012; Kitcher 2001).
There are, of course further possibilities, and these views can be combined in more 
complex ways (e.g. requiring scientists to use political values in some domains, while permitting 
them to use their personal values in others).  But if, for simplicity, we stick to these three primary 
 In some cases, the justiﬁcation for incorporating values into the scientiﬁc process dictates an answer.  Feminist critiques of 2
historically androcentric ﬁelds, for example, suggest that non-androcentric values are needed as a corrective.  I set aside such 
cases in this paper.
 Mara Walli, Matthew Wong, and I discuss this at length in a work-in-progress.3
 I set aside, then, cases where the values, say, of a policy-maker are unreasonable, in the sense that they lie outside the range of 4
values that ought to be tolerated in a liberal society.  In such cases, an advocate of the political view may permit or require 
scientists to reject those unreasonable values.  (See e.g. Resnik 2001.)  Also, in this paper I will set aside the important question 
of what the political view ought to say when the values of the public diverge from the values of policy-makers.  The answer to 
this question, I think, will depend on one’s theory of political representation.
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options, I think the third, which I will call the political view, is the most attractive.  More 
precisely, I think that in most cases where values are called for in core parts of the scientiﬁc 
process, scientists should privilege political values.   The most obvious concern with this view, 5
and one that has received much attention from its advocates, is that it doesn’t seem practical.  It 
isn’t feasible to ask citizens or policy-makers to weigh in at every point in the scientiﬁc process 
where values are required, and even if we could, non-experts often will not have the scientiﬁc 
background to fully understand the options before them.  Substitutes for actual participation on 
the part of policy-makers or the public, such as asking scientists to predict what the public would 
choose or to determine what values policy-makers would hold upon reﬂection, seem to place 
unreasonable epistemic demands on scientists.
Douglas (2005), Intemann (2015), Guston (2004), and others have argued that these 
problems aren’t insurmountable, by suggesting speciﬁc ways that the concerns of policy-makers 
and the public can be brought into the scientiﬁc process.  And Kevin Elliott (2006; 2011) has 
suggested a more general way we might make progress.  The political view goes hand-in-hand 
with a view of the relationship between science and policy that is widely-held:  that the role of a 
scientist is to promote informed decision-making by policy-makers.   Bioethicists have 6
extensively discussed how health care professionals can promote informed decision-making on 
the part of patients and research subjects.  Theoretical and empirical research has led to a range 
of suggestions for how physicians can promote informed decision-making, even in cases where a 
patient’s values may be uncertain, different research subjects may hold different values, and so 
 This, of course, is proposed as a principle of professional ethics - not e.g. a legal requirement.5
 See also Resnik (2001), Martin and Schinzinger (2010), and Schroeder (2016) for theoretical defenses of this idea, which is 6
consonant with the mission statements of many scientiﬁc organizations and associations.
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forth.  Elliott’s hope is that many of these suggestions can be adapted to the scientiﬁc case, or at 
least a parallel research program could be carried out, informed by the work of bioethicists.7
It is, of course, far from established that these proposals will work, but the range of 
options on the table strikes me as cause for optimism.  And even if these solutions don’t work in 
all cases, there is still bite to the political view, since it could still tell scientists to use political 
values when they can determine those values.  Accordingly, in this paper I would like to describe 
a different and I think deeper concern with the political view, one which has been conspicuously 
absent from the literature thus far.  In requiring scientists to guide certain aspects of their work 
by political values, we will sometimes in effect ask that they support political causes they may 
personally oppose and bar them from fully advocating for their preferred policy measures.  We 
are, then, depriving scientists of important political rights possessed by the general public.  In the 
remainder of this paper, I will spell out this objection more fully and explain why I think it has 
signiﬁcant moral force.  In the end, I will suggest that although there is reason to think that the 
objection doesn’t ultimately undermine the political view, it nevertheless constitutes a signiﬁcant 
cost that accompanies that view, which its proponents need to acknowledge.
2.  Two Cases Where the Political View Seems Troublesome
The literature on values in science is vast and diverse, and so it will be useful to have 
some particular examples in mind.  First, consider Douglas’s (2000; 2009) argument that 
scientists should or must appeal to value judgments when resolving certain uncertainties that 
arise during the scientiﬁc process.  Scientists conducting research into the potential carcinogen 
dioxin, for example, were faced with liver samples which had tumors that could not clearly be 
 See also Schroeder (2016) for how this might go.7
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categorized as malignant or benign.  In resolving such borderline or ambiguous cases, Douglas 
argues that scientists should appeal to contextual values, when the constitutive norms of science 
don’t dictate any resolution.  In this case, health-protective values would lead scientists to 
classify borderline samples as malignant; while concerns about overregulation would lead 
scientists to classify those same samples as benign (Douglas 2000).  
Second, consider the many choices that scientists have to make when preparing their 
results for presentation.  How should uncertainty be characterized?  (Should 90% or 95% 
conﬁdence intervals be used?)  Which study results should be highlighted?  (Which drug side 
effects should be discussed at length, and which included as part of a long list?)  How should 
statistics be summarized?  (As means or medians?  Should results be broken down by gender, or 
presented only in aggregate?)  In making choices like these, scientists frequently must appeal to 
values — to decide, for example, which pieces of information are important and which are not.8
It is, I presume, fairly uncontroversial that these value choices — how to resolve 
uncertainties in the research process and how to present results — can inﬂuence policy in 
foreseeable ways.  Douglas, for example, argues that this is the case in the dioxin studies.  
Classifying borderline samples as malignant will make dioxin appear to be a more potent 
carcinogen, likely leading policy-makers to regulate it more stringently (2000, 571).  Keohane, 
Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014) show how a presentation choice made by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change led to poor policy outcomes, which likely could have been avoided by 
presenting information differently.  More generally, we know from a wealth of studies in 
psychology and behavioral economics that the way information is presented to someone can 
strongly inﬂuence her subsequent choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), and there have been 
 For discussions, see Elliott (2006), Hardwig (1994), Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014), Resnik (2001), and Schroeder 8
(2016).
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several inﬂuential commentaries calling for scientists to more carefully “frame” their results 
(Nisbet and Mooney 2007; Lakoff 2010).  So it seems straightforward that the value choices 
made by scientists can predictably affect policy.
If these value choices can inﬂuence policy, then in directing scientists to make them in 
accordance with political values — as opposed to the scientists’ personal values — we are asking 
scientists to characterize policy-relevant material in a way that may promote an outcome they 
strongly disfavor.  For example, suppose the scientists in Douglas’s dioxin study value public 
health much more than they value keeping industry free from overregulation, but the public and 
its elected representatives have the opposite view.  Further, suppose both views are substantively 
reasonable, in that they are within the range of policies eligible for adoption through democratic 
processes.  In this case, the political view would tell the scientists to categorize borderline 
samples as benign, since that would better cohere with the public’s values.  This could make 
dioxin appear to have minimal carcinogenic effects, predictably leading to less regulation than 
would have occurred had the scientists classiﬁed borderline samples according to their own, 
health-protective values.  Similarly, suppose an environmental economist conducting an impact 
study of a proposed construction project is herself deeply committed to the preservation of 
natural spaces.  Nevertheless, if the public is strongly committed to economic development, the 
political view would require her to put front-and-center a detailed breakdown of the economic 
consequences of construction, while describing the ecological costs more brieﬂy or in a less 
prominent place — likely frustrating her desire for preservation.
Notice that the concern here is not simply that scientists are being asked to provide 
information that will lead to an outcome they disfavor.  I take it that any reasonable approach to 
scientiﬁc ethics will require that scientists communicate honestly, even in cases where that 
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promises to yield policies they don’t like.  Similarly, I presume that scientists must also be 
forbidden from presenting information in ways that, though technically accurate, are nevertheless 
misleading.  The problem here is that Douglas’s scientists are being asked to characterize results 
in one way (as benign) that could, with equal scientiﬁc validity, have been characterized 
differently (as malignant).  And our environmental economist is being asked to present her 
results in one way (highlighting economic beneﬁts), when an alternate presentation (one 
highlighting ecological costs) would be equally honest, accurate, objective, transparent, clear, 
and so forth.  In each case, then, we have a collection of underlying data which can be described 
or characterized in different ways, neither of which appears to be more scientiﬁcally valid than 
the other.  The political view insists that scientists choose the description grounded in values they 
don’t accept and which seems likely to promote policy outcomes they disfavor.  In this respect, 
the political view requires scientists to in effect advocate for, or at least tilt the playing ﬁeld 
towards, political views they disagree with.9
3.  Elliott and The Principle of Helpfulness
This seems clearly to be a signiﬁcant imposition on scientists and thus a cost of the 
political view.  It is therefore surprising that, so far as I can tell, philosophers who have argued 
for the political view have not commented on it.  This is most striking in Elliott’s work.  Elliott, 
recall, argues that scientists should aim to promote informed decision-making among policy-
makers, in something like the way physicians should aim to promote informed decision-making 
among patients.  Standard accounts in bioethics say that it is the patient’s values that carry the 
 Can’t we let the scientists advocate for their preferred positions in other ways?  We could let scientists present their preferred 9
interpretation separately.  But if the political view is to have bite, presumably these alternate results will have to be clearly 
designated so and offered in a less prominent place (e.g. in an appendix or online supplement).  And we should of course permit 
scientists to advocate for their views outside of their scientiﬁc papers/reports.  But it seems likely that these (private) statements 
will carry much less policy weight than their scientiﬁc ones.
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day: in normal cases, the physician’s job is to help a patient make decisions that cohere with her 
own values.  If the scientiﬁc cases is analogous, then the scientist’s job is to help policy-makers 
make decisions that cohere with their (or the public’s) values.  This, in turn, suggests that 
scientists should use political values when resolving uncertainties, presenting results, and so 
forth.  In other words, Elliott’s proposal seems to imply the political view.10
The main defense Elliott offers for this view, however, relies on Scanlon’s “Principle of 
Helpfulness”:
Suppose I learn, in the course of conversation with a person, that I have a piece of 
information that would be of great help to her because it would save her a great deal of 
time and effort in pursuing her life’s project.  It would surely be wrong of me to fail 
(simply out of indifference) to give her this information when there is no compelling 
reason not to do so.11
Elliott sums up the idea this way:  “[I]n situations where one can signiﬁcantly help another 
individual by engaging in an action that requires little sacriﬁce, it is morally unacceptable not to 
help” (2011, 139).  If the political view, however, requires characterizing data or presenting 
information in ways that promote policy choices a scientist strongly opposes, then this Principle 
doesn’t apply.  When the pro-health scientist is required to classify ambiguous samples as 
benign, that does involve a sacriﬁce.  A refusal to do so — which would hinder the pro-industry 
policy-maker’s ability to make an informed regulatory decision — would not be done “simply 
out of indifference”.  It would be done out of the scientist’s desire to protect public health.  
 In some work, Elliott appears to suggest that transparency about values may be enough (Elliott and Resnik 2014).  That is, he 10
doesn’t seem to place (many) constraints on scientists’ value choices, so long as they are open about those choices.  If that is 
Elliott’s view — and it is not clear to me that it is — it strikes me as in tension with his insistence that scientists promote 
informed decision-making.  Surely I can better help you make a decision that coheres with your values by working from your 
values, rather than by working from my own values (even if I am open about what I am doing).  Further, even if scientists are 
open about their value choices, policy-makers frequently won’t have the technical expertise to be able to reinterpret a scientiﬁc 
study, replacing one set of values (the scientist’s) with another (their own).  (If values could so easily be swapped out by non-
specialists, then much of the debate about values would be unimportant.  Transparency is all we would require.)
 Scanlon (1996, 224), quoted in Elliott (2011, 139).11
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(Similar things, obviously, can be said about the environmental economist asked to highlight the 
economic aspects of a proposed construction project.)
Scanlon’s Principle of Helpfulness is a quite weak one, applying only in cases where the 
agent in question can put forward no signiﬁcant burden of compliance.  That Elliott uses it to 
justify his informed decision-making framework, and implicitly the political view, suggests that 
he thinks that such a view doesn’t impose signiﬁcant burdens on scientists.  But if what I’ve said 
has been correct, that is wrong.  Even if the political view is justiﬁed — and, as I’ve said, I think 
it is — we need to recognize that it asks a lot of scientists in cases where their values diverge 
from those of the relevant political body.
4.  Physicians vs. Scientists
This, however, brings up an interesting question.  If Elliott is right that the scientiﬁc case 
is analogous to the biomedical case, then shouldn’t informed consent requirements in medicine 
be treated as similarly burdensome?  Few bioethicists, though, would have sympathy for a 
physician who claimed that seeking informed consent constituted a signiﬁcant ethical burden.  
(They may have sympathy for the claim that seeking informed consent is burdensome in more 
mundane ways — e.g. too time-consuming — but those complaints seem very unlike the 
scientists’.)  I think that there is an important difference between the cases, which will help us to 
more clearly understand why the scientist is often burdened in a way that carries moral weight, 
while the physician normally is not.
We can see this by constructing a case which seems to put a physician in a position like 
the scientist’s.  Consider Jane, a doctor who strongly believes that the end of life for terminal 
patients is greatly enhanced by effective pain management, even if doing so shorten’s the 
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patient’s life or impairs his consciousness.  For this reason, Jane has chosen palliative care as her 
specialty, making it her life’s work to help dying patients avoid unnecessary pain.  One of her 
patients, John, has continually insisted that he wants to remain as lucid as possible, even if that 
means agony.  As he lies here, in agony, Jane suspects that if she framed the information properly 
— highlighting a medication’s ability to relieve pain, while downplaying its cognitive effects — 
she might be able to get John to accept it.  And accepting the medication, Jane strongly believes, 
would be much better for John.  Nevertheless, standard interpretations of informed consent 
forbid her from doing so.  Knowing that John is especially concerned about lucidity, she is 
ethically bound to highlight that information when informing him of his options.  Unsurprisingly, 
John declines the pain medication and experiences what Jane regards as an awful death — 
precisely the kind of thing she went into palliative care to prevent.
Like our pro-health scientist, Jane has been asked to present information in a way that 
ultimately frustrates her deeply-valued goals.  But imagine Jane complains to the ethics board at 
her hospital, arguing that it is burdensome to ask her to highlight to John the effects of pain 
medication on lucidity, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-held values.  This complaint 
doesn’t strike me as at all compelling.  Why?  Because Jane’s values shouldn’t hold any sway 
over John’s medical choices.  John has the right to reject pain medication, whatever Jane (or just 
about anyone else) thinks about it.  Put another way, John has no obligation to take Jane’s wishes 
into consideration, when he makes his decision.  His decision is ultimately his.
Now, imagine our pro-health scientist complains to her ethics committee, asserting that it 
is burdensome to ask her to present her data in a pro-industry light, when it could with equal 
scientiﬁc validity be presented in a pro-health light, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-
held concern for public health.  Or imagine the environmental economist complaining about 
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having to foreground the economic beneﬁts of the proposed construction project, since doing so 
will make it more likely that the project is approved and another natural space will be bulldozed.  
If we assume that the scientists are citizens of the society in question, then their situation is 
different from Jane’s.  As citizens in a democracy, their views should hold some sway over their 
government’s policy choices.  A government does have an obligation to take its citizens’ views 
into consideration when making policy decisions.  And when the government ultimately acts, it 
does so on the scientists’ behalf.  The decision is, in part, the scientists’.
The scientists, then, are stakeholders and even part-decision-makers in the associated 
policy-decisions, in a way that Jane is not a stakeholder in John’s decision.  This is true even if 
Jane cares more about John’s decision than our scientists care about the policy decisions.  We can 
see, then, that the political view isn’t burdensome simply because it directs scientists to promote 
or advocate for outcomes they disfavor.  It is burdensome because it sometimes directs scientists 
to promote or advocate for disfavored views, on matters that they have a right to speak on, to a 
body that purports to act on their behalf.  This is what gives their burden its moral signiﬁcance.12
5.  Justifying the Burdens of the Political View
Some scientists have recognized the burdens that even neutrality — let alone the political 
view — would impose on them.  
Conservation biology is inescapably normative. Advocacy for the preservation of 
biodiversity is part of the scientiﬁc practice of conservation biology.  If the editorial 
policy of or the publications in [the journal] Conservation Biology direct the discipline 
toward an “objective, value-free” approach, then they do not educate and transform 
society…  To pretend that the acquisition of “positive knowledge” alone with avert mass 
extinctions is misguided…  Without openly acknowledging such a perspective, 
 What about cases where the scientists are not citizens of the society in question?  In some cases, we can still make out a 12
stakeholder claim.  (When it comes to climate change, for example, we are all stakeholders in U.S. climate policy.)  But such 
cases raise complications which I unfortunately can’t discuss in a short paper like this one.
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conservation could become merely a subdiscipline of biology, intellectually and 
functionally sterile and incapable of averting an anthropogenic mass extinction.  (Barry 
and Oelschlaeger 1996)13
Most conservation biologists enter that ﬁeld because of a strong commitment to the value of 
biodiversity and the preservation of nature (Marris 2006).  Similar things are surely true of other 
scientiﬁc disciplines.  (My experience has been that public health researchers and economists 
studying inequality disproportionately share certain political values.)  To the extent that these 
values diverge from the values of the public and its representatives, the political view would 
require these scientists to continually characterize their results in ways structured by a value 
system they ﬁnd unacceptable.  (In this respect, things would be quite different for, say, climate 
scientists.  Although their work is controversial, it nevertheless is founded on values that are 
widely shared.  The potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change are ones that 
virtually everyone cares about.  Climate change deniers typically object to the empirical claims 
made by climate scientists - not to the basic values they hold.)
Is it fair, then, to tell a conservation biologist, who perhaps entered the ﬁeld because of 
her love for natural spaces and has spent the bulk of her life collecting information that she hopes 
can be used to preserve them, that she is nevertheless ethically bound to resolve uncertainties in 
her research in ways favorable to economic growth, or to present her results in ways that 
highlight the economic value (as opposed to, say, the private or aesthetic value) of undeveloped 
land?  I don’t have a full answer to this question — such an answer would require more 
empirical information, as well as a fuller discussion of political philosophy — but I think we can 
see how the argument would go.  There are a range of situations in which we impose signiﬁcant 
 This article was followed by a collection of commentaries, most of which generally supported the authors’ views.  Similar 13
proposals seem to crop up frequently among conservation biologists, and are generally endorsed by those in the ﬁeld (Marris 
2006).
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restrictions on speech and advocacy for people in important social positions.  The Code of 
Conduct for U.S. judges, for example, bars judges from publicly endorsing candidates for 
political ofﬁce and from making speeches for political organizations.   Uniformed U.S. military 14
personnel are not permitted to participate in political fundraising, speak at political events, or 
display political signs, even on their private vehicles.   Other constraints on speech and 15
advocacy seem ethically appropriate for politicians, police ofﬁcers, lawyers, and others.  
So, if there is an important public good served by constraining scientists’ advocacy, it 
doesn’t seem in principle problematic to do so.  Two arguments along these lines seem 
promising.  First, a distinctly political approach might argue that although imposing this burden 
on scientists does restrict important political rights of speech and advocacy, it is done in order to 
expand the political rights of others.  By requiring scientists to work from the values of the 
public, the ability of the public to make informed policy choices and to effectively advocate for 
their own positions is enhanced.  Thus, although the political view constitutes a loss of political 
freedom to scientists, that loss is more than balanced by the gain in political freedom to the 
public as a whole.  (A view like this seems generally consistent with an approach to democracy 
like Brettschneider’s (2007).)
Second, a straightforwardly consequentialist argument could point out the terrible 
consequences that threaten to follow if the public and/or policy-makers distrust scientiﬁc results.  
One of the primary arguments that has been put forward in favor of informed-consent approaches 
in bioethics has been that it promotes trust on the part of patients.  Similarly, Elliott’s informed 
decision-making approach — which implies the political view — seems like a promising way to 
 http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges14
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf15
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promote trust in science (Elliott 2011, 133-6; cf. Hardwig 1994; Resnik 2001).  If, then, the 
political view proves to be an effective way of promoting public trust in science, which in turn 
heads off the problems that ensue when policy-makers disregard science, that could justify 
imposing signiﬁcant burdens on scientists.
Neither of these defenses, of course, is anywhere near complete.  But both do strike me as 
quite reasonable, and so I don’t think the concerns I’ve discussed in this paper should lead 
proponents of the political view to give up that position.  That said, it is important to note the 
form that these defenses take.  Neither attempts to show that the burden on scientists is not 
morally signiﬁcant (as, perhaps, we might be inclined to say about the complaint of the palliative 
care physician).  Instead, they each point to compensating beneﬁts — not necessarily enjoyed by 
the scientists in question — which morally outweigh the scientists’ burden.  This means that the 
political view, even if it is justiﬁed, comes at a real cost to scientists, which is something its 
proponents need to acknowledge.  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Two Roads Diverge in a Wood: Indifference to the Difference Between ‘Diversity’ and
‘Heterogeneity’ Should Be Resisted on Epistemic and Moral Grounds
Anat Kolumbus*, Ayelet Shavit* and Aaron M. Ellison
,,,
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference
from The Road Not Taken, by Robert Frost (1916)
Abstract: 
We argue that a conceptual tension exists between “diversity” and “heterogeneity” and that
glossing over their differences has practical, moral, and epistemic costs. We examine how 
these terms are used in ecology and the social sciences; articulate a deeper linguistic 
intuition; and test it with the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). The 
results reveal that ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ have conflicting rather than 
interchangeable meanings: heterogeneity implies a collective entity that interactively 
integrates different entities, whereas diversity implies divergence, not integration. 
Consequently, striving for diversity alone may increase social injustice and reduce 
epistemic outcomes of academic institutions and governance structures. 
* Equal main contributors. 
Key words: collectivity, diversity, ecology, heterogeneity, injustice, institutional diversity.
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1. Introduction: Diversity in the Ecological and Social Sciences
The concepts of diversity and heterogeneity are two basic types of dissimilarity that are 
implicitly and commonly assumed to hold interchangeable meanings by scholars and 
laymen alike. However, when we examined their actual usage, a surprising conceptual 
discrepancy – in fact a tension – emerged. In this article we call attention to this tension 
between ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’1 and we argue that there are non-trivial epistemic, 
moral, and practical costs to science and society when this difference is glossed over. 
Our critical examination is part of a large body of literature on the benefits of 
diversity for science and society. There exist strong epistemic (Shrader-Frechette 2002; 
Longino 2002; Solomon 2006b) and moral (Haraway 1979; Fricker 2007; Douglas 2009, 
2015) arguments for diversity in institutions, governance structures, and ecological systems
1  In this article, we use the analytic tradition of concept notation. If quoting the 
concept’s usage, it will appear as “X” (e.g., Fisher’s “diversity” is defined as…), when 
explicitly mentioned as a concept it will appear as X (e.g., the concept of diversity is…), 
and when implicitly mentioned as a concept it will appear as ‘X’ (e.g., ’heterogeneity’ here 
describes…). 
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(“ecosystems”). For example, empirical evidence shows that diversity improves academic 
performance (Gurin et al. 2004; Freeman and Huang 2015; Page 2014), because diverse 
individuals hold different values (Longino 1990; Harding 1991), situated knowledge 
(Haraway 1989), socio-gender locations (Code 2006), research styles and specialities 
(Gerson 2013) and conflicting theoretical scaffolds (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007). There 
also are costs associated with diversity, including feelings of isolation and alienation 
leading to reduced academic achievements of minorities (Armor 1972; Holoien 2013) and 
unbridgeable disagreements among researchers that disintegrate research groups (Gerson 
2013; Shavit and Silver, accepted for publication).
There also are societal costs of divergence between scientists and non-scientists. 
Within the social realm, increased divergence from scientific worldviews may facilitate 
public manipulation by spreading ignorance – agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008) 
– and untrue and/or unjust environmental outcomes (Shrader-Frechette 2002). Within the 
scientific realm, divergence exempts scientists from responsibility for not assessing 
carefully enough social risks of generalizing their recommendations outside the laboratory, 
field, or model (Douglas 2009). Given the increasing science-society divergence, it is often
non-experts who engage with the public – e.g., journalists teaching politicians about 
climate change or students teaching the underprivileged – which further widen the 
separation and may also silence local knowledge (Fricker 2007), e.g. by leading 
experienced mothers not to consider their comprehensive understanding and information as
‘knowledge’ compared to a young psychology student who never held a child, or depriving
those living all their life near a spring to “know” their local flow rate compared to an 
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ecology student or governmental regulator who read published results taken at random 
from nearby streams (Shavit, Kolumbus and Silver, accepted for publication).
Given the fine line between the costs and benefits of constructive and destructive 
dissimilarities, interrogating the most basic concepts and measurements of dissimilarity 
seems important and timely. This paper aims for a step in that direction.
2. Definitions of Dissimilarity
Fundamental to both diversity and heterogeneity is the concept of “variance” (Fisher 1918, 
1925). Briefly, measurable properties (“variables”) of a group of individual entities (a 
“population” of cells, organisms etc.) are rarely identical. Rather, they will take on a range 
of values y = {y1, y2, y3, … yn}, where the value of the variable measured for the i
th 
individual is denoted yi. When graphed as a histogram (Tukey 1977), these values are 
distributed, with the most frequent values clustered around the most common one and rarer
values towards the edges.
The average value of the distribution of the measured variables (its expected value 
E(y) or its mean value y´ ), equals the sum of all the individual measurements divided by
the number of individuals, n: y´=∑
i=1
i=n y i
n
. The variance, or “spread” of the distribution is 
the sum of the squared differences between each individual measurement and the mean:
σ
2=∑
i=1
i=n
( y i− y´)
2
. The standard error of the mean ( √σ
2
n
)  provides intuitive estimates 
of how variable the set of measurements is. Under reasonable assumptions, ≈63% of the 
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measurements fall within ± 1 standard error of the mean, and ≈95% fall within ± 2 standard
errors of the mean.2
In statistics (and hence in nearly all the social and natural sciences), means and 
variances are characteristics of single populations (groups of measurements), but 
heterogeneity usually is a composite property of a group of measurements taken from more
than one population. For example, the classic analysis of variance (ANOVA) developed by 
Fisher (1918) is used to determine if two or more populations differ in their average 
measured traits (e.g., height). A basic assumption of ANOVA is that the variances of the 
populations being compared are equal; this is referred to as “homogeneity of variance” or 
“homoskedasticity”. In contrast, if variances are unequal (heterogeneous or 
heteroskedastic), mathematical transformations of the data must be done to ensure that 
variances are homogeneous prior to comparing populations using ANOVA.3 Note that 
‘heterogeneity’ here describes only the variance as a problem to overcome in order to allow
a common basis for comparison. Throughout the rest of this article, however, the concept 
of heterogeneity describes entities within a collective. “Diversity”, if it is used at all in 
statistics, refers simply to describe a collection of datasets that describe a wide range of 
different, often incommensurate, variables.
In contrast, diversity is used widely in ecology (e.g., McGill et al. 2015) and the 
social sciences (e.g., Page 2011). Unlike variance or heterogeneity, diversity is not a 
simple, one-dimensional predicate. McGill et al. identified at least 15 different kinds of 
2 Ellison and Dennis (2010) provide a full discussion of the assumptions behind these 
estimates and calculation of associated confidence intervals.
3 See Gotelli and Ellison (2012) for details and another example of a “cost” of 
heterogeneity.
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ecological diversity; differences among them reflect the number of variables or populations
that are measured (one or more), the spatial scale of measurement (local or regional), and 
whether it is measured within or between populations. Unlike ‘variance’ or ‘heterogeneity’ 
– both of which are interpretable on their own – ‘diversity’ has little meaning to an 
ecologist unless it is associated with an object. For example, the concept of alpha diversity 
refers to the number of different species in a locality, the concept of gamma diversity to the
number of different species in a region [a collection of localities], and beta diversity 
measures population change between localities.4  
In the social sciences, Page (2011) makes similar distinctions between three kinds of 
diversity: (1) variation, or diversity within a type, referring to quantitative differences in a 
specific variable; (2) diversity of types, referring to qualitative differences between types; 
and (3) diversity of composition, or the way types are arranged. Page’s variation is directly 
analogous to an ecologist’s alpha diversity, and his diversity of types and diversity of 
composition are analogous to different dimensions of an ecologist’s beta diversity. Most 
social scientists use “diversity” as a catchall phrase not attached to any particular measured
process (Page, personal communication), but we suggest that more attention should be paid
to the dimensions of beta diversity. 
Although ‘diversity’ appears to be used abstractly in common parlance and is 
implicitly assumed to mean something very similar to ‘heterogeneity’, when we examined 
deeply rooted linguistic intuitions of certain core examples, and tested these intuitions in 
large databases of linguistic usage, an interesting distinction between ‘diversity’ and 
4 Each of these can be unweighted (i.e., simple counts of different species) or weighted 
by their abundance or sizes (Chao et al. 2014).
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‘heterogeneity’ was revealed, with relevance for understanding and improving civil society
and its institutions. 
3. A Conceptual Tension Between Diversity and Heterogeneity
Whereas scientific language may seem indecisive or vague, artistic language can be precise
and revealing. For example, Robert Frost’s The Road Not Taken beautifully highlights 
diverging dimensions of a difference (i.e., ‘diversity’), whereas the etymology of 
‘heterogeneous’ implies something quite the opposite: an integration of multiple other (Gr.:
hetero) kinds (Gr. genus) within a single whole. 
We argue that attributing heterogeneity to something (e.g., a cell, computer, etc.) 
implies attributing an integration of mutual interactions among different entities that all 
belong to the same collective, whereas attributing diversity to a collection of objects or 
entities entails neither interactions nor a common collective.
An examination of English idiomatic constructions reveals clear distinctions in usage
of diversity and heterogeneity. We would say that the parts of a cell or a clock are 
heterogeneous, but not that they are diverse. In contrast, we recognize a diverse collection 
of wall decorations or tools. There is an apparent semantic distinction here: cells and 
clocks are collectives whose functioning entails the integration of a number of interacting 
parts, whereas walls or garages function independently of the collection of items hanging 
on them.  In other aspects of common usage, however, many objects in daily speech, 
including communities, populations, or universities, are called diverse or heterogeneous 
interchangeably.
The Corpus of Contemporary American English (henceforth: COCA; Davies 2008) 
provides a resource with which to examine common usage of diversity and heterogeneity 
in more detail. COCA contains more than 520 million words of texts, including scholarly 
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writing, fiction and nonfiction, newspapers and spoken recordings, and has tools to 
conduct complex searches for occurrences of words, phrases, parts of speech, other 
linguistic forms, and any combination thereof. Compilations of lists of co-occurrences (i.e.,
all types of words [adjectives, verbs, nouns, etc.] or specific words that appear near a target
word) that can be used to infer intended meanings of predicates such as diverse or 
heterogeneous. 
Sabar (2016) used COCA to infer motivations underlying regular co-occurrences of 
words. By identifying partial intersection of words that regularly co-occur more than 
expected by chance alone, Sabar identified communicative strategies: the choices of 
specific linguistic forms that best contribute to their intended message (e.g., “look” and 
“carefully” form the phrase “look carefully” that calls for visual attention). Thus, the 
generality of a communicative strategy that is evident in a particular example is established
via a quantitative prediction of a non-random co-occurrence (“look” and “carefully” occur 
together and in sequence more frequently than expected by chance alone, and Sabar (2016)
confirmed that “look” and “see” differ in meaning as a feature of attention by showing that 
“look” co-occurred more frequently with words such as “notice” than did “see”). 
 We searched COCA and the Wikipedia Corpus (Davies 2015) for frequencies of 
“diverse” and “heterogeneous” and tested our hypotheses regarding differences in meaning
between them using chi-square tests for non-random frequencies. “Diverse” occurred 12-
30 times more frequently than “heterogeneous” in the corpora. In line with our hypothesis, 
“homogeneous”, “collective”, “whole”, “integration” and “interaction” co-occurred 
significantly more frequently with “heterogeneous” than with “diverse” (improved 
prediction by, respectively, 58, 24, 8, 11, and 11%). Antonyms of these words (“single”, 
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“individuals”, “division”, “separation”) showed only random patterns of co-occurrence 
when they co-occurred at all (see tables 1-7 in the Appendix). A possible explanation for 
the latter findings is that while concepts of a collective whole seem to be more explicitly 
related to ‘heterogeneity’, words and meanings of singularity are relevant to both terms (in 
the case of heterogeneity they could relate both a single whole or to its parts). Nonetheless,
it is evident that there is empirical support for our semantic intuition regarding 
‘heterogeneity’ as interactions among diverse entities within a collective whole, and, 
perhaps more importantly, the empirical lack of a collectivist meaning for ‘diversity’.
The attribute of diversity does not correctly describe collective entities because its 
meaning and reference are much wider than the concept of heterogeneity. A heterogeneous 
entity may be composed physically of nothing more than diverse entities, but as a 
collective, it entails multiple direct and indirect interactions, and feedbacks, among these 
entities. All reproducing biological groups (genomes, cells, metapopulations, etc.) are 
heterogeneous in the collective sense. Hence, additional information that refers to internal 
interactive processes improves models of heterogeneous entities and systems (Wade 1978; 
Roughgarden, accepted for publication). Some human groups – e.g., families, football 
teams or kibbutzim – would best be described as heterogeneous, whereas others – e.g., 
people waiting to pay the cashier – would not (Shavit 2008). There may be grave costs 
associated with failing to identify the goals of certain human groups as diverse or 
heterogeneous, as the next section portrays. 
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4. Illustrating the Diversity-Heterogeneity Trade-Off
4.1 Moral costs  
Many – perhaps most – readers of this essay would say that promoting diversity is a social 
good because it is a stepping-stone to heterogeneity and thus to social justice. Although we 
may not yet have achieved a just and heterogeneous society, we should nonetheless 
promote diversity as much as possible and not dwell on the semantic particularities of 
distinguishing the concepts of diversity from heterogeneity. We think this line of thinking 
is misleading, and that the continuous focus on racial, ethnic, or gender ‘alpha diversity’ 
(i.e., headcounts) and use of the results of these measurements as a sufficient basis for 
discourse and policy, creates a vicious circle that may hinder social change in many of our 
institutions, in particular in our schools, colleges, and universities.
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that segregation of African-American and Caucasian students in 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. One outcome of this 
decision was transporting students of different racial backgrounds into different school 
districts (“busing”) to achieve diverse, “integrated” schools. This was intended to provide 
equal opportunities, academic aspirations, and achievements for all students and to 
improve relations among different races (Armor 1972). Unfortunately, according to some 
of its strongest supporters, busing did not improve academic aspirations or achievements 
(St. John 1975), sometimes decreased them and often worsened interracial relations: 
“integration … enhances ideologies that promote racial segregation, and reduces 
opportunities for actual contact between the races.” (Armor 1972, 13). 
In higher education, diversification is primarily done through “affirmative action”. 
Many scholars support affirmative action (e.g., Bowen and Bok 2000; Rothstein and Yoon 
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2008), but others have argued that it leads to similar or worse outcomes than would have 
occurred in its absence (e.g., Sander 2004; Sander and Taylor Jr. 2012). For example, 
between 1988 and 2007, faculty of color made up only 17% of total full-time faculty, and 
that there had been little change in this number since the 1980’s (Turner, González, and 
Wood 2008). Similar findings have been reported for the number of earned PhDs (NSF 
2013). 
However one thinks about affirmative action, we suggest that in the interest of 
promoting social justice that institutions should not measure diversity alone – how many 
people of different backgrounds are found at a certain time and place – nor wait for it “to 
work its magic” and reduce injustice. Smith (2015) identifies three problems with current 
mechanisms for promoting diversity in higher education: (1) responding to calls to improve
diversity reactively rather than proactively, often by producing an internal quantified 
response to an external standardized requirement; (2) failure to include people from the 
many interacting parts of a university – faculty, staff, students, etc. – in discussions about 
diversity; and (3) making diversification into a specific program rather than an integral 
institutional function and goal. All of these common methods of “working towards 
diversity” are problematic precisely because they increase diversity but reduce 
heterogeneity. They track and magnify difference and divergence rather than encourage 
and enhance mutual interaction among all different co-occurring identity groups. 
A more positive approach was reported by Walton and Cohen (2011), who conducted
a very brief intervention in one’s sense of social belonging (SOB) to a selective, largely 
Caucasian, college. After three years, there was a significant increase in the GPA (grade 
point average) of African-American students relative to control groups. SOB is central to a 
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heterogeneous community as it is a psychological aspect of being a part of an integrated 
collective.   
We suggest that a trade-off exists between tracking diversity and building 
heterogeneity, which may result in a vicious circle leading to blaming those afflicted with 
social inequality for their under-representation. Since we are better at measuring discrete 
variables such as grades and gender than at measuring interactions such as SOB and 
research cooperation, we invest more effort in creating changes we can easily track rather 
than those that demand more complex, “beta type”, measurements (e.g., institutional SOB, 
type of contacts with colleagues or task composition in the lab). As a result of neither 
measuring these latter dynamics nor investing in their visible change, alienation and lower 
academic achievements may persist among minority students and scholars (Syed, Azmitia, 
and Cooper 2011) even while their “diversity” increases. If this processes continues, a 
dangerous positive feedback may emerge, where not only will one’s self-image and 
achievements be worsened, but also his/her social identity comes out worse than before 
affirmative action took place. 
4.2. Epistemic Benefits
Aiming for heterogeneity rather than diversity often has epistemic benefits. Human 
collectives – as well as individual agents – have a variety of epistemic perspectives 
(Shavit, Kolumbus and Silver, accepted for publication). These perspectives differ in 
multiple inter-related ways, involve different backgrounds and experiences, and vary in 
ways of perceiving, explaining, and evaluating information about the world. Perspectives 
direct our attention to track a wide range of phenomena, promote diverse models to explain
them (Griesemer 2014) and encourage adaptive-reflection by employing “…a variety of 
social perspectives, often…by taking the perspective of others” (Bohman 2006, 180).
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Information is distributed asymmetrically between agents, so that some of it is 
known in general, some exclusive to certain groups, and some idiosyncratic to specific 
individuals (Sunstein 2003; Andesron 2006; Solomon 2006a; Gerson 2013); lack of 
interaction keeps pieces of information latent.5 Diversity alone will not ensure that 
information is shared and provides fewer opportunities for agents to reflect on information 
that they can access only through interactions with others (Longino 2002; Tollefsen 2006). 
Integrative working interaction across specialties – unlike the typical diverse-one-
way adoption of ideas from one disciplinary to another – “includes coordinated efforts to 
pose and solve new research problems that can redefine specialty boundaries” (Gerson 
2013, 516), and leads to developing new specialties. Tollefsen (2006) interweaves 
individual and collective knowledge in a way that demonstrates the benefits of epistemic 
heterogeneity. She suggested a framework of splitting a group that shares a common goal 
(e.g., works on a related set task or problems) into sub-groups; heterogeneity is manifested 
on an inter-sub-group level. Each sub-group is responsible for a different task, has its own 
sub-goals, and devises its own strategies and solutions. Mutual interactions result when the
sub-groups return to the original group setting to present their suggestions and give 
feedback to other sub-groups. They encounter dissenting perspectives of out-groups and 
are forced to consider them and examine their own perspective closely. This self-scrutiny 
and actual encounters with critiques by other groups reveals problems, such as 
inaccuracies, leaps and gaps, and uncertainties, allowing the sub-groups and the integrated 
collective opportunities for self-correction (Tollefsen 2006). 
5 There is an on-going discussion regarding the epistemic efficacy of deliberation, 
which is beyond the scope of this article.
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Since all sub-groups are part of a larger community that shares a common goal, they 
both depend on other sub-groups and are depended upon by them. This framework is 
heterogeneous rather than diverse as the common goal and the inter-sub-group interactions 
serve to integrate the group. It also maintains differences, thus reducing the danger of 
group cohesiveness leading to unanimity and conformism, without promoting divergence. 
Such a framework increases the chances of achieving accurate results and obtaining a more
just process of decision-making.    
5. Conclusion
Diversity is not heterogeneity, and a continued focus on the former is not increasing the 
latter; instead, there is often a trade-off and tension between them. We illustrated how 
heterogeneity can better advance academic institutions and governess structures by 
integrating different people, identities, perspectives, and sources of information; it 
facilitates interactions among them, which have constructive epistemic and moral 
implications. Conversely, diversity alone often leads to divergence, is insufficient to resist 
social injustice and it misses epistemic opportunities that result from integrative working 
interactions. Institutions are often unaware of the diversity-heterogeneity tension or remain
indifferent to it. They invest efforts in promoting diversity while neglecting heterogeneity, 
thus paying the costs of the trade-off and not reaping its benefits. Tracking alpha and 
disregarding beta diversity maintain this trade-off and obscures it. For moral and epistemic 
reasons we suggest noting this conceptual and practical difference and aiming for 
heterogeneity.
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Appendix
Table 1. Wikipedia Corpus total target words occurrences.
Diverse Heterogeneous
30967 1096
Table 2. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “interaction”. Hypothesis:
“heterogeneous”-“interaction” > “diverse”-“interaction”. 
Interaction present Interaction absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 11 18 1085 7
Diverse 49 82 30918 93
Total 60 100 32003 100
P<.001
Table 3. COCA total target words occurrences.
Diverse Heterogeneous
16685 1305
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Table 4. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “collective”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “collective” > “diverse”- “collective”.
Collective present Collective absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 5 31 1300 7
Diverse 11 69 16674 93
Total 16 100 17974 100
P<.001
Table 5. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “whole”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “whole” > “diverse”- “whole”.
Whole present Whole absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 7 15 1298 7
Diverse 40 85 16645 93
Total 47 100 17943 100
P<.05
Table 6. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “integration”. Hypothesis:
“heterogeneous”- “integration” > “diverse”- “integration”.
Integration present Integration absent
N % N %
Heterogeneous 6 18 1299 7
Diverse 28 82 16657 93
Total 34 100 17956 100
P<.05
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 Table 7. Co-occurrences of “heterogeneous”/ ”diverse” with “single”. Hypothesis: 
“heterogeneous”- “single” < “diverse”- “single”.
Single present Single absent
N % N %
Diverse 77 97 16608 93
Heterogeneous 2 3 1303 7
Total 79 100 17911 100
P>.05
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Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation
Abstract
My starting points are the claims that explanations are answers to why-questions, and that
to answer the question why some event E occurred one must provide reasons why E oc-
curred. The idea that all explanations of events are causal then becomes the theory that
the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. My main thesis in this paper is that
many “counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should
distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“first-level reasons”) from the reasons why
those reasons are reasons (“second-level reasons”). An example that treats a second-level
reason as a first-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level reason is
not a cause. But second-level reasons need not be first-level reasons; nor (on my theory)
need they be causes. Along the way I use the distinction between levels to diagnose the
appeal of, and one main flaw in, the DN model of explanation.
1
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1 A New Causal Theory of Explanation
It is obvious that some explanations of some phenomena speak of the causes of those phe-
nomena. Simple examples come immediately to mind: the bridge collapsed because the wind
reached a certain intensity, electrons flew off the metal because light shone on it. Much more
controversial is the claim that every explanation of why some event happened must say some-
thing about the causes of that event. What’s more, not only is it controversial whether this
claim is true, it is also controversial how the claim should be understood. I have a new way
of understanding the idea that all explanations of events invoke causes, one that, I think, is the
most natural way to understand it. I also think that the idea, understood my way, is true (with
one qualification1), and can be defended against the repeated claim that there exist non-causal
explanations.
My theory starts with the idea, which has been held by many others, that explanations
are answers to why-questions.2 A theory of explanation, then, should say what it takes for
a proposition to be an answer to a why-question. Now one standard form answers to why-
questions take is “P because Q”: “The tide is high because the moon is overhead” answers
“Why is the tide high?” But there is another form answers to why-questions can take. The other
form is “A/The reason why P is that Q.”3 Now because-answers and reasons-why answers are,
in some sense, equivalent. “The tide is high because the moon is overhead” and “The reason
why the tide is high is that moon is overhead” in some sense convey the same information. But
I think that, for theoretical purposes, it is better to focus on reasons-answers. (I argue for this
claim in (Skow 2016).)
A theory built around reasons-why answers will fill in the schema
1See footnote 6.
2Among those who hold that explanations are answers to why-questions are Hempel
(1965)—with some qualifications, Bromberger (1992), and Van Fraassen (1980).
3I ignore here the forms used to give “teleological” explanations; I extend my theory to
cover teleological explanations in (Skow 2016).
2
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1. A reason why P is that Q iff . . .
What should the claim that “explanations of events are causal” look like, if put into the form
(1)? Let “P” hold the place for a sentence that describes the occurrence of an event. (I won’t try
to say anything useful about which sentences do this.) Here is my proposal:4
(T) A reason why P is that Q if and only if the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P.5
The same kinds of examples that lend credence to the idea that explanations of events are causal
lend credence to its translation (T) into the language of reasons. The lighting of the fuse caused
the bomb to go off; sure enough, it is also true that the reason why the bomb went off is that
the fuse was lit. The electron’s passing through a magnetic field caused it to accelerate; sure
enough, the reason why it accelerated is that it passed through a magnetic field.
On the other hand, the same examples philosophers have thought are counterexamples to
the idea that explanations of events are causal also threaten to be counterexamples to (T).
A bunch of these examples, I think, are based on the same mistake. There is a distinction
to be made between “levels” of reasons. The examples fail because they confuse the two levels.6
My aim in this paper is to introduction the distinction, and show how it can be used to defuse
some examples. I will look, in particular, at Elliott Sober’s claim that equilibrium explanations
are non-causal, and Marc Lange’s claim that “distinctively mathematical” explanations are non-
causal (Sober 1981, Lange 2013).
4There are other theories of explanation that try to capture the idea that all explanations of
events are causal—for example, (Salmon 1984) and (Lewis 1986). I do not have space here to
explore the differences between their theories and mine.
5For stylistic convenience I sometimes speak of causation as a relation between facts, and
sometimes as a relation between events. I remain neutral on which, if either, of these ways of
speaking gets us closer to causation’s “fundamental nature.”
6I should say that there is one kind of counterexample that I think succeeds against (T):
examples of “grounding” explanations. My true view is that every reason why a given event
occurred is either a cause or a ground of its occurrence. But I will ignore grounding explanation
in this paper.
3
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2 Levels of Reasons
The distinction I want to introduce is that between
• a fact R being a reason why some event E occurred—then R is a “first-level” reason; and
• a fact F being a reason why R is a reason why E occurred—then F is a “second-level”
reason, a reason why something else is a reason.
Reasons on the two different levels appear in answers to different why-questions. The first-level
reasons are the facts that belong in the complete answer to the question why E occurred. The
second-level reasons, on the other hand, belong in the answer to a different why-question: the
question, concerning some reason R why E occurred, of why R is a reason why E occurred.
It is easy to come up with examples of first-level reasons. If I strike a match and, by
striking it, cause it to light, then one reason why the match lit is that I struck it. What about an
example of a second-level reason? We can find one by looking for the answer to the question of
why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match lit. One answer (there are others)
is: one reason why the fact that I struck the match is a reason why the match lit is that there was
oxygen in the room at the time. In general, background conditions to a cause’s causing its effect
are, I hold, reasons why the cause is a reason why its effect happened. (Background conditions
are not, however, the only kind of second-level reason; more on this in a bit.)
3 Second-Level Reasons Need Not Be First-Level Reasons
Here is the thesis about levels of reasons that I will defend in this paper:
A fact can be a second-level reason without being a first-level reason. A fact F can
be a reason why R is a reason why E happened, without F itself being a reason why
E happened.
I say that F need not itself be a reason why E happened; I do not say that it cannot. The example
I gave earlier shows that sometimes F is also a reason why E happened. The presence of oxygen,
4
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besides being a reason why the striking of the match is a reason why the match lit, is also itself
a reason why the match lit. But it is not always like this.
Here is an example in which a second-level reason is not also a first-level reason. Jill
throws a rock at a window, Joan sticks out her mitt and catches the rock, and the window
remains intact. The fact that Joan stuck out her mitt is a reason why the window remained
intact. There is the first-level reason. Why is it a reason? The reason why it is a reason is that
Jill threw a rock at the window. (You can test this with a counterfactual: if Jill hadn’t thrown,
certainly Joan’s sticking out her mitt would not have been a reason why the window remained
intact. The window wouldn’t have “needed” Joan’s help.) But this second-level reason is not
also a first-level reason: that Jill threw a rock is not a reason why the window remained intact.7
In this case, the second-level reason that is not also a first-level reason is a fact that
“corresponds” to the occurrence of an event: Jill’s throwing of the rock. According to my theory
(T), first-level reasons why events occur all correspond to events, since they are all causes.
But not all second-level reasons are like the two examples we’ve seen so far (Jill’s throw, the
presence of oxygen); not all second-level reasons correspond to events.
In fact, I hold that laws of nature are second-level reasons that are not also first-level
reasons. If I drop a rock from one meter above the ground, and it hits the ground at a speed
of 4.4 m/s, the fact that I dropped it from one meter up is a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4
m/s. The law relating impact speed s to drop height d, namely s =
√
2dg (assuming drag is
negligible and d is small), is a second-level reason: it is a reason why my dropping the rock
from one meter up is a reason why the rock was going 4.4 m/s when it landed. But it is not, in
my view, also a first-level reason. It is not a reason why the rock is on the ground at 4.4 m/s.
Mentioning laws of nature probably brings to mind Carl Hempel’s DN model of expla-
nation, which says (I’m sure this is familiar) that an explanation of a fact F is a conjunction of
facts that (i) entail F, and (ii) essentially contains a law among its conjuncts (Hempel 1965).
7This is also the kind of example many take to show that causation is not transitive; see for
example (Hitchcock 2001).
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Hempel’s theory is not framed as a theory of the reasons why facts obtain, but it is natural to in-
terpret it as committed to the thesis that whenever there are any reasons why some fact obtains,
at least one of the reasons is a law of nature. I, along with many others, reject Hempel’s theory,
but I have a new diagnosis of where it goes wrong. Its mistake is to take certain second-level
reasons, laws of nature, to also be first-level reasons.
I asserted without argument that laws are second-level reasons; but this is a natural view
to have, on certain approaches to causation. One approach to causation takes laws to be central:
whenever you have a cause and effect C and E, there are some laws connecting C to E—and C
is a cause of E because of those connecting laws.8 But that is just to say that whenever C is a
cause of E, some law is a reason why C is a cause of E. Now I hold that when some fact F is a
reason why C is a cause of E, then F is also a reason why C is a reason why E happened. So it
follows from this theory of causation that laws are second-level reasons. If you start here, and
in addition think that second-level reasons are always also first-level reasons, you head toward
the characteristic thesis of the DN model, the thesis that among the reasons why some event
happens is always at least one law. But this line of thought is fallacious, because second-level
reasons need not be first-level reasons; and, on my view, laws that are second-level reasons are
never first-level reasons.
I admit that I have given no direct argument that laws are not first-level reasons. I’d like
to put the burden on the other side: why think the are? They are certainly second-level reasons:
they are certainly reasons why causes are reasons why their effects happen. But as the Joan
and Jill example shows, second-level reasons are not always first-level reasons. So why think
they are in the case of laws? Certainly we have a sense that laws are “explaining something”;
my view captures this sense, by assigning them the role of explaining why causes explain their
effects. Why isn’t that enough?
8Hempel endorses something like this idea about causation; see (Hempel 1965: 349). It has,
of course, had many other defenders.
6
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4 How The Levels Can Get Confused
I said that the flaw in the DNmodel is that it mis-classifies laws, which are second-level reasons,
as first-level reasons. I also sketched an argument (with a false premise) that leads to this mis-
classification: “laws are second-level reasons, and second-level reasons are always first-level
reasons, so laws are also first-level reasons.” But I’m not saying that Hempel or anyone else
ever entertained this argument explicitly. Is there anything else to be said about how and why
supporters of the DN model might have come to mis-classify laws as first-level reasons?
Yes, there is. Pragmatic effects, effects of the rules of conversation on information ex-
change, can produce “data” that misleadingly suggest that laws are first-level reasons.
The reasons why an event happened are the parts of the answer to the question of why it
happened. So if we come across a conversation in which one person asks “Why did E happen?,”
and another person answers this question by citing some fact F; and if that answer strikes us as
correct; then we have some good evidence that F really is a reason why E happened.
Some of the evidence that laws are (first-level) reasons why events happen appears to fit
this pattern (but I will argue it does not). Imagine someone walks into the room just as the rock
hits the ground at 4.4 m/s, and she sees that it hit at this speed (maybe the rock fell onto a device
that measures impact speeds). A curious person, she asks me why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s. I
respond,
Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height
d by the law s =
√
2dg (and of course
√
2 · 1 · 9.8 ≈ 4.4).
Haven’t I answered her question? And doesn’t the law that s =
√
2dg appear in my answer? If
so, then the law is a reason why the rock hit the ground at 4.4 m/s—isn’t it?
If the answers to these questions are “yes, yes, and yes,” then, at least in some cases, a
law is a reason why an event occurred. It’s not hard to get from this conclusion to the claim
(characteristic of the DN model) that this is so in all cases, and that when someone answers a
7
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why-question without mentioning a law, her answer is incomplete.9
But the answers to these questions are not “yes, yes, and yes.” To explain what I think is
going on I need to introduce another distinction: the distinction between a good response to a
question and an answer to a question. If someone asks a question, obviously one good way to
respond is to answer the question. But not every good response is an answer.
A simple example suffices to establish this. Sally asks whether Caleb is coming to the
party. I know he’s supposed to go to the party. I respond by saying “He’s sick.” This is a good
response. But it is not an answer. The only two possible answers are “yes (he’s coming)” and
“no (he’s not coming).” I didn’t say either of those things.
There is a theoretical reason why we should expect there to be good responses that are not
answers. The notion of an answer is a semantic one. The relation between a proposition and a
question, in virtue of which that proposition is an answer to that question, is a semantic relation.
But the notion of a good response is a pragmatic one. Whether a response to a question is good
is a matter of what a cooperative speaker should say. In some circumstances, a cooperative
speaker should respond to a question by doing something other than, or something more than,
answering the question. In the simple example, I know that if I just answer the question by
saying “no,” then Sally will immediately ask me why he’s not coming. Since I can foresee
that she’ll ask that, and since I know the answer to this question too, I respond to her explicit
question not by answering it, but by answering the expected follow-up question. It is okay in
this case not to explicitly answer the question she asked, because what I do say, my answer to
the expected follow-up, conversationally implies that the answer to her explicit question is no.
I did not, however, need to be so indirect. I could have responded by answering both
questions. I could have said, “no, he’s sick.” Here my response is good, but again it contains
information that is not part of the answer to the question she explicitly asked. What keeps
it from being a bad response is that the additional information is relevant to the topic of our
9This “incompleteness” defense is most fully developed by Railton (1981). For one thorough
argument against it, see (Woodward 2003: chapter 4).
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conversation; and it is relevant because, though it is not an answer to her question, it is an
answer to an expected follow-up question.
I think the same thing is going on in the dropped rock example. I responded to the question
by saying
Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height
d by the law s =
√
2dg.
My response is a good one, but (as we’ve seen) it does not follow that every part of my response
is part of an answer to the question asked. In my view, the first part of my response—“I dropped
it from one meter”—is an answer to the explicit question (“why did the rock hit the ground at
4.4 m/s?”), but the second part, the law, is not; it, instead, is an answer to an unasked follow-
up why-question, a follow-up question I can anticipate would be asked immediately if I only
answered the explicit question. The follow-up is, of course, why is the fact that I dropped it
from one meter up a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s?
In summary: it is often a good thing to include a second-level reason in a response to the
question why some event happened; but the fact that this is good thing to do is compatible with
that second-level reason not being a reason why that event happened.
5 Equilibrium Explanations
I now have two distinctions: that between first- and second-level reasons, and that between a
good response to a why-question an answer to a why-questions. The two together provide the
key to defusing many problem cases for (T), the thesis that the reasons why something happened
are its causes.
Elliott Sober argued that equilibrium explanations are not causal explanations. His main
example of an equilibrium explanation was R. A. Fisher’s answer to the question of why the ratio
of males to females in the current adult human population is very close to 1:1 (Fisher 1931).
“The main idea” of Fisher’s answer, Sober reports, “is that if a population ever departs from
9
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equal numbers of males and females, there will be a reproductive advantage favoring parental
pairs that overproduce the minority sex. A 1:1 ratio will be the resulting equilibrium point”
(201). Parents who overproduce the minority sex are likely to have more grandchildren. So if
males outnumber females in the population, the fitter trait is to be disposed to have more female
children than male; being the fitter trait, this disposition should increase in frequency, with the
result that the sex ratio is pushed from male-biased toward equality. The opposite happens if
females outnumber males. Now Sober claims that this is not a causal explanation, since
a causal explanation...would presumably describe some earlier state of the popu-
lation and the evolutionary forces that moved the population to its present con-
figuration...Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was in
fact produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have occurred
regardless of which of a variety of causal scenarios actually transpired. (202)
In other words: Fisher’s explanation does not say, for example, that the sex ratio in the year 1000
was such-and-such, and that this caused the sex ratio in the year 1100 to be such-and-such, and
so on. Instead it consists of a bunch of conditional facts: for each year in the sufficiently distant
past, if the sex-ratio in that year had had any “non-extreme” value (non-extreme meaning not
all males or females), then the sex ratio today still would have been 1:1.
The first thing I want to say is that Sober makes a claim about what the causes of the
current sex ratio are that I reject. He thinks that the only relevant causes of the fact that the sex
ratio is currently 1:1 are facts of the form the sex ratio at time T is m:n. I’m with those who
reject this claim. The fact that the sex ratio in 1000 was m:n is “too specific” to be a cause
of the current sex ratio. There is a less specific fact, the fact that the percentage of males in
1000 was not 0 or 100%, that is as well placed to be the cause. The less specific fact is “better
proportioned” to the effect than the more specific one; so it gets to be the cause.10
10A “proportionality requirement” on causation is defended in Yablo (1992) and Strevens
(2008). The claim that examples of explanations that, like Fisher’s, abstract away from the nitty-
10
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My disagreement with Sober might not seem to help much. Isn’t Fisher’s explanation still
a counterexample to (T)? Even if the cause of the current sex ratio is that the sex ratio in the past
was never extreme, Fisher’s explanation doesn’t cite this cause either; his explanation instead
contains a bunch of other facts, namely the conditional facts described earlier. Doesn’t it follow
that these conditional facts, which are not causes, are reasons why the sex ratio is 1:1, and thus
that (T) is false?
I deny that those conditional facts that Fisher offers up are reasons why the sex ratio is
1:1. But I can’t just say this; for when Fisher offered those facts up in response to the question
of why the sex ratio of 1:1, everyone celebrated his response, they did not reject it. How can his
response be something to celebrate, if it didn’t answer the question?
The distinctions I introduced earlier show why. Fisher’s response was something to cel-
ebrate, because it was a good response to the question. But it can be a good response without
containing an answer; in fact that’s exactly what I think is going on.
I think that the reason why the sex ratio is now 1:1 is that the sex ratio in the past was
never extreme. But this is not something anyone would believe, or even be able to come to
know, without an accompanying answer to the question of why that is the reason. So a good
response to the question of why the sex ratio is now 1:1 must include an answer to the question
of why the fact that the sex ratio was never extreme in the past is a reason why it is 1:1 now.
And that’s the question that the conditionals in Fisher’s response constitute an answer to. Those
conditional facts are second-level reasons why some other fact is a reason why the sex ratio is
1:1.
gritty details of the causal process that produced the event being explained count as non-causal is
repeated by Batterman in, for example, (Batterman 2000: 28) and (2010: 2). Batterman assumes
that abstracting away from the details takes you away from the causes; but the proportionality
requirement shows that in some cases at least this is not so. Less specific facts may be better
proportioned to an effect than more specific ones.
11
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6 “Distinctively Mathematical” Explanations
Marc Lange has recently described a class of explanations that he calls distinctively mathemat-
ical explanations, and argued that they are not causal explanations (Lange 2013). My interest
is not in whether his examples qualify as non-causal by his criteria, but in whether they are
counterexamples to (T). Here is one of the examples:11
Why did a given person [say, Jones] on a given occasion not succeed in crossing all
of the bridges of Königsberg exactly once (while remaining always on land or on a
bridge rather than in a boat, for instance, and while crossing any bridge completely
once having begun to cross it)?...[Because] in the bridge arrangement, considered
as a network, it is not the case that either every vertex or every vertex but two is
touched by an even number of edges. Any successful bridge-crosser would have to
enter a given vertex exactly as many times as she leaves it unless that vertex is the
start or the end of her trip. So among the vertices, either none (if the trip starts and
ends at the same vertex) or two could touch an odd number of edges (488-89).
Here is what Lange says about why explanations like this one not causal explanations:
these explanations explain not by describing the world’s causal structure, but roughly
by revealing that the explanandum is more necessary than ordinary causal laws are
(491).
There is definitely something right, and deep, in what Lange says. But I do not think that his
examples are counterexamples to (T).
Let P be the property of bridge-arrangements that a bridge-arrangement has if and only if
either every land-mass or every land-mass but two is met by an event number of bridges. The
(supposed) answer to the question of why Jones failed that Lange presents boils down to this:
11This example is also discussed in detail by (Pincock 2007).
12
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(2) The bridges of Königsberg lacked P; and, necessarily, if a bridge arrangement lacks P,
then no one can cross all the bridges exactly once.12
Now if (2) really is the answer to the question, then my theory is false. So is (2) the answer?
There are two parts to (2). First is the fact that the bridges lacked P. Now it is no problem for
my theory to recognize that this fact is a reason why Jones failed. For this fact is certainly a
cause of his failure. The challenge to my theory comes if the second fact in (2) is a reason why
Jones failed. For the second fact, that necessarily, no one can cross all the bridges exactly once,
if the bridges lack P, cannot be a cause of Jones’ failure.
I want to say the same thing about this example that I’ve said about the others. (2), I
maintain, is not an answer to the question of why Jones failed. (2) contains an answer as a
part—the fact that the bridges lacked P. But it has another part, the necessary truth, that is not
part of the answer. How is this compatible with the evident fact that (2) is a really good thing
to say in response to the question of why Jones failed? Because the part of (2) that is not an
answer to this question is an answer to an obvious follow-up why-question, namely, why is it
that the bridges’ lacking P is the reason why Jones failed?
Lange’s diagnosis of this example, and the others he discusses, is quite sophisticated,
and I don’t have the space here to go in to all the things he says about them. Let me at least,
however, mention one further thing he says. At one point he writes, “Even if [these examples]
happen to appeal to causes, they do not appeal to them as causes...any connection they may
invoke between a cause and the explanandum holds not by virtue of an ordinary contingent law
of nature, but typically by mathematical necessity” (496). I am quite taken by this idea that an
answer to a why-question might appeal to causes but not appeal to them as causes. What might
this mean, in terms of reasons why? Here is a natural suggestion: maybe in some cases a cause
is a reason why its effect happened, but it is false that the reason why the cause is a reason why
its effect happened is that it is a cause. The suggestion continues: cases like that are examples
12I’m going to take Lange’s qualifications about always remaining on land etc. as given.
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of “non-causal explanations.”
I think the suggestion is plausible: if there truly are cases like that, they should be coun-
terexamples to my theory. They are not, however, counterexamples to my theory as stated. I
should amend my theory to make it more vulnerable:
(T2) A reason why P is that Q if and only if (i) the fact that Q is a cause of the fact that P, and
(ii) the reason why the fact that Q is a reason why P is that the fact that Q is a cause of the
fact that P.
Now the question is whether the Königsberg example, or any other example, is a counterexam-
ple to (T2). I have a lot of thoughts about this, but can only be brief here. Lange’s idea is that
since the “connection” between the bridges’ lacking P, and Jones’ failure, is secured by a math-
ematical truth (a theorem of graph theory), the bridges’ lacking P, while a reason, is not a reason
because it is a cause. I reject this claim. Even if the connection is secured by a mathematical
truth, the cause is still a reason because it is a cause. This assertion requires defense, but I don’t
have the space to defend it here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a new causal theory of explanation that says that the reasons why
an event occurred are its causes. I also drew two distinctions: that between the reasons why E
happened, and the reasons why those reasons are reasons; and that between an answer to a why-
question, and a good response to a why-question. I used these distinctions to defend the theory
against the claim that equilibrium explanations and distinctively mathematical explanations are
non-causal; and I believe the distinctions can be used to defend it against a wide variety of other
examples.
14
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In Defense of the Actual Metaphysics of Race 
Abstract. In a recent paper, David Ludwig (2015, 244) argues that “the new 
metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of metaphysical and normative 
classificatory issues.”  Ludwig defends his thesis by arguing that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-
substantive metaphysics from contemporary metametaphysics.  However, I show 
that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of actual metaphysics of race.  
One interesting result is that actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics. 
1. Introduction 
 In David Ludwig’s (2015, 44) recent article “Against the New Metaphysics of Race,” he 
argues for the provocative thesis that “the new metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues.”  Furthermore, to continue to engage in such a 
“methodologically dubious metaphysics of race” is, in Ludwig’s (2015, 262) opinion, “a bad 
idea.”  Key to Ludwig’s critique is that he defines “metaphysicians of race” as “committed to the 
ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” much like other metaphysicians engaged in 
mainstream analytic metaphysics (Ludwig 2015, 245).  Furthermore, for Ludwig, “the new 
metaphysics of race” consists of disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race” (Ludwig 
2015, 245).  In his critique, Ludwig focuses on two debates in the new metaphysics of race.  
The first is the debate about whether races exist according to the one fundamental 
meaning of ‘race’ in current, ordinary English in the United States (Ludwig 2015, 257).  I’ll call 
this the US race debate*.1  According to Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 256, 260), some interlocutors 
                                                          
1
 The asterisk is intentional.  I’m calling this debate ‘the US race debate*’ because I think 
Ludwig has changed the focus of the relevant debate.  I borrow the convention of using an 
asterisk to flag when the meaning of a term has been changed from Joshua Glasgow (2009, 140). 
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in the US race debate* are Anthony Appiah, Joshua Glasgow, Michael Hardimon, Sally 
Haslanger, Quayshawn Spencer, and Naomi Zack.   
The second debate in the new metaphysics of race is about whether humans have races 
according to the one fundamental meaning of ‘race’ in the life sciences (Ludwig 2015, 254).  I 
will call this the biological race debate*.  Ludwig (2015, 251, 253, 259) claims that, among 
others, the interlocutors of the biological race debate* are Robin Andreasen, Bernard Boxill, 
A.W.F. Edwards, Adam Hochman, Jonathan Kaplan, Koffi Maglo, Armand Leroi, Massimo 
Pigliucci, Neven Sesardic, and Alan Templeton. 
Ludwig defends his thesis using an argument premised on the claim that the new 
metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-substantive metaphysics 
from contemporary metametaphysics: one from Eli Hirsch, one inspired from Theodore Sider, 
and one from Ludwig himself.  The relevant background here is that recent metametaphysics has 
been preoccupied with what constitutes a “substantive” metaphysical dispute, which, roughly, is 
a dispute that is really about metaphysics as opposed to some other topic, like how we use 
language (Hirsch 2005, 67). 
While I agree with Ludwig that to engage in a metaphysics of race that confuses 
metaphysical and normative classificatory issues is a bad idea, and while I think that the new 
metaphysics of race (as Ludwig defines it) might be based on such a confusion, I will show that 
the work that actual metaphysicians of race are doing involves no such confusion.  In other 
words, the point of this paper is show that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of the 
actual metaphysics of race. 
For clarity, by ‘actual metaphysicians of race’, I’m talking about the same group of 
scholars that Ludwig is talking about in his critique, and by ‘actual metaphysics of race’ I’m 
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talking about the same body of work that Ludwig is talking about in his critique.2  However, 
unlike Ludwig (2015, 245), I will not require actual metaphysicians of race or actual metaphysics 
of race to be “committed to the ideal of one fundamental ontology of race,” even with respect to 
a particular linguistic context.   
I will begin by clarifying Ludwig’s argument and his defense of each premise.  Second, I 
will show that even if Ludwig’s argument is a good critique of the new metaphysics of race, it’s 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  Finally, I will provide closing remarks where, 
among other things, I will clarify how the actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the 
metaphysics done in the philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics.  As for 
objections, I will respond to them along the way. 
2. Ludwig’s Argument and Its Defense 
2.1 The Basic Argument 
 Though Ludwig does not state his argument explicitly, a charitable reconstruction of it is 
below:  
(1) If the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive, then it is based on a  
confusion of metaphysical and normative classificatory issues. 
(2) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(3) So, the new metaphysics of race is based on a confusion of metaphysical  
and normative classificatory issues. 
                                                          
2
 For instance, like Ludwig (2015, 244), I consider Joshua Glasgow to be an actual 
metaphysician of race, and, like Ludwig (2015, 263), I consider Glasgow’s actual metaphysics of 
race to consist of work like his book A Theory of Race and his article “On the New Biology of 
Race.” 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -517-
 
4 
 
Ludwig states (3) as his thesis in the first paragraph of his opening remarks.3  Ludwig states (2) 
in his opening remarks as well and at several points throughout his paper.4  Ludwig also treats 
(2) as a reason for adopting (3).5  However, since there is a logical gap between (2) and (3), it’s 
charitable to add (1) as a suppressed premise.6   
2.2 Ludwig’s Defense of His Premises 
Though Ludwig takes the truth of (1) for granted, he offers three, in-depth defenses of (2) 
that utilize three different notions of non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s first defense of (2) 
is the following: 
(4) The new metaphysics of race is substantive only if there is exactly one  
allowable and fundamental ontology of race for each of its race debates. 
(5) If there is a plurality of legitimate biological subdivisions below the  
species level or a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ for 
each race debate in the new metaphysics of race, then there is a plurality 
of allowable ontologies of race for each race debate in the new 
metaphysics of race. 
(6) The antecedent of (5) is true. 
(7) So, it’s not the case that the new metaphysics of race is substantive. 
Ludwig claims (4) in section 3.1 and justifies his constraint on substantive metaphysics 
from how he defines ‘a metaphysics of x.’  For Ludwig (2015, 245, 251), a project on the 
                                                          
3
 See Ludwig (2015, 244). 
4
 See Ludwig (2015, 245, 260-262). 
5
 See, especially, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4 in Ludwig (2015). 
 
6
 [removed for blind review] 
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“metaphysics of x” assumes that metaphysicians of x are committed to “one fundamental 
ontology” of x that rules out “a plurality of equally allowable ontologies” of x, at least for the 
relevant linguistic context.7  Since a substantive metaphysics of x must at least be a metaphysics 
of x, it follows that a substantive metaphysics of x requires exactly one allowable and 
fundamental ontology of x.  Substituting ‘race’ for ‘x’ gives us (4).   
 As for (5), Ludwig states that the first disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s 
consequent in section 2.  Here Ludwig (2015, 247) follows Kaplan and Winther (2013) in 
arguing that if there is a plurality of equally legitimate but distinct ways of subdividing species 
into “legitimate biological kinds,” then “[e]mpirical evidence underdetermines the ontological 
status of race,” which in turn, permits a plurality of allowable ontologies of race (Ludwig 2015, 
246-247).  In particular, Ludwig (2015, 245, 247-249) argues that “both racial realism and 
antirealism” are allowable ontologies of race given different equally legitimate ways of 
subdividing a species, and even in the same race debate.  An example is how Zack (2002) uses 
the fact that humans have no subspecies to defend racial anti-realism in the US race debate*, 
while Spencer (2014) uses the fact that humans have a population subdivision that matches the 
current US census racial scheme to defend racial realism in the same race debate.   
 Ludwig states that the second disjunct of (5)’s antecedent leads to (5)’s consequent in 
section 3.1.  In his words, “If there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’, 
there is also a plurality of equally allowable ontologies of race” (Ludwig 2015, 251).  
Interestingly, Ludwig never defends this assertion because he takes it to be obviously true.   
                                                          
7
 See Ludwig (2015, 251) for (4) and see Ludwig (2015, 245) for Ludwig’s view on the 
metaphysics of x. 
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 Next, Ludwig defends (6) by defending the truth of each disjunct in the antecedent of (5).  
As for the first disjunct, Ludwig (2015, 246-247) argues that there is a plurality of legitimate 
biological divisions below the species level (e.g. population subdivisions, monophyletic levels, 
subspecies, etc.) because, first, legitimate biological kinds are interest dependent, and, second, 
there is a plurality of “explanatory interests” among biologists in different research contexts (e.g. 
population genetics, phylogenetic systematics, etc.).  As for the second disjunct, Ludwig reaches 
it by making an induction from what’s going on in the two most popular race debates in the new 
metaphysics of race: which are the US race debate* and the biological race debate*. 
Ludwig (2015, 254) argues that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of 
‘race’ in the biological race debate* since biologists in different research programs use ‘race’ in 
different ways that suit their needs.  For instance, Ludwig (2015, 254) points out that ‘race’ is 
often used as a synonym for ‘subspecies’ in systematic biology, but often used as a synonym for 
‘ecotype’ in ecology.  As for the US race debate*, Ludwig takes a more circuitous route to the 
conclusion that there is a plurality of equally allowable specifications of ‘race’ in that debate.  
First, Ludwig (2015, 255) appeals to Glasgow et al.’s (2009) empirical research on how 
Americans use ‘race’ to argue that ‘race’ is “polysemous” in the current US.  Next, Ludwig 
(2015, 257-258) argues that the context for the US race debate* has not been “sufficiently 
specified” to narrow the debate to “exactly one fundamental candidate meaning of ‘race’ in the 
United States.”  Hence, according to Ludwig, from induction, the second disjunct of (6) holds as 
well. 
Ludwig’s second defense of (2) utilizes Hirsch’s notion of non-substantive metaphysics.  
The second defense is below: 
(8) A dispute is merely verbal if each side can plausibly interpret the other  
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side as speaking a language in which the latter’s asserted sentences are 
true. 
(9) A dispute is non-substantive if it is merely verbal. 
(10) Each side can plausibly interpret the other side as speaking a language in  
which the latter’s asserted sentences are true in the new metaphysics of 
race. 
(11) Thus, the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(8) is a direct quote from Ludwig (2015, 259), which is itself a summary of Hirsch’s (2005; 
2008) view on non-substantive metaphysics.   
Hirsch defends his distinction between merely verbal disputes and ones that aren’t with 
several examples from the history of science and philosophy.  For instance, Hirsch (2005, 73) 
shows that the dispute among classical physicists about whether a projectile’s final velocity is 
equal to its initial velocity on Earth was not a merely verbal dispute because physicists on both 
sides could not charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true.  In other words, both sides 
were using the same meanings of ‘projectile’, ‘velocity’, ‘Earth’, etc., and what they disagreed 
about were the laws of motion.  In contrast, Hirsch (2008, 407-408) shows that the dispute 
between John Locke and Joseph Butler about whether a tree can survive a change in its parts was 
merely verbal since either side could charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true using 
the other’s meaning of ‘identity’.  In short, a merely verbal dispute for Hirsch is one where the 
disputants are either talking past one another or merely arguing about how we do (or should) use 
language. 
As for (9), we can infer that it’s a premise from how Ludwig (2015, 259-260) uses 
‘merely verbal’ and ‘nonsubstantive’ at this point in his paper.  Furthermore, Ludwig’s 
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vocabulary here is uncontroversial since it’s the same vocabulary that Hirsch (2005, 67) uses.  
As for (10), Ludwig endorses it when he says the following: 
Realists like Andreasen, Edwards, Leroi, Sesardic, and Spencer can interpret 
antirealists as speaking the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to 
subspecies, populations with visible traits that mark relevant biological 
differences, populations with cognitive differences, and so on.  Antirealists like 
Glasgow, Lewontin, Hochman, Maglo, and Zack can interpret realists as speaking 
the truth in a language in which ‘race’ refers to genetic clusters, patterns of 
mating, clades, and so on (Ludwig 2015, 259-260). 
Finally, Ludwig defends (2) in a third way using his interpretation of Sider’s notion of 
non-substantive metaphysics.  Ludwig’s third defense of (2) is below: 
(12) A dispute about an expression E is non-substantive if its disputants are 
endorsing multiple, equally joint-carving candidate meanings for E. 
(13) The new metaphysics of race is a dispute that is non-substantive according 
to (12). 
 (14) The new metaphysics of race is non-substantive. 
(12) is directly from Ludwig (2015, 261), and is a rough summary of Sider’s (2011, 46-49) view 
of non-substantive metaphysics.  Sider defends the non-joint-carving condition in his definition 
of ‘non-substantivity’ from his stipulation of what metaphysics is about.   
For Sider (2011, vii) the “central task” of metaphysics is “to discern the ultimate or 
fundamental reality underlying the appearances.”  We are supposed to describe this reality using 
a privileged language, so-called Ontologese, which is privileged exactly because all of its 
expressions (e.g. terms, quantifiers, etc.) are “joint-carving,” which means that they carve out the 
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world’s fundamental structure (Sider 2011, vii).8  So, naturally, when we find that one or more of 
the expressions that we’ve used to formulate a question Q does not have exactly one, best joint-
carving meaning, it’s likely that a debate about Q is not about the fundamental structure of the 
world, and thus, is not a substantive metaphysical debate in Sider’s sense.   
With that said, it’s important to note that Ludwig’s summary of Sider is rough, and does 
not reflect Sider’s (2011, 49) “revised” definition of a non-substantive dispute.  What Ludwig 
presents is Sider’s unrefined view, which occurs at the beginning of section 4.2 in chapter 4 of 
Sider’s Writing the Book of the World.  However, later on in section 4.2, after Sider considers 
multiple problems with his unrefined view, he settles on what he calls his “revised” definition.9  
Nevertheless, since Ludwig uses Sider’s unrefined notion of non-substantivity in his critique, 
that’s what I’ll focus on as well.  However, for clarity, I’ll say that (12) expresses Sider-style 
non-substantivity as opposed to Siderian non-substantivity. 
In any case, Ludwig (2015, 261) asserts and defends (13) when he says that Spencer’s, 
Leroi’s, Pigliucci’s, and Hochman’s biological definitions of ‘race’ are all “equally joint-carving 
candidates” for ‘race’ because they are all “objective ways of distinguishing between populations 
below the species level.”  Furthermore, Ludwig (2015, 261-262) bolsters his support for (13) 
when he says that Hardimon’s, Glasgow’s, Feldman and Lewontin’s, and Appiah’s biological 
definitions of ‘race’ are also equally joint-carving candidates for ‘race’ because they are all “non-
joint-carving” meanings.  
3. Why Ludwig’s Argument is an Irrelevant Critique of Actual Metaphysics of Race 
                                                          
8
 For Sider’s clarification of “Ontologese,” see Sider (2011, 171-173). 
 
9
 For Sider’s “revised” definition, see Sider (2011, 49). 
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Even though Ludwig has provided a valid argument that may be sound as well, it turns 
out that Ludwig’s critique does nothing to undermine the actual metaphysics of race.  The latter 
is partially because Ludwig’s critique is not about the actual metaphysics of race, it’s about a 
hypothetical metaphysics that he calls ‘the new metaphysics of race’.   
Remember that the new metaphysics of race is, according to Ludwig (2015, 245), and by 
definition, constituted by disputes about “one fundamental ontology of race.”  Furthermore, 
remember that Ludwig claims that people like Glasgow, Haslanger, Appiah, and Spencer are 
engaged in one such dispute, the US race debate*, and people like Andreasen, Pigliucci, Kaplan, 
and Templeton are engaged in another such dispute, the biological race debate*.  However, these 
last two claims are simply false.   
For one, the term ‘fundamental ontology’ is not even a phrase used in actual metaphysics 
of race.  For instance, it does not appear once among the actual metaphysics of race that Ludwig 
(2015, 263-265) cites, and he cites 40 such publications.  Second, some actual metaphysicians of 
race embrace a pluralist ontology for the nature of race in the relevant context.  For example, at 
the beginning of Spencer’s (2014, 1026) article on the “national” meaning of ‘race’ in the US, he 
concedes that ordinary Americans are using multiple “geographic” and “ethnic” meanings of 
‘race’.  In fact, Spencer (2014, 1026) explicitly says, “Hence, I acknowledge upfront that there 
are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.”   
However, Ludwig could object here.  Specifically, Ludwig (2015, 257) interprets 
Spencer’s focus on the national meaning of ‘race’ in the US as an endorsement of it being “the 
only relevant candidate meaning for philosophical debates about the referent of “race” in the 
United States.”  While the latter is a possible interpretation of Spencer’s project, it’s not the most 
charitable one given how he presents his project at the beginning of his article.  Spencer (2014, 
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1025) begins by saying upfront that his project is merely “to debunk” the idea that “folk racial 
classification has no biological basis.”  Spencer attempts to accomplish that goal by showing that 
‘race’, in its national meaning in the current US, is a directly referring term for a biological 
entity—a set of particular human populations—that presently happens to be biologically real in 
virtue of being a level of human population structure.  Thus, given how Spencer (2014, 1026) 
presents his own project, his race theory is compatible with there being a pluralist nature of race 
in the current US context.  Furthermore, this interpretation best explains why Spencer (2014, 
1026) says that “there are several ways that Americans use ‘race’.” 
There are other actual metaphysicians of race who embrace pluralism about the nature of 
race as well.  For instance, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1162-1163) are happy to grant that both 
the ecotype and the subspecies are equally legitimate ways of dividing a species into biological 
races.  It’s just that they believe that humans have ecotypes, but not subspecies.  In fact, Pigliucci 
and Kaplan (2003, 1163) explicitly say, “Races, then, can be defined and picked out in a number 
of ways.” 
Finally, there are plenty of actual metaphysicians of race who do not embrace pluralism 
about the nature of race, but who do entertain pluralism as a metaphysical possibility, which is 
enough to show that they do not presuppose that there is a single fundamental ontology of race in 
the relevant context.  For instance, after obtaining messy results about how ordinary Americans 
use ‘race’ and race terms in a widely distributed survey, Glasgow (2009, 75) entertains the 
possibility that ordinary Americans are sometimes “talking past each other” when they use 
‘race’, much like we sometimes do when we use ‘jade’.  In fact, Glasgow (2009, 75) explicitly 
says, “So maybe ‘race’ is used in some contexts to refer to a social kind of thing and in other 
contexts to a biological kind of thing.”  That doesn’t sound like somebody who presupposes that 
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there is a single fundamental ontology of race in the US context.  Now, even though Ludwig’s 
argument is not about actual metaphysics of race, it could still be a relevant critique of actual 
metaphysics of race.  So to that I now turn. 
In order to know whether Ludwig’s argument succeeds in critiquing the actual 
metaphysics of race, we need to know more about the debates among actual metaphysicians of 
race.  Clearly, the US race debate* and the biological race debate* are not debates among actual 
metaphysicians of race.  However, the US race debate and the biological race debate are.  The US 
race debate is the debate about the nature and reality of race according to what ‘race’ means in 
the ordinary discourse of contemporary Americans, but only when ‘race’ is used to classify 
humans.  The latter debate actually exists because all of the individuals that Ludwig places in the 
US race debate* have expressed an interest in the focus I’ve just articulated.10  The biological 
race debate is the debate about whether humans have any races in a nontrivial biological sense of 
‘race’.  The latter debate actually exists as well.11  These are the two race debates that Ludwig 
was attempting to critique, and given these distinctions, we can see that Ludwig’s argument 
really isn’t relevant to these two debates. 
For one, neither the US race debate nor the biological race debate satisfies Hirsch’s 
criterion for a non-substantive dispute.  The US race debate is not a merely verbal dispute 
because racial realists in that debate, such as Haslanger and Spencer, cannot plausibly interpret 
racial anti-realists in that debate, such as Appiah and Glasgow, as speaking a language in which 
                                                          
10
 For evidence, see Appiah (1996, 42), Glasgow (2009, 15), Haslanger (2012, 133), and Spencer 
(2014, 1025). 
11
 For evidence, see Andreasen (1998, 200-201, 205), Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1161-1164), 
Maglo (2011, 362-363), and Templeton (2013, 262-263). 
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anti-realist race theories are true, and vice versa.  For instance, if Glasgow (2009, 33) is correct 
about (H1*) being part of the non-negotiable semantic content of ‘race’ in the ordinary discourse 
of Americans, then Spencer (2014, 1026) is incorrect about ‘race’ directly referring to a set of 
human populations in the national racial discourse of Americans, and vice versa.12  The 
biological race debate is not a merely verbal dispute either.  For instance, if Pigliucci and Kaplan 
(2003, 1165) are correct that humans subdivide into “biologically significant” ecotypes, then 
Hochman (2013, 347) is incorrect that humans do not subdivide into “meaningful biological 
units,” and vice versa. 
Next, even if the US race debate or the biological race debate is non-substantive in a 
Ludwigian or Sider-style sense, that fact does not imply a “confusion about metaphysical and 
normative classificatory issues” as (1) claims.  This is because actual metaphysicians of race are 
adopting a different view of substantive metaphysics—namely, one that does not require 
metaphysical disputes about race to presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race or 
anything about joint-carving.  Thus, while Ludwig’s argument is relevant to the hypothetical new 
metaphysics of race, it doesn’t make contact with actual metaphysics of race. 
Interestingly, when Ludwig defines ‘the new metaphysics of race’, he anticipates the 
worry that his focus on it may mischaracterize actual metaphysics of race.   In response, Ludwig 
(2015, 245) says, “However, I do not want to engage in a verbal dispute about the meaning of 
“metaphysics of race”… this article only challenges a certain type of metaphysics of race while 
proposing an alternative deflationist and normative metaphysics of race.”  However, this reply is 
                                                          
12
 (H1*) is the claim that a race is, at least, a group of human beings that is distinguished from 
other groups of human beings by visible physical features, of the relevant kind, that the group 
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perplexing because if the new metaphysics of race is a purely hypothetical metaphysics that does 
not describe the disputes in actual metaphysics of race (as I’ve shown), and, in addition, if the 
disputes in actual metaphysics of race already do away with monist and fundamentalist 
assumptions about race (as I’ve shown), it’s hard to imagine what the purpose is for lodging 
Ludwig’s critique in the first place.  In any case, we can rest assured that actual metaphysicians 
of race are immune to Ludwig’s critique because they’ve already been vaccinated against monist 
and fundamentalist assumptions about race. 
5. Closing Remarks 
In this paper, I’ve shown that Ludwig’s critique of the new metaphysics of race is 
irrelevant to the actual metaphysics of race.  However, I’ve said little about the conditions of 
substantivity that actual metaphysicians of race adopt.  In addition to the bare minimum of “not 
talking past one another” (Glasgow 2009, 28), actual metaphysicians of race embrace disputes 
about how certain linguistic communities actually use ‘race’ (e.g. Pigliucci and Kaplan 2003, 
1162-1163; Glasgow 2009, 6), and embrace disputes about how certain linguistic communities 
should use ‘race’ (e.g. Haslanger 2012, 221-247; Hochman 2014, 80).  However, actual 
metaphysicians of race do not embrace disputes that have unimportant social and scientific 
consequences.  For instance, Haslanger (2012, 300) motivates the US race debate by pointing out 
that engaging in it will help us frame and evaluate social policies and appropriately address 
stubborn inequalities in health.  Also, Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003, 1170) point out that engaging 
in the biological race debate can help biologists debunk hereditarian hypotheses about race and 
intelligence, yield insights into human evolutionary history, and yield insights into human 
migration history. 
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Interestingly, the criteria for substantive metaphysics that actual metaphysicians of race 
adopt make the metaphysical disputes in the actual metaphysics of race more akin to 
metaphysical disputes in the philosophy of science (e.g. the species debate, the nature of natural 
kinds, the ontic structural realism debate, etc.) than those in mainstream analytic metaphysics 
(e.g. debates about the nature of fundamentality, grounding, modality, substantivity, etc.).  For 
instance, Matthew Slater’s (2015) stable property cluster theory of natural kinds has a real shot at 
explaining why some kinds support epistemically reliable inductions in a domain while others 
don’t, which could help systematic biologists achieve more agreement about how they should 
classify organisms into species and higher taxa.  So, much like disputes in the actual metaphysics 
of race, there are practical payoffs to science or society for engaging in metaphysical disputes in 
the philosophy of science.  However, mainstream analytic metaphysics does not guarantee a 
payoff for science or society.  For instance, what exactly is the payoff for science or society in 
debating about “the” nature of substantive metaphysics?  
Perhaps Sider (2011, 47) sums up my point best when he says, “… this concept is not 
intended to apply to everything that might justly be called “nonsubstantive”.  For example, it 
isn’t meant to apply to equivocations between distinct lexical meanings (as in a dispute over 
whether geese live by “the bank”, in which one disputant means river bank and the other means 
financial bank)… Nor is it meant to capture the shallowness of inquiry into whether the number 
of electrons in the entire universe is even or odd (an inquiry that is substantive in my sense, but 
pointless).” 
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Measurement of Statistical Evidence: Picking Up Where Hacking (et al.) Left Off 
 
Abstract Hacking’s (1965) Law of Likelihood says – paraphrasing– that data support 
hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) for H1 over H2 exceeds 
1. But Hacking (1972) noted a seemingly fatal flaw in the LR itself: it cannot be interpreted 
as the degree of “evidential significance” across applications. I agree with Hacking about the 
problem, but I don’t believe the condition is incurable. I argue here that the LR can be 
properly calibrated with respect to the underlying evidence, and I sketch the rudiments of a 
methodology for so doing. 
 
Introduction  
The “likelihoodist,” or “evidentialist,” school of thought in statistics is well known among 
philosophers, more so perhaps than among scientists or even statisticians, in large part due to 
Hacking (1965). One way to distinguish evidentialism from the other major schools – 
frequentism and Bayesianism – is to note that evidentialism alone focuses on the assessment 
of statistical evidence as its principal task, rather than decision-making or the rank-ordering 
of beliefs.
1
  
																																																								
1	Hacking himself generally prefers the term “support” over “evidence,” as does Edwards 
(1992), but other representatives of this school (Good 1950; Barnard 1949; Royall 1997) 
refer to an equivalent concept as “evidence.”	I prefer “evidence,” since this is the familiar, 
albeit vague, word for what we are trying to illuminate; and I prefer “evidentialist” over 
“likelihoodist” as the name of the school, since the former highlights a key distinction 
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It might be thought, therefore, that evidentialism would be the predominant approach to 
statistical inference in science, where quantifying evidence is usually the main objective. (If 
you don’t agree, try getting scientists to stop using the p-value as a measure of the strength of 
the evidence!) But frequentism, and to a lesser extent Bayesianism, predominate in the 
scientific literature, while evidentialism is virtually unseen.  Why is this? I’m going to argue 
here that the fault lies with evidentialism’s failure thus far to address the problem of 
calibrating the units in which evidence is to be measured. Since meaningful calibration is the 
sine qua non of scientific measurement, this turns out to be the loose thread that causes the 
cloth to unravel when we pull on it.  
Before proceeding it may be worth noting some things I will and will not be talking about. 
First, I am concerned only with statistical evidence, and will not be considering the concept 
of evidence as it appears in other contexts, e.g., in legal proceedings. Second, I will treat 
statistical evidence as a relationship between data and hypotheses under a model that can be 
expressed in the form of a likelihood (as defined below). On this view, data do not possess 
inherent evidential meaning on their own, but only take on meaning in the context of their 
relationships to particular hypotheses, with the nature of those relationships governed by the 
form of the likelihood.  I will not be concerned here with measurement problems associated 
																																																																																																																																																																												
between this school and the others. By contrast, likelihood features prominently in all 
modern statistical frameworks.	
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with the data themselves.
2
  Third, I am interested here solely in addressing the question of 
whether this relationship between data and hypotheses can be rigorously quantified.  If the 
answer is yes, then presumably the degree of evidence could play a role in decision making 
(deciding how strong is strong enough when it comes to evidence) or in guiding belief, but I 
will not be addressing these topics here.  It is one hallmark of evidentialist reasoning that 
statistical evidence is treated independently of these matters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section (1) I articulate the central 
evidence calibration problem (ECP), and suggest reframing it in measurement terms. In 
section (2), I consider ways in which evidentialism’s preoccupation with so-called “simple” 
hypotheses (as defined below) has constricted the theory, masking the true nature of the 
underlying measurement problem, and also obscuring the solution. In section (3) I illustrate a 
methodology for beginning to address the ECP once the restriction to simple hypotheses is 
relaxed.  In section (4) I briefly consider what changes would be required to axiomatic 
foundations in order to accommodate this methodology while remaining true to the spirit of 
evidentialism’s original motivating arguments. 
 
(1) The Evidence Calibration Problem (ECP) 
At the heart of evidentialism is Hacking’s (1965) familiar Law of Likelihood, which says 
in essence that data support one statistical hypothesis H1 over another hypothesis H2 
																																																								
2	In common usage “evidence” is often used to refer to what I am calling data, but “evidence” 
also has this other sense of being a relationship between data and hypotheses. In order to 
maintain this distinction, I will call the data “data” and the relationship “evidence.”  
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whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) for H1 over H2 exceeds 1. But Hacking (1972) pointed out 
a problem in assigning any particular interpretation to the magnitude of the LR. In his review 
of Edwards (1992, orig. 1972), he says: 
“Now suppose the actual log-likelihood ratio between the two hypotheses is r, and 
suppose this is also the ratio between two other hypotheses, in a quite different 
model, with some evidence altogether unrelated to [the original data]. I know of no 
compelling argument that the ratio r ‘means the same’ in these two contexts.”
3
 (p. 
136)  
Thus we can say that, for one experiment, data support hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 
with LR = 2, and, for another experiment, that a different set of data support  H3 over H4 with 
LR = 20; but we cannot saying anything definite about how much more the second set of data 
supports H3 over H4 relative to the amount by which the first set supports H1 over H2.  
Edwards was well aware of this problem, saying expressly that “we shall not be attempting to 
make an absolute comparison of different hypotheses on different data.” (p. 10).  But 
Hacking’s point cuts deep. If the numerical value of the LR cannot be meaningfully 
compared across applications, in what sense is it meaningful in any one application? 
																																																								
3	Here Hacking is using “evidence” in the sense of what I am calling data; however, he goes 
on to describe what he has in mind in terms of levels of “evidential significance.” He refers 
to the log LR as this is the form preferred by Edwards. Note that Hacking already appears to 
have been alluding to this problem in Hacking (1965), vide p. 61.	
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Hacking’s criticism points to a fundamental problem for evidentialists, who appear to be 
able to say whether given data support H1 over H2, but not by how much they support H1.
4
 
This is on the face of it metaphysically perplexing, but also, it leaves a gap between support, 
as Hacking’s Law defines it, and a truly quantitative weight of evidence, which would be far 
more useful scientifically if only we could work out how to evaluate it.  
 Following the core arguments in Barnard (1949), Hacking (1965) and Edwards (1992), I 
will assume that the LR is the key quantity in any cogent theory of statistical evidence. But 
the Law of Likelihood is more specific than this assumption: it assigns a particular 
importance to one very narrowly conceived aspect of the LR, a fact that is obscured by 
evidentialism’s focus on simple hypotheses, to which I turn next.  
 Before doing so, I note that resolving Hacking’s problem requires unpacking his phrase 
‘means the same’.  I think that this must be understood as ‘means the same with respect to 
the underlying evidence,’ a locution that lands us solidly in measurement territory. We must 
be able to think in terms of the underlying evidence, as something we can – at least in the 
abstract – conceive of independently of how we measure it. The question then becomes: How 
do we establish meaningful measurement units for evidence, so that a given measurement 
value always ‘means the same’ with respect to the evidence? This is the ECP. 
And here, in a nutshell, is the evidentialist’s difficulty in addressing the ECP. The LR for 
a simple hypothesis comparison (see below) is a single number, thus, the evidentialist is lured 
																																																								
4	Royall (1997) is the only one as far as I know who argues that the magnitude of the LR 
does express strength of evidence in a comparable manner across applications. But I think his 
arguments on this point fail for reasons articulated in Forster & Sober (2004).	
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into the claim that “the LR is the evidence.” To see the danger here, consider a mercury 
thermometer reading 80°F. We might say, “the temperature is 80°,” but this is a 
circumlocution for “80 is the numerical value we assign, on the Fahrenheit scale, to the 
underlying temperature.” Now suppose that rather than degrees, only units of volume V are 
annotated on the sides of the glass. We might be tempted to say “V is the temperature,” but 
now this statement is not merely a circumlocution, it is also an error.  V alone does not tell us 
the temperature; we must, at the least, also take into account the pressure. To insist that 
temperature can be represented by volume alone, or by pressure alone, or by any other single 
thing that can be readily and directly measured, is to mistake the nature of temperature. Just 
so, I am going to argue that the simple LR mistakes the nature of evidence, by obscuring the 
fact that the evidence itself is not a number, and moreover, that the evidence is not any single 
thing that can be readily and directly measured, but instead, it is a function of (at least) two 
measurable things.  
 
(2) The Insidiousness of Simple Hypotheses 
To begin with, we need to define likelihood: 
“The likelihood, L(H|R), of the hypothesis H given data R, and a specific model, is 
proportional to P(R|H), the constant of proportionality being arbitrary.” Edwards (1992) 
(p. 9) 
Two key points are familiar: (i) likelihood represents a feature of an hypothesis given data, 
not the other way around; and (ii) likelihood is related to but not the same as probability, 
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since it is defined only up to an arbitrary multiplicative factor and therefore does not follow 
the Kolmogorov axioms. I will not rehearse the advantages of likelihood in spelling out a 
theory of statistical evidence, but suffice it to say that likelihood enables inferences to 
proceed independently of what are, arguably, extraneous features of study design, including 
the sampling distribution of all those observations that might have occurred but didn’t.   
There is a third important feature of this definition as well, and this regards the nature of 
the hypotheses to which the definition is intended to apply. Edwards is, as always, explicit: 
“An essential feature of a statistical hypothesis is that its consequences may be described 
by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive outcomes, to each of which a definite 
probability is attached.”  (p. 4) 
This precludes consideration of likelihoods involving composite hypotheses. For instance, in 
the context of a coin-tossing experiment in which x independent tosses have landed heads 
and y have landed tails, and letting θ=P(heads), one can write the likelihood L(θ=0.1|x, y), or 
L(θ=0.2|x, y). These likelihoods involve “simple” hypotheses, in which θ is assigned a single 
numerical value, so that the corresponding probability P(x, y|θ) returns a single number on 
the probability scale for each possible outcome (x, y).  But one can not write L(θ=0.1 or 
θ=0.2|x, y), because the latter involves a “composite” hypothesis, which does not assign a 
definite probability to the observed outcome. To know the probability of observing (x, y) 
under the hypothesis “θ=0.1 or θ=0.2,” we would need not only to know the probability of (x, 
y) for each θ, but also, we would need to know the prior probabilities of θ=0.1 and θ=0.2.  As 
these prior probabilities lies outside the likelihood, they are not admissible on the 
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evidentialist view. 
But even the simplest examples of statistical reasoning generally involve hypotheses that 
appear on the face of things to be composite; e.g., we might be interested in whether the coin 
is biased toward tails or fair, which would appear to involve the improperly formed 
hypothesis θ<0.5. This situation is handled by treating composite hypotheses “solely on the 
merits of their component parts” (Edwards, p. 5). Thus in forming the LR corresponding to 
‘coin is biased toward tails’ vs. ‘coin is fair,’ we would need to consider separately the 
(infinitely many) simple LRs in the form L(θ=θi|x, y)/L(θ=0.5|x, y), for each possible i
th
 value 
of θ≤0.5. Now the LR is a function of θ, not a single number (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 LR as a function of θ for x = 2, y = 8. 
 
 
In practice it seems that what is important is not so much the proscription against 
composite hypotheses, but rather the prescription for how they may be interpreted.  We can 
graph the LR as a function of θ, as if we were admitting composite hypotheses, but we can 
only make statements like “θ=0.2 is supported over θ=0.5, on given data, by LR=6.9,” while 
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“θ=0.1 is supported over θ=0.5, on those same data, by LR=4.4.”
5
  But as a practical matter, 
the graph is not a sufficiently concise summary for general scientific applications. We still 
need some way to reduce the function LR(θ) to a single number summarizing the strength of 
the evidence.  
And this is where we get into trouble, because focus shifts naturally to the maximum LR 
(MLR), which occurs over the best supported value – the maximum likelihood estimate 
(m.l.e.) – of θ. Indeed, given that we are only allowed to make statements about one simple 
hypothesis comparison at a time, the MLR, itself a ratio of two simple likelihoods, appears as 
the best single constituent LR to use as a summary feature of the LR graph. (Below I 
consider how relaxing the requirement that hypotheses must be simple frees us up to consider 
other features.) We have now successfully summarized the function LR(θ) as a single number, 
the MLR, but this summary is tethered to the m.l.e.. We appear to have answered the 
question: How well supported is the m.l.e. compared to (one or more individual) alternative 
values of θ?  But that is not the question we asked initially, which was about the evidence.
6
 
The m.l.e. of θ arrives on the scene as a seemingly innocuous point of special interest, the 
value that corresponds to the maximum support, but it rapidly takes over, embroiling us in a 
downward spiral of increasingly perplexing difficulties. One immediate issue with relying on 
the MLR to summarize the evidence (continuing to focus for ease of discussion on the coin-
																																																								
5	Moreover we can only make such statements when both the data and the form of the 
likelihood are the same in the numerator and the denominator of the LR, for only in such 
cases will the constants of proportionality cancel. 
6
 Hacking (p. 28 ff.) makes clear the conceptual reasons for keeping estimation and evidence 
(or support) separate.  
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tossing example, in which maximization occurs only in the numerator of the LR), is that 
MLR≥1: the MLR can only show evidence in favor of the numerator but never in favor of the 
denominator. This is problematic, like using a thermometer in which the mercury is 
prevented from receding. 
Another problem with the MLR is that it begs the question of measurement scale in a 
particularly obvious way, because its evidential meaning would appear to require some kind 
of adjustment to compensate for the maximization itself. The more parameters we maximize 
over (again, for ease of discussion, assuming maximization occurs only in the numerator), the 
larger the MLR becomes. How are we to separate the portion of the MLR reflecting the 
evidence from the portion representing an artifact of the process of maximization?  It 
becomes particularly hard to retain the fiction that the numerical value of the maximum LR 
has some prima facie meaning with respect to the underlying evidence, regardless of the 
number of parameters over which the LR is maximized.  
There is a third, more subtle but at least as damaging, difficulty with summarizing 
evidence via MLRs. Simple LRs can be multiplied across two data sets, but MLRs can not be 
multiplied. Rather, to obtain the MLR based on two sets of data, we first combine the data to 
find the new m.l.e., which is a kind of weighted average of the two original m.l.e.s, and then 
we find the new MLR with respect to this average m.l.e. on the combined data. Now consider 
a situation in which data set D1 favors H2 by some substantial amount, and D2 also favors H2, 
but by a lesser amount. In such situations it is not uncommon for the combined support for 
H2 to be less than the original support on D1 alone.  But this is not how evidence behaves: 
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strong evidence for H2 followed by weaker evidence also supporting H2 ought to lead to 
stronger evidence for H2, not intermediate evidence. (A blood type match following a DNA 
match does not lessen the evidence that the defendant was at the crime scene.
7
) This means 
that we cannot in practice differentiate between situations in which new data are truly 
diminishing the evidence, and situations in which the evidence is in fact increasing but the 
MLR at the average m.l.e. goes down anyway. This tendency of the MLR to “average” 
across combined data is entirely due to its dependence on the m.l.e.; simple LRs do not share 
this defect.
8
 	
Of course none of this need surprise unreconstructed evidentialists, who, after all, 
disavowed composite hypotheses – and therefore any need for maximization – from the start.  
But then beyond the simplest of examples, we are left with an irreducible graph of the 
component simple LRs, not a single number.  This is true already in single-parameter cases;  
the problem is only exacerbated in higher dimensions.  
There is also the matter of masking the nature of the real problem: by focusing initially 
only on those situations in which the LR is a single number, we missed Hacking’s 
measurement question, how do we ensure that this number always ‘means the same’? It is 
only when we consider composite hypotheses that it becomes clear we were never warranted 
																																																								
7	This example was suggested by Hasok Chang. 
8	This issue plays a salient role in the current “crisis” of non-replication of statistical findings 
in the biomedical and social sciences, where the tendency of p-values and MLRs to “regress 
to the mean” upon attempts to replicate initial findings is widely interpreted as meaning that 
the evidence has gone down. In the absence of a properly behaved evidence measure, 
however, this conclusion is entirely unwarranted.	
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in the first place in assuming that the face value of the LR for a simple vs. simple hypothesis 
comparison is the evidence. Composite hypotheses force us to think in terms of the LR graph, 
which, precisely because it is not a single number, immediately raises the issue of which 
feature(s) of the graph might be relevant to the evidence. Composite hypotheses are crucial, 
not only because they are scientifically relevant, but also, because they beg a question all but 
hidden as long as we focus only on simple hypotheses.  
The urge to sidestep the problem of the evidential interpretation of the MLR is the reason 
evidentialists have been reluctant to admit composite hypotheses into their formalism in the 
first place.  But it is fair to say that they have failed to provide any viable alternative to the 
MLR as the summary measure of evidence strength in practice. The preoccupation with 
simple hypotheses has entailed inherent difficulties for the program, and it has also masked a 
basic underlying calibration issue.  The good news, I believe, is that it has also been masking 
the possibility of a solution.  
 
 (3) Towards a Solution to the Measurement Calibration Problem  
Consider again the coin-tossing experiment and LR(θ) as shown in Figure 1. Let us 
suppose, following the spirit if not the letter of the Law of Likelihood, that all of the 
evidential information is captured, somehow, in this graph. What feature(s) of the graph 
should we take as representing the degree of evidence?   
The MLR of course is one possibility, but I have already stated some objections to this 
option.  An alternative would be to use the area under the graph (ALR). (Note that this is 
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only possible if we allow ourselves to consider the truly composite hypothesis θ<0.5, because 
the ALR requires simultaneous consideration of all of the constituent simple hypotheses.
9
) 
But while we’re at it, why not also consider using sets of features of the graph?  For instance, 
the evidence might be a function of the both the MLR and the ALR, e.g., their product, or 
their ratio.  What we need is a methodology for figuring out which among the many 
possibilities is the correct one. 
The methodology I propose is quite simple, at least to begin with. Let’s consider the 
behavior of candidate evidence measures in situations where we have clear intuitions 
regarding the behavior of evidence, and see which of our candidate measures behaves like the 
object of measurement, the evidence. Here I will illustrate using coin-tossing “thought 
experiments” to discover patterns of behavior of the evidence with changes in data, 
considering the evidence that the coin is either biased toward tails or fair. I propose that, 
perhaps with a little persuasion, I could convince you that the following patterns capture 
what we mean when we talk about statistical evidence in this context. (Here I summarize the 
data in terms of n=the number of tosses, and x/n=the proportion of tosses that land heads.)  
(i) Evidence as a function of changes in n for fixed x/n For any given value of x/n, the 
evidence increases as n increases. The evidence may favor bias (e.g., if x/n = 0.05) or no 
bias (e.g., if x/n = ½), but in either case it gets stronger with increasing n.  
																																																								
9	The ALR is proportional in this simple example to the Bayes factor under a uniform prior 
on θ, which is sometimes interpreted in Bayesian circles as a measure of evidence strength; it 
is also proportional to the relative belief (Evans 2015), another Bayesian proposal for 
measuring evidence. But the ALR itself does not involve a prior, so I see no prima facie 
reason for the evidentialist to balk at this suggestion, once composite hypotheses are allowed.	
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(ii) Evidence as a function of changes in x/n for fixed n  If we hold n constant but allow 
x/n to increase from 0 up to, say, 0.20, the evidence favoring ‘coin is biased’ diminishes: 
i.e., the evidence for bias is stronger the further x/n is from ½. But we have also already 
noted that when x/n is close to ½ the evidence favors ‘coin is fair.’ Therefore, as x/n 
continues to approach ½, at some point the evidence will shift to favoring ‘coin is fair,’ 
and from that point, the evidence for ‘coin is fair’ will increase the closer x/n is to ½.  
(iii) Rate of evidence change as a function of changes in n for fixed x/n For given x/n, as n 
increases the evidence increases more slowly with fixed increments of data. E.g., consider 
evidence in favor of bias with one additional tail (T), following T, or TT, or TTT. When 
the number of tails in a row is small (i.e., when there is weak evidence favoring bias), each 
subsequent T makes us that much more suspicious that the coin is biased. But suppose we 
have already observed 100 Ts in a row: now one additional T changes our sense of the 
evidence hardly at all, as we are already quite positive that the coin is not fair.
10
  
 (iv) x/n as a function of changes in n (or vice versa) for fixed evidence It follows from (i) 
and (ii) that in order for the evidence to remain constant, n and x/n must adjust to one 
another in a compensatory manner. E.g., if x/n increases from 0 to 0.05, in order for the 
evidence to remain the same n must increase to compensate; otherwise, the evidence 
would go down, following (ii) above. By the same token, it is readily verified that if (i) 
																																																								
10	This underscores the point made above that evidence is not inherent in the data (say, a 
single toss T), but rather, evidence is a relationship between the data and the hypotheses that 
depends on context. 
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and (ii) hold, then as x/n continues to increase, at some point n must begin to decrease in 
order to hold the evidence constant as the evidence shifts to favoring ‘coin is fair.’  
Note that at this point we have not mentioned probability distributions, likelihoods,  or 
parameterization of the hypotheses. These patterns characterize evidence in only a very 
informal, vague manner. However, by the same token, they exhibit a kind of generality: they 
derive from our general sense of evidence, from what we mean by statistical evidence before 
we attempt a formal mathematical treatment of the concept.  
Can we find a precise mathematical expression that exhibits these patterns? As  
illustrated in Figure 2, the ratio RLR=MLR/ALR exhibits all of the expected behaviors. By 
contrast, neither MLR nor ALR shows all four of these patterns. For instance, MLR, as 
already noted, cannot show increasing evidence in favor of H2 because it can never favor H2 
in the first place; and both MLR and ALR increase exponentially in n for fixed x/n rather 
than showing the concave-down pattern in 2(a).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Patterns of behavior of RLR for coin-tossing thought experiments: (a) Patterns (i) 
and (iii); (b) Pattern (ii); (c) Pattern (iv).  
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Of course none of this proves that RLR is the correct, or optimal (or properly calibrated) 
measure of evidence. But this style of reasoning buys us an important methodological tool. 
Whichever features of the LR graph we consider and however we combine them, we must be 
able to show that the resulting evidence measure behaves like the evidence. When proposing 
candidate evidence measures anything goes, but only those candidates that behave 
appropriately remain on the ballot. And even in this very simple example, two obvious 
candidates – the MLR and the ALR – have already dropped out of contention.  
Of course, there is no reason to assume that what works in this simple case (RLR) will 
work in more complicated cases, nor have we yet resolved the ECP’s fundamental calibration 
issue. Establishing that a measure behaves like the object of measurement is only a first step, 
but it is a vital step not previously taken. It provides an “empirical” measurement scale, not 
an absolute scale, much as early thermoscopes provided good experimental tools while 
falling short of proper, absolute, calibration (Chang 2004).
11
  Projecting an empirical 
measure onto an absolute scale requires a broader theoretical foundation, but one needs the 
empirical measure first.  My point here is simply that confronting the ECP head on, and in 
the context of composite hypotheses, opens the door for the first time to the possibility of 
establishing a proper measurement scale for statistical evidence.   
Note too that the coin-tossing exercise suggests the existence of an equation of state 
involving the three quantities (n, x/n and the evidence), such that fixing any one quantity 
																																																								
11	Indeed, the ECP poses what Chang calls a “nomic” measurement problem, much like the 
nomic problem of temperature measurement. What I am describing here is a necessary but 
not sufficient stage in resolving a nomic problem. 
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while allowing a second one to change requires a specific compensatory change in the third. 
This in turn suggests a new, and potentially very powerful, way to think about the laws 
governing the behavior of LRs. I’m not aware of any evidentialist work that considers such 
equations, but I see no reason that an evidentialist-at-heart should be prohibited from 
pursuing their study. 
  
(4) Relaxing the Foundations To Include Composite Hypotheses 
In order to tackle the ECP in the terms of the preceding section, we need to amend the 
foundations of evidentialism, but only slightly. I propose the following changes. First, let’s 
retain Edwards definition of likelihood, as quoted above, but insert the word “simple” (which 
is tacit in Edwards’ original statement): “The likelihood, L(H|R), of a simple hypothesis H 
given data R, and a specific model, is proportional to P(R|H), the constant of proportionality 
being arbitrary.” Second, we can again add the word “simple” to his characterization of a 
statistical hypothesis: “An essential feature of a simple statistical hypothesis is that its 
consequences may be described by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive outcomes, to 
each of which a definite probability is attached.”  But we can now add a definition of 
likelihood for a composite hypothesis: “A composite hypothesis H given data R, and a 
specific model, is the set of all constituent simple hypotheses, defined up to a single constant 
of proportionality.” Thus the essential feature of a composite hypothesis is that each of its 
constituent simple hypotheses may be described by an exhaustive set of mutually-exclusive 
outcomes, to each of which a definite probability is attached.  We can now use this definition 
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of a composite hypothesis to define the corresponding composite likelihood, as the set of all 
constituent simple likelihoods. 
Under my proposal, the spirit of the Law of Likelihood can be retained: We can say that 
all of the evidential information conveyed by given data regarding a comparison between two 
hypotheses on a particular model is contained in the LR, where, under the expanded 
definition of hypotheses, the LR is understood to be a function of all unknown parameters, or 
better still perhaps, a graph. This can equivalently be read as a definition of evidential 
information, as whatever changes the LR graph.
12
  But the idea that the (simple) LR itself 
expresses the degree or weight of the evidence must be abandoned. What I have attempted to 
argue here is that there is at least the possibility of replacing this notion with something more 
useful.   
 
Discussion   
Evidence is a general and vague term in science. Statistical evidence is a narrower concept, 
but it still inherits some of this vagueness.  One way to tackle a general and vague term is by 
seeking a precise definition that maintains full generality, but of course, this might not be 
possible. Weyl (1952) has suggested another approach: 
“To a certain degree this scheme is typical for all theoretic knowledge: We begin with 
some general but vague principle, then find an important case where we can give that 
																																																								
12	I borrow this idea from Frank (2014), who defines information as whatever changes a 
probability distribution. 
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notion a concrete precise meaning, and from that case we gradually rise again to 
generality… and if we are lucky we end up with an idea no less universal than the one 
from which we started. Gone may be much of its emotional appeal, but it has the same or 
even greater unifying power in the realm of thought and is exact instead of vague.” (p. 6) 
Can evidentialism be redeemed and made truly useful to science? Of course I have not 
proved that the answer is yes. But in section (3) I illustrated a case in which we appear to be 
able to give the vague concept of statistical evidence a concrete, precise meaning, via the 
quantity RLR=MLR/ALR. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to rise again to 
generality from this first step. But for those of us who agree with most of what Barnard, 
Hacking and Edwards have to say on the subject, it seems worthwhile to see how far we can 
take this line of reasoning. This also seems to be a singular opportunity for philosophers of 
science to step into the breach and at least try to solve a problem that has long stood between 
one of the needs of science – for well-behaved quantitative measures of evidence – and the 
capabilities of conventional statistical methodologies. 
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What Basic Emotions Really Are  
Encapsulated or Integrated?  
Abstract: While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions (BEs) and 
about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that 
BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the 
products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this 
assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that 
evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications 
of these claims for debates about the existence of basic emotions in humans. 
1. Introduction 
It is widely held among emotion theorists that there is some theoretically interesting 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. On this picture, basic emotions 
(BEs) are primarily structured by evolution whereas higher cognitive emotions are 
substantially structured by either culture or individual experience. While there is ongoing 
debate about the existence of BEs and about their status as natural kinds, these debates 
usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that 
encapsulation is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products 
of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumptions is entirely unwarranted, that 
there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to 
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expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the distinction between basic and higher cognitive 
emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications of these claims for the existence of basic 
emotions in humans.  
In the following section, I characterize the received view of BEs, which holds (among 
other things) that BEs are solutions to basic life problems in our evolutionary past. Then I 
consider and reject some of the reasons to think that BEs are cognitively encapsulated. In the 
second section, I provide an example of a BE in rodents that bears the marks of cognitive 
integration (as opposed to encapsulation). The basic life problem that likely shaped this 
emotion appears to demand substantial cognitive integration. In the third section, I draw out 
the implications for a current debate in emotion theory concerning the existence of BEs in 
humans.  
2. Basic Emotions 
BEs – including anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise (for an extended list, 
see Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) – are thought to be human-typical behavioral syndromes that 
include involuntary facial expressions of emotion, physiological changes (e.g. in heart rate, 
blood pressure, and hormone levels), and changes in bodily posture (including bodily social 
displays and orienting responses). According to BE theory, these syndromes have a similar 
kind of evolutionary explanation and similar neural and psychological mechanisms.  
Specifically, they each evolved to address basic life problems or adaptive problems (such as 
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resource competition, avoidance of predators and avoidance of poisons and parasites). Some 
of these basic life problems are ones that we share with non-human animals.  
Moreover, the elicitation and production of these syndromes (including the 
coordination of various response components) are supposed to be explained by automatic 
appraisal mechanisms and affect programs, respectively (Ekman, 1977, 1999). For instance, 
affect programs explain phenomena observed in experiments that ask people to distinguish 
photographs of facial expressions of emotions, connect these expressions with emotion 
terms, or rate their appropriateness in response to vignettes (for an overview, see Ekman, 
2003). They are also supposed to explain the results of experiments that connect facial 
expressions with changes in physiological response components (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). To generalize, affect programs are 
introduced to explain the observed coordination of various response components and the 
cross-cultural production of these various syndromes (which is thought to explain widespread 
recognition of facial expressions across cultures). 
3. Unwarranted Assumptions Concerning Cognitive Integration 
Many emotion theorists claim that BEs lack cognitive integration. In this section, I argue that 
these claims are based on unwarranted assumptions.  
Assumption 1: Cognitively Integrated only if Informationally Integrated 
In most cases, questions about the integration of emotions with cognition concern the 
possibility that emotions are modular in Fodor’s (1983) sense. This depends (among other 
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things) on whether they can store information that cognitive systems cannot access 
(informational encapsulation); or whether information from other cognitive systems can 
interfere with the operations of an emotion (cognitive penetrability); or whether people have 
conscious access to emotional processes or merely their outputs (opacity); or whether the 
information that an emotion provides is general as opposed to specific (which would imply 
shallow outputs). These are some of the more well-known marks of cognitive integration or 
its absence, encapsulation. 
Philosophers and psychologists alike usually proceed under the assumption that 
integration with cognition depends entirely on whether information is integrated in these 
ways. These assumptions translate to discussions about BEs, where evidence for lack of 
informational integration is sometimes used as evidence for lack of cognitive integration 
simpliciter: 
Three other types of evidence suggest that [basic] emotion processes can operate 
independently of cognition. Emotions have been induced by unanticipated pain…, 
manipulation of facial expressions…, and changing the temperature of cerebral blood… 
In all these conditions the immediate cause of the emotion was noncognitive. (Izard, 
1992, p. 563, see also his 2007) 
Here, Izard apparently assumes that the impenetrability of BEs constitutes evidence that BEs 
operate independently of cognition. The fact that they respond to low level inputs or 
processes to which other systems have limited access certainly suggests that emotional states 
can respond to information that is not integrated with cognition. In addition, there is evidence 
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that people cannot fully control facial expressions of BEs (Ekman, 1972; Friesen, 1973), 
suggesting that BEs are cognitively impenetrable. Overall, BEs appear to lack informational 
integration. 
Nevertheless, the realm of the cognitive picks out not only informational states, but 
also includes a broader range of internal states that function as causal intermediates between 
stimulus and response, perception and action (Rey, 1997). Cognitive states so understood 
include not only informational states (such as beliefs) but also motivational states (such as 
desires). Moreover, questions about cognitive integration may be asked about either 
informational or motivational states. If so, the possibility arises that the two forms of 
cognitive integration are independent of one another. If so, any inference from the one to the 
other is invalid.  
This becomes clear when we consider hunger. Hunger may very well be akin to 
desire (a paradigmatic case of a cognitively integrated state) in the sense that it can interact 
with other cognitive systems to produce flexible or novel behaviors, as when rodents take 
novel “short cuts” to get to a food box in a maze (Olton, 1979; Tolman, 1948). Short cut 
behaviors suggest that hunger is a motivational state that can incline rodents to the pursuit of 
an end (e.g. food consumption) by selecting from a range of different means, perhaps by 
interacting with informational states that relate means to ends (e.g. means-ends beliefs). Even 
so, hunger may be cognitively impenetrable in that it may be triggered by low level stimuli 
and processes (e.g. low-level detection of changes in blood sugar). Moreover, when one feels 
hungry, one cannot interfere with the feeling of hunger by thinking about it (e.g. by noticing 
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that the amount of energy one’s body has stored in fat deposits is more than enough to 
sustain oneself). One can even imagine that it is informationally encapsulated: it might store 
information (e.g. about which foods are more calorically dense) that other systems cannot 
directly access. 
These conceptual possibilities suggest that questions concerning the integration of 
informational states are conceptually independent of questions concerning the integration of 
motivational states. Hunger may be informationally encapsulated while retaining a degree of 
integration as a motivational state. Wholesale encapsulation, therefore, does not follow from 
informational encapsulation. If this is correct, then inferences like the one Izard draws above 
are invalid: having non-cognitive inputs is not a reason to think that emotions operate 
independently of cognition. They might very well operate in concert with cognition on the 
output side or as motivational states. Before I raise that possibility, consider another reason to 
rule it out at the outset: that BEs are not integrated with propositional attitudes, including 
beliefs and desires. 
Assumption 2: Integration with Beliefs and Desires is the Criterion for Cognitive 
Integration  
Contrary to the previous assumption, this one respects the distinction between motivational 
and informational integration. Nevertheless, I argue that it sets the bar for cognitive 
integration too high. 
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To see this, consider Griffiths’ (Griffiths, 1997, 2004) views on the distinction 
between basic and higher cognitive emotions. First, he draws on some of the same evidence 
as Izard to conclude that BEs are opaque and informationally encapsulated. Since they have 
these and other marks of modularity, Griffiths thinks BEs have “limited involvement” with 
higher cognitive processes, which are “…the processes in which people use the information 
of the sort they verbally assent to (traditional beliefs) and the goals they can be brought to 
recognize (traditional desires) to guide relatively long-term action and to solve theoretical 
problems.” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 92) Here, Griffiths may be making the same faulty assumption 
as Izard (that informational encapsulation implies cognitive encapsulation more broadly). 
However, let us grant that he may have additional reasons to think that emotions are not 
integrated on the output side or qua motivational states.  
From this, Griffiths draws a broader conclusion: that BEs are not “flexible [or] 
integrated with long-term, planned action” and are instead “restricted to short-term, 
stereotyped responses” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 241). The apparent assumption is that if BEs are 
not integrated with beliefs, desires and long-term planning, then the only alternative is that 
they are similar to fixed action patterns, being inflexible and stereotyped. Griffiths makes no 
explicit argument for this assumption, perhaps at the time it was widespread enough to make 
further argument otiose. 
Nevertheless, it has become a tendentious assumption for several reasons. First, the 
phenomena of intelligent action are much broader than deliberate, “long-term, planned 
action” mediated by beliefs and desires. For instance, Ginet (1990) argues that many clear 
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cases of actions (as distinct from mere behaviors, such as reflexes or fixed action patterns) 
are not plausibly mediated by conscious beliefs, desires or intentions: involuntarily crossing 
one’s legs, kicking a door in anger, impulsively pulling a loose thread from one’s clothes, 
and slamming on the brakes to avoid hitting a dog. These actions are not mere behaviors or 
reflexes. That is, they appear to be purposive and guided by the agent, but it is difficult to 
find belief-desire style explanations that render them intelligible.1 Why not think that BEs 
can influence actions more akin to this variety than to “long-term, planned actions”? Griffiths 
never raises this question, neither does he give reason to rule out the possibility that BEs 
cause actions intermediate between long-term planned action and stereotyped behavioral 
responses. 
Second, if we ask what might explain the other varieties of action that Ginet picks 
out, it may be that such actions are guided by other representational states, aside from 
conscious or verbally reportable beliefs, desires and intentions. For instance, in the last 
twenty years, cognitive scientists have begun to emphasize the role of unconscious or non-
conceptual representational states in generating flexible and intelligent behavior (Bermúdez, 
2003). Informational states aside from beliefs include perceptual representations, map-like 
spatial representations and representations of affordances. Motivational states aside from 
desires include drives, incentives and feedback mechanisms.  
                                                     
1 See also Hursthouse (1991). 
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The flexibility and intelligence of these representational states becomes clear when 
we consider animal behavior. Nonhuman animals display forms of intelligent or purposive or 
instrumental behavior (see e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998), even while lacking 
linguistically mediated propositional attitudes. This suggests that instrumental behaviors in 
non-human animals are underwritten by a different form of cognitive integration. Consider 
what Susan Hurley calls holistic flexibility: 
The holistic flexibility of intentional agency contributes a degree of generality to the 
agent’s skills: a given means can be transferred to a novel end, or a novel means adopted 
toward a given end. The end or goal functions as an intervening variable that organizes 
varying inputs and outputs and allows a degree of transfer across contexts. (Hurley, 2003, 
pp. 237–38) 
Where this sort of flexibility is found, it suggests that behavior is best explained with 
reference to informational states which represent the means available to an organism (e.g. 
affordances) and motivational states that represent its ends (e.g. drive states), which can 
interact interchangeably in order to bring about the same end by various means or to deploy a 
single means to bring about various ends.  
Nevertheless, these informational and motivational states may sometimes lack 
inferential integration with beliefs and desires. Even in humans, phenomena like “blind-
sight” suggest that perceptual representations can flexibly guide behavior without being 
integrated with verbally reportable states. That is, even though these perceptual states are not 
verbally reportable or consciously accessible, these informational states mediate goal-
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directed behaviors (e.g. putting a plate in a slot) rather than just reflexes and fixed action 
patterns (see e.g. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991). All this suggests that Griffiths’ 
requirements on cognitive integration are too stringent. Verbal reportability and conscious 
accessibility of a representational state is not necessary for such a state to influence flexible 
behaviors. To my knowledge there is no evidence that BEs fail to meet less stringent 
requirements on cognitive integration such as holistic integration. 
Once the full range of representational states is expanded in this way (beyond beliefs 
and desires), it becomes possible that BEs have some degree of motivational integration with 
other representational states aside from conscious beliefs and desires to produce behaviors 
that are more flexible and purposive than stereotyped behaviors. Griffiths provides no reason 
to rule out this possibility.  
4. Evidence of Integration in a Basic Emotion 
In fact, there is some reason to rule it in. Consider the instinctive patterns of territorial 
behavior of rodents. These behaviors have been investigated in great detail using a resident-
intruder experimental paradigm (for an overview, see D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984, 
2003) add it Adams RRR) in which resident (who have occupied a cage or colony for a few 
weeks) will attack unfamiliar male intruders introduced into their cage. The attacks of the 
resident and the defensive maneuvers of the intruder comprise sets of stereotyped behaviors. 
Each attack behavior of the resident is paired with a matching defensive maneuver of the 
intruder. The resident adopts a set of stereotyped postures and attacks aimed at biting the 
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dorsal surfaces of the intruder. On the other hand, the intruder adopts a distinctive set of 
stereotyped behaviors aimed at avoiding or blocking the resident’s attempts to bite its back.  
While these behaviors are certainly stereotyped, they are not brittle or reflexive. For 
instance, attacks of residents vary depending on the defensive strategy adopted by the 
intruder, and they seem to be governed by a motive to approach and attack that persists the 
entire time that the intruder is present.  By contrast, the intruder rat’s whole suite of 
behaviors seems to be governed by a persistent motive to escape and avoid. 
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Figure 1 Confrontation and avoidance behaviors (e.g. facial expressions, postures and 
maneuvers) of resident and intruder mice (respectively). From Defensor and Corley (2012), 
p. 683 permission pending © Elsevier. Originally published in Physiology and Behavior. 
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What scientists have discovered about these behaviors (the flexibility of these 
behaviors and their coherent aims) indicates that they are produced by two underlying 
motivational systems, what I call the confrontation and avoidance systems (D. C. Blanchard 
& Blanchard, 1984, 2003; D. C. Blanchard, Litvin, Pentkowski, & Blanchard, 2009). The 
confrontation system is tuned to bring about a specific end state, repeated back-biting. 
Moreover, this motive does not depend on learning: rats which have been socially isolated 
from birth will still attempt to bite the back of an intruder (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1961). So far, the 
focus has been on cases in which a given rodent is purely motivated by confrontation or 
avoidance, but aggressive encounters in the wild usually involve a mix of offensive and 
defensive postures. This suggests that these motivational systems can be activated 
simultaneously or in close succession to produce mixed patterns of behavior. 
Regardless, these systems have many of the characteristics of affect programs in 
humans. They are posited to explain a coordinated suite of behaviors and physiological 
changes that may include facial expressions, cardiovascular changes, and endocrine 
responses (Defensor, Corley, Blanchard, & Blanchard, 2012; Fokkema, Koolhaas, & van der 
Gugten, 1995). Moreover, these systems are tailored to solve basic life problems. 
Specifically, the confrontation system solves the problem of defending territories from other 
males for breeding purposes (and without fatally injuring kin in the process), whereas the 
avoidance system solves the problem of avoiding occupied territories and failing that, 
defending against the attacks of residents. For these reasons, we have all the same reasons to 
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postulate BEs in rodent that we have in humans. Let us suppose then that the confrontation 
and avoidance systems are BEs in rodents.  
Interesting for my purposes, under certain conditions, the presence of the unfamiliar 
male can produce highly flexible and novel behaviors. In the bound-intruder task, an intruder 
is tied down on a Plexiglas plate with only its ventral surfaces (belly-side) exposed and 
placed in the cage of a resident, so that the resident cannot easily bite the back of the intruder. 
As a result, the resident will sometimes bite at the bands that tie down the intruder or dig 
under the intruder so that the resident can bite the intruder’s back (R. J. Blanchard, 
Blanchard, Takahashi, & Kelley, 1977). In contrast, none of these behaviors are adopted 
when the intruder is tied down with his back exposed.  
These instrumental behaviors are clearly not stereotyped forms of attack, rather they 
are forms of flexible behavior adjustment to achieve the aim of biting the intruder’s back: 
they exhibit holistic integration. In this case, the same end can be achieved by several, novel 
means. Attempts to bite the intruder’s bonds or to dig underneath the intruder are novel 
means toward the end of biting the back of the intruder. Moreover, some of a resident’s 
means can be deployed toward novel ends. Digging is an element of the rat’s behavioral 
repertoire that is ordinarily used for an entirely different purpose: constructing burrow 
systems for shelter and nesting (Boice, 1977). This suggests that there are informational 
states, representations of means (e.g. motor representations of digging, biting, lateral attack, 
etc.), that can interact interchangeably with motivational states, representations of various 
ends (e.g. nesting, back-biting, eating etc.), in order to produce flexible behaviors. 
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Importantly, the confrontation system seems to be involved in coordinating flexible 
back-biting behavior. Moreover, this is something we would predict if it is a solution to the 
basic life problem of defending a territory from intruders. Flexibility is required to 
successfully repel an intruder because it is not in the intruder’s best interest to be repelled 
easily or to act predictably. For instance, the intruder would be sure to fare poorly if it acted 
in a way that accommodates the attacks of the resident. So a single fixed action pattern or 
even a whole suite of fixed action patterns on the part of the resident would not tend to be 
successful against the most likely strategy of the intruder. It is more adaptive to have a 
flexible motivational state that leads to repeated back biting across a wide range of strategies 
or postures that the intruder might adopt. Rather than leading only to inflexible, stereotyped 
responses, it appears that solutions to basic life problems sometimes require some degree of 
motivational integration. 
 
5. Implications for Emotion Theory 
If we understand BEs in this way, this changes the shape of an ongoing debate in emotion 
theory concerning the existence of BEs in humans. In the past, this debate has carried on 
under the assumption that if an emotion is biologically basic, then one should predict that the 
various response components of the emotion will have a high degree of coherence; that for 
example “all instances of anger should have a characteristic facial display, cardiovascular 
pattern, and voluntary action that are coordinated in time and correlated in intensity.” 
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(Barrett, 2006, p. 29) This high degree of coherence is not observed across many emotions 
(Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). For 
instance, when anger is elicited in experimental settings, it is uncommon to observe facial 
expressions in conjunction with the other putative components of BE anger.  
One way of defending the basicality of an emotion against this criticism is to reassess 
what patterns of emotional response are predicted by BE theory. As we saw in the section 
above the motivational component of a basic emotion can select novel, instrumental 
behaviors. Moreover, the motivational component can be indispensable for solving a basic 
life problem. I think we can add to this the possibility that other response components are not 
as indispensable as the motivational state. To see this, suppose that anger in humans is a 
solution to basic life problems of deterring conspecifics from challenges and insults. If so, it 
may be that the only reliable requirement of successful deterrence (at least in our lineage) is a 
flexible motivation to retaliate against perceived wrongs (e.g. McCullough, Kurzban, & 
Tabak, 2012). For instance, a reliable disposition to garner a reputation for revenge (e.g. by 
avenging personal offenses) appears to be a highly reliable strategy for deterrence (e.g. Daly 
& Wilson, 1988; Frank, 1988), perhaps more so than any facial expression or physiological 
responses. If revenge can be served cold, then anger may not always require anything more 
than a motivation to avenge. If so, then we might expect that the only reliably occurring 
component of anger is the relevant motivational state. But if this is correct, then evidence of 
low coherence is not evidence against the existence of BE anger. While this is a just-so story 
that may or may not end up being true, it shows that the expected level of coherence in a BE 
Atlanta, GA; 3-5 November 2016 -567-
Isaac Wiegman 
10/19/2016 
17 
 
depends on which basic life problem shaped that emotion. In some cases, we might expect 
the motivational state to be the only component that does not significantly vary across the 
situations in which these problems arise. In that case, contextually variable responses will be 
the norm rather than the exception. 
 
6. Conclusion: What Basic Emotions Really Are 
So what are basic emotions? Like other theoretical terms, part of the theoretical function of 
basic emotions is to place selective stress on competing theories (e.g. Kroon, 1985). In this 
case, BEs and competing conceptions of emotion allow us to discriminate between 
evolutionary theories of emotion in competition with radical social constructivist theories 
(e.g. Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013).  
BEs help distinguish these theories by specifying an architecture for emotion 
production predicted by evolutionary considerations. The distinguishing factor is whether 
emotion production is categorical or dimensional (see figure 2). If each BE is a solution to a 
different basic life problem, then when a BE is elicited, we should see emotional responses 
that are relevant to that basic life problem and distinct from the responses manifested by 
other BEs. Emotion production is categorical in the sense that the behavioral responses are 
controlled by a single emotional state (as distinct from other emotional states that might 
control a distinct pattern of response). By contrast, if all emotions are socially constructed as 
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some theorists claim, we might expect to see emotional behaviors controlled directly by 
multiple dimensions of appraisal (as in the bottom half of figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Competing architectures for emotion production. Top diagram is a categorical 
architecture, whereas the bottom is dimensional. From Moors (2012), p. 266 permission 
pending © John Benjamins Publishing Company. Originally published in Zachar and Ellis 
(2012). 
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Until the present, contextual variability of emotional responses has played a decisive 
role in distinguishing between these two architectures for emotion production. If flexible 
motivational states are not included among the components of BEs, then discrete emotion 
production predicts insensitivity to context subsequent to elicitation (though emotion 
regulation processes can perhaps inhibit or augment emotional responses according to 
context). However, once flexible motivational states are possible, categorical emotion 
production is compatible with a greater amount of contextual variability. 
Admittedly, this added complexity makes it more difficult to test whether humans 
have BEs. Nevertheless, it is not impossible. For instance, in the case of anger, researchers 
have developed a neurological measure of approach motivation (for a review, see Carver & 
Harmon-jones, 2009). If this motivational state is a component of anger, we can measure 
whether approach motivation itself is better predicted by contextual variables subsequent to 
anger elicitation or rather by contextual variables prior to or during elicitation. If contextual 
variables prior to elicitation do not independently predict approach motivation as BE theory 
might lead us to expect, then we would have evidence against the existence of BE anger. 
I have argued against prevailing assumptions that BEs lack cognitive integration. In 
the past, evidence against cognitive integration has been concerned with informational 
integration, and motivational integration has not been considered. Moreover, the assumed 
requirements for integration concern interaction with verbally reportable or consciously 
accessible states, and integration with other representational states is ignored. Moreover, BEs 
in rodents exhibit a form of motivational integration that plausibly hinges on interaction with 
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a wider variety of representational states. Properly understood, BEs are more likely to refer to 
emotional states in humans.  
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Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies
Abstract
The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization 
and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) iluminating discussion
of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this 
renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an 
important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent 
grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims aleging the multiple realization 
of psychological kinds are vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, 
intuitions notwithstanding, the terms in which their recommendation has been 
put make it impossible to folow, while also misleadingly insinuating that meeting 
their desideratum virtualy guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching 
of grains, what multiple realization realy requires is a principled method for 
adjudicating upon diferences between tokens. Shapiro’s (2000) work on multiple 
realization can be understood as an atempt to adumbrate such a method.
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1. Introduction
The multiple realization (“MR”) hypothesis asserts, at its baldest, that the same 
psychological state may be realized in neurologicaly distinct substrates (Polger 
2009). Hilary Putnam’s (1967) ingenious suggestion that pain is likely to be a 
multiply realized kind (“MR kind”) rather neatly captures the thought here—
while both mammals and moluscs presumably experience pain, they’re likely to 
instantiate it in neurological systems of a very diferent sort.
MR was played against a popular philosophical theory of mind in the 1960s 
which atempted to identify mental states with neural states. Since MR implies a 
many-to-one mapping from neural states to mental states, if it is in fact true that 
mental states are multiply realized, it folows that no clear identity relation can 
hold between them. As Bechtel and Mundale (1999, 176) frame the issue, “[o]ne 
corolary of this rejection of the identity thesis is the contention that information 
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about the brain is of litle or no relevance to understanding psychological 
processes.” When the MR hypothesis irst came to prominence, its critics by and 
large accepted it as empiricaly correct, and merely denied its touted 
antireductionist implications. In recent years the debate has struck a new note, 
with many philosophers caling the empirical hypothesis itself into question. 
Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) inluential paper, folowed quickly at the heels by 
Shapiro’s (2000) penetrating analysis of functions, perhaps did most to reignite the 
old controversy and drag MR back into the philosophical limelight. Bechtel and 
Mundale express what seems to be an important insight about multiple 
realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing 
kinds, claims aleging the multiple realization of psychological kinds are 
vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, intuitions notwithstanding, the 
terms in which their recommendation has been put make it impossible to folow, 
while also misleadingly insinuating that meeting their desideratum virtualy 
guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching of grains, what MR realy 
requires is a principled method for adjudicating upon diferences between tokens. 
Shapiro’s (2000) work on MR can be understood as an atempt to adumbrate such a
method.
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2. Bechtel and Mundale’s grain requirement
Bechtel and Mundale appeal to “neurobiological and cognitive neuroscience 
practice” in the hope of showing how claims that psychological states are multiply 
realized are unjustied. Intuitively, theirs is an argument from success: cognitive 
neuroscience’s method assumes MR is false, and the success of that method is 
evidence that MR is false. They argue that it is “precisely on the basis of working 
assumptions about commonalities in brains across individuals and species that 
neurobiologists and cognitive neuroscientists have discovered clues to the 
information processing being performed” (1999, 177).
Bechtel and Mundale examine both the “neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological practice of carving up the brain.” What they believe this 
examination reveals is, irstly, that the principle of psychological function plays an 
essential role in both disciplines, and secondly, that “the cartographic project itself 
is frequently carried out comparatively—across species” (1999, 177), the opposite 
of what one would expect if MR were “a serious option.” It is the very similarity 
(or homology) of brain structure which permits generalization across species; and 
similarity in the functional characterization of homologous brain regions across 
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species only makes sense if the claims of MR are either false or greatly 
exaggerated. For instance, “[e]ven with the advent of neuroimaging, permiting 
localization of processing areas in humans, research on brain visual areas remains 
fundamentaly dependent on monkey research…” (1999, 195). “The clear 
assumption is that the neural organization in the macaque wil provide a 
defeasible guide to the human brain” (1999, 183). Brodmann’s famous brain maps 
were based upon comparisons of altogether 55 species and 11 orders of mammals. 
If MR were true, “one would not expect results based on comparative 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological studies to be particularly useful in 
developing functional accounts of human psychological processing” (1999, 178). 
They also argue that the ubiquity of brain mapping as a way of decomposing 
cognitive function points to the implausibility of the MR thesis. The understanding
of psychological function is increasingly “being fostered by appeal to the brain and
its organization” (1999, 191), again, the opposite of what one would expect “[i]f the
taxonomies of brain states and psychological states were as independent of each 
other as the [MR] argument suggests” (1999, 190-91).
In light of such considerations, Bechtel and Mundale (1999, 178-79, 201-04) 
resort to grains as a way of making sense of what they perceive to be the 
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entrenched, almost unquestioning consensus prevailing around MR. They think 
that it can be traced to the practice of philosophers appealing to diferent grain 
sizes in the taxonomies of psychological and brain states, “using a coarse grain in 
lumping together psychological states and a ine grain in spliting brain states.” 
When Putnam went about colecting his various specimens of pain, he ignored the 
many likely nuances between them. At the same time, he had few compuctions 
about declaring them diferent at a neurological level. His contention that pain is 
likely to be an MR kind can only command our respect if we can be sure that when
he was comparing his specimens from a neurological point of view he was careful 
to apply no less lenient a standard of diferentiation than he applied when 
comparing his specimens from a psychological point of view. Bechtel and Mundale
maintain that when “a common grain size is insisted on, as it is in scientic 
practice, the plausibility of multiple realizability evaporates.” As their examples of 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological practice atest, scientists in these ields 
typicaly match a coarse-grained conception of psychological states with an 
equaly coarse-grained conception of brain states. Despite the habit of 
philosophers individuating brain states in accordance with physical and chemical 
criteria, a habit no doubt originating with Putnam, this is not how neuroscientists 
characterize them. The notion of a brain state is “a philosopher’s iction” (1999, 
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177) given that the notion neuroscientists actualy employ is much less ine-
grained, namely “activity in the same brain part or conglomerate of parts.”
A not unrelated factor is that the MR hypothesis often gets presented in a 
“contextual vacuum.” The choice of grain is always determined by context, with 
“diferent contexts for constructing taxonomies” resulting in “diferent grain sizes 
for both psychology and neuroscience.” The development of evolutionary 
perspectives, for instance, in which the researcher necessarily adopts a coarse 
grain, contrasts with the much iner grain that wil be appropriate when assessing 
diferences among conspecics:
One can adopt either a coarse or a ine grain, but as long as one uses a 
comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, the mapping between 
them wil be correspondingly systematic. For example, one can adopt a 
relatively coarse grain, equating psychological states over diferent 
individuals or across species. If one employs the same grain, though, one 
wil equate activity in brain areas across species, and one-to-one mapping is
preserved (though perhaps further taxonomic reinement and/or 
delineation may be required). Conversely, one can adopt a very ine grain, 
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and diferentiate psychological states between individuals, or even in the 
same individual over time. If one similarly adopts a ine grain in analyzing 
the brain, then one is likely to map the psychological diferences onto brain 
diferences, and brain diferences onto psychological diferences. (1999, 202)
At least among some philosophers Bechtel and Mundale’s message has 
evidently been wel received (Couch 2004; Polger 2009; Godfrey-Smith, personal 
communication; see also tacit approval in Aizawa and Gilet 2009, 573). Polger 
(2009) explains the motivation for the grain requirement in an iluminating way. 
Neuroplasticity has in recent times been thought to provide compeling evidence 
for the MR of mental states. He concludes that “contrary to philosophical 
consensus, the identity theory does not blatantly ly in the face of what is known 
about the correlations between psychological and neural processing” (2009, 470). 
The grains argument igures prominently in his reasoning. As he points out, it 
might be tempting to regard a phenomenon like cortical map plasticity—where 
diferent brain regions subserve the same function at diferent times in an 
individual’s history, say, after brain injury or trauma—as an existence proof of MR.
But not if the point about grains is taken to heart. It al comes down to what we 
mean by “diferent brain regions” subserving “the same function.” Consider that 
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recovered functions are frequently suboptimal. Genuine MR would indeed require
the same psychological state to be underwriten by diferent neurological states; 
but suboptimality is evidence of diference underlying diference, not diference 
underlying sameness, as MR requires:
It’s true that this kind of representational plasticity involves the “same” 
function being mediated by “diferent” cortical areas. But here one faces the
chalenge leveled by Bechtel and Mundale’s charge that defenses of [MR] 
employ a mismatch in the granularity of psychological and neuroscientic 
kinds. If we individuate psychological processes quite coarsely—by gross 
function, say—then we can say that functions or psychological states are of 
the same kind through plastic change over time. And if we individuate 
neuroscientic kinds quite inely—by precise cortical location, or particular 
neurons—then we can say that cortical map plasticity involves diferent 
neuronal kinds. But this is clearly a mug’s game. What we want to know is 
not whether there is some way or other of counting mental states and brain 
states that can be used to distinguish them—no doubt there are many. The 
question is whether the sciences of psychology and neuroscience give us 
any way of registering the two taxonomic systems. (2009, 467, my emphasis)
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3. Problems with the grain requirement: imprecise, impracticable, and 
misleading
But now the question is this: what, precisely, can it mean to use a “comparable” 
grain, or to keep a grain size “constant,” across both psychological and 
neurophysiological taxonomies? Polger’s motivation makes a lot of sense, to be 
sure, but talk of “registering” taxonomies (as of aligning classicatory regimes, or 
rendering distinct scientic descriptions commensurable, or however else one might 
care to put it) doesn’t shed any light on how the desideratum for consistent grains 
can actualy be met. Since it is intended to serve in part as a methodological 
prescription, it’s important to know what to make of this requirement—metaphors
won’t help us here. How, in concrete terms, is an investigator meant to satisfy such 
a condition as this on their research?
Perhaps it means this. Suppose you have two tokens of fruit. The science of 
botany (say) could deliver descriptions under which the two are classied the 
same (e.g. from the point of view of species), but also descriptions under which 
they come out as diferent (e.g. from the point of view of varieties). The irst 
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description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the second. Now imagine 
economics coming into the picture. The science of economics can likewise deliver 
descriptions under which both tokens are classied the same (e.g. both are forms 
of tradable fresh produce) or diferent (e.g. one, being typicaly the crunchier and 
sweeter variety, has a lower elasticity of demand than the other). Once again, the 
irst description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the second. Perhaps, 
then, we could take it that botany and economics deliver descriptions at the same 
grain of analysis when their judgments of sameness or diference cohere in a given
case. In the example, botanical descriptions via species classication would be 
furnished at the same grain as economic descriptions via commodity classication,
so that species descriptions in botany are “at the same grain” as commodity 
descriptions in economics. By the same logic, variety descriptions in botany would 
be comparable to elasticity descriptions in economics. Fine. But if that is al that 
“maintain a comparable grain” amounts to, it realy does beg the question, for this 
is simply type-type identity by iat. Of course such a recommendation wil ensure 
that the mapping between psychology and neuroscience wil be “systematic” (to 
use Bechtel and Mundale’s term), because on this account yielding concordant 
judgments of similarity or diference across taxonomies is what it means to apply 
the same grain. So we haven’t solved the problem: this version of the grain 
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requirement makes type-type identity a fait accompli, efectively obliterating al 
MR kinds from the natural order.
It’s just as wel that I don’t think this is what Bechtel and Mundale had in 
mind when they made their move to grains; supposing otherwise would serve 
only to trivialize an important aspect of their analysis. Stil the construal is by no 
means far-fetched: “[o]ne can adopt either a coarse or a ine grain,” they tel us, 
“but as long as one uses a comparable grain on both the brain and mind side, the 
mapping between them wil be correspondingly systematic” (note that—it wil 
be!). This sounds like someone with the utmost conidence in the grain 
requirement, which is of course what one would have if one thought grains could 
be legitimately matched in just this way. My guess is that, while they do have 
something important to tel us about MR, a beguiling metaphor has led them to 
suppose that MR is easier to refute than it actualy is. (I’l support this contention 
with a few examples in a moment.)
Of course maters aren’t much helped by the reasonable suspicion that MR 
is the result of pairing inconsistent grains. For what is neuroscience if not a ine-
grained description of psychology, and psychology if not a coarse-grained 
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description of neuroscience? It is surely plausible that the neural and 
psychological sciences line up in something like this way, given that talk about the 
mind is realy talk about the brain from a somewhat more abstract point of view.
What Bechtel and Mundale are ultimately trying to convey through their 
discussion of grains is the thought that claims of MR cannot be advanced wily-
nily—that there is an objective and standard way to go about verifying the 
existence of MR kinds and arbitrating disputes involving them. For the reasons 
just canvassed, however, it strikes me that talk of grains doesn’t serve their 
purposes at al wel. In fact they would have been nearer the mark had they said 
that what MR requires is some sort of principled mismatching of grains.
So far I’ve tried to indicate in what respects Bechtel and Mundale’s grain 
requirement is imprecise and impracticable. Before I can show that the grains 
strategy is also misleading, and indeed often gets things wrong, I need to set it 
against an account which demonstrably gets things right.1 Shapiro (2000) expresses
with enviable lucidity what I think is the crucial insight towards which Bechtel 
1 It is an account which even its detractors concede gets at least the essential point of interest to us 
here right, e.g. Gilet (2003).
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and Mundale were uneasily groping. Interestingly, some philosophers—e.g. Polger
(2009)—write as if the grain requirement and Shapiro’s own formula for MR were 
efectively interchangeable. This is a mistake: the two approaches deliver diferent 
judgments in nontrivial cases (as I’l ilustrate in a moment).
As Shapiro reminds us:
Before it is possible to evaluate the force of [the MR thesis] in arguments 
against reductionism, we must be in a position to say with assurance what 
the satisfaction conditions for [the MR thesis] actualy are. (2000, 636)
For him, “[t]he general lesson is this. Showing that a kind is multiply realizable, or 
that two realizations of a kind are in fact distinct, requires some work” (2000, 645). 
Furthermore, “[t]o establish [the MR thesis], one must show that the diferences 
among purported realizations are causaly relevant diferences” (2000, 646). 
Shapiro’s concerns revolve around what motivates ascriptions of diference, and 
therefore sameness. The issue is important because the classic intuition pump that 
asks us to conceive a mind in which every neuron has been replaced by a silicon 
chip depends on our ascription of an interesting diference between neurons and 
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silicon chips, apparently even where silicon chips can be made that contribute to 
psychological capacity by one and the same process of electrical transmission. His 
answer too, like Bechtel and Mundale’s, depends ultimately on context—in 
particular, the context set by the very inquiry into MR itself.
Shapiro (2000, 643-44) argues that “the things for which [the MR thesis] has 
a chance of being true” are al “deined by reference to their purpose or capacity or
contribution to some end.” This is the reason why carburetors, mousetraps, 
computers and minds are standard fare in the literature of MR. They are deined 
“in virtue of what they do,” unlike, say, water, which is typicaly deined by what 
it is, i.e. its constitution or molecular structure, and accordingly not an MR kind. 
Genuine MR requires that there be “diferent ways to bring about the function that 
deines the kind.” Truly distinct (indeed multiple) realizations are those that “difer
in causaly relevant properties—in properties that make a diference to how [the 
realizations] contribute to the capacity under investigation.” Two corkscrews 
difering only in color are not distinct realizations of a corkscrew, because color 
“makes no diference to their performance as a corkscrew.” Similarly, the diference
between steel and aluminium is not enough to make two corkscrews that are alike 
in al other respects two diferent realizations of a corkscrew “because, relative to 
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the properties that make them suitable for removing corks, they are identical.” In 
this instance, diferences of composition can be “screened of.” Naturaly there 
may be cases where diferences of composition wil be causaly relevant (and it 
turns out that this wil be important to the broader point I make below about 
where the grains strategy goes wrong). Perhaps rigidity is the alegedly MR kind 
in question. In that event, compositional diferences wil necessarily speak to how 
aluminium and steel achieve this disposition. The crucial thing to note here is that 
MR is the context, and MR makes function the relevant consideration, i.e. the 
specic point of view from which we wil compare a set of tokens in the irst 
instance (not phenomenology, not behavioral ecology, or anything else for that 
mater). Explanatory considerations may of course ine-tune the sort of function 
that captures our atention (cork-removal, rigidity, vision, camera vision, etc.). But 
function here is our key preoccupation, and having setled on a specic function 
which a set of tokens can be said to perform, the al-important question on 
Shapiro’s analysis is how the two tokens bring that function about. Each case must 
be judged on its own merits. Thus unlike the two corkscrews identical in al 
respects save color, which do not count as distinct realizations, waiter’s corkscrews
and winged corkscrews are enabled to perform the same task in virtue of diferent 
causaly relevant properties, and therefore do count as genuinely distinct 
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realizations of a corkscrew, one based on the principle of simple leverage, the other
relying on a rack and pinions (Fig. 1).
(a) (b)
Figure 1. A waiter’s corkscrew (a) and a winged corkscrew (b). Each contributes to the capacity of 
cork-removal in diferent ways.
Notice that to the extent Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion envisages 
certain realizing properties being “screened of” from consideration in the course 
of inquiry, there is a sense in which the taxonomies of realized and realizing kinds 
may be said to be “commensurable” or “registrable” (no doubt explaining why 
some philosophers have simply confused commensurability with causal 
relevance). Thus when comparing the cork-removing properties of two waiter’s 
corkscrews, compositional diferences wil not feature in the realizing taxonomy (if
we accept Shapiro’s characterization of the problem). So we have cork-removal, 
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which features in what we may regard as a coarse-grained taxonomy, realized by 
two objects described by a “science” of cork-removal in which microstructural 
variations do not mater, hence which might also be regarded as a coarse-grained 
taxonomy. If on the other hand we were comparing the same corkscrews for 
rigidity, where one was made of steel and the other of aluminium, compositional 
diferences would feature in the realizing taxonomy. Here we would have rigidity, 
which features in what we could wel regard as a more ine-grained taxonomy 
than that encompassing cork-removal, realized by two objects described by a 
science in which microstructural variations realy do mater (namely metalurgy), 
and which might also be regarded as a ine-grained taxonomy, at least more ine-
grained than the ictitious science of cork-removal. But my point is this: 
commensurability nowhere appears as an independent criterion of validity in 
Shapiro’s account of MR, for it is an artifact of the causal relevance criterion, not a 
self-standing principle. Taxonomic commensurability is in fact an implicit 
requirement of the causal relevance criterion in the sense that it’s taken care of 
once the proper question is posed. As an explicit constraint it is a wil-o’-the-wisp.
Armed with this analysis, let’s examine how Bechtel and Mundale atempt 
to refute the status of hunger as an MR kind. Putnam (1967) had compared hunger
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across species as diverse as humans and octopuses to ilustrate the likelihood that 
some psychological predicates are multiply realizable. On the basis of their grains 
critique, however, Bechtel and Mundale suggest that hunger wil not do the work 
Putnam had cut out for it; for “at anything less than a very abstract level,” hunger 
is diferent in octopuses and humans (1999, 202). The thought is that a iner 
individuation of hunger refutes the existence of a single psychological kind, 
hunger, which can be said to cross-classify humans and octopuses. Thus they essay
to chalenge the cognitive uniformity which MR requires at the level of 
psychology.
Perhaps we might irst note that when identifying a single psychological 
state to establish the necessary conditions for MR, nothing Bechtel and Mundale 
say actualy precludes the choice to go abstract. If context is what ixes the choice of 
grain (as they are surely right to point out), who’s to say that context couldn’t ix 
the sort of grain that makes hunger relevant in an abstract sense? It may be 
tempting to think that a more detailed description of something is somehow more 
real. But there is of course nothing intrinsicaly more or less real about a chosen 
schema relative to others that might have been chosen. There is no reason to 
suspect, for instance, that a determinate has any more reality than a determinable.
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And yet there is a deeper problem with Bechtel and Mundale’s deployment 
of the grains strategy here. To repeat their complaint: “at anything less than a very 
abstract level,” hunger is diferent in octopuses and humans. But now why should 
this be relevant? Who would deny it? They themselves seem to be oblivious to the 
context which the very inquiry into MR makes paramount. They are not right to 
alege, as they do, that “the assertion that what we broadly cal ‘hunger’ is the 
same psychological state when instanced in humans and octopi has apparently 
been widely and easily accepted without specifying the context for judging 
sameness” (1999, 203). The reason why hunger, pain, vision and so on were al 
taken for granted—assumed to be uniform at the cognitive level—is because MR 
made function the point of view from which tokens were to be compared. As 
Shapiro reminds us, “the things for which [the MR thesis] has a chance of being 
true” are al “deined by reference to their purpose or capacity or contribution to 
some end.” It was understood that, say in the case of pain, regardless of 
phenomenal, ecological or behavioral diferences between human and octopus 
pain (I doubt any of which were lost on Putnam), al instances of pain in these 
creatures had something like detection and avoidance in common. This might be to 
cast pain at “a very abstract level,” but this just happens to be the context which 
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the inquiry into MR itself sets. A similarly abstract feature is what unites al 
instances of hunger: let’s cal it nutrition-induction. It is not that decades of 
philosophers had simply forgoten to specify the point of view from which these 
psychological predicates were being considered: it is rather that they simply didn’t
need to, since al of them had read enough of Putnam and the early functionalists 
to know what they were about. Phenomenal and other diferences that one might 
care to enumerate between these predicates come a dime a dozen. But the whole 
point of functionalism was to abjure the inquiry into essences and focus instead on
the causal role of a mental state within the life of an organism. Yes, this is to 
compare tokens from an “abstract level,” but that’s what made functionalism 
intriguing to begin with. And if Shapiro’s analysis is any guide, it is realy the next 
step in the endeavor to verify the existence of an MR kind that is the crucial one. 
Genuine MR requires that there be “diferent ways to bring about the function that 
deines the kind.” So the folow-up question concerns how the relevant organisms 
achieve their detection and avoidance function, or nutrition-induction function, or 
whatever the case may be. It is in fact only by asking this next question that we can
appreciate just how badly the grains strategy fares. The atempt to individuate 
hunger more inely does not refute the multiple realizability of hunger as between 
humans and octopuses. For, relative to the shared function of nutrition-induction, 
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it is extremely likely that humans and octopuses realize this capacity in diferent 
ways. The atempt to individuate pain more inely would likewise not refute the 
multiple realizability of pain as between humans and octopuses. For, relative to the
shared function of detection and avoidance, it is extremely likely that humans and 
octopuses realize this capacity in diferent ways. So we see that the grains strategy, 
to the extent that it involves ine-graining psychological states in order to 
undermine the cognitive uniformity required by MR, sets itself a very easy job 
indeed, and mischaracterizes the nature of MR by its neglect of function. Moreover
Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion—which honors the core concerns motivating 
Bechtel and Mundale’s resort to grains—does not demonstrate that hunger (or 
pain) is type-reducible.
A good ilustration of the grains strategy in action is provided by Couch’s 
(2004) atempt to refute the claim that the human eye and the octopus eye are 
distinct realizations of the kind eye. Conceding diferences at a neurobiological 
level, the strategy again involves chalenging the aleged uniformity at the 
cognitive level. As he explains, “[e]stablishing [MR] requires showing that…the 
physical state types in question are distinct [and] that the relevant functional 
properties are type identical. Claims about [MR] can be chalenged at either step” 
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(2004, 202). Reminding us that psychological states “are often only supericialy 
similar,” and that “at a detailed level the neural diferences make for functional 
diferences” (2004, 203), he states:
Psychologists sometimes talk about humans and species like octopi sharing 
the same psychological states. However, they also recognize that there are 
important diferences involved depending on how inely one identies the 
relevant features..Establishing multiple realization requires showing that 
the same psychological state has diverse realizations. But we can always 
disagree with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological 
diferences at another level of description. (2004, 203)
Thus he relates that while the two types of eyes have similar structure in certain 
respects, both consisting of a spherical shel, lens and retina, they use diferent 
kinds of visual pigments in their photoreceptors, as wel as having diferent 
numbers of them, the octopus having one in contrast to the human eye which has 
four. They also have diferent retinas. The human retina, with rods and cones, 
focuses light by bending the lens and so changing its shape. The octopus eye, with 
rhabdomeres instead of rods and cones, focuses light by moving the lens 
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backwards and forwards within the shel. Al these factors show up as diferences 
in output, not just structure. The octopus, having only a single pigment, is 
colorblind, while its receptor’s unique structure alows it to perceive the plane of 
polarized light. Retinal diferences likewise make for functional diferences, with 
very litle information processing occurring on the octopus’s retina, unlike the case
of the human retina. This produces diferences in stimuli and reaction times. So 
the two eyes might be similar, but when described with a suitably ine grain, he 
contends, they come out type distinct. In the result they are both physicaly and 
cognitively diverse, and so not genuine examples of MR.
Notice again that, contrary to what is claimed, it has not been demonstrated
that type-type identity prevails here after at al (on the understanding that the 
kind camera eyehuman reduces to its distinct neural type, and the kind camera 
eyemolusc in turn reduces to its distinct neural type). If anything what this foray into 
molusc visual physiology succeeds in showing is that, relative to the kind camera 
eye, human camera eyes and octopus camera eyes count as distinct realizations(!), 
for, assuming Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion applies, human camera eyes 
achieve the function of camera vision diferently to the way octopus camera eyes 
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achieve this function. Were we to atend to the original inquiry, which concerned 
whether human eyes and octopus eyes count as distinct realizations of the kind 
eye, Shapiro’s own response, for what it’s worth, is clear (2000, 645-46): here we do 
seem to confront a genuine case of type-type identity, as Putnam himself assumed,
because, relative to the function of vision (not camera vision), both humans and 
moluscs achieve the function the same way (namely, by camera vision!). 
Diferences that would be relevant at the neural level between humans and 
moluscs when asking how camera vision is achieved can be conveniently screened
of when the question is how vision, as distinct from camera vision, is achieved. 
Again if pain or hunger were the kind in question, it seems more likely than not 
that we would confront a case of MR (unlike with vision), as we conjectured earlier.
Explanatory context dictates the function of interest, and the function is one that 
we have to assume is common to the tokens in question in order to get the inquiry 
into MR of the ground. Indeed if Shapiro’s analysis is correct, with MR we’re 
always asking how some common function is achieved by diferent tokens that do 
that thing. Where there is no common function the question of MR cannot so much 
as arise. The fact that the question does arise in al the cases we’ve considered is a 
powerful indication that we’re dealing with functions which al the relevant tokens
actualy share. The grains strategy confuses maters by suggesting that in many 
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cases involving putative MR kinds, psychological states can be individuated using 
a iner grain of description. But if what I have been saying is right, this is not the 
proper way to refute a putative case of MR.
That mine is the correct assessment of the situation is not only atested to by
Shapiro’s analysis of MR, but also by the fact that it avoids the very mug’s game 
Polger sought to eschew by embracing the grains strategy in the irst place. If for 
any putative MR kind I am free to cavil with the choice of your size of grain (“oh, 
that’s far too coarse for psychology,” or “now that’s realy not coarse enough for 
neuroscience”), how is the resulting game any less of a mug’s game than the one 
we were trapped in at the start? I myself have played a few of these games with 
philosophers. No one wins. Couch’s remarks are teling: “we can always disagree 
with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological diferences at 
another level of description.” So the game goes on.
4. Conclusion
In sum, I think there’s a genuine problem with the grain requirement. The central 
diculty is that in the terms in which it’s been put it is largely unworkable, and at 
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best no more than a loose metaphor. For a recommendation intended to serve at 
least in part as a methodological reform, this is clearly unsatisfactory. I don’t deny 
that Bechtel and Mundale were onto something. But whatever value their insight 
into MR might have has been obscured by their unfortunate formulation of the 
issue. Moreover, as I have tried to show, the formulation is unfortunate not just 
because it happens to be unworkable. More worryingly, the argument from grains 
distorts the truth about MR by encouraging the view that mind-brain identity 
comes for free once we invoke the “same grain” of description across both realized
and realizing kinds. But when the insight to which this locution seems to point is 
expressed in terms that are inteligible and empiricaly tractable (namely, Shapiro’s
causal relevance criterion), mind-brain identity seems anything but a fait accompli.
Grains talk makes it tempting to think MR is easier to refute than it in fact is. It is 
certainly true, as Bechtel and Mundale acknowledge, that context ixes the choice 
of grain (where by “grain” we mean the respect under which we seek to compare a
set of tokens); but we are not ipso facto obliged to employ a consistent grain across 
realized and realizing kinds (since this is just about meaningless as far as a 
researcher into these maters would be concerned and raises a host of diculties 
beside). Rather than matching grains, what MR realy behooves us to do is to 
apply a principled method for adjudicating upon diferences between tokens of a 
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functional kind. Shapiro’s work on MR shows us how to approach this important 
task.
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Abstract
The interventionist account of causation has been largely dismissed as a
serious candidate for application in physics. This dismissal is related to
the problematic assumption that physical causation is entirely a matter
of dynamical evolution. In this paper, I oﬀer a fresh look at the interven-
tionist account of causation and its applicability to thermodynamics. I
argue that the interventionist account of causation is the account of cau-
sation which most appropriately characterizes the theoretical structure
and phenomenal behavior of thermodynamics.
1 Introduction
The interventionist account of causation has been largely dismissed as a serious
candidate for application in physics. For example, a dismissal of this sort is
evident in the words of theoretical physicist Peter Havas:
We are all familiar with the everyday usage of the words “cause” and
“efect”; it frequently implies the interference by an outside agent
(whether human or not), the “cause”, with a system, which then
experiences the “efect” of this interference. When we talk of the
principle of causality in physics, however, we usually do not think
of speciic cause-efect relations or of deliberate intervention in a
system, but in terms of theories which allow (at least in principle)
the calculation of the future state of the system under consideration
from data speciied at a time t0 (Havas 1974, 24).
And worries about the relevance of the interventionist account of causation in
physics come not only from physicists, but also from philosophers—even those
who favor interventionism:
There are important diferences between, on the one hand, the [in-
terventionist] way in which causal notions igure in common sense
and the special sciences and the empirical assumptions that underlie
their application and, on the other hand, the ways in which these
notions igure in physics (Woodward 2007, 67).
1
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The reasons for dismissals and worries like those above are related to a
common (but problematic) assumption that causation in physics has something
to do with the dynamical evolution of a closed system. The problem is that,
in our preoccupation with dynamical evolution and closed systems, we tend to
forget and/or neglect those areas of physics for which we do not have complete
equations of motion or for which it doesn’t make sense to consider entirely closed
systems. And it is in those areas that the dynamical view of physical causation
makes less sense and interventionism inds its home.
In this paper, I propose to take a fresh look at the interventionist account of
causation and its applicability to one of those neglected areas of physics: ther-
modynamics. I will argue that an interventionist analysis of thermodynamics
succeeds where the dynamical view of physical causation fails. As I will show, all
theorizing in thermodynamics requires careful deinition of the “system” under
consideration, which necessarily involves attending to the boundaries that en-
close the system and the conditions imposed on those boundaries. Once bound-
aries are adequately speciied, we end up with a strong distinction between the
internal properties and processes of the system and those external inluences
that constrain the internal dynamics. It is in the distinction between internal
properties and external inluences that the natural it between the structure of
thermodynamic theorizing and the interventionist account of causation becomes
apparent.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I show that interventionist
reasoning is inseparable from the structural foundation of thermodynamic the-
ory. In section 3, I show how “driving forces” and their conjugate luxes provide
a rich basis for meaningful interventionist causal claims in thermodynamics. In
section 4, I use the success of interventionist causal analysis in thermodynamics
to make some broader concluding remarks.
2 The centrality of manipulated equilibrium
Thermodynamic theorizing is structured around the characterization of equi-
librium states and the processes by which systems move from one equilibrium
state to another. But just what is a thermodynamic equilibrium state?
A thermodynamic equilibrium state is the state of a system that is not un-
dergoing a change (thermal, mechanical, or chemical). However, an equilibrium
state is not a spontaneous occurrence. Natural thermodynamic systems are in
constant lux. They engage in all sorts of interactions: they transfer heat, push
and pull on one another, change their volume, and chemically react. The very
idea of a thermodynamic “system”, which can only be deined by the location
and/or nature of its boundaries, is in itself a theoretical concept that we impose
on the world in order to do thermodynamic “bookkeeping” (Dill and Bromberg
2011, 93). In order for a thermodynamic system to achieve an equilibrium
state, the system must have been allowed to relax for a suicient amount of
time without the disturbing external inluences of uncontrolled contact with
other systems. And such a condition requires boundaries that isolate it—or
2
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otherwise control exchanges—from other systems. Often those boundaries are
put in place artiicially, by human intervention.
Consider, for example, the air in an ordinary room. If we deine our ther-
modynamic system in relation to the walls and doors of the room, we can say
that the system has a ixed volume. If no massive weather change is currently
occurring, we can assume that the air pressure in the room is approximately
constant (not by isolation, but by contact with an external system whose pres-
sure is approximately constant). If some kind of air conditioning system is in
place and has been running for some time, we can also say that the temperature
of the room is approximately constant. We can say that most of the chemical
reactions occurring in the room are in a steady state and that the concentra-
tions of various gases are relatively uniform (except perhaps for some minor
concentration gradients near any plants and/or people located in the room),
with equal low into and out of the room for each type of gas. Notice, now, that
even this almost-equilibrium state requires artiicial maintenance (the rigidity of
walls, contact with an exterior reservoir supplying constant pressure, the contin-
uous work of the air conditioner, etc.). Stricter equilibrium states require much
more careful isolation and maintenance, and true equilibrium states (which only
exist in theory) require idealized boundaries (e.g., perfect thermal insulators,
frictionless pistons, perfectly rigid containers, etc.).
There is something of a tension, however, in the way that we think about
equilibrium states. On the one hand, equilibrium states are the product of
external conditions imposed on a system. On the other hand, once we consider
those external conditions as given, a system will naturally or spontaneously tend
toward the equilibrium state allowed by the constraints. But that spontaneous
or natural behavior cannot be conceived of without external constraints being
placed on the system in question. To even conceive of an equilibrium state,
we must ask about the conditions imposed on its boundaries. What kind of
walls enclose it? Permeable, semi-permeable, impermeable? Rigid or lexible?
Adiabatic or conducting? There is no such thing as an equilibrium state unless
the boundaries of the system are well-deined.1 And the conditions imposed
on those boundaries constitute external interventions on the system; they ef-
fectively set various thermodynamic variables to take on certain values. For
example, conducting walls that put a system in contact with a thermal reservoir
are efectively a way of intervening on temperature. Likewise, a semi-permeable
boundary is a way of selectively intervening on particle concentrations in the
system. (I will return to the question of how to conceive of boundary conditions
as interventions on thermodynamic variables below in section 3.)
Thus, thermodynamic equilibrium states are inherently manipulated states—
manipulated to be so either by human design or by some other mechanism that
efectively imposes equilibrium conditions by external intervention. And these
external manipulations or interventions, which impose values on certain thermo-
dynamic variables, are entirely consistent with the concept of an intervention
1In fact, a system with no deined boundaries or external constraints is eﬀectively a universe,
and its fate is something like the “heat death” discussed by Thomson, Helmholtz, and Rankine.
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that has been developed by Woodward (2003) and others. According to the
interventionist account of causation, an intervention directly forces a variable
to take on (or remain ixed at) a certain value. Furthermore, Woodward’s def-
inition of an intervention makes no reference to human action, and thus any
entity or structure playing the role of setting certain variable values or hold-
ing them ixed can fulill the requirements for intervention. For example, a
cell membrane is a structure that efectively intervenes to maintain a certain
equilibrium internal to the cell, by keeping interior and exterior pressures equal
and by maintaining certain chemical concentrations by only allowing for select
passage into and out of the cell.
Now how do these manipulated equilibrium states igure into theorizing
about thermodynamic processes? We begin by representing our system of inter-
est by reference to a thermodynamic coniguration space. The thermodynamic
coniguration space is the set of all possible equilibrium states of a system, where
the coordinates of that space are a relatively small number of macroscopic ther-
modynamic variables and each point in the coniguration space represents a
distinct equilibrium state. For example, we might choose as coordinates the
following parameters: internal energy (U), volume (V ), and the particle num-
bers of the various species present (N1, N2, …, Ni). Then the entropy functionfor our system, S = S(U, V,N1, . . . , Ni), will deine a hyper-surface within theconiguration space (see igure 1).
With this thermodynamic coniguration space and the hyper-surface deined
by the entropy function in place, we can begin to theorize about any ordered
sequence of states (call these A,B,C, . . .) located on the hyper-surface. Notice
that a curve drawn through this sequence of states looks something like a pro-
cess (in fact, we call it a quasi-static process) in that it represents a series of
changes undergone by the system. However, such a curve can be nothing like a
real process, because real processes involve nonequilibrium states and the curve
represents a system that remains in equilibrium along its entire length. Further-
more, the curve could never represent the autonomous trajectory of a system,
since every state that makes up the path is an equilibrium state and no isolated
system would move from one equilibrium state to another spontaneously. So in
order to think about a quasi-static process as something like a process, we must
think of a system being “led”—by a series of external interventions—through
the succession of desired states via “hops”. We efectively imagine the system
being “corralled” through the sequence of equilibrium states. And by imagining
the sequence of hops between states to be very small and carried out by very
tiny interventions, we can approximate a smooth curve more and more closely
(in fact, arbitrarily closely).2
In summary, the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory is the set
of equilibrium states and the quasi-static “processes” that can be drawn like
lines through the space of such states. As I have argued here, the very idea
of an equilibrium state is not possible without reference to boundaries and the
constraints that set the value of certain thermodynamic variables within those
2My discussion here closely follows that of Callen (1985, Ch. 4).
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Figure 1: A representation of a quasi-static process in thermodynamic coniguration
space. From Callen (1985).
boundaries. Furthermore, we cannot think about quasi-static “processes”, which
are sequences of those equilibrium states, without thinking about a series of
ininitesimal external interventions that force a system from one equilibrium
state to the next. It is in this sense that interventionist reasoning is inseparable
from the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory.
In the next section, I will discuss thermodynamic theorizing in greater speci-
icity. As I will show, the interventionist view of causation maps naturally onto
the use of potential functions when theorizing about a system undergoing a
process.
3 Thermodynamic potentials and driving forces
The equilibrium state toward which a system will tend, given the conditions
imposed on its boundaries, is governed by the energy and entropy considerations
provided in the First and Second Laws of thermodynamics. The First Law tells
us that any change in the internal energy (U) of a system will be equal to
the total amount of energy it gains through energy exchange with the external
world, in the form of heat and/or in the form of work. The Second Law tells
us that any isolated system (i.e., any closed system with ixed internal energy)
5
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will tend toward its state of maximum entropy (S). The Second Law also has
the result that the internal energy of any closed system with ixed entropy
will be minimized. However, neither internal energy nor entropy are directly
measurable, nor do we have a speciic function that tells us their dependence
on other state variables. What we do have, however, are other equations of
state (e.g., the ideal gas law) in addition to equations for U and S in diferential
form, which tell us about the way in which small changes in other state variables
relate to small changes in energy and entropy:
dU = TdS − pdV +
∑
j
µjdNj (1)
dS =
(
1
T
)
dU +
( p
T
)
dV −
∑
j
(µj
T
)
dNj , (2)
where T is absolute temperature, p is pressure, V is volume, µj is the chemicalpotential for species j, and Nj is the number of particles for species j. The aboveequations (and other variant forms) are commonly referred to as thermodynamic
potential functions.
Notice that each term in both equations above involves a pair of conjugate
variables. The second term in equation 1, for example, involves pressure and
volume as a conjugate pair. For every pair of conjugate variables, one of the
variables is extensive (i.e., additive such that the property of a system is equal
to the sum of that property for all of its component subsystems), while the other
is intensive (i.e., independent of the size of the system). Looking again at the
second term in equation 1 as an example, pressure is the intensive variable and
volume is the extensive variable.
Depending on the factors controlled in a given experimental context, each
pair of conjugate variables tells us something about a tendency of the system
as it moves toward equilibrium in that context. Since conjugate variables will
be extremely important for our purposes here, let’s concentrate on one pair and
use an example to decipher its practical meaning.
Figure 2: Two thermodynamic systems A and B before, during, and after arriving at
thermal equilibrium. From Dill and Bromberg (2011, 100).
Consider the term ( 1
T
)
dU in equation 2 and the process pictured in igure
2. We begin with two systems A and B, each enclosed in a rigid container.
System A begins at temperature TA and system B at TB , where TA 6= TB .
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The two systems are then brought into thermal contact with one another,
but remain thermally insulated from the rest of the world. Now each sys-
tem has an unknown entropy that can be expressed as a function of its in-
ternal energy, volume, and particle numbers, and since entropy is an exten-
sive quantity, the total entropy of the combined system can be expressed as
STotal = SA(UA, VA,NA) + SB(UB , VB ,NB). Since entropy will be maximizedat equilibrium, we use equation 2 to write the diferential expression for STotaland set it to zero:
dSTotal =
(
1
TA
)
dUA +
(
pA
TA
)
dVA −
∑
i
(
µAi
TA
)
dNAi+
(
1
TB
)
dUB +
(
pB
TB
)
dVB −
∑
j
(
µBj
TB
)
dNBj = 0
(3)
If we assume that there is no particle exchange between the two systems and
that no chemical change occurs within each system, we can eliminate the terms
that allow for changing particle numbers. And since the containers are rigid,
we can eliminate the terms that allow for changing volume. Furthermore, given
that the combined system is isolated from the external world, the total internal
energy of the combined system must remain constant, and any change in energy
of either system must be compensated by a change in energy of the other. Thus,
dUA = −dUB . So we have the following simpliied expression:
dSTotal =
(
1
TA
−
1
TB
)
dUA, (4)
which will be equal to zero (i.e., attain equilibrium) when TA = TB .Thus we have derived the well-known result that two objects brought into
thermal contact will reach equilibrium when their temperatures are equal. But
more importantly for our purposes here, we can interpret the factors in equation
4 in light of this equilibration process. The diference in temperatures between
the two systems leads to a nonzero value of the factor 1
TA
− 1
TB
, which efectively
acts as a “force” driving a change dUA in the internal energy of system A. Moregenerally speaking, when a system is placed in thermal contact with a system
at a diferent temperature, the temperature diference between the two systems
acts as a force driving an exchange of heat energy between the systems. Phrased
in terms of a system and its surroundings, 1
T
describes the tendency of a system
to exchange heat with its environment; it is the incremental relaxation that a
system experiences in transferring a small bit of its energy dU .3
Physicists commonly use the language of “driving forces” in referring to the
intensive parameters in the thermodynamic potential functions. Looking back
again at equation 2, a diference between the pressure p of the system and its
environment will act as a driving force for an exchange of volume dV between
the system and its environment, and a diference between the concentration of a
3Alternatively, we could have begun with the thermodynamic potential function for internal
energy (equation 1) to derive the same result.
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particular species µj in the system and its environment will act as a driving forcefor exchanges of particles of the respective species with the environment (dNj).The force or tendency represented in each of the conjugate pairs (T, p,µ) can act,
separately or together (depending on the constraints imposed on the process),
to drive changes in its paired extensive variable (dU , dV , or dN, respectively),
and thus to drive the system and its environment toward the equilibrium state
of maximum entropy.4
This “driving force” language—and its basis in the way in which the en-
vironment exchanges energy and entropy with a system—matches the way in
which relationships among thermodynamic variables would be modeled by the
interventionist account of causation. According to the interventionist account, a
variable X is an interventionist cause of another variable Y if there is a possible
intervention on X that will change the value of Y (or the probability distribu-
tion over the values of Y ) when the values of all other variables in the system
remain ixed.5 In physical experiments, the condition that the values of all other
variables in the system remain ixed across changes in the intervention on X is
often enforced using what I will call “auxiliary interventions” on those variables.
To see how interventionist treatment matches the “driving force” language, let’s
consider the temperature equilibration case above, with system A as the causal
system under investigation.
Consider the set of thermodynamic variables characterizing system A when
we consider the temperature equilibration process in terms of maximization of
entropy: volume VA, the set of particle numbers for each species NA, tempera-ture TA, and internal energy UA. Each of these variables is represented belowin igure 3. The primary intervention in the temperature equilibration case was
the operation of placing system B in thermal contact with system A. This in-
tervention occurred speciically under conditions in which the volume VA andparticle numbers NA of system A were held constant; the enforcement of con-stant values of VA and NA, by enclosing the system within rigid impermeablewalls, constitutes the set of auxiliary interventions in this case. Under the con-
ditions set by these auxiliary interventions, the primary intervention produced a
change in TA, since the original temperatures of the two systems were not equal,and this change in temperature resulted in a change in the internal energy (UA)of the system. And since, under conditions where all other variables are held
constant, the intervention was an intervention on TA and resulted in a change
4Physicists use the language of “driving forces” in both the entropy and energy represen-
tations. When we ﬂip between the energy picture of a system and the entropy picture of that
same system, the metric by which we measure progress toward equilibrium changes. Each
metric has its own way of characterizing the driving force because, in changing our metric of
progress, there is a transformation on the force term. Still, physically, it is one and the same
force driving the system toward equilibrium. This representational change in the physical
equations mirrors a widely-noted feature of the interventionist account of causation: when we
change the set of variables with which we characterize a causal system, our characterization
of the causal relationship itself can change.
5I have ignored some technical details for the sake of simplicity here. See Woodward (2003,
59) for the more precise interventionist criteria for X’s being a type-level direct cause of Y
and X’s being a type-level contributing cause of Y .
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in UA, we can say that TA is an interventionist cause of UA.

VA NA1 NA2 . . . NAi

I TA UA
Figure 3: An interventionist causal graph of the temperature equilibration process in
which system A, originally at temperature TA, is brought into contact with anothersystem B, originally at temperature TB . The variable I represents the intervention thatplaces the two systems in contact and thus changes the value of TA. The lock symbols() represent the auxiliary interventions which hold VA and NA ixed.
To further lesh out the causal claim being represented by the arrow from
TA to UA in igure 3, we can contrast varying interventions in which we putsystem A in contact with system B at varying temperatures TB1, TB2, . . . TBn,while still holding VA and NA constant at the same values. Under such varyinginterventions, we will ind that there are corresponding variations in the inal TAand UA. Therefore, the interventionist account conirms that the temperature
TA of system A is a cause of its internal energy UA. In general, interventionson temperature lead to changes in internal energy via exchange of heat when
volume and particle numbers are held constant. Such a causal claim seems
to be precisely what physicists mean to convey when they use “driving force”
language with respect to temperature.
The intervention in the above case, where we have an equilibration process
between two inite systems with difering initial temperatures, is an example
of a “soft” or “parametric” intervention in that it modiies the temperature of
our system rather than determining it completely.6 When we put system A
with its initial temperature TA in contact with system B with its initial tem-perature TB , the combined system inds an equilibrium temperature somewherebetween the initial values of TA and TB . But thermodynamics also providesconceptual tools for theorizing about “hard” or “structural” interventions that
entirely determine the value of an intensive parameter for a system. We call
these theoretical entities “reservoirs” or “baths”, and they have the property of
being able to exchange one or more extensive quantities while their correspond-
ing intensive properties remain constant. For example, an energy bath (i.e., a
temperature reservoir), by virtue of its size, is able to exchange energy with a
system with which it is put in contact with negligible efect on its temperature.
Likewise, a volume bath (i.e., a pressure reservoir) is able to exchange volume
while remaining at constant pressure, and a particle bath (i.e., concentration
reservoir) is able to exchange particles while maintaining constant particle con-
6For the distinction between soft and hard interventions, see Eberhardt and Scheines (2007).
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centrations. When we theorize about cases in which we put a system in contact
with a reservoir instead of a inite system, we consider a hard intervention that
determines the value of the relevant intensive variable in our system. Such the-
oretical experiments bring the interventionist causal structure into even clearer
relief: putting a system in contact with a reservoir is an intervention that sets
the value of an intensive variable in the system, which in turn results in a change
in the corresponding extensive variable.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Illustration of a pressure-driven process, depicting (a) the system in its initial
equilibrium state before the piston-locking pins are released; (b) the system once it has
reached its new equilibrium state after the pins are released. This image shows the result
of the case where p0 > pRes and the piston rises, but all of the same considerations wouldapply in the case that p0 < pRes and the piston falls.
Let’s look at an example. Consider a system that is in an initial equilibrium
state (p0, T,N). Suppose that we intervene on the system by bringing it intocontact with a reservoir that maintains the same temperature T as the system
but a diferent pressure pRes. We might do so by releasing an initially-lockedpiston, allowing it to move freely between the system and the reservoir (see igure
4). The process that ensues will be ruled by a maximization of the entropy of the
total combined system, so we are interested in the condition where dSTotal = 0:
dSTotal =
1
TRes
dUSys +
pSys
TRes
dVSys +
1
TRes
dURes +
pRes
TRes
dVRes = 0 (5)
Due to conservation of volume and conservation of energy, dUSys = −dURes and
dVSys = −dVRes, so the above condition reduces to the following:
dSTotal =
(
pSys − pRes
TRes
)
dVSys = 0 (6)
We can see here that it is the pressure diference between system and reservoir
that is driving the exchange of volume. And again, this physical interpretation
in terms of driving forces matches the interventionist causal account. By placing
the system in contact with the reservoir, we set the pressure of the system to
a new value, and the forced change in pressure results in a change in volume.
Were we to impose a diferent pressure on the system by placing it in contact
10
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with a reservoir at a diferent pressure, we would see the corresponding volume
change as well. Thus, pressure is an interventionist cause of volume (see igure
5).

T N1 N2 . . . Ni

I p V
Figure 5: Interventionist causal representation of the pressure equilibration process de-
picted in igure 4. The variable I represents the intervention that places the system in
contact with the pressure reservoir and thus changes the value of p. The lock symbols
() represent the auxiliary interventions which hold T and N ixed.
As shown in the examples above, the most important key to successful
thermodynamic theorizing is the careful deinition of the boundaries between
systems and accounting for the transactions that occur at those boundaries.
Interventionist reasoning its naturally into thermodynamic theorizing because
its distinction between the interventions external to a causal system and the
causal relations internal to that system is perfectly applicable where thermo-
dynamic boundaries are well-deined. Since interventions are always performed
on a causal system from outside, it is entirely natural to label exchanges be-
tween a system and its environment as interventions of the environment on those
systems.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that there is a natural it between thermodynamic
theorizing and the interventionist account of causation. I therefore argue that
the interventionist account is the most suitable account of causation for describ-
ing thermodynamic theorizing and our actual interactions with thermodynamic
systems.
I suggested at the beginning of this paper that we tend to assume that physi-
cal causation will have a dynamical form, and that my identiication of interven-
tionism as the most appropriate account of causation in thermodynamics would
run contrary to this assumption. It might be objected that this is a somewhat
dull result, however. Thermodynamics, so the objection might run, is not “fun-
damental” physics, and so it is unsurprising that we should ind interventionist
causation rather than dynamic causation in a realm of physics that is…well…not
dynamical. But such an objection would miss the point. Our common as-
sumption that “physical causation” must refer to the dynamical propagations
of systems is the result of our preoccupation with “fundamental” physics (which
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we also assume, almost by deinition, must have a dynamical form) and neglect
of those areas of physics which are considered to be “non-fundamental”.7
So what is it to be a cause in (at least some of) physics? Here is a simple
answer: an account of causation which appropriately characterizes the theoreti-
cal structure and phenomenal behavior of a domain of physics gives an account
of what it is to be a cause in that domain of physics. And I have shown that
the interventionist account does just that in thermodynamics.
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